This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-0604
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
David Paul Patterson, Appellant.
Filed March 7, 2016 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hubbard County District Court File No. 29CR1496
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Donovan D. Dearstyne, Hubbard County Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)
Frank Bibeau, Deer River, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of fifth-degree possession and sale of a
controlled substance, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2012), arguing that the search
warrant was not lawfully executed. Appellant also raises various constitutional
challenges. We affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 10:20 a.m. on January 24, 2014, the Paul Bunyan Task Force led
by Officer Fraik (the officer) executed a knock-and-announce warrant at appellant David
Paul Patterson’s home. The officers knocked, announced themselves, and saw appellant
moving inside the home. Upon entering the home, the officers immediately placed
appellant in handcuffs, performed a safety check, and secured the home. The officers
then presented appellant with the search warrant and obtained a post-Miranda statement
from him at approximately 10:30 a.m. Pursuant to the search warrant, the task force
seized approximately seven pounds of marijuana. In appellant’s post-Miranda statement,
appellant acknowledged that he received a copy of the warrant. He stated that he uses,
sells, and gives away marijuana. Appellant further stated that he does not make money
from sales of the marijuana, but rather he makes medicine for his friends for spiritual and
religious purposes. Appellant was initially charged with fifth-degree possession of a
controlled substance, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1). He was
subsequently charged with fifth-degree sale of a controlled substance, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(a)(1).
2 In February 2014, appellant filed an informal omnibus motion with the court to
(1) dismiss the charges pursuant to 29 USC § 1359 for lack of jurisdiction; (2) dismiss the
charges because he was coerced and threatened to sign documents; and (3) remove
Assistant County Attorney Erika Randall from the case. Appellant also filed a formal
omnibus motion dated June 15, 2014, to dismiss the charges for violating his civil rights
under the United States Constitution, including: (1) freedom of religion; (2) equal
protection; (3) his inalienable right to medicinal use and medicinal marijuana defense of
others; and (4) to medicine and U.S. patents. The district court denied appellant’s
motions.
On January 16, 2015, at a contested omnibus hearing regarding appellant’s motion
to suppress the search warrant and the evidence seized as a result of the search, the
officer, appellant, and appellant’s daughter testified. On February 9, 2015, the district
court issued an order denying appellant’s motion. The district court found that the
officers presented appellant with the search warrant approximately ten minutes after they
entered the residence and concluded that the search warrant for appellant’s residence was
lawfully executed.
A jury trial was held, and the jury found appellant guilty on both charges. This
appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The search of appellant’s residence
Appellant challenges the district court’s ruling at the omnibus hearing that the
search warrant was validly executed. He argues that the procedures under Minn. Stat.
3 § 626.16 (2014) were violated because he was not given a copy of the search warrant
immediately upon the officers’ entry, and, as a result, the search of his home was invalid.
We disagree.
“[S]tatutory construction is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Lee v.
Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2009). “The object of all interpretation and
construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.
Stat. § 645.16 (2014). “We construe statutes to effect their essential purpose but will not
disregard a statute’s clear language to pursue the spirit of the law.” Lee v. Fresenius
Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117, 123 (Minn. 2007). “If the meaning of a statute is
unambiguous, we interpret the statute’s text according to its plain language.” Brua v.
Minn. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 778 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2010).
“[W]e review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. That is, we
examine the record to see if there is reasonable evidence in the record to support the
court’s findings.” Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn.
2013) (quotations and citations omitted). “[W]e view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” Id. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when we are left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In addition,
“[d]eterminations of credibility of witnesses at the omnibus hearing are left to the trial
court, and those determinations will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.” State v.
Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. App. 1989) (citing State v. Randa, 342 N.W.2d 341,
343 (Minn. 1984)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989).
4 Under Minn. Stat. § 626.16, “[w]hen the officer conducts the search the officer
must give a copy of the warrant . . . to the person in whose possession the premises or the
property or things taken were found.” Minor and technical defects in the execution of a
search warrant do not render an otherwise valid search and seizure invalid. State v.
