This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-1061
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Anthony Wayne Quaderer, Appellant.
Filed May 19, 2025 Affirmed Bjorkman, Judge
Beltrami County District Court File No. 04-CR-23-633
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Symon Schindler-Syme, Assistant County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of refusal to submit to chemical testing of his
blood or urine as required by a search warrant. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) declining to instruct the jury that the state must prove the officer had
probable cause to believe that appellant was driving while impaired, and (2) admitting
testimony that people who refuse to perform field sobriety tests are impaired. In a pro se
supplemental brief, he argues that the district court erred by denying his challenge to the
search warrant. We affirm.
FACTS
On a March evening in 2023, a Bemidji police officer stopped a vehicle because of
its loud exhaust and identified the driver as appellant Anthony Wayne Quaderer. As they
interacted, the officer noticed that Quaderer was “sweating profusely,” despite the below-
freezing temperature. The officer also noticed that Quaderer’s eyes were “glassy” and his
pupils were constricted and not reacting to light. Based on these observations, the officer
believed Quaderer was under the influence of a narcotic analgesic like fentanyl or heroin,
or a central-nervous-system stimulant like cocaine or methamphetamine, or a combination
thereof.
The officer asked Quaderer to perform field sobriety tests; Quaderer refused. The
officer arrested Quaderer for driving while impaired, then obtained a search warrant to
obtain a sample of Quaderer’s blood or urine for testing. When the officer presented
Quaderer the warrant, explained that refusal to test is a crime, and asked for a blood sample,
Quaderer refused by shaking his head. He did the same when asked for a urine sample.
2 Quaderer was charged with felony test refusal under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20,
subd. 2(2) (2022). Before trial, 1 the district court rejected Quaderer’s challenge to the
search warrant; granted the state’s motion, over Quaderer’s objection, to admit testimony
from the officer about Qauderer’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests; and denied
Quaderer’s request for an instruction to the jury that the state must prove that the officer
had probable cause to believe that he was driving while impaired.
The matter proceeded to trial, at which the officer was the sole witness. He testified
consistent with the facts above. When asked about Quaderer’s refusal to perform field
sobriety tests, the officer testified that, in his experience, when people refuse field sobriety
testing “it’s because they are so impaired that they know that they’re going to perform
poorly and they’d rather just skip the step.” The jury found Quaderer guilty, and the district
court sentenced him to 64 months’ imprisonment.
Quaderer appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to instruct the jury that the state must prove the officer had probable cause to believe that Quaderer was driving while impaired.
We review de novo whether a particular jury instruction accurately states the law,
as indicated in the charging statute. State v. Davis, 864 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Minn. 2015).
But we will not reverse a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction absent
an abuse of discretion. State v. Kelbel, 648 N.W.2d 690, 703 (Minn. 2002).
1 Quaderer’s first trial ended in a hung jury. Unless indicated otherwise, all references to trial are to the second trial, which led to the conviction under review.
3 A district court has “considerable latitude” in determining the language of jury
instructions, but the instructions must, as a whole, “fairly and adequately explain the law
. . . and define the crime charged.” Davis, 864 N.W.2d at 176 (quotations omitted). “To
determine if a jury instruction correctly states the law, we analyze the criminal statute and
the case law under it.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Minn. 2015). A district court
abuses its discretion if it instructs the jury in a manner that “confuses, misleads, or
materially misstates the law.” State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 166 (Minn. 2024) (quotation
omitted).
Quaderer contends that the district court abused its discretion by declining to
instruct the jury that the state must prove that the officer had probable cause to suspect he
was driving while impaired. We disagree.
The charging statute provides: “It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a
chemical test . . . of [their] blood or urine as required by a search warrant.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2). As Quaderer acknowledges, this language expressly requires only
proof of a search warrant, not separate proof that the officer had the probable cause
necessary to obtain one. See Minn. Stat. § 626.08 (2022) (stating that “[a] search warrant
cannot be issued but upon probable cause”). It also does not reference any other statute
that imposes a probable-cause requirement, making it unlike the statute that criminalizes
refusal to take a breath test. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (2022) (citing Minn.
Stat. § 169A.51 (2022)). In other words, probable cause to believe a driver is impaired is
not an element of the charged test-refusal offense.
