STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A24-0250
Court of Appeals McKeig, J. Took no part, Hennesy, J. State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: November 12, 2025 Office of Appellate Courts Brian Russell Lueck,
Appellant.
________________________
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota;
Kyra Ladd, Wadena County Attorney, Wadena, Minnesota; and
Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant Wadena County Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
Charles A. Ramsay, Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsay Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Roseville, Minnesota, for appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. When a warrant authorizes one type of chemical test—either blood or
urine—a person’s refusal to submit to that specific test, and not another, is required to
sustain a conviction for test refusal under Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2), and 171.177,
subd. 2.
1 2. A test refusal conviction based on refusal of a warranted chemical test does
not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Affirmed.
OPINION
MCKEIG, Justice.
This case concerns the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), the
test-refusal statute, as applied to a driver who refuses a chemical test where law
enforcement obtained a warrant authorizing only one type of test—either blood or urine,
but not both. Specifically, we must determine if a prosecution in this circumstance would
violate a driver’s Fourth Amendment rights, and whether offering a test that is not
authorized by the warrant implicates the Fourth Amendment. In order to resolve these
constitutional issues, we must first decide an issue of statutory interpretation: whether
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), which incorporates Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2
(governing testing pursuant to a search warrant), requires a person to refuse both a blood
and a urine test to be convicted of test refusal when the warrant authorizes a single type of
test.
In 2023, appellant Brian Russell Lueck was involved in a head-on collision when
he attempted to pass several vehicles during a snowstorm. Police detained Lueck on
suspicion of driving while impaired and obtained a search warrant for Lueck’s blood.
Police did not obtain a search warrant for Lueck’s urine. Lueck refused to submit to both
a blood test and a urine test. Lueck was charged with first-degree test refusal. He moved
to suppress his refusal to submit to both tests and to dismiss the test refusal charge. Lueck
2 argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited his test-refusal charge because applicable
statutes required him to refuse both a blood and a urine test in order to be charged with test
refusal, but police did not have a warrant for a urine test. The district court denied Lueck’s
motion, and Lueck was convicted of first-degree test refusal. The court of appeals
We hold that the plain language of Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2), and 171.177,
subd. 2, requires that, in cases where the warrant authorizes one type of chemical test—
only a blood test or only a urine test—the person may be convicted of test refusal if the
person refuses only the test authorized in the warrant. The person does not need to also
refuse the alternative test. In this case, where the warrant authorized solely a blood test,
the State needed to prove that Lueck refused a blood test in order to convict him of test
refusal. We further hold that Lueck’s test-refusal conviction did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because it was based only on Lueck’s refusal of a warranted blood test.
Accordingly, we affirm the ultimate decision of the court of appeals, although on other
grounds.
FACTS
The facts of this case are undisputed. On March 11, 2023, at approximately
11:00 a.m., Lueck was involved in a head-on collision when he attempted to pass several
vehicles, including a snowplow, on Highway 71 in Wadena County during a snowstorm.
After the accident, police detained Lueck on suspicion of driving while impaired and
obtained a search warrant for Lueck’s blood. While en route to the hospital, police
presented Lueck with the search warrant and told him that a judge “issued a blood draw
3 warrant for you. Refusal to submit is a crime. Do you understand that?” Seven minutes
later, at the hospital, Lueck refused to submit to a blood draw. Police told Lueck that
“refusal to test is a crime. So, you’re refusing both a blood and a urine test.” Lueck refused
to submit to testing. 1
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Lueck with several offenses, including first-
degree test refusal, Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2). 2 Lueck moved to suppress his
refusal to submit to both blood and urine tests and dismiss the test-refusal charge. He
argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited this charge because Minn. Stat. § 171.177,
subd. 2, required him to refuse both a blood and a urine test in order to be charged with test
refusal, but police did not have a warrant for a urine test. The district court rejected this
argument, concluding that “Minn. Stat. § 171.177 only requires law enforcement to offer a
urine test if a defendant refuses to submit to a blood test to prosecute for test refusal” and
1 Although the record does not indicate how Lueck refused the urine test, Lueck conceded in his briefing and oral argument before us that he refused to submit to a warrantless urine test. 2 A person commits first-degree driving while impaired if they “violate[] section 169A.20 (driving while impaired)” and they “ha[ve] previously been convicted of a felony under this section.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2). The State alleged that Lueck violated Minn. Stat. §169A.20, subd. 2(2), which makes it a crime for “any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test . . . of the person’s blood or urine as required by a search warrant under sections 171.177 and 626.04 to 626.18.” We refer to this charge as first-degree test refusal. 4 does not require a search warrant “for both a defendant’s blood and urine to prosecute for
test refusal.” It denied Lueck’s motion to suppress and dismiss.