Mollberg, 310 Minn. 376, 385, 246 N.W.2d 463, 469 (1976), see also Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973). In order to suppress evidence due to
defects in the execution of a search warrant, appellant has the burden to show that the
defects caused prejudice to him. Mollberg, 310 Minn. at 385, 246 N.W.2d at 469 (1976).
Appellant does not argue that section 626.16 is ambiguous. Rather, appellant
argues that the statute requires actual physical presentation of the warrant to appellant
before entry. But appellant provides no case law in support of this interpretation. The
statute requires that a copy of the warrant be given to the person “[w]hen the officer
conducts the search.” Minn. Stat. § 626.16. A plain reading of the statute does not
require that the warrant be presented before entry.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-0604
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
David Paul Patterson, Appellant.
Filed March 7, 2016 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hubbard County District Court File No. 29CR1496
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Donovan D. Dearstyne, Hubbard County Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)
Frank Bibeau, Deer River, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of fifth-degree possession and sale of a
controlled substance, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2012), arguing that the search
warrant was not lawfully executed. Appellant also raises various constitutional
challenges. We affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 10:20 a.m. on January 24, 2014, the Paul Bunyan Task Force led
by Officer Fraik (the officer) executed a knock-and-announce warrant at appellant David
Paul Patterson’s home. The officers knocked, announced themselves, and saw appellant
moving inside the home. Upon entering the home, the officers immediately placed
appellant in handcuffs, performed a safety check, and secured the home. The officers
then presented appellant with the search warrant and obtained a post-Miranda statement
from him at approximately 10:30 a.m. Pursuant to the search warrant, the task force
seized approximately seven pounds of marijuana. In appellant’s post-Miranda statement,
appellant acknowledged that he received a copy of the warrant. He stated that he uses,
sells, and gives away marijuana. Appellant further stated that he does not make money
from sales of the marijuana, but rather he makes medicine for his friends for spiritual and
religious purposes. Appellant was initially charged with fifth-degree possession of a
controlled substance, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1). He was
subsequently charged with fifth-degree sale of a controlled substance, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(a)(1).
2 In February 2014, appellant filed an informal omnibus motion with the court to
(1) dismiss the charges pursuant to 29 USC § 1359 for lack of jurisdiction; (2) dismiss the
charges because he was coerced and threatened to sign documents; and (3) remove
Assistant County Attorney Erika Randall from the case. Appellant also filed a formal
omnibus motion dated June 15, 2014, to dismiss the charges for violating his civil rights
under the United States Constitution, including: (1) freedom of religion; (2) equal
protection; (3) his inalienable right to medicinal use and medicinal marijuana defense of
others; and (4) to medicine and U.S. patents. The district court denied appellant’s
motions.
On January 16, 2015, at a contested omnibus hearing regarding appellant’s motion
to suppress the search warrant and the evidence seized as a result of the search, the
officer, appellant, and appellant’s daughter testified. On February 9, 2015, the district
court issued an order denying appellant’s motion. The district court found that the
officers presented appellant with the search warrant approximately ten minutes after they
entered the residence and concluded that the search warrant for appellant’s residence was
lawfully executed.
A jury trial was held, and the jury found appellant guilty on both charges. This
appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The search of appellant’s residence
Appellant challenges the district court’s ruling at the omnibus hearing that the
search warrant was validly executed. He argues that the procedures under Minn. Stat.
3 § 626.16 (2014) were violated because he was not given a copy of the search warrant
immediately upon the officers’ entry, and, as a result, the search of his home was invalid.
We disagree.
“[S]tatutory construction is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Lee v.
Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2009). “The object of all interpretation and
construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.
Stat. § 645.16 (2014). “We construe statutes to effect their essential purpose but will not
disregard a statute’s clear language to pursue the spirit of the law.” Lee v. Fresenius
Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117, 123 (Minn. 2007). “If the meaning of a statute is
unambiguous, we interpret the statute’s text according to its plain language.” Brua v.
Minn. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 778 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2010).
“[W]e review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. That is, we
examine the record to see if there is reasonable evidence in the record to support the
court’s findings.” Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn.
