This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0842
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Camille Lashay Dennis-Bond, Appellant.
Filed April 29, 2024 Affirmed Cochran, Judge
Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA-CR-21-2353
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pipenhagen, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Travis M. Keil, Chanhassen, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Cleary, Judge. ∗
∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for third-degree murder, criminal
vehicular homicide, criminal vehicular operation, and careless driving, appellant argues
that she is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred when it rejected her Batson
challenge. In the alternative, appellant argues that her convictions of third-degree murder,
criminal vehicular homicide, and criminal vehicular operation should be reversed because
the evidence at trial was insufficient. Appellant also argues that the district court abused
its discretion by denying her motion for a downward dispositional or durational departure.
We affirm.
FACTS
The following facts summarize the evidence received during the jury trial, viewed
in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. On the morning of Sunday, April 4, 2021,
appellant Camille Lashay Dennis-Bond was driving to church in her black Chevy Malibu
on eastbound County Road 42 near the cities of Burnsville and Savage. Dennis-Bond’s
brother, L.B., was also driving to church at the same time and from the same location as
Dennis-Bond. He drove separately in a white Chrysler. Dennis-Bond had a friend riding
in the passenger seat of her car. Dennis-Bond’s sister, C.M.B., was riding in the passenger
seat of L.B.’s car.
According to Dennis-Bond’s passenger, the siblings’ cars were driving side-by-side
down County Road 42. After stopping at a stop light, Dennis-Bond and L.B. rolled down
their windows. As the cars idled, the siblings talked about “who could accelerate faster
2 from the stoplight.” When the light turned green, the cars rapidly accelerated down the
road. Several other drivers saw the two cars race down County Road 42 at what were
described as “horrific” speeds.
As the siblings proceeded eastbound, L.B.’s Chrysler collided with a red
Honda CRV that was turning across County Road 42 at an intersection. The force of the
collision flipped the CRV and split the car in half. Dennis-Bond avoided the collision and
pulled to the side of the road, where she exited her vehicle and ran over to the scene of the
accident. Dennis-Bond was heard saying that she hoped the driver of the CRV was dead.
The driver of the CRV and his passenger died immediately at the scene of the crash.
C.M.B. also suffered serious injuries. Dennis-Bond was arrested at the scene.
A crash-reconstruction specialist with the Minnesota State Patrol (the sergeant)
obtained data from the “air-bag control module” in L.B.’s car, which provided “a short
window of pre-crash information.” Using surveillance video from a nearby business and
applying “energy and momentum equations” to the data from L.B.’s car, the sergeant
determined that L.B. was travelling between 99 and 112 miles per hour at the time of the
collision. And based on the surveillance footage, the sergeant concluded that
Dennis-Bond’s car was travelling between 91 and 107 miles per hour just before the crash.
The speed limit on County Road 42 at the scene of the crash was 50 miles per hour. Based
on his experience, the sergeant opined that Dennis-Bond and L.B. were racing.
The sergeant also determined that the CRV was travelling between 15 and 17 miles
per hour when it was struck by L.B.’s car. According to the sergeant, the CRV “would
have cleared the intersection significantly” had L.B. and Dennis-Bond been traveling the
3 speed limit. The sergeant determined that L.B.’s speed was the “primary factor” for the
crash, and that Dennis-Bond’s “comparable speeds with” L.B. was a “secondary factor.”
Respondent State of Minnesota filed a complaint in October 2021 charging
Dennis-Bond with two counts of third-degree murder and two counts of criminal vehicular
homicide for the deaths of the CRV driver and his passenger. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.195(a), .2112, subd. 1(a)(1) (2020). Because of C.M.B.’s serious injuries, the state
also charged Dennis-Bond with criminal vehicular operation—for a total of five charges
arising from the collision. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 1(1) (2020). Dennis-Bond
moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the state lacked probable cause. The district
court denied Dennis-Bond’s motion and scheduled a trial.
Dennis-Bond’s jury trial began on December 5, 2022. During jury selection, the
state used a peremptory strike on Prospective Juror 7, who is a person of color. Dennis-
Bond challenged the state’s peremptory strike, arguing that the strike was based solely on
the prospective juror’s race. The district court upheld the state’s peremptory strike,
concluding that there was “not a sufficient basis to find that purposeful discrimination ha[d]
been established.”
