State of Minnesota v. Antonyo Esquire Lundy

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-1212

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

Antonyo Esquire Lundy, Appellant.

Filed July 6, 2026 Affirmed Cochran, Judge

Ramsey County District Court File Nos. 62-CR-23-4301, 62-CR-22-7422

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Smith,

John, Judge. ∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

In this direct appeal from the final judgment of convictions for theft and failure to

register as a predatory offender, appellant argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty

pleas because his pleas are not constitutionally valid. We affirm.

FACTS

In December 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Antonyo

Esquire Lundy 1 with felony theft under Minnesota Statutes section 609.52, subdivision 2

(2022), in court file number 62-CR-22-7422. The complaint alleged that Lundy broke into

two vehicles parked in a lot adjacent to a business and stole tools and other items from the

vehicles. In July 2023, the state charged Lundy in a different court file, number 62-CR-

23-4301, with violating the predatory-offender-registration statute by failing to register an

address or change of information as required with the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal

Apprehension in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 243.166, subdivision 5(a)(1)

(2022).

Lundy entered into a plea agreement with the state to resolve both these and two

other open case files. Under the terms of the agreement, Lundy agreed to plead guilty to

felony theft in court file number 62-CR-22-7422, failing to register in court file number

1 This appeal involves two district court files. Our case management system identifies Lundy as “Antonyo Esquire Lundy” in court file number 62-CR-23-4301, and “Antonyo Esquire Lundy, Jr.” in court file number 62-CR-22-7422. Because it is unclear from our case management system which name is correct, we use the name from the 2023 case file— Antonyo Esquire Lundy.

2 62-CR-23-4301, and to the charges in the two other open court files. 2 In exchange, the

state agreed to dismiss the remaining felony charges in one of the other files. The state and

Lundy also agreed to the sentencing terms including concurrent sentencing, a mitigated

dispositional departure with 365 days to serve at the workhouse, and restitution.

At the plea hearing, defense counsel presented the terms of the plea agreement.

Defense counsel also urged the district court to grant Lundy conditional release based on

credit for time served. The district court asked Lundy if he understood the terms of the

plea agreement, and if he wanted to give up his trial rights. Lundy responded, “Yes.” The

district court then asked Lundy, “[D]o you understand if you don’t show up for sentencing,

if you don’t cooperate with the presentence investigation [(PSI)], if you do not remain law

abiding, I’m going to keep your pleas and I’m going to likely give you more jail time or

even prison time?” Lundy said, “Okay.” The district court asked, “You understand that?”

Lundy responded, “Yes.” The district court reiterated, “[Y]ou need to understand that if

you don’t do well, all bets are off in terms of disposition. Understood?” Lundy repeated,

“Yes.”

Lundy then pleaded guilty to theft, violating the predatory-offender statute, and the

charges in the two other open case files pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. He

confirmed that he reviewed the plea petition with his attorney “line by line” and that his

attorney answered his questions. Defense counsel tendered the plea petitions, without

objection from the state, and Lundy provided a factual basis for his pleas after confirming

2 The other offenses in the other two open court files are not at issue on appeal.

3 he understood the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. He also agreed that no person

was forcing him to plead guilty. After continuing the matters for sentencing, the district

court released Lundy from jail on his own recognizance and instructed him to contact the

probation department within 48 hours to participate in a PSI prior to sentencing.

The district court held a sentencing hearing in January 2025. Lundy failed to appear,

and the district court issued a warrant for his arrest. The district court also noted that the

PSI was not completed as required.

Lundy was later arrested on the bench warrant and appeared in court for a sentencing

hearing in April 2025. The district court received the PSI report by the time of the hearing.

The district court adjudicated Lundy guilty of the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. As

the district court was announcing concurrent prison sentences for the offenses, Lundy

interrupted the judge to state that he believed the plea agreement contemplated probation

rather than jail time. The district court responded, “There was an agreement for a departure,

but you did not comply with your requirements, because my understanding is that you may

have picked up a new file, . . . which violates the plea agreement.” The district court

continued the hearing to give Lundy time to speak with his attorney about whether he

wanted to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Lundy appeared in court about a month later for the rescheduled sentencing hearing.

