This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-0919
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Ann Marie Hoyer, Appellant.
Filed April 4, 2016 Affirmed Johnson, Judge
Olmsted County District Court File No. 55-CR-15-479
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Terry L. Adkins, Rochester City Attorney, Kelly M. Wagner, Assistant City Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Patrick Dinneen, Silver Bay, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Ann Marie Hoyer was convicted of driving while impaired. She argues that the
district court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence arising from a stop of her
vehicle after a state trooper saw her vehicle lose traction when making a turn and drive onto a concrete median. We conclude that the trooper had a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity and, therefore, affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 12:55 a.m. on January 4, 2015, State Trooper Eric Bormann was
driving west on Elton Hills Drive (also known as 19th Street) in Rochester, near the
intersection with the east frontage road of U.S. Highway 52. The weather was cold, windy,
and snowy, and there was snow on the road. As he approached the intersection, Trooper
Bormann saw a vehicle travel east on Elton Hills Drive and turn north onto the frontage
road. Trooper Bormann saw the vehicle lose control by fishtailing to the right before
swerving to the left and driving onto a concrete median with its left front wheel. Trooper
Bormann then saw the vehicle drive off the median, briefly stop in the lane of travel, and
continue driving north.
Trooper Bormann activated his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle for
careless driving and driving outside the lane of travel. Trooper Bormann approached the
driver’s side of the vehicle and spoke with the driver, Hoyer. Trooper Bormann observed
indicia of intoxication, including slurred speech and glassy eyes. He administered a field
sobriety test and a preliminary breath test and arrested Hoyer for driving while impaired
(DWI). After reading Hoyer the implied-consent advisory, Trooper Bormann administered
a breath test, which indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.18.
The state charged Hoyer with one count of third-degree DWI for operating a motor
vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§§ 169A.20, subd. 1(5), .26, subd. 1(a) (2014), and another count of third-degree DWI, in
2 violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), .26, subd. 1(a). In May 2015, Hoyer
moved to suppress the evidence obtained by Trooper Bormann after stopping her vehicle
on the ground that the trooper’s investigatory stop was invalid. At the suppression hearing,
the state and Hoyer stipulated to the admission of an 18-page packet of documents, which
includes Trooper Bormann’s written report. The report contains, among other things, the
following narrative:
My attention was drawn to a Chevy Tahoe that was making a left turn from eastbound 19th Street to the northbound east frontage road. As the Tahoe turned left in front of me it fishtailed (the rear wheels were spinning with the right portion of the vehicle sliding to the right) to the right. The Tahoe did not just fishtail for a second or two but was fishtailing for much of the left turn. The Tahoe’s rear swung so far to the right that the Tahoe began driving out of its lane to the left and headed towards the cement median curb. The Tahoe drove onto the cement median curb with its left front wheel. The Tahoe then drove back down off of the curb then briefly stopped in its lane. My squad camera did not record the fishtail but it did record the Tahoe hitting the curb and stopping.
The state and Hoyer also stipulated to the admission of a video-recording of the stop that
was captured by Trooper Bormann’s squad-car dashboard video camera. After reviewing
the evidence, the district court denied Hoyer’s motion on the ground that, after Trooper
Bormann observed Hoyer’s vehicle fishtailing and driving onto the concrete median, he
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop.
The parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence court trial. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 4. The district court found Hoyer guilty of both of the charged offenses. The district
court stayed imposition of sentence for two years, ordered Hoyer to serve 30 days on
electronic home monitoring, and assessed a $750 fine. Hoyer appeals.
3 DECISION
Hoyer argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress
evidence. Specifically, she contends that Trooper Bormann did not have a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity before stopping her vehicle because her driving
was consistent with the normal manner of driving in wintry conditions.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The
Fourth Amendment also protects the right of the people to be secure in their motor vehicles.