The case proceeded to trial, where several witnesses testified, including uninvolved
drivers, first responders, and law-enforcement officers (including the sergeant), as
summarized above. Before closing argument, the district court granted Dennis-Bond’s
motion to include a count of careless driving in the jury instructions as a lesser included
offense. The jury found Dennis-Bond guilty on all six counts—the original five counts
plus the careless-driving count.
4 Before sentencing, Dennis-Bond moved for a downward dispositional or durational
departure. The district court denied Dennis-Bond’s motion and imposed concurrent,
executed sentences of 150 and 180 months, respectively, on the third-degree-murder
convictions and 38 months on the criminal-vehicular-operation conviction. 1 This appeal
follows.
DECISION
Dennis-Bond makes three arguments on appeal. First, she contends that she is
entitled to a new trial because the district court clearly erred by denying her challenge of
the state’s peremptory strike of a prospective juror of color. Second, Dennis-Bond argues
that her convictions for all charges except careless driving should be reversed because the
evidence was insufficient for the jury to determine that her conduct caused the collision.
Finally, Dennis-Bond asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying her
motion for a downward dispositional or durational departure. We address Dennis-Bond’s
arguments in turn.
I. The district court did not clearly err by denying Dennis-Bond’s Batson challenge.
Each party to a criminal trial is afforded a limited number of peremptory strikes,
which “allow a party to excuse a prospective juror without providing a reason.” State v.
Lufkins, 963 N.W.2d 205, 209 (Minn. 2021); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 6. A
party may use a peremptory challenge “to strike a prospective juror that the party believes
1 The district court did not impose sentences on Dennis-Bond’s two convictions of criminal vehicular homicide or her conviction of careless driving.
5 will be less fair than some others” in an effort “to select as final jurors the persons they
believe will be most fair.” State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 100 (Minn. 2009) (quotation
omitted). But a party may not use a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror
based on race, as doing so violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986);
see also State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 136-37 (applying Batson). A party’s assertion
that a peremptory strike is based on race is referred to as a Batson challenge. See Lufkins,
963 N.W.2d at 209.
Minnesota courts use a three-step framework set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Batson to determine whether a peremptory challenge was motivated by racial
discrimination. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3).
Under this framework,
(1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor executed a peremptory challenge on the basis of race; (2) the burden then shifts to the prosecution to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question; and (3) the district court must determine whether the defendant has carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101. We afford a district court “great deference” in a Batson ruling
“because the record may not reflect all of the relevant circumstances that the court may
consider.” Id. (quotation omitted). As a result, we will not reverse a district court’s ruling
on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d 717,
724 (Minn. 2007); see also State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 811 (Minn. 2019) (holding
6 that a district court’s ruling on a Batson challenge is reviewed for clear error unless the
district court “makes its determinations using the wrong legal standard”).
Dennis-Bond brought a Batson challenge after the state struck Prospective Juror 7.
Addressing Dennis-Bond’s Batson challenge, the district court first determined that
Dennis-Bond had made a prima facie showing that the peremptory strike was based on
race. Next, the district court determined that the state offered a race-neutral explanation
for the peremptory strike of Prospective Juror 7 based on his “responses regarding a car
accident that he was previously in.” Lastly, the district court concluded that Dennis-Bond
failed to demonstrate that the strike was motivated by purposeful discrimination, and it
denied the Batson challenge.
Dennis-Bond argues that the district court erred by denying her Batson challenge.
Because the district court determined that Dennis-Bond made a prima facie showing of
discrimination and proceeded to steps two and three of her Batson challenge, we need not
address step one. See Lufkins, 963 N.W.2d at 210 (holding that “the question as to step
one is moot on appeal” when the district court proceeds to steps two and three of a Batson
analysis). We therefore only consider steps two and three of the district court’s Batson
analysis, as follows.
A. Race-Neutral Explanation
At step two of the Batson analysis, the state must “offer a reasonably specific
explanation that the court can use to determine whether that reason is related to the case
being tried.” Id. at 211 (emphasis omitted). The explanation “need not be persuasive or
even plausible,” Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101, and “will be deemed race-neutral unless a
7 discriminatory intent is inherent in the . . . explanation,” Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d at 726
(quotation omitted).