2013) (quotations and citations omitted). “[W]e view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” Id. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when we are left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In addition,
“[d]eterminations of credibility of witnesses at the omnibus hearing are left to the trial
court, and those determinations will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.” State v.
Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. App. 1989) (citing State v. Randa, 342 N.W.2d 341,
343 (Minn. 1984)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989).
4 Under Minn. Stat. § 626.16, “[w]hen the officer conducts the search the officer
must give a copy of the warrant . . . to the person in whose possession the premises or the
property or things taken were found.” Minor and technical defects in the execution of a
search warrant do not render an otherwise valid search and seizure invalid. State v.
Mollberg, 310 Minn. 376, 385, 246 N.W.2d 463, 469 (1976), see also Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973). In order to suppress evidence due to
defects in the execution of a search warrant, appellant has the burden to show that the
defects caused prejudice to him. Mollberg, 310 Minn. at 385, 246 N.W.2d at 469 (1976).
Appellant does not argue that section 626.16 is ambiguous. Rather, appellant
argues that the statute requires actual physical presentation of the warrant to appellant
before entry. But appellant provides no case law in support of this interpretation. The
statute requires that a copy of the warrant be given to the person “[w]hen the officer
conducts the search.” Minn. Stat. § 626.16. A plain reading of the statute does not
require that the warrant be presented before entry.
Applying the statute to the facts, the district court found that the task force
executed a valid knock-and-announce search warrant at appellant’s home, announced
their presence, and “before the actual search began, [appellant] was provided a copy of
the search warrant.” The district court concluded that the search warrant was lawfully
executed and defendant was not prejudiced by any delay in being presented with the
search warrant.
The officer testified that he drove from Bemidji to appellant’s home on the
morning of January 24, 2014. He stated that he was the primary officer executing the
5 search warrant. The officer testified that he arrived at appellant’s address with “several
other people in the vehicle” and that there were “other vehicles parked behind [him].”
The officer stated that he executed the knock-and-announce warrant by knocking on the
door and announcing to appellant that the police were there to execute a search warrant.
Appellant acknowledged receipt of the warrant in his recorded post-Miranda statement
that day. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record
supports the district court’s findings.
Appellant further argues that defects in the execution of the warrant due to the
officer’s late arrival with the warrant caused him prejudice. The district court found that
appellant was not prejudiced by any delay in receiving the warrant, and appellant fails to
show any prejudice from the delay. Mollberg, 310 Minn. at 385, 246 N.W.2d at 469.
Moreover, the district court implicitly found the officer’s testimony more credible. We
defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687,
691 (Minn. App. 2012). The officer’s testimony supports the district court’s findings of
facts. Rasmussen, 832 N.W.2d at 797 (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly,
we conclude that the search warrant for appellant’s residence was lawfully executed.
II. The constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 152.025
In the background section of appellant’s brief he states, “[a]ppellant wishes to
raise and preserve the civil rights issues asserted in his Defendant’s Ominbus [sic]
Challenges dated June 15, 2014, but not to repeat in its entirety, for sake of brevity now.
Instead appellant reasserts his inalienable right to medicinal use and medicinal marijuana
defense of others.”
6 It appears that appellant relies on the omnibus motion he filed in district court for
his argument. While a motion filed in the district court may be relied upon pursuant to
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.01, subd. 2, appellant failed to follow the required procedures.
See Id. (requiring a supplemental “short letter argument” and “the trial court submissions
and decision shall be included in the addendum”). And issues not briefed on appeal are
waived. State v. Butcher, 563 N.W.2d 776, 780-81 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 5, 1997); see McKenzie v. State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 746 n.1 (Minn. 1998)
(applying the rule that arguments not briefed are waived when appellant alluded to issues
but “fail[ed] to address them in the argument portion of his brief”). Moreover, appellant
provides no further argument or evidence to substantiate this assertion. An assignment of
error based on mere assertions and not supported by argument or authority cannot be
considered on appeal except where prejudice is obvious. State v. Modern Recycling, Inc.,
558 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997). Because appellant did not adequately brief or
provide legal support for his constitutional arguments, he has waived these issues.
Affirmed.