Lueck later waived his right to a jury trial, and the parties agreed that the district
court would decide Lueck’s guilt based on stipulated facts pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.01, subd. 3. As part of this agreement, the State agreed to dismiss all the charges except
for the test-refusal charge. The district court found Lueck guilty of first-degree test refusal
and sentenced him to 48 months in prison.
Lueck appealed his conviction, raising the same statutory and constitutional
arguments he made in the district court. State v. Lueck, No. A24-0250, 2024 WL 4879776,
at *1–2 (Minn. App. Nov. 25, 2024). The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at *4. Specifically,
the court of appeals held that “[t]he statutory language [in Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2]
is clear: a person commits the crime of test refusal if he or she ‘refuses’ (i.e., ‘objects to’)
the test that was initially offered and for which a warrant was issued, and he or she was
‘offered’ another test.” Id. at *3. The court held that the State “need not show that
appellant refused the alternative test.” Id. It concluded that the district court did not err
when it denied Lueck’s motion to dismiss the test-refusal charge “because there is no
constitutional or statutory requirement that law enforcement obtain a search warrant for
both blood and urine.” Id. at *4.
We granted Lueck’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
Lueck contends that the State violated his Fourth Amendment rights when it
prosecuted him for test refusal because law enforcement had no warrant for a urine test.
5 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A search conducted without a warrant is
unreasonable unless it satisfies one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement.” State v. Barrow, 989 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Minn. 2023) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Lueck relies on Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), State v. Trahan,
886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016), and State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016), to
support his constitutional argument. In Birchfield, the Supreme Court considered whether
statutes that criminalize a suspected impaired driver’s refusal to test for intoxication
violated the Fourth Amendment. 579 U.S. at 444. The Court held that while a breath test
was a permissible search incident to a lawful arrest for impaired driving, a blood test was
not. Id. at 476. Accordingly, criminalizing a suspected impaired driver’s refusal of a
warrantless blood test is only permissible where the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement applies. Id. at 474–75. Later that same year, we held that, under
Birchfield, a Minnesota statute criminalizing the refusal of warrantless blood tests and urine
tests was unconstitutional as applied to the defendants in those cases. Trahan, 886 N.W.2d
at 224 (warrantless blood test); Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 233–34 (warrantless urine test).
In 2017, the Minnesota Legislature responded by enacting several statutes that are
relevant here. The Legislature split the test-refusal statute into two provisions, one that
addresses the refusal of a breath test, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1), and another that
addresses the refusal of a blood or urine test, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2). See Act
of May 23, 2017, ch. 83, art. 2, § 2, 2017 Minn. Laws 351, 355. It also enacted Minn. Stat.
6 § 171.177, establishing testing advisory and civil driver’s license revocation provisions for
warranted test refusal or failure. See Act of May 23, 2017, ch. 83, art. 2, § 10, 2017 Minn.
Laws 351, 360–66.
Lueck argues that his test-refusal charge violated the Fourth Amendment under
Birchfield, Trahan, and Thompson because the officer did not obtain a warrant for a urine
test. Lueck’s constitutional argument is premised on an issue of statutory interpretation.
He claims that Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2), and 171.177, subd. 2, always require a
person to refuse both a blood and a urine test in order to be convicted of test refusal. And
Birchfield, Trahan, and Thompson require a warrant (unless an exception applies) for both
blood and urine tests. Thus, according to Lueck, because the statute requires refusal of
both tests before charge and conviction, and because both tests require a warrant, the statute
cannot be constitutionally applied unless the State obtains warrants for both tests. Lueck
maintains that because the State only obtained a warrant for a blood test, his test refusal
charge violated the Fourth Amendment.
Because Lueck’s constitutional argument turns on his particular understanding of
Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2), and 171.177, subd. 2, to resolve this issue, we must
first interpret those statutes before determining whether Lueck’s test-refusal prosecution
was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
I.
We start with whether Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2), and 171.177, subd. 2,
always require a person to refuse both a blood and a urine test in order to commit test
refusal. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Roberts v. State, 945
7 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 2020). The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain
and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16; State v. Latino, 15
N.W.3d 654, 658 (Minn. 2025). “We begin our analysis with the relevant statutory text
because the plain language of the statute is our best guide to the Legislature’s intent.”
Latino, 15 N.W.3d at 659 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When
interpreting a statute, the first step is to determine whether the language is ambiguous. Id.
at 658–59. If there is “only one reasonable way to read the text,” the statute is
unambiguous, and we enforce the statute’s plain meaning. State v. Fugalli, 967 N.W.2d
74, 77 (Minn. 2021); Latino, 15 N.W.3d at 659.