The prosecutor told the district court that its race-neutral reason for striking
Prospective Juror 7 was based on Prospective Juror 7’s description of his involvement in a
car accident and his analysis of fault. During voir dire, Prospective Juror 7 admitted that
he once rear-ended a student driver who stopped abruptly when a traffic light turned
yellow. Prospective Juror 7 acknowledged that he should have given the student driver
more space, especially because it was raining and hailing at the time. But Prospective
Juror 7 maintained that he was not “100 percent at fault” and that the student driver
probably should have proceeded through the yellow light instead of “slamming the brake
right away.” When explaining the state’s reason for striking Prospective Juror 7, the
prosecutor focused on how Prospective Juror 7 “stuck to his guns that a large part of [the
accident] could have been avoided if [the] driver ahead of him would have simply . . . gone
through the intersection.” The prosecutor told the district court that the state believed it
would be inappropriate to seat Prospective Juror 7 in a case that involved comparing the
fault of drivers involved in an accident. The district court concluded that the state’s
proffered reason was nondiscriminatory. We agree.
The state’s justification for the strike concerned a race-neutral topic relevant to
Dennis-Bond’s trial—namely, comparative fault in motor-vehicle accidents. Thus, the
state’s proffered reason was “reasonably specific,” “related to the case being tried,” and
not inherently discriminatory. See Lufkins, 963 N.W.2d at 210-11. We therefore conclude
8 that the district court did not clearly err in its determination that the state articulated a
nondiscriminatory justification for the strike.
B. Pretext
At step three of the Batson analysis, the challenging party must prove “that the
peremptory strike was motivated by racial discrimination and that the proffered reasons
were merely a pretext for the discriminatory motive.” Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d at 726
(quotation omitted). The district court determined that there was “not a sufficient basis to
find that purposeful discrimination ha[d] been established.” Dennis-Bond argues that the
district court clearly erred and that pretext is evident from the record because (1) the state
mischaracterized Prospective Juror 7’s answers and (2) the state did not use a peremptory
strike on a white juror who provided “similar” answers to Prospective Juror 7. As follows,
we are not persuaded by either argument.
1. Factually Incorrect Information
Dennis-Bond asserts that the prosecutor offered “factually incorrect” information in
support of the race-neutral justification by mischaracterizing Prospective Juror 7’s answers
during voir dire. Dennis-Bond argues that this mischaracterization is evidence that the
prosecutor’s justification was merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive and that the
district court clearly erred when it found otherwise.
Dennis-Bond is correct that there was a discrepancy between one of Prospective
Juror 7’s answers and the prosecutor’s characterization of that answer. During questioning,
Prospective Juror 7 admitted that he should have given the student driver more space. By
contrast, in response to Dennis-Bond’s Batson challenge, the prosecutor recounted that
9 Prospective Juror 7 “did not, in any of his [answers], as the [s]tate recalls, talk about what
he could have done differently” to avoid the accident. The state does not dispute that the
prosecutor’s recollection of Prospective Juror 7’s answer “was not entirely correct.” But
the state contends that “the crux of the [s]tate’s basis for striking [Prospective Juror 7] had
to do with his statements about fault, which the prosecutor accurately stated.” The state’s
argument is persuasive.
In State v. Gomez, the prosecutor used a peremptory strike on a Black prospective
juror who believed that her father had been wrongly convicted of a crime because there
was insufficient evidence of his guilt. 721 N.W.2d 871, 883-84 (Minn. 2006). The
prosecutor explained that they struck the prospective juror because she was still convinced
that her father was wrongly convicted. Id. at 884. Gomez argued that the prosecutor
exaggerated the prospective juror’s answer by describing the juror’s “family having gone
to some length to examine the evidence of her father’s guilt.” Id. The supreme court held
that, even if the prosecutor exaggerated the prospective juror’s response, “it was not an
exaggeration of [the prospective juror’s] belief that her father was wrongly convicted, the
reason for the strike.” Id.
