This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-0916
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Bryant Wayne Paige, Appellant.
Filed November 17, 2025 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-23-14309
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicholas G. Kimball, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal following a conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
appellant argues that (1) the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his petition to withdraw his guilty plea and (2) the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for a downward durational departure. We affirm.
FACTS
DNA testing revealed that appellant Bryant Wayne Paige conceived a child with a
13-year-old in the spring of 2022 when he was 32 years old. As a result, respondent State
of Minnesota charged appellant with first-degree criminal sexual conduct—penetration or
contact with a person under the age of 14 while the actor is at least 36 months older in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1a(e) (Supp. 2021).
Following the charge, appellant made four appearances without an attorney but
maintained at each appearance that he had retained private counsel. The district court
granted appellant continuances each time to allow appellant to appear with his counsel.
Counsel appeared at appellant’s fifth appearance and filed a certificate of representation
the same day.
At a subsequent omnibus hearing, trial counsel raised the possibility of challenging
a search warrant, and the district court gave appellant a week to address the issue. Trial
counsel ultimately did not challenge the search warrant or file any other suppression
motions because he “didn’t see any that were worth pursuing.”
Less than a month later, appellant agreed to plead guilty to the charged offense. In
exchange, the state agreed to cap any prison time at 153 months, the bottom of the
presumptive sentencing range based on appellant’s criminal-history score of three points.
See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.B (Supp. 2021).
2 At the plea hearing, trial counsel questioned appellant to establish the factual basis
for the plea. Among his other admissions, appellant stated that he reviewed the discovery
with trial counsel, understood the plea and its consequences, and understood that the plea
agreement was binding absent extraordinary circumstances. In his plea petition, appellant
also affirmed his satisfaction with trial counsel. The district court determined that appellant
had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his trial rights. It accepted his guilty
plea and ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) and psychosexual evaluation.
Prior to sentencing, appellant filed a motion for a downward durational departure.
At the sentencing hearing, the state argued that appellant’s crime resulted in a pregnancy
and an immeasurable change to the victim’s life. It also highlighted the almost-20-year
age gap between appellant and the victim. Appellant, on the other hand, contended that
the sexual conduct was of a “consensual nature,” and he did not know that the victim was
a minor. The district court considered all the information presented to it, including the
parties’ arguments, appellant’s motion for a sentencing departure, the PSI, and the
psychosexual evaluation. The district court determined that there were no substantial or
compelling circumstances that warranted a sentencing departure and denied appellant’s
departure motion. The district court sentenced appellant to 153 months in prison, in
accordance with the plea agreement and within the presumptive guidelines range.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal, and this court stayed the appeal to allow appellant to
petition the district court for postconviction relief. Appellant’s postconviction petition
requested a withdrawal of his guilty plea. He argued in part that his plea was involuntary
3 because “the circumstances surrounding his plea” made him feel “forced into pleading
guilty.” The postconviction court denied appellant’s petition, and we reinstated this appeal.
DECISION
I. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s petition to withdraw his guilty plea.
Appellant argues that he entered an involuntary guilty plea and “felt forced into
pleading guilty” because trial counsel (1) was absent at appellant’s first four appearances;
(2) told appellant that others questioned “how he could represent someone like
[appellant]”; (3) did not challenge the admissibility of a search warrant; and (4) did not
consult with appellant about how to best proceed. Appellant asserts that, but for trial
counsel’s inadequate representation, appellant would not have pleaded guilty. 1 We are not
persuaded.
A postconviction court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if it is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest
injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.
2010). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Id. A guilty plea is involuntary, and therefore invalid, if the defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn.
1994); Sanchez v. State, 868 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d on other grounds,
1 The state argued that appellant did not brief a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the postconviction court and thereby forfeited the claim on appeal. Assuming without deciding that appellant did not forfeit this claim, appellant still does not prevail because he cannot satisfy the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4 890 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2017). Appellate courts “consider the [postconviction] court’s
factual findings that are supported in the record,” and we “conduct a de novo review of the
legal implication of those facts on the ineffective assistance claim.” State v. Nicks, 831
N.W.2d 493, 503-04 (Minn. 2013).
Petitions for postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel must allege facts that, if true, would satisfy the two-prong Strickland test. Nicks,
831 N.W.2d at 504 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
Under the first Strickland prong, “the defendant must prove that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687-96). “[T]he standard for attorney competence is ‘representation by an
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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-0916
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Bryant Wayne Paige, Appellant.