See State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). But a law-enforcement officer may,
“‘consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop’” of a motor
vehicle if “‘the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot.’” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968))). A reasonable, articulable suspicion exists if, “in
justifying the particular intrusion the police officer [is] able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. The reasonable-
articulable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than
an unarticulated hunch,” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quotation
omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” Timberlake, 744
N.W.2d at 393 (quotation omitted). An officer “must be able to point to something that
4 objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182 (quotation omitted);
see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. Even a minor traffic violation may
provide the necessary reasonable, articulable suspicion for a traffic stop. See State v.
George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). When analyzing whether a stop is justified,
a district court should consider “the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-0919
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Ann Marie Hoyer, Appellant.
Filed April 4, 2016 Affirmed Johnson, Judge
Olmsted County District Court File No. 55-CR-15-479
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Terry L. Adkins, Rochester City Attorney, Kelly M. Wagner, Assistant City Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Patrick Dinneen, Silver Bay, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Ann Marie Hoyer was convicted of driving while impaired. She argues that the
district court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence arising from a stop of her
vehicle after a state trooper saw her vehicle lose traction when making a turn and drive onto a concrete median. We conclude that the trooper had a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity and, therefore, affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 12:55 a.m. on January 4, 2015, State Trooper Eric Bormann was
driving west on Elton Hills Drive (also known as 19th Street) in Rochester, near the
intersection with the east frontage road of U.S. Highway 52. The weather was cold, windy,
and snowy, and there was snow on the road. As he approached the intersection, Trooper
Bormann saw a vehicle travel east on Elton Hills Drive and turn north onto the frontage
road. Trooper Bormann saw the vehicle lose control by fishtailing to the right before
swerving to the left and driving onto a concrete median with its left front wheel. Trooper
Bormann then saw the vehicle drive off the median, briefly stop in the lane of travel, and
continue driving north.
Trooper Bormann activated his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle for
careless driving and driving outside the lane of travel. Trooper Bormann approached the
driver’s side of the vehicle and spoke with the driver, Hoyer. Trooper Bormann observed
indicia of intoxication, including slurred speech and glassy eyes. He administered a field
sobriety test and a preliminary breath test and arrested Hoyer for driving while impaired
(DWI). After reading Hoyer the implied-consent advisory, Trooper Bormann administered
a breath test, which indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.18.
The state charged Hoyer with one count of third-degree DWI for operating a motor
vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§§ 169A.20, subd. 1(5), .26, subd. 1(a) (2014), and another count of third-degree DWI, in
2 violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), .26, subd. 1(a). In May 2015, Hoyer
moved to suppress the evidence obtained by Trooper Bormann after stopping her vehicle
on the ground that the trooper’s investigatory stop was invalid. At the suppression hearing,
the state and Hoyer stipulated to the admission of an 18-page packet of documents, which
includes Trooper Bormann’s written report. The report contains, among other things, the
following narrative:
My attention was drawn to a Chevy Tahoe that was making a left turn from eastbound 19th Street to the northbound east frontage road. As the Tahoe turned left in front of me it fishtailed (the rear wheels were spinning with the right portion of the vehicle sliding to the right) to the right. The Tahoe did not just fishtail for a second or two but was fishtailing for much of the left turn. The Tahoe’s rear swung so far to the right that the Tahoe began driving out of its lane to the left and headed towards the cement median curb. The Tahoe drove onto the cement median curb with its left front wheel. The Tahoe then drove back down off of the curb then briefly stopped in its lane. My squad camera did not record the fishtail but it did record the Tahoe hitting the curb and stopping.
The state and Hoyer also stipulated to the admission of a video-recording of the stop that
was captured by Trooper Bormann’s squad-car dashboard video camera. After reviewing
the evidence, the district court denied Hoyer’s motion on the ground that, after Trooper
Bormann observed Hoyer’s vehicle fishtailing and driving onto the concrete median, he
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop.
The parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence court trial. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 4. The district court found Hoyer guilty of both of the charged offenses. The district
court stayed imposition of sentence for two years, ordered Hoyer to serve 30 days on
electronic home monitoring, and assessed a $750 fine. Hoyer appeals.