Here, regardless of the prosecutor’s mischaracterization of Prospective Juror 7’s
answer to the question of what he could have done differently to avoid the accident with
the student driver, the record reflects that Prospective Juror 7 nonetheless attributed some
fault to the student driver. And the state’s proffered reason for striking Prospective Juror 7
was because of “how he assigned fault to this person that he rear-ended.” Thus, as in
Gomez, the prosecutor’s exaggeration of the degree to which Prospective Juror 7 attributed
10 fault to the student driver was not an exaggeration of Prospective Juror 7’s belief that he
was not “100 percent at fault” for rear-ending another driver. See id. Because this case
involved, in part, a determination of who was at fault for causing a collision, it was
reasonable for the state to strike Prospective Juror 7 based on his perception of comparative
fault. We discern no reason to conclude that the prosecutor’s limited misstatement shows
that the reason given by the state for striking Prospective Juror 7 was a pretext for
discrimination.
2. The State’s Refusal to Strike a Comparable White Juror
Dennis-Bond also argues that the state’s refusal to strike Prospective Juror 24, who
is White and was also questioned about fault in a car accident, is further evidence of pretext.
Prospective Juror 24 explained that she was involved in a car accident when she hit another
vehicle after she drove through a stop sign without stopping. When asked whose fault the
crash was, Prospective Juror 24 emphasized that she could not see the stop sign because it
was obscured by overgrown branches, but she did acknowledge that she hit the other
vehicle. She also agreed that, had the stop sign been visible, the accident would have been
her fault.
While both Prospective Jurors 24 and 7 answered questions about attributing fault
in a car accident, Prospective Juror 24’s answers are distinguishable from the answers of
Prospective Juror 7 because Prospective Juror 24 did not attribute fault to the other driver.
Instead, she stated that the accident occurred because she did not see the obstructed stop
sign. And so, the prosecutor may have reasonably concluded that Prospective Juror 24’s
experience would not bias any decision in Dennis-Bond’s trial regarding the central issues
11 of evaluating causation and fault among drivers. Thus, the state’s decision not to strike
Prospective Juror 24 does not suggest that the state struck Prospective Juror 7 solely
because of his race.
In sum, Dennis-Bond has not demonstrated that the prosecutor’s reason for striking
Prospective Juror 7 was pretextual. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
not clearly err by determining that Dennis-Bond failed to prove purposeful discrimination
under step three of the Batson analysis or by denying Dennis-Bond’s Batson challenge.
See Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101.
II. The evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Dennis-Bond was a proximate cause of the victims’ deaths and injuries.
Next, Dennis-Bond argues that her convictions of third-degree murder, criminal
vehicular homicide, and criminal vehicular operation should be reversed because there was
insufficient evidence produced at trial “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that her driving
conduct was a substantial factor in causing the accident.” We are not persuaded.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we conduct a
painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient
to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” State v. Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823, 832 (Minn.
2012) (quotation omitted). We must “assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved contrary evidence.” State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. 2010)
(quotation omitted). “We will not disturb a verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for
the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a
12 reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the
offense charged.” State v. Flowers, 788 N.W.2d 120, 133 (Minn. 2010) (quotation
omitted).
“[T]he [s]tate bear[s] the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every
element of a charged offense in a criminal trial.” State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 919
(Minn. 2019). The causation elements of third-degree murder, criminal vehicular
homicide, and criminal vehicular operation are the only elements that Dennis-Bond
challenges on appeal. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.195(a) (“Whoever, without intent to effect
the death of any person, causes the death of another by perpetrating an act eminently
dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life, is guilty
of murder in the third degree . . . .” (emphasis added)), .2112, subd. 1(a)(1) (“[A] person is
guilty of criminal vehicular homicide . . . if the person causes the death of a human being
. . . as a result of operating a motor vehicle: (1) in a grossly negligent manner[.]” (emphasis
added)), .2113, subd. 1(1) (“A person is guilty of criminal vehicular operation resulting in
great bodily harm . . . if the person causes great bodily harm to another . . . as a result of
operating a motor vehicle: (1) in a grossly negligent manner[.]” (emphasis added)).
