This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1869
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Bayyinah Jameelah Shelton, Appellant.
Filed September 26, 2016 Affirmed Rodenberg, Judge
Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CR-14-4020
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Assistant County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal-Hill, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Randall, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Bayyinah Jameelah Shelton challenges her conviction of terroristic
threats, arguing that the state failed to prove the requisite mental state under the charging
statute. Because the record supports the fact-finder’s determination that appellant
recklessly disregarded the risk of terrorizing others, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant had a pending Social Security claim and, on May 15, 2014, she
telephoned the St. Cloud Social Security office and left this voicemail message:
Bayyinah Shelton, [Social Security number redacted], I’m gonna kill everybody, I’m sick [of] you guys f---ing with me for no g--d--n reason, I didn’t even submit a f---ing claim so I don’t know why you guys are even riding me and telling me some bulls---, and I didn’t even f---ing submit a g--d--n claim, so why the f--- are you guys riding me? Call me back and I might try to kill you guys, [appellant’s telephone number], you’re starting f---ing war (indiscernible) killing all you f---ing white people, I’m sick of this stupid sh--.
The Social Security worker who received the voicemail message, K.S., was
distraught upon listening to it, and reported the message to her supervisor. Police
investigated the complaint and eventually arrested appellant for terroristic threats.
Appellant admitted to police that she contacted “St. Cloud Social Services” and stated
that she would kill herself if they didn’t stop sending her mail. Appellant appeared
hysterical and made other suicidal comments when arrested.
2 The state charged appellant with terroristic threats (reckless disregard of risk)
under Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2012).1 Appellant waived her right to a jury trial.
At trial, the state introduced the voicemail evidence and testimony from K.S. and an
investigating officer. K.S. testified that she had sent appellant several letters, which
included her office address and direct telephone number, concerning appellant’s claim.
K.S. testified that she believed she and her office were threatened by appellant, that the
message was “very concerning,” and that she felt “stressed” and “nervous” after listening
to it. K.S. contacted her supervisor, who in turn notified local police, the office security
guard, and Federal Protective Services.
Appellant first testified that she had no recollection of the day the threatening
message was left. She later testified that she remembered interacting with police officers
at her residence. Appellant believed she had left the message and described it as
shocking and disturbing. Appellant claimed that she contacted the Social Security office
because she was trying to figure out what was wrong with her mental health, and thought
that she had left the message in a “dream state.”
The district court found appellant guilty of terroristic threats (reckless disregard of
risk), and sentenced her to one year in jail, with all but 60 days stayed, and two years of
probation, during which mental-health supports were required as a condition of
probation. This appeal followed.
1 The offense was restyled as “threats of violence” by 2015 legislation. Minn. Stat. § 609.713 (Supp. 2015).
3 DECISION
Appellant challenges her terroristic-threats conviction, arguing that the evidence is
insufficient to prove that she acted with reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing
others. Appellant argues that her conduct and statements amounted to mere “transitory
anger.” Appellant does not argue on appeal that the Al-Naseer circumstantial-evidence
evaluation applies to the sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis on the mental-state
question. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. 2010).
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we review whether “the facts in
the record and any legitimate inferences drawn from them” could lead a fact-finder to
“reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Whitley, 682 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. App. 2004). This
standard of review applies equally in reviewing jury trials and court trials. Id. at 694-95.
Minnesota law provides that a person is guilty of making terroristic threats if she
“threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to
terrorize another . . . or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror . . . .”
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1. “Terrorize means to cause extreme fear by use of
violence or threats.” State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 400, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614
(1975). The state made no claim at trial that appellant acted “with purpose to terrorize.”
Instead, it posited only that appellant recklessly disregarded the risk of causing terror
when she left the voicemail message. A statement is threatening if the “communication
in its context would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator
will act according to its tenor.” Id. at 399, 237 N.W.2d at 613 (quotations omitted). A
4 “crime of violence” includes third-degree assault. See Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 1(d)
(2012) (listing third-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.223 (2012) as a crime
of violence).
