This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0585
State of Minnesota Respondent,
vs.
Anthony Alton Holloway, Appellant.
Filed April 1, 2024 Affirmed Worke, Judge
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69DU-CR-22-629
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kimberly Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his attempted-second-degree-murder and child-endangerment
convictions, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted certain
out-of-court statements. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 2, 2022, police were dispatched to an apartment building to investigate a
reported stabbing. Upon their arrival, police encountered a woman, later identified as K.F.,
lying on the hallway floor. Police saw that K.F. was bleeding heavily based on the quantity
of blood “on her clothing, [and she] appeared to be stabbed multiple times.” Paramedics
arrived and began to treat K.F.’s wounds. K.F. had stab wounds to “her . . . [chest], on her
back and on her hand.” 1 It was later determined that K.F. was two months pregnant and
that her partner, appellant Anthony Alton Holloway, was the father. Holloway and K.F.
lived together in an apartment with two young children. 2
One of the officers spoke to H.E., a resident who had called 911. H.E. was holding
K.F.’s younger son (one year old). Police entered K.F.’s apartment; inside officers found
Holloway and K.F.’s older son (eight years old).
A jury trial was held in November 2022. The state called K.F. as its witness. K.F.
testified that, on the morning of March 2, 2022, she (1) was asleep in her bed with her
1 According to the police report, “[K.F.] sustained thirteen to fifteen stab wounds to her chest, neck and back, including one that pierced her heart.” 2 Holloway is the father of K.F.’s then unborn daughter and her younger son.
2 younger son; (2) was taken to the hospital in an ambulance to treat injuries; and (3) received
medical treatments while at the hospital, including stitches, an ultrasound, and surgery on
her hand to reattach tendons in her finger. But when the prosecutor asked K.F. if she was
able to testify about “what happened that caused those injuries,” K.F. replied: “I don’t want
to talk about it.” The state asked K.F. another question: “Did Mr. Holloway cause them?”
K.F. replied that she “d[i]dn’t want to talk about it.” The state ended its direct examination.
On redirect, the state asked K.F. why she left her apartment on the morning of March 2.
K.F. replied: “Because I was bleeding.”
The jury was excused for a brief recess for the district court to discuss an evidentiary
issue with counsel. The state proposed additional evidence be admitted to supplement
K.F.’s testimony under the residual hearsay exception of rule 807. The state intended to
offer K.F.’s statements made to police at the hospital. Holloway’s counsel argued that the
proposed evidence did not qualify under the exception and should be excluded. The district
court determined that “given [its] discretion over admission of evidence and application of
the totality of the circumstances in this case, I do find that the requirements for Rule 807,
including the notice requirement, have been met in this case” and it allowed the state to
present its evidence under the residual exception. The state then offered witness testimony,
still photos, and body-camera footage.
The jury found Holloway guilty of second-degree attempted murder and child
endangerment. The district court imposed a sentence of 240 months in prison. This appeal
followed.
3 DECISION
Holloway contends that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted
K.F.’s out-of-court statements to police. He argues that the state failed to use reasonable
efforts during K.F.’s testimony “to procure the most probative evidence of what” transpired
on the morning of March 2, 2022.
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and
[appellate courts] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).
Hearsay is a “statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible, unless an exception applies. Minn. R.
Evid. 802. The residual exception allows the admission of a hearsay statement “not
specifically covered by rule[s] 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness.” Minn. R. Evid. 807.
“A determination that a statement meets the foundational requirements of a hearsay
exception is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Holt v. State, 772 N.W.2d 470, 483
(Minn. 2009). “When deciding whether to admit hearsay evidence under Rule 807, the
first consideration is whether the proffered statement has circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.” State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020).
4 Second, the district court must determine whether the three enumerated
requirements of rule 807 are met. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 293 (Minn. 2019).
Rule 807 requires that (1) “the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact,” (2) “the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence”
procurable “through reasonable efforts” by the proponent, and (3) the general purpose
behind the Minnesota Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice are served by the
admission of the statement into evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 807.
Holloway contends that the state failed to use “reasonable efforts” in questioning
K.F. about the facts surrounding her injuries, therefore the requirements of rule 807 were
not satisfied. We disagree.
K.F.’s recorded out-of-court statements—one recorded soon after the incident
during a police interview and the second recorded at the hospital by an investigator the
following day—have the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness generally considered by
the district court when admitting evidence at trial.
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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0585
State of Minnesota Respondent,
vs.
Anthony Alton Holloway, Appellant.
Filed April 1, 2024 Affirmed Worke, Judge
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69DU-CR-22-629
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kimberly Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his attempted-second-degree-murder and child-endangerment
convictions, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted certain
out-of-court statements. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 2, 2022, police were dispatched to an apartment building to investigate a
reported stabbing. Upon their arrival, police encountered a woman, later identified as K.F.,
lying on the hallway floor. Police saw that K.F. was bleeding heavily based on the quantity
of blood “on her clothing, [and she] appeared to be stabbed multiple times.” Paramedics
arrived and began to treat K.F.’s wounds. K.F. had stab wounds to “her . . . [chest], on her
back and on her hand.” 1 It was later determined that K.F. was two months pregnant and
that her partner, appellant Anthony Alton Holloway, was the father. Holloway and K.F.
lived together in an apartment with two young children. 2
One of the officers spoke to H.E., a resident who had called 911. H.E. was holding
K.F.’s younger son (one year old). Police entered K.F.’s apartment; inside officers found
Holloway and K.F.’s older son (eight years old).