The applicable statutes do not define “cause,” but Minnesota law provides that the
causation element is assessed in terms of proximate cause. See State v. Smith, 119 N.W.2d
838, 848-49 (Minn. 1962) (applying the substantial-factor test and proximate-cause
principles to a previous version of the third-degree murder statute); 2 State v. Jaworsky, 505
2 We are not aware of any court applying the proximate-cause or substantial-factor test to the cause element of third-degree murder under section 609.195(a). But the supreme court
13 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. App. 1993) (observing that “[c]riminal vehicular homicide and
criminal vehicular operation are derived from involuntary manslaughter” and thus that an
actor must proximately cause death or injury to be found guilty of those offenses), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1993); State v. Smith, 819 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Minn. App. 2012)
(explaining that “Minnesota law requires the state to prove that the act of operating a motor
vehicle was the proximate cause of the victim’s death” for a person to be convicted under
the criminal-vehicular-homicide statute), aff’d, 835 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2013); State v.
Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Minn. App. 2011) (same), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14,
2012).
“A proximate cause is something that played a substantial part in bringing about the
death or injury.” Smith, 819 N.W.2d at 728 (quotation omitted). “There can be more than
one cause of harm.” State v. Hofer, 614 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Minn. App. 2000). An
intervening, superseding cause of harm can limit a defendant’s liability for their own
culpable conduct if it breaks the chain of causation. Id. An intervening cause is considered
a superseding cause, however, only if four conditions are met:
has routinely observed that the cause element of various homicide offenses requires proof that the defendant’s acts were a substantial causal factor in the victim’s death. See State v. Olson, 435 N.W.2d 530, 531, 534 (Minn. 1989) (applying the substantial-factor test to second-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter); State v. Sutherlin, 396 N.W.2d 238, 240-41 (Minn. 1986) (applying the “substantial causal factor” test to first-degree murder). The pattern jury instructions for third-degree murder also define “cause” as “a substantial factor in causing the death.” 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.15 (2023). Finally, the parties do not dispute that the proximate-cause standard applies to the cause element of third-degree murder under section 609.195(a). For these reasons, we assume without deciding that the cause element of section 609.195(a) is assessed under the proximate-cause lens.
14 1) its harmful effects must have occurred after the original negligence; 2) it must not have been brought about by the original negligence; 3) it must have actively worked to bring about a result which would not otherwise have followed from the original negligence; and 4) it must not have been reasonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer.
Id. But “[w]hen the acts or omissions of two or more persons combine to bring about a
harmful result, those acts or omissions are concurring causes of the harm.” Id.
Dennis-Bond contends that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find beyond
a reasonable doubt that her conduct was a proximate cause—i.e., played a substantial part
in the deaths and injuries at issue—because her car did not collide with the CRV. Instead,
she argues that the evidence establishes that L.B.’s driving conduct was a “superseding
intervening cause of the accident.” We disagree.
We have already addressed a similar issue in another case, in which multiple drivers
were speeding in concert and a collision with an uninvolved vehicle ensued. See In re
Welfare of C.P.W., 601 N.W.2d 204, 209-10 (Minn. App. 1999), rev. denied (Minn.
Nov. 23, 1999). C.P.W. involved a high-speed car chase where a driver, J.M.P., was
pursued by three vehicles, including one driven by C.P.W., a juvenile. Id. at 206. The
chase proceeded through a residential area, where the drivers travelled between 55 and 90
miles per hour. Id. Eventually, J.M.P. ran a red light and struck another car, killing one
person and injuring several others. Id. As a result, the state filed a delinquency petition
charging C.P.W. with one count of criminal vehicular homicide and several counts of
criminal vehicular operation. Id. at 206-07. At the probable-cause hearing, “[t]he district
court concluded C.P.W.’s driving was not the proximate cause of the collision because
15 J.M.P.’s decision to speed through the intersection was a superseding intervening force
breaking the chain of causation.” Id. at 207. The state appealed that determination. Id.
We reversed the district court’s determination that the state lacked probable cause
to charge C.P.W. Id. at 210. We concluded that, even though C.P.W.’s vehicle “was not
physically involved in the accident, C.P.W. was such an active participant in the ongoing
course of conduct that he was effectively a proximate cause of the accident.” Id. at 209.