Appellant does not dispute that she made the statements on the voicemail message.
She argues only that the state failed to prove the mental-state requirement. In the context
of a terroristic-threats conviction, “[r]ecklessness requires deliberate action in disregard
of a known, substantial risk.” State v. Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d 53, 57 (Minn. App. 2009),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 2009). “[A] person who might lack a specific intent to
threaten or terrorize may nevertheless utter an objectively threatening statement
recklessly, committing a terroristic-threats crime. By acting without regard to a known,
substantial risk, a person’s threats, however intended, may violate the statute.” Id.
Here, the state introduced the recording of appellant’s threats. The recording on
K.S.’s answering device contained several clear threats to “kill” people. K.S. testified
that she had sent appellant several letters, which included the address of the Social
Security office and K.S.’s direct telephone number, concerning appellant’s pending
claim. K.S.
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1869
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Bayyinah Jameelah Shelton, Appellant.
Filed September 26, 2016 Affirmed Rodenberg, Judge
Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CR-14-4020
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Assistant County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal-Hill, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Randall, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Bayyinah Jameelah Shelton challenges her conviction of terroristic
threats, arguing that the state failed to prove the requisite mental state under the charging
statute. Because the record supports the fact-finder’s determination that appellant
recklessly disregarded the risk of terrorizing others, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant had a pending Social Security claim and, on May 15, 2014, she
telephoned the St. Cloud Social Security office and left this voicemail message:
Bayyinah Shelton, [Social Security number redacted], I’m gonna kill everybody, I’m sick [of] you guys f---ing with me for no g--d--n reason, I didn’t even submit a f---ing claim so I don’t know why you guys are even riding me and telling me some bulls---, and I didn’t even f---ing submit a g--d--n claim, so why the f--- are you guys riding me? Call me back and I might try to kill you guys, [appellant’s telephone number], you’re starting f---ing war (indiscernible) killing all you f---ing white people, I’m sick of this stupid sh--.
The Social Security worker who received the voicemail message, K.S., was
distraught upon listening to it, and reported the message to her supervisor. Police
investigated the complaint and eventually arrested appellant for terroristic threats.
Appellant admitted to police that she contacted “St. Cloud Social Services” and stated
that she would kill herself if they didn’t stop sending her mail. Appellant appeared
hysterical and made other suicidal comments when arrested.
2 The state charged appellant with terroristic threats (reckless disregard of risk)
under Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2012).1 Appellant waived her right to a jury trial.
At trial, the state introduced the voicemail evidence and testimony from K.S. and an
investigating officer. K.S. testified that she had sent appellant several letters, which
included her office address and direct telephone number, concerning appellant’s claim.
K.S. testified that she believed she and her office were threatened by appellant, that the
message was “very concerning,” and that she felt “stressed” and “nervous” after listening
to it. K.S. contacted her supervisor, who in turn notified local police, the office security
guard, and Federal Protective Services.
Appellant first testified that she had no recollection of the day the threatening
message was left. She later testified that she remembered interacting with police officers
at her residence. Appellant believed she had left the message and described it as
shocking and disturbing. Appellant claimed that she contacted the Social Security office
because she was trying to figure out what was wrong with her mental health, and thought
that she had left the message in a “dream state.”
The district court found appellant guilty of terroristic threats (reckless disregard of
risk), and sentenced her to one year in jail, with all but 60 days stayed, and two years of
probation, during which mental-health supports were required as a condition of
probation. This appeal followed.
1 The offense was restyled as “threats of violence” by 2015 legislation. Minn. Stat. § 609.713 (Supp. 2015).
3 DECISION
Appellant challenges her terroristic-threats conviction, arguing that the evidence is
insufficient to prove that she acted with reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing
others. Appellant argues that her conduct and statements amounted to mere “transitory
anger.” Appellant does not argue on appeal that the Al-Naseer circumstantial-evidence
evaluation applies to the sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis on the mental-state
question. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. 2010).