3 DECISION
Hoyer argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress
evidence. Specifically, she contends that Trooper Bormann did not have a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity before stopping her vehicle because her driving
was consistent with the normal manner of driving in wintry conditions.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The
Fourth Amendment also protects the right of the people to be secure in their motor vehicles.
See State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). But a law-enforcement officer may,
“‘consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop’” of a motor
vehicle if “‘the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot.’” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968))). A reasonable, articulable suspicion exists if, “in
justifying the particular intrusion the police officer [is] able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. The reasonable-
articulable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than
an unarticulated hunch,” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quotation
omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” Timberlake, 744
N.W.2d at 393 (quotation omitted). An officer “must be able to point to something that
4 objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182 (quotation omitted);
see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. Even a minor traffic violation may
provide the necessary reasonable, articulable suspicion for a traffic stop. See State v.
George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). When analyzing whether a stop is justified,
a district court should consider “the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that
trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that
would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622
N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001). If the underlying facts are undisputed, this court applies a
de novo standard of review to a district court’s conclusion that an investigatory stop is
justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion. State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 551 (Minn.
2009).
In this case, Trooper Bormann stated in his report that he saw Hoyer’s vehicle lose
control, swerve, drive onto a concrete median, and briefly stop in the lane of travel. In the
district court, Hoyer testified that she did not stop in the lane of travel but otherwise did
not deny that she engaged in the conduct described in Trooper Bormann’s written report.
Hoyer did not introduce any other evidence to contradict Trooper Bormann’s written report
or to call it into question. Furthermore, this court has viewed the squad-car video-
recording, which corroborates Trooper Bormann’s written report, to the extent stated by
the report. In light of the factual record, the district court properly credited Trooper
Bormann’s written report.
The only remaining question is whether the conduct described in Trooper
Bormann’s written report gives rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
5 activity. The state contends that Hoyer’s driving violated two traffic laws. See Minn. Stat.
§ 169.13, subd. 2 (2014) (“Any person who operates or halts any vehicle upon any street
carelessly or heedlessly in disregard for the rights of others, or in a manner that endangers
or is likely to endanger any property or any person . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); Minn.
Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a) (2014) (“A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely
within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”); see also id., subd. 9 (“No
vehicle shall be driven over, across or within any . . . dividing space [or] barrier section
. . . .”). We agree. In light of these traffic laws, Hoyer’s driving gave rise to a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity so as to justify Trooper Bormann’s investigatory
stop of her vehicle. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 578.
Hoyer contends that, notwithstanding these statutes, the caselaw requires an officer
to observe driving that is “either in addition to, or somehow separate from” noncompliant
driving that is due to poor driving conditions. Hoyer cites Shull v. Commissioner of Pub.
Safety, 398 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. App. 1986), in which an officer saw a vehicle driving slower
than necessary on a snow-packed, icy road while weaving back and forth over the center
line. Id. at 13. On appeal, Shull argued that his driving was attributable to the road
conditions. Id. at 13-14. But this court concluded that the officer justifiably formed a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal driving conduct. Id. at 14. Consequently,
Shull does not support Hoyer’s argument for reversal in this case. A more similar case is
Warrick v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. App. 1985), in which a
police officer stopped a vehicle after observing that it “subtl[y]” weaved within its lane and
6 varied its speed while the weather was cold and windy with limited visibility, though the
vehicle never crossed either the fog line or the center line. Id. at 586. This court concluded,
“In view of the wind and the impaired visibility, the ‘subtle’ weaving of the driver and the
speed changes, principally between 40 and 45 m.p.h., do not reasonably warrant the
intrusion of a brief investigatory stop.” Id. Warrick is distinguishable from this case,
however, because the driver stayed within his lane of traffic, while Hoyer weaved outside
her lane of traffic, swerved abruptly, and drove onto a concrete median.
In sum, Trooper Bormann had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Hoyer
engaged in criminal activity by violating traffic laws. Thus, the district court did not err
by denying Hoyer’s motion to suppress evidence.
Affirmed.