We determined that the evidence showed that “C.P.W. and J.M.P. were not acting
independently of each other” and were “jointly engaged in conduct demonstrating a
conscious disregard for the safety of the public.” Id. We held that J.M.P.’s driving was
not a superseding cause because there was “substantial evidence that J.M.P.’s decision to
run the final red light was the natural end of the sequence of events, not an unrelated event
that altered the likely result of the dangerous car chase.” Id. at 209-10.
Similarly, here, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Dennis-Bond’s conduct was a proximate cause of the deaths
and injuries even though her vehicle was not physically involved in the accident. Further,
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that L.B.’s decision to speed through the
intersection was not a superseding cause. At trial, Dennis-Bond’s passenger testified that,
just prior to the collision, Dennis-Bond and L.B. talked through open car windows while
stopped at a red light. The two specifically discussed “who could accelerate faster from
the stoplight.” The passenger added that both Dennis-Bond and L.B. “accelerated quickly”
once the light turned green. Similarly, another driver, who was stopped behind the cars at
16 the red light, confirmed that the cars had their windows lowered and there was “a lot of
talking” between the cars. After the light turned green, the cars “took off.”
At an ensuing intersection, a driver waiting to make a U-turn witnessed the cars
speed past her. The driver noted that one car “was just slightly in front of the other and
they were going at a high rate of speed and it appeared like they were racing.” Moments
later, the driver witnessed the collision between L.B.’s Chrysler and the red CRV.
Yet another driver testified that, while stopped at a red light to cross County
Road 42, he saw two cars racing at “horrific” speeds. The driver testified that the cars
“were really close to each other” and it appeared that “one of them was trying to kind of
get up past the other one.” After the cars passed him, the driver looked down for a moment
before looking up again and saw the collision.
Finally, the sergeant, who is a crash-reconstruction specialist, testified that L.B.’s
speed was the “primary factor” for the crash and Dennis-Bond’s “comparable speeds with
the Chrysler” was a secondary factor. The sergeant added that Dennis-Bond and L.B.
appeared “to keep their speeds together,” which, in his experience as a state trooper,
indicated they were racing. The sergeant added that the CRV “would have cleared the
intersection significantly” had Dennis-Bond and L.B. not been speeding.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, demonstrates that
Dennis-Bond and L.B. were not acting independently of each other. The evidence indicates
that the racing was initiated by Dennis-Bond’s banter with L.B. and her rapid acceleration
at the stoplight, and that Dennis-Bond continued to play an active role in the racing by
jockeying for position with L.B. The evidence also shows that the two were racing at
17 “horrific” speeds and entered the intersection where the collision occurred nearly
simultaneously. The mere fact that Dennis-Bond avoided the collision does not diminish
her active participation in the racing prior to the collision. A reasonable juror could
conclude that Dennis-Bond played a substantial part in bringing about the deaths and
injuries. And the evidence was sufficient to conclude that L.B.’s decision to speed through
the final intersection “was the natural end of the sequence of events.” See C.P.W., 601
N.W.2d at 210. L.B.’s speeding was not a superseding cause because it was “not an
unrelated event that altered the likely result of the dangerous [racing].” 3 Id. Accordingly,
taken in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
find Dennis-Bond guilty of third-degree murder, criminal vehicular homicide, and criminal
vehicular operation.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dennis-Bond’s motion for a downward dispositional or durational departure.
Finally, Dennis-Bond argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying
her motion for a downward dispositional or durational departure at sentencing. We
disagree.
3 Dennis-Bond also suggests that the victim’s decision to turn through the intersection without yielding to L.B. and Dennis-Bond was a superseding cause of the collision. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, “[t]he driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right-of-way which the driver might otherwise have.” Minn. Stat. § 169.20, subd. 1(d) (Minn. 2020). Second, the sergeant testified that the CRV would have made it through the intersection if not for Dennis-Bond’s and L.B.’s speeds. Accordingly, the jury could reasonably conclude that Dennis-Bond caused the collision and that the CRV’s entrance into the intersection was not a superseding cause.
18 District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to depart from a
presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). We will not disturb
a district court’s refusal to depart “absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Oberg,
627 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 22, 2001). A district
court abuses its discretion if its decision “is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record. State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn.