Minnesota Statutes § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), creates the crime of test refusal for blood
or urine tests authorized by a warrant: “It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a
chemical test . . . of the person’s blood or urine as required by a search warrant under
sections 171.177 and 626.04 to 626.18.” 3 The plain language of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20,
subd. 2(2), demonstrates that it is a crime to refuse either a “blood or urine” test that has
been authorized by a search warrant (emphasis added); it does not state that it is a crime
for a person to refuse tests of their “blood and urine.” “If the Legislature unambiguously
uses the word ‘or,’ we read the term in the disjunctive and require that only one of the
possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied.” State v. Abdus-
3 However, a warrant is not required if the exigent circumstances exception applies. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. (3)(b) (“When, under the provisions of section 169A.20, 169A.51, or 171.177, a search warrant is required for a blood or urine test, that requirement is met if a judicially recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.”). The State has never argued that the exigent circumstances exception applies in this case. 8 Salam, 1 N.W.3d 871, 878 (Minn. 2024) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). No other language in the statute indicates that “or” means something different
than its usual meaning of the disjunctive. The unambiguous plain meaning of Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2), is that a person’s refusal to submit to a test of blood or urine as
required by a warrant, not both, is all that is required for the person to commit the crime of
test refusal.
Minnesota Statutes § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), criminalizes refusal of a blood or urine
test “as required by a search warrant under section[] 171.177.” Accordingly, the next step
is to consider whether Minn. Stat. § 171.177 is unambiguous as to its requirements for the
tests a driver must refuse in order to commit test refusal. Minnesota Statutes
section 171.177, subdivision 2 provides:
The peace officer who directs a test pursuant to a search warrant shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant. If the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine test, the officer may direct whether the test is of blood or urine. If the person to whom the test is directed objects to the test, the officer shall offer the person an alternative test of either blood or urine. Action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered and action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was offered.
The first sentence of section 171.177, subdivision 2 indicates that the officer “shall
direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant.” Id. The warrant, therefore, dictates
which test the officer “shall direct”: if the officer obtains a warrant for a blood test, the
officer must direct the person to submit to a blood test; if the officer obtains a warrant for
a urine test, the officer must direct the person to submit to a urine test. Id. The second
sentence addresses situations where “the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine test.”
9 Id. (emphasis added). In this situation, “the officer may direct whether the test is of blood
or urine” according to the officer’s own discretion. 4 See Nash v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 4
N.W.3d 812, 816 (Minn. 2024) (“[S]ubdivision 2 tells us that when a warrant authorizes
either a blood or urine test . . . the officer has discretion to decide which test to use.”).
As both parties acknowledge, the plain language of these first two sentences allows
for two types of warrants—those that authorize a single type of test and those that authorize
either a blood or urine test. The parties also do not dispute—and we agree—that the first
sentence of section 171.177, subdivision 2 applies in this case and that the second sentence
does not apply because the warrant authorized only a blood test.
There is, however, a dispute about the application of the last two sentences of
section 171.177, subdivision 2, which require the officer to “offer the person an alternative
test of either blood or urine” if they refuse the test and state that “[a]ction may be taken
against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered,” and vice
versa. Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2. Lueck argues that a person can only be charged
with test refusal if they refuse to submit to both a blood test and a urine test. He claims
that the statutory requirement that the officer offer the alternative test after the person
refused to submit to the first test implicitly requires that the person must also refuse the
alternative test. Lueck relies in part on our decision in Nash, where we stated several times
4 There are evidentiary reasons why the officer may prefer one chemical test over the other. See Lueck, 2024 WL 4879776, at *6 (Ede, J., concurring specially) (noting one of those reasons is “to quantify the amount of controlled substance present in a suspect’s blood instead of a perhaps less-probative measure of chemical metabolite present in their urine”). 10 that section 171.177, subdivision 2 requires that a person refuse both a blood and a urine
test in order to be charged with test refusal. 4 N.W.3d at 816, 818, 819, 820 n.9 (Minn.
2024). 5 The State argues that section 171.177, subdivision 2 does not require the person
to refuse the alternative test; it requires only that the person must refuse the first test of
blood or urine and that the officer must offer the alternative test of blood or urine.
According to the State, the person’s response to the offer of the alternative test is
immaterial.
The court of appeals agreed with the State’s interpretation of section 171.177,
subdivision 2. Lueck, 2024 WL 4879776, at *2–3. The court held that the plain statutory
language requires that, to be convicted of test refusal under Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd.
2(2), and 171.177, subd. 2, a person must refuse a warranted chemical test of blood or urine
and be offered an alternative test, and that the State “need not show that [the person] refused
the alternative test.” Id. at *3. In doing so, the court of appeals held that our statements to
the contrary in Nash were dicta and “not germane to the decision.” Id. (citing Nash, 4
N.W.3d at 821 (holding the peace officer’s warning that “refusal to take a test is a crime”
satisfied the advisory provision of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1)).