Defense counsel indicated that Lundy did not want to withdraw his pleas. Lundy moved

for a downward dispositional departure in his pending case files, arguing that he was

particularly amenable to probation and treatment. The district court denied Lundy’s motion

for a downward dispositional departure to probation. Instead, the district court sentenced

4 Lundy to 25 months in prison on the predatory-offender charge (file 62-CR-23-4301) and

a stayed sentence of 19 months in prison on the felony theft charge (file 62-CR-22-7422).

Lundy appeals.

DECISION

“An appellant may challenge a guilty plea’s validity in the first instance on direct

appeal.” State v. Lawrence, 982 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Minn. App. 2022). If we determine

that a defendant’s plea agreement has been violated, we “may allow withdrawal of the plea,

order specific performance, or alter the sentence if appropriate.” State v. Brown,

606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000). But a defendant does not have an absolute right to

withdraw a guilty plea. Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016).

Lundy argues that his guilty pleas were not intelligent or voluntary and seeks to

withdraw his pleas on that basis. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be

accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Brown, 606 N.W.2d at 674. The validity of a guilty

plea is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. State v. Raleigh,

778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a

plea is invalid. Id. If a defendant entered an invalid guilty plea, we will reverse and remand

to the district court to allow the defendant to withdraw their guilty plea. State v. Davenport,

948 N.W.2d 176, 180-81 (Minn. App. 2020).

Intelligence Requirement

Lundy first argues that his guilty pleas were not intelligent because the district court

added conditions to the pleas that were not presented by the parties as part of the plea

agreement. The state responds that Lundy’s pleas were intelligent because he understood

5 the charges against him, the rights he was giving up, and the agreement he was making.

We agree with the state.

The intelligence requirement ensures that the defendant understands the state’s

charges against him, the rights being waived, and the consequences of the plea. Raleigh,

778 N.W.2d at 96. The defendant must understand the plea’s “direct consequences.” Id.

“Direct consequences are those which flow definitely, immediately, and automatically

from the guilty plea, such as the maximum sentence to be imposed . . . .” State v. Crump,

826 N.W.2d 838, 841-42 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn.

May 21, 2013).

Lundy contends that the district court rendered his guilty pleas unintelligent by

adding terms to the plea agreement. A district court “must not participate in plea

negotiations.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.04, subd. 3(1). When a judge becomes involved in

the plea-bargaining process, there is an inherent risk that the defendant will feel pressured

to plead guilty. Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 567-68 (Minn. 2018). However, a

district court may inquire about the status of negotiations, share general sentencing

practices, or provide information without becoming improperly entangled in the

plea-bargaining process. Id. at 565.

Here, Lundy claims his pleas were not intelligent because the district court “refused

to honor the plea agreement” by imposing a prison sentence. Lundy asserts that the plea

agreement with the state anticipated that Lundy would receive concurrent sentences, a

mitigated dispositional departure with a year in the workhouse, and restitution. Lundy

contends that the district court added new conditions to the plea agreement by telling him

6 that: “[I]f you don’t show up for sentencing, if you don’t cooperate with the presentence

investigation, if you do not remain law abiding, I’m going to keep your pleas and I’m going

to likely give you more jail time or even prison time.” The state argues in response that

the district court did not participate in the plea negotiation because the district court was

explaining the conditions of Lundy’s release between the plea hearing and the sentencing

hearing.

When viewed in context, we are satisfied that the district court’s statement did not

amount to an impermissible intrusion into the plea-negotiation process. Rather, the district

court was imposing conditions on Lundy’s release from jail pending the sentencing

hearing, after Lundy pleaded guilty. At the hearing, defense counsel asked the district court

to grant Lundy conditional release from custody pending the sentencing hearing. The

district court then discussed the conditions of release and advised Lundy that if he did not

show up for sentencing, cooperate with the PSI, or remain law abiding, the district court

would likely impose more jail time or a prison sentence. The criminal rules of procedure

grant district courts the authority to impose release conditions. See, e.g., Minn. R. Crim.