Filed November 17, 2025 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-23-14309
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicholas G. Kimball, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal following a conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
appellant argues that (1) the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his petition to withdraw his guilty plea and (2) the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for a downward durational departure. We affirm.
FACTS
DNA testing revealed that appellant Bryant Wayne Paige conceived a child with a
13-year-old in the spring of 2022 when he was 32 years old. As a result, respondent State
of Minnesota charged appellant with first-degree criminal sexual conduct—penetration or
contact with a person under the age of 14 while the actor is at least 36 months older in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1a(e) (Supp. 2021).
Following the charge, appellant made four appearances without an attorney but
maintained at each appearance that he had retained private counsel. The district court
granted appellant continuances each time to allow appellant to appear with his counsel.
Counsel appeared at appellant’s fifth appearance and filed a certificate of representation
the same day.
At a subsequent omnibus hearing, trial counsel raised the possibility of challenging
a search warrant, and the district court gave appellant a week to address the issue. Trial
counsel ultimately did not challenge the search warrant or file any other suppression
motions because he “didn’t see any that were worth pursuing.”
Less than a month later, appellant agreed to plead guilty to the charged offense. In
exchange, the state agreed to cap any prison time at 153 months, the bottom of the
presumptive sentencing range based on appellant’s criminal-history score of three points.
See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.B (Supp. 2021).
2 At the plea hearing, trial counsel questioned appellant to establish the factual basis
for the plea. Among his other admissions, appellant stated that he reviewed the discovery
with trial counsel, understood the plea and its consequences, and understood that the plea
agreement was binding absent extraordinary circumstances. In his plea petition, appellant
also affirmed his satisfaction with trial counsel. The district court determined that appellant
had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his trial rights. It accepted his guilty
plea and ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) and psychosexual evaluation.
Prior to sentencing, appellant filed a motion for a downward durational departure.
At the sentencing hearing, the state argued that appellant’s crime resulted in a pregnancy
and an immeasurable change to the victim’s life. It also highlighted the almost-20-year
age gap between appellant and the victim. Appellant, on the other hand, contended that
the sexual conduct was of a “consensual nature,” and he did not know that the victim was
a minor. The district court considered all the information presented to it, including the
parties’ arguments, appellant’s motion for a sentencing departure, the PSI, and the
psychosexual evaluation. The district court determined that there were no substantial or
compelling circumstances that warranted a sentencing departure and denied appellant’s
departure motion. The district court sentenced appellant to 153 months in prison, in
accordance with the plea agreement and within the presumptive guidelines range.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal, and this court stayed the appeal to allow appellant to
petition the district court for postconviction relief. Appellant’s postconviction petition
requested a withdrawal of his guilty plea. He argued in part that his plea was involuntary
3 because “the circumstances surrounding his plea” made him feel “forced into pleading
guilty.” The postconviction court denied appellant’s petition, and we reinstated this appeal.
DECISION
I. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s petition to withdraw his guilty plea.
Appellant argues that he entered an involuntary guilty plea and “felt forced into
pleading guilty” because trial counsel (1) was absent at appellant’s first four appearances;
(2) told appellant that others questioned “how he could represent someone like
[appellant]”; (3) did not challenge the admissibility of a search warrant; and (4) did not
consult with appellant about how to best proceed. Appellant asserts that, but for trial
counsel’s inadequate representation, appellant would not have pleaded guilty. 1 We are not
persuaded.
A postconviction court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if it is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest
injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.
2010). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Id. A guilty plea is involuntary, and therefore invalid, if the defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn.
1994); Sanchez v. State, 868 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d on other grounds,
1 The state argued that appellant did not brief a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the postconviction court and thereby forfeited the claim on appeal. Assuming without deciding that appellant did not forfeit this claim, appellant still does not prevail because he cannot satisfy the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4 890 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2017). Appellate courts “consider the [postconviction] court’s
factual findings that are supported in the record,” and we “conduct a de novo review of the
legal implication of those facts on the ineffective assistance claim.” State v. Nicks, 831
N.W.2d 493, 503-04 (Minn. 2013).
Petitions for postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel must allege facts that, if true, would satisfy the two-prong Strickland test. Nicks,
831 N.W.2d at 504 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
Under the first Strickland prong, “the defendant must prove that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687-96). “[T]he standard for attorney competence is ‘representation by an
attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney
would perform under similar circumstances.’” State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn.