4 Moreover, we recently held that probable cause is not an element of test refusal
under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), and therefore need not be part of the jury
instructions for that offense. State v. Torrez, 8 N.W.3d 674, 678-79 (Minn. App. 2024),
rev. granted (Minn. Sept. 25, 2024). And while Quaderer asserts that Torrez was “wrongly
decided,” it is precedential authority that is binding on this court, unless and until the
supreme court reverses it. State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684, 691, 694-95 (Minn. App.
2021), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 10, 2021). Accordingly, Quaderer’s claim of instructional
error fails.
II. The district court did not commit reversible error by admitting testimony that people who refuse to perform field sobriety tests are impaired.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Dolo v.
State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2020). “Even if the district court’s admission of
evidence was in error, such admission is harmless if it did not significantly impact the
verdict.” State v. Heller, 12 N.W.3d 452, 466 (Minn. 2024).
Quaderer contends the officer’s testimony about drivers who refuse field sobriety
tests was “improper profile evidence.” He is correct that evidence is inadmissible if it
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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-1061
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Anthony Wayne Quaderer, Appellant.
Filed May 19, 2025 Affirmed Bjorkman, Judge
Beltrami County District Court File No. 04-CR-23-633
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Symon Schindler-Syme, Assistant County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of refusal to submit to chemical testing of his
blood or urine as required by a search warrant. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) declining to instruct the jury that the state must prove the officer had
probable cause to believe that appellant was driving while impaired, and (2) admitting
testimony that people who refuse to perform field sobriety tests are impaired. In a pro se
supplemental brief, he argues that the district court erred by denying his challenge to the
search warrant. We affirm.
FACTS
On a March evening in 2023, a Bemidji police officer stopped a vehicle because of
its loud exhaust and identified the driver as appellant Anthony Wayne Quaderer. As they
interacted, the officer noticed that Quaderer was “sweating profusely,” despite the below-
freezing temperature. The officer also noticed that Quaderer’s eyes were “glassy” and his
pupils were constricted and not reacting to light. Based on these observations, the officer
believed Quaderer was under the influence of a narcotic analgesic like fentanyl or heroin,
or a central-nervous-system stimulant like cocaine or methamphetamine, or a combination
thereof.
The officer asked Quaderer to perform field sobriety tests; Quaderer refused. The
officer arrested Quaderer for driving while impaired, then obtained a search warrant to
obtain a sample of Quaderer’s blood or urine for testing. When the officer presented
Quaderer the warrant, explained that refusal to test is a crime, and asked for a blood sample,
Quaderer refused by shaking his head. He did the same when asked for a urine sample.
2 Quaderer was charged with felony test refusal under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20,
subd. 2(2) (2022). Before trial, 1 the district court rejected Quaderer’s challenge to the
search warrant; granted the state’s motion, over Quaderer’s objection, to admit testimony
from the officer about Qauderer’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests; and denied
Quaderer’s request for an instruction to the jury that the state must prove that the officer
had probable cause to believe that he was driving while impaired.
The matter proceeded to trial, at which the officer was the sole witness. He testified
consistent with the facts above. When asked about Quaderer’s refusal to perform field
sobriety tests, the officer testified that, in his experience, when people refuse field sobriety
testing “it’s because they are so impaired that they know that they’re going to perform
poorly and they’d rather just skip the step.” The jury found Quaderer guilty, and the district
court sentenced him to 64 months’ imprisonment.
Quaderer appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to instruct the jury that the state must prove the officer had probable cause to believe that Quaderer was driving while impaired.
We review de novo whether a particular jury instruction accurately states the law,
as indicated in the charging statute. State v. Davis, 864 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Minn. 2015).
But we will not reverse a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction absent
an abuse of discretion. State v. Kelbel, 648 N.W.2d 690, 703 (Minn. 2002).
1 Quaderer’s first trial ended in a hung jury. Unless indicated otherwise, all references to trial are to the second trial, which led to the conviction under review.
3 A district court has “considerable latitude” in determining the language of jury
instructions, but the instructions must, as a whole, “fairly and adequately explain the law
. . . and define the crime charged.” Davis, 864 N.W.2d at 176 (quotations omitted). “To
determine if a jury instruction correctly states the law, we analyze the criminal statute and
the case law under it.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Minn. 2015). A district court
abuses its discretion if it instructs the jury in a manner that “confuses, misleads, or
materially misstates the law.” State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 166 (Minn. 2024) (quotation
omitted).
Quaderer contends that the district court abused its discretion by declining to
instruct the jury that the state must prove that the officer had probable cause to suspect he
was driving while impaired. We disagree.