2015) (quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe a presumptive sentence or range of
sentences “for offenders for whom imprisonment is proper.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd.
5(2) (2020). A district court must pronounce a sentence within the applicable guidelines’
range unless it finds “identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a
departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020). But a district court is not required to
depart even when substantial and compelling circumstances are present. See State v. Back,
341 N.W.2d 273, 275 (Minn. 1983) (“[W]e will not interfere with a sentence that falls
within the presumptive sentence range even if there are grounds that would justify
departure.”).
At sentencing, Dennis-Bond moved for a downward dispositional or durational
departure. “A dispositional departure places the offender in a different setting than that
called for by the presumptive guidelines sentence.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623
(Minn. 2016). “A dispositional departure typically focuses on characteristics of the
defendant that show whether the defendant is particularly suitable for individualized
treatment in a probationary setting.” Id. (quotation omitted). By contrast, a durational
19 departure concerns the length of the sentence and “must be based on factors that reflect the
seriousness of the offense, not the characteristics of the offender.” Id.
In her motion for a downward dispositional departure, Dennis-Bond sought
probation and a stay of the presumptive prison sentences for her convictions. In support
of her motion, Dennis-Bond focused on the qualities that made her particularly suitable for
probation, including that she (1) was only 19 years old at the time of the accident; (2) had
“aspirations of going to the National Guard, attending college, and [attending] law school”;
(3) had no prior adult criminal history; (4) had no new violations and had abided by court
orders while on conditional release; (5) had strong family and community support; and
(6) showed remorse and “regrets speeding, yelling at the Honda CRV, the lives lost, and
most importantly, realizes she must make better decisions.”
And, in support of her motion for a downward durational departure, Dennis-Bond
noted that she “was not involved directly in the accident at all” and “avoided the collision
entirely.” Dennis-Bond also argued that the driver of the CRV “failed to yield as required
and pulled out in front of traffic travelling eastbound on County Road 42.” Dennis-Bond
argued that these facts lessened the seriousness of the offense.
The district court declined to grant Dennis-Bond’s motion for a dispositional
departure, stating that Dennis-Bond failed to demonstrate “a substantial and compelling
reason” to conclude that she was amenable to probation. The district court emphasized
that, although Dennis-Bond complied with the conditions of release during the trial, she
was also cited twice for speeding since the accident. The district court also declined to
grant a durational departure for any of the three convictions at issue. The district court
20 stated that granting Dennis-Bond’s motion “would diminish or minimize the facts that led
to the crash, which was driving down the highway at twice the legal limit, at roughly 100
miles an hour.”
Renewing the arguments she made at sentencing, Dennis-Bond contends that the
district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a downward dispositional or
durational departure when it imposed sentences for her two convictions of third-degree
murder and her conviction of criminal vehicular operation. We are not persuaded.
Even if a mitigating factor justifies departure, we will not ordinarily interfere with
the imposition of a presumptive sentence. See State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668
(Minn. 2006); State v. Musse, 981 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Minn. App. 2022), rev. denied (Minn.
Dec. 28, 2022). Moreover, when the record shows that the district court carefully evaluated
the testimony and information presented, we “may not interfere” with the district court’s
decision not to depart. State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. App. 1985)
(emphasis added). Refusals to depart will be reversed only in “rare” cases. Kindem, 313
N.W.2d at 7.
This is not the rare case that warrants reversal. At the sentencing hearing, the district
court considered a number of victim-impact statements, Dennis-Bond’s arguments for
departure, Dennis-Bond’s presentence investigation report, and the sentencing guidelines
before imposing sentences for third-degree murder and criminal vehicular operation. The
sentences imposed by the district court were each within the presumptive sentencing range
under the guidelines. Because the record reflects that the district court carefully evaluated
the testimony and information presented at sentencing and imposed presumptive sentences,
21 we “may not interfere with the [district] court’s exercise of discretion.” Van Ruler, 378
N.W.2d at 80-81. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Dennis-Bond’s motion for a downward dispositional or durational departure when
imposing sentences for the convictions of third-degree murder and criminal vehicular
operation.
Affirmed.