P. 6.02 (permitting a district court to set conditions of release prior to trial); 19.05 (allowing

a district court to set or modify conditions of release at an initial-appearance hearing); 27.01

(providing that after conviction but before sentencing, a district court may “continue or

alter the terms of release, or the court may confine the defendant”). It is clear, in context,

that the conditions Lundy challenges on appeal—appearing for sentencing, cooperating

with the PSI, and remaining law abiding—related to Lundy’s release from custody and not

to the underlying terms of the plea agreement itself.

7 When reviewing a plea agreement and its conditions, we look at what the parties

reasonably understood to be the terms of their agreement. State v. Wukawitz,

662 N.W.2d 517, 527 (Minn. 2003). Here, the record supports the conclusion that Lundy

understood the conditional-release terms imposed by the district court. Lundy agreed to

plead guilty, and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. At the plea hearing,

the district court asked Lundy numerous times if he understood that the district court would

impose more jail time or a prison sentence if Lundy failed to abide by the terms of his

conditional release. Lundy indicated each time that he understood. Lundy acknowledged

he went through the plea agreement “line by line” with his attorney, that his attorney

answered his questions, and that he was thinking clearly. Lundy confirmed he wished to

plead guilty. The district court went over Lundy’s rights with him and asked if he

understood that he was waiving those rights by entering the guilty pleas. Lundy indicated

he understood he was waiving those rights.

Based on our review of all the relevant circumstances surrounding the pleas, we

conclude that the district court did not impermissibly intrude into the plea-negotiation

process but was instead discussing a condition of release. The district court was authorized

to impose conditions of release, independent of the plea agreement that Lundy had with

the state. Moreover, the record shows that Lundy acknowledged that he understood the

terms of the plea agreement, understood he was waiving certain rights by pleading guilty,

and wanted to proceed with the plea hearing. Accordingly, the record reflects that Lundy’s

guilty pleas were made intelligently.

8 Voluntary Requirement

Lundy next asserts that his pleas were not voluntary because he did not receive

probation, as contemplated by the plea agreement. The state argues that Lundy’s pleas

were voluntary because the promise of probation was conditioned on Lundy’s

pre-sentencing behavior. We again agree with the state.

“The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to

improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Improper pressure or coercion

generally comes from an external source, such as a threat or promise made to induce a

defendant to plead guilty. Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016). Whether

a plea is voluntary is determined by considering all of the relevant circumstances.

State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 718-19 (Minn. 1994); see also Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96

(instructing courts to examine what the parties understood to be the terms of the plea

agreement).

Lundy contends that his guilty pleas were involuntary because the pleas were

induced by the state’s unfulfilled promise that he would receive probation, a year in the

workhouse, and restitution. Lundy argues that he did not receive the benefit of his plea

bargain because the district court imposed a prison sentence rather than placing him on

probation. We are not persuaded by these arguments.

As explained above, the district court sentenced Lundy to prison because he failed

to comply with the conditions of release prior to sentencing. These conditions included

appearing for the sentencing hearing, cooperating with the PSI, and remaining law abiding.

The district court explained these conditions to Lundy at the plea hearing and advised

9 Lundy that if he violated those conditions, the district court was “likely [to] give [him]

more jail time or even prison time.” Lundy acknowledged that he understood. The district

court again asked, “You understand that?” Lundy said, “Yes.” The district court said,

“[Y]ou need to understand that if you don’t do well, all bets are off in terms of disposition.

Understood?” Lundy confirmed, “Yes.” Given the record before us, there is no basis to

conclude that Lundy pleaded guilty due to improper pressure or coercion. Lundy received

jail time because he failed to comply with the district court’s conditions of release, not

because the state induced him to enter the plea agreement based on an unfulfilled promise.

We therefore conclude that Lundy’s pleas were made voluntarily.

In sum, Lundy has not met his burden to show he is entitled to withdraw his guilty

pleas.

Affirmed.