The charging statute provides: “It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a
chemical test . . . of [their] blood or urine as required by a search warrant.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2). As Quaderer acknowledges, this language expressly requires only
proof of a search warrant, not separate proof that the officer had the probable cause
necessary to obtain one. See Minn. Stat. § 626.08 (2022) (stating that “[a] search warrant
cannot be issued but upon probable cause”). It also does not reference any other statute
that imposes a probable-cause requirement, making it unlike the statute that criminalizes
refusal to take a breath test. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (2022) (citing Minn.
Stat. § 169A.51 (2022)). In other words, probable cause to believe a driver is impaired is
not an element of the charged test-refusal offense.
4 Moreover, we recently held that probable cause is not an element of test refusal
under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), and therefore need not be part of the jury
instructions for that offense. State v. Torrez, 8 N.W.3d 674, 678-79 (Minn. App. 2024),
rev. granted (Minn. Sept. 25, 2024). And while Quaderer asserts that Torrez was “wrongly
decided,” it is precedential authority that is binding on this court, unless and until the
supreme court reverses it. State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684, 691, 694-95 (Minn. App.
2021), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 10, 2021). Accordingly, Quaderer’s claim of instructional
error fails.
II. The district court did not commit reversible error by admitting testimony that people who refuse to perform field sobriety tests are impaired.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Dolo v.
State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2020). “Even if the district court’s admission of
evidence was in error, such admission is harmless if it did not significantly impact the
verdict.” State v. Heller, 12 N.W.3d 452, 466 (Minn. 2024).
Quaderer contends the officer’s testimony about drivers who refuse field sobriety
tests was “improper profile evidence.” He is correct that evidence is inadmissible if it
serves only to “impliedly urge[]” the jury to “infer that since defendant’s conduct fit [a
described] profile, the defendant must have been guilty.” Id. at 467 (quotations omitted).
But even assuming that the challenged testimony was inadmissible, its admission does not
warrant reversal if it did not significantly impact the verdict. Id. at 466, 468.
We assess impact by independently reviewing the record and considering a
nonexclusive list of factors: “(1) the manner in which the party presented the evidence,
5 (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who offered the
evidence used it in closing argument, and (4) whether the defense effectively countered the
testimony.” Id. at 468 (quoting State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024)). We
also consider the strength of the evidence of guilt. See id. at 469.
Consideration of these factors satisfies us that the admission of the challenged
testimony did not significantly impact the verdict. As Quaderer notes, the state did point
to the challenged testimony during closing argument, which weighs against a conclusion
of harmlessness. But it is the only factor that does so. The challenged testimony itself was
a single statement that played a very small role in the presentation of evidence—much
smaller than the officer’s unchallenged testimony that Quaderer’s condition (profuse
sweating despite cold weather, glassy eyes, and constricted and unresponsive pupils) was
consistent with him being under the influence of a controlled substance. While the officer’s
experience and expertise may have made his statement about the refusal of field sobriety
testing persuasive, these credentials equally bolstered his other testimony that more directly
addressed the question of Quaderer’s impairment. Moreover, Quaderer was able to counter
the testimony during his cross-examination of the officer, emphasizing that field sobriety
testing is not mandatory and challenging the evidentiary basis for the officer’s assertion
that chemically impaired drivers are uniquely prone to refusing such testing. And most
fundamentally, overwhelming evidence entirely independent of the challenged testimony
proved the two key issues at trial: (1) whether a search warrant required Quaderer to submit
to chemical testing of his blood or urine, and (2) whether he refused. On this record, any
error in admitting the challenged testimony was harmless.
6 III. Quaderer is not entitled to relief based on his pro se challenge to the search warrant.
In a pro se supplemental brief, Quaderer argues that the search warrant requiring
him to submit to chemical testing of his blood or urine was invalid because the officer
deliberately or recklessly omitted from the warrant application information regarding the
reason for the traffic stop, requiring a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
171-72 (1978). The record reflects that this issue is not properly before us. Quaderer did
not request a Franks hearing before his first trial. Nor did he request one in the written
motion challenging the search warrant that he filed before his second trial. At the hearing
on that motion, Quaderer referred to “an omission of relevant information” from the search
warrant. The state objected that Quaderer had not preserved a Franks issue with a timely
pretrial motion, as required under Minn. R. Crim. P. 10.01, subd. 2. The district court
agreed and made no substantive ruling on the issue. Quaderer identifies no error in the
district court’s reasoning and, therefore, has not demonstrated a basis for relief.
Affirmed.