1993) (quoting White v. State, 248 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1976)). “[T]here is a strong
presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable” and this court does not second-
guess counsel’s trial strategy. Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).
Under the second Strickland prong, appellant must show prejudice by
“demonstrat[ing] a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d
480, 486 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Put differently, appellant must “prove that the
outcome would have been different absent the errors,” and to do so, “appellant must do
more than merely make bald assertions and conclusory allegations.” Sanderson v. State,
601 N.W.2d 219, 226 (Minn. App. 1999), rev. granted (Minn. Jan. 18, 2000) and ord.
5 granting rev. vacated (Minn. Mar. 28, 2000) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Larsen,
901 N.W.2d 433, 441 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2017).
We decline to analyze the first Strickland prong because appellant fails to satisfy
the second Strickland prong. See Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10 (concluding appellate court
need not address both Strickland prongs if one is dispositive). First, regarding trial
counsel’s absences, appellant fails to explain how those absences prejudiced him. We see
no obvious prejudice, either; the district court granted appellant continuances until he
obtained trial counsel, and once trial counsel became the attorney of record, he was present
for all subsequent hearings. Second, appellant does not explain how a third party’s
questioning of trial counsel’s decision to represent appellant resulted in prejudice. Third,
we do not second-guess strategic decisions, which includes trial counsel’s decision not to
challenge the warrant. See Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10. Even if we did, appellant does
not contend that challenging the warrant would have resulted in a different outcome.
Fourth, appellant does not explain how he was prejudiced by a failure of trial counsel to
consult with him.
We conclude that appellant’s “bald assertions” that he was prejudiced and that he
would not have pleaded guilty but for trial counsel’s errors are insufficient to support plea
withdrawal. See Sanderson, 601 N.W.2d at 226. As a result, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the postconviction court.
6 II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for a downward durational departure.
Appellant argues that substantial and compelling circumstances existed for a
departure because his offense was “less serious than the typical offense.” He supports this
argument with contentions that the unlawful sexual contact was “consensual,” and that he
did not know the victim was a minor. Appellant’s argument is unavailing.
Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of a motion for a downward
durational departure for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08
(Minn. 2014). “A [district] court must pronounce a sentence within the applicable
[sentencing guidelines] range unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances that distinguish a case and overcome the presumption in favor of the
guidelines sentence.” Id. at 308 (quotation omitted). “A durational departure is a sentence
that departs in length from the presumptive guidelines range” and “must be based on factors
that reflect the seriousness of the offense, not the characteristics of the offender.” State v.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016) (emphasis omitted). When presented with a
motion for a sentencing departure, district courts may consider a nonexclusive list of
mitigating and aggravating factors provided by the sentencing guidelines. See Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a-b (Supp. 2021). One mitigating factor is whether “[o]ther
substantial grounds exist that tend to excuse or mitigate the offender’s culpability, although
not amounting to a defense.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(5). If the record shows that
the district court carefully considered and evaluated the information presented to it, this
court “may not interfere” with its imposition of a presumptive sentence, “even if there are
7 grounds that would justify departure.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn.
App. 1985); State v. Abeyta, 336 N.W.2d 264, 265 (Minn. 1983).
Appellant acknowledges that mistake of age is not a defense to his crime. He
nonetheless argues that it is unclear whether the district court considered his asserted
mistake or the “consensual nature” of the unlawful sexual conduct. 2 However, the record
shows that the district court read appellant’s written motion for a sentencing departure and
heard his oral argument in support, both of which included these exact arguments. The
record further shows that the district court reviewed the PSI and the psychosexual
evaluation. The district court stated that, while it found some mitigating factors in
appellant’s case, it also found aggravating factors, and for that reason, it “[did] not find[]
that substantial or compelling circumstances exist[ed] to warrant any type of a departure.”
Because the district court considered all information presented to it and imposed a sentence
within the presumptive range, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion when it denied
appellant’s motion for a downward durational departure.
Affirmed.
2 Appellant cites a nonprecedential opinion of this court in support of his argument on appeal. Because his reliance is unpersuasive and nonprecedential opinions are not binding on this court, we do not consider the nonprecedential opinion. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions and order opinions are not binding authority . . . [but] may be cited as persuasive authority.”).