We conclude that neither party’s interpretation of the last two sentences of
section 171.177, subdivision 2 is reasonable. We do not look at statutory language “in
isolation.” State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011). Instead, we interpret
5 However, as discussed below, this case is distinguishable from Nash, where law enforcement obtained a warrant authorizing a test of Nash’s blood or urine. Nash, 4 N.W.3d at 814. Here, law enforcement only obtained a warrant for Lueck’s blood. 11 words and sentences in a statute “as a whole” and “in the light of their context.” Id. (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The first sentence of section 171.177,
subdivision 2 requires the officer to “direct a blood or urine test as provided in the
warrant.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2 (emphasis added). If, as both parties argue, the
third and fourth sentences of section 171.177, subdivision 2 apply to situations where the
warrant only authorizes a blood test, then they would require the officer to offer a urine test
that was not provided in the warrant. Such an offer would contradict the requirement in
section 171.177, subdivision 2 that the officer “direct a blood or urine test as provided in
the warrant.” Because Lueck’s and the State’s interpretations apply the last two sentences
of section 171.177, subdivision 2 when the warrant authorizes only one type of chemical
test, their interpretations are in direct conflict with that subdivision’s explicit warrant
requirement. These interpretations are therefore unreasonable in light of the statute’s
language as a whole and the last two sentences’ context in the statute. Instead, by their
plain terms, the third and fourth sentences of section 171.177, subdivision 2 only apply in
the context of the second sentence—“[i]f the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine
test,” in which case “the officer may direct” which is tested. (Emphasis added.)
This holding is consistent with our statements in Nash. Section 171.177,
subdivision 2’s requirement that the peace officer offer an alternative test does not conflict
with its explicit warrant requirement where “the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine
test,” as described in the second sentence of section 171.177, subdivision 2. Minn. Stat.
§ 171.177, subd. 2. This was the situation in Nash, where the officer obtained a warrant
for Nash’s blood or urine. 4 N.W.3d at 814. In this scenario, the officer “may direct
12 whether the test is of blood or urine,” according to the officer’s discretion. Id. It follows
that, if the person refuses to submit to the first test directed by the officer, section 171.177,
subdivision 2 requires the officer to offer the second test that was also “provided in the
warrant.” Id.
Because the last two sentences of section 171.177, subdivision 2 do not apply when
the warrant authorizes the officer to direct only one type of chemical test, the only sentence
of section 171.177, subdivision 2 that applies to this situation is the first: “The peace officer
who directs a test pursuant to a search warrant shall direct a blood or urine test as provided
in the warrant.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2. This language must also be considered in
light of the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), criminalizing the refusal
of a single warranted test “of the person’s blood or urine.” Reading the plain language of
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), in conjunction with the first sentence of Minn. Stat.
§ 171.177, subd. 2, leads to a single reasonable conclusion: where a warrant authorizes one
type of chemical test—only a blood test or only a urine test—a person must refuse only the
test authorized by the warrant to be convicted of test refusal. The person need not refuse
both a blood and a urine test.
Here, the officer obtained a warrant solely for Lueck’s blood. 6 Therefore, Minn.
Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2), and 171.177, subd. 2, require the State to prove that Lueck
refused only the blood test to convict him of test refusal.
6 The fact that the officer also offered Lueck a urine test is immaterial, because the offer was not statutorily required. Similarly, that Lueck refused the urine test is immaterial because his refusal of the urine test was not the basis of the test-refusal charge. 13 II.
Having concluded that Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2), and 171.177, subd. 2, as
applied here, require the State to prove that Lueck refused only a blood test in order to
convict him of test refusal, we consider the constitutional implications of the test-refusal
prosecution in this case. We review constitutional questions de novo. State v. Rey, 905
N.W.2d 490, 495 (Minn. 2018).
In Trahan, we summarized the Supreme Court’s holding in Birchfield as follows:
“if the police lawfully arrest a person for suspicion of driving while impaired, a blood test
cannot be required without a warrant or exigent circumstances, and the Fourth Amendment
prohibits a person from being convicted for refusing such a test when no warrant or exigent
circumstances are present.” Trahan, 886 N.W.2d at 221 (citing Birchfield, 579 U.S. at
477–78). Birchfield and Trahan clearly provide that a test-refusal conviction based on
refusing a blood test does not violate the Fourth Amendment if there was a warrant for the
blood test. Because Lueck’s test-refusal conviction was based on refusing only a blood
test and a warrant authorized the blood test, we hold that Lueck’s test-refusal conviction
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, though on
other grounds.
HENNESY, J. took no part in the decision of this case.