A jury trial was held in November 2022. The state called K.F. as its witness. K.F.
testified that, on the morning of March 2, 2022, she (1) was asleep in her bed with her
1 According to the police report, “[K.F.] sustained thirteen to fifteen stab wounds to her chest, neck and back, including one that pierced her heart.” 2 Holloway is the father of K.F.’s then unborn daughter and her younger son.
2 younger son; (2) was taken to the hospital in an ambulance to treat injuries; and (3) received
medical treatments while at the hospital, including stitches, an ultrasound, and surgery on
her hand to reattach tendons in her finger. But when the prosecutor asked K.F. if she was
able to testify about “what happened that caused those injuries,” K.F. replied: “I don’t want
to talk about it.” The state asked K.F. another question: “Did Mr. Holloway cause them?”
K.F. replied that she “d[i]dn’t want to talk about it.” The state ended its direct examination.
On redirect, the state asked K.F. why she left her apartment on the morning of March 2.
K.F. replied: “Because I was bleeding.”
The jury was excused for a brief recess for the district court to discuss an evidentiary
issue with counsel. The state proposed additional evidence be admitted to supplement
K.F.’s testimony under the residual hearsay exception of rule 807. The state intended to
offer K.F.’s statements made to police at the hospital. Holloway’s counsel argued that the
proposed evidence did not qualify under the exception and should be excluded. The district
court determined that “given [its] discretion over admission of evidence and application of
the totality of the circumstances in this case, I do find that the requirements for Rule 807,
including the notice requirement, have been met in this case” and it allowed the state to
present its evidence under the residual exception. The state then offered witness testimony,
still photos, and body-camera footage.
The jury found Holloway guilty of second-degree attempted murder and child
endangerment. The district court imposed a sentence of 240 months in prison. This appeal
followed.
3 DECISION
Holloway contends that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted
K.F.’s out-of-court statements to police. He argues that the state failed to use reasonable
efforts during K.F.’s testimony “to procure the most probative evidence of what” transpired
on the morning of March 2, 2022.
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and
[appellate courts] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).
Hearsay is a “statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible, unless an exception applies. Minn. R.
Evid. 802. The residual exception allows the admission of a hearsay statement “not
specifically covered by rule[s] 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness.” Minn. R. Evid. 807.
“A determination that a statement meets the foundational requirements of a hearsay
exception is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Holt v. State, 772 N.W.2d 470, 483
(Minn. 2009). “When deciding whether to admit hearsay evidence under Rule 807, the
first consideration is whether the proffered statement has circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.” State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020).
4 Second, the district court must determine whether the three enumerated
requirements of rule 807 are met. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 293 (Minn. 2019).
Rule 807 requires that (1) “the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact,” (2) “the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence”
procurable “through reasonable efforts” by the proponent, and (3) the general purpose
behind the Minnesota Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice are served by the
admission of the statement into evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 807.
Holloway contends that the state failed to use “reasonable efforts” in questioning
K.F. about the facts surrounding her injuries, therefore the requirements of rule 807 were
not satisfied. We disagree.
K.F.’s recorded out-of-court statements—one recorded soon after the incident
during a police interview and the second recorded at the hospital by an investigator the
following day—have the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness generally considered by
the district court when admitting evidence at trial.
We have held that the district court does not abuse its discretion by admitting the statement as trustworthy when (1) there is no Confrontation Clause issue because the declarant testifies, admits to making the prior statement, and is available for cross-examination by the defense counsel; (2) the statement is recorded, removing any real dispute about what the declarant said; (3) the statement is against the declarant’s penal interest; and (4) the statement is consistent with the State’s other evidence that pointed strongly toward the defendant’s guilt.
Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 293 (quotation omitted). Generally, the penal-interest factor can
be satisfied when the declarant’s statements are against her social interest in maintaining
her relationship with the defendant. See State v. Whiteside, 400 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Minn.
5 App. 1987) (concluding statement by defendant’s girlfriend implicating defendant was
against her penal interests), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 1987).
Here, K.F. testified and was cross-examined, her out-of-court statements were
recorded, the statements are against K.F.’s social interest in maintaining her relationship
with Holloway, and the statements are consistent with the state’s theory of the case. Id.;
see also State v. Plantin, 682 N.W.2d 653, 659 (Minn. App. 2004) (admitting under prior
residual hearsay rule statement made by victim who later recanted; victim admitted to
making statement, testified at trial, and made statement consistent with evidence of
defendant’s guilt), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). Further, the specific requirements
of rule 807 have been met: (1) K.F.’s statements included material facts because they
addressed the essential elements of Holloway’s murder attempt; and (2) admission of the
statements otherwise furthers the purpose of the rules and the interests of justice.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted certain hearsay
statements under the residual exception.
Affirmed.