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we review whether “the facts in
the record and any legitimate inferences drawn from them” could lead a fact-finder to
“reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Whitley, 682 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. App. 2004). This
standard of review applies equally in reviewing jury trials and court trials. Id. at 694-95.
Minnesota law provides that a person is guilty of making terroristic threats if she
“threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to
terrorize another . . . or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror . . . .”
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1. “Terrorize means to cause extreme fear by use of
violence or threats.” State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 400, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614
(1975). The state made no claim at trial that appellant acted “with purpose to terrorize.”
Instead, it posited only that appellant recklessly disregarded the risk of causing terror
when she left the voicemail message. A statement is threatening if the “communication
in its context would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator
will act according to its tenor.” Id. at 399, 237 N.W.2d at 613 (quotations omitted). A
4 “crime of violence” includes third-degree assault. See Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 1(d)
(2012) (listing third-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.223 (2012) as a crime
of violence).
Appellant does not dispute that she made the statements on the voicemail message.
She argues only that the state failed to prove the mental-state requirement. In the context
of a terroristic-threats conviction, “[r]ecklessness requires deliberate action in disregard
of a known, substantial risk.” State v. Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d 53, 57 (Minn. App. 2009),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 2009). “[A] person who might lack a specific intent to
threaten or terrorize may nevertheless utter an objectively threatening statement
recklessly, committing a terroristic-threats crime. By acting without regard to a known,
substantial risk, a person’s threats, however intended, may violate the statute.” Id.
Here, the state introduced the recording of appellant’s threats. The recording on
K.S.’s answering device contained several clear threats to “kill” people. K.S. testified
that she had sent appellant several letters, which included the address of the Social
Security office and K.S.’s direct telephone number, concerning appellant’s pending
claim. K.S. testified that she believed she and her office were threatened by appellant,
that the message was “very concerning,” and that she felt “stressed” and “nervous.”
Although appellant first disclaimed any memory of the day of the call, she later testified
that she remembered some parts of the day. The voicemail message includes appellant’s
name, social security number, and telephone number. Appellant, in making the call, had
to have retrieved the telephone number for the Social Security office from one of the
notices sent to her, because she called the direct telephone of the very person who had
5 sent her the notices. On these facts, the fact-finder could reasonably find that appellant
recklessly disregarded the risk of terror her statements could cause K.S.
Appellant argues that it is reasonable and rational to infer from the evidence that
she was merely expressing transitory anger due to ongoing stress and mental-health
issues, and that she did not intend to follow through on her threats. But the crime of
reckless-disregard terroristic threats does not require proof of any intent to follow through
on threats. It is enough that the threats were made, that they caused or tended to cause
terror, and that the person making the threats recklessly disregarded the risk of terrorizing
others. Id., 771 N.W.2d at 57. The district court found that the state had proved the
elements of the offense. The record supports the district court’s findings.
Appellant also appears to argue that, in order to be a crime, terroristic threats must
be specifically directed at a particular individual, rather than a group of people. She cites
nothing in support of this claim. We can find no authority for such a “group-threat
exception.” Moreover, it is clear from the record that appellant called the direct line of
K.S., the person responsible for processing appellant’s claim, and made the threats to her.
Although others employed by Social Security were threatened, the appellant’s statements
were directed at K.S. on her direct telephone line, and included “I might try to kill you
guys, . . . killing all you f---ing white people.”
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is
sufficient to support the district court’s finding that the state proved that appellant
recklessly disregarded the risk of causing extreme fear to those hearing the telephone-
6 message threats. The record supports the district court’s conclusion that appellant is
guilty of terroristic threats.2
Affirmed.
2 Despite the very disturbing threats made by appellant, the district court commendably tailored a sentence which took appellant’s apparent mental-health issues into account.