This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1889
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Ammanuel Ray Jones, Appellant
Filed August 8, 2016 Affirmed Worke, Judge
Fillmore County District Court File No. 23-CR-14-361
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brett A. Corson, Fillmore County Attorney, Preston, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.*
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
arguing that the district court failed to waive the requirement for a psychosexual
evaluation and abused its discretion by denying appellant a downward dispositional
departure. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 9, 2014, appellant Ammanuel Ray Jones was living with his then-fiancée
whose nieces and nephews were visiting for the night. The children had friends spending
the night with them, including 11-year-old S.L.B. While S.L.B. slept on the couch in the
living room, Jones lay on the floor next to the couch, put his hands in S.L.B.’s pants, and
penetrated her vagina with his finger. Jones was charged with first- and second-degree
criminal sexual conduct.
In October 2014, Jones was charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct—
victim mentally impaired/helpless. This matter involved a different victim. At a pretrial
hearing, Jones’s attorney indicated that the parties were attempting to settle both matters
because the two separate criminal-sexual-conduct cases presented the potential of Jones
receiving mandatory lifetime conditional release.†
On June 22, 2015, Jones pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct—
victim under 13 years of age, penetration—in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd.
† See State v. Nodes, 863 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 2015) (holding that “the first of two convictions entered at same hearing, but arising from separate behavioral incidents, was a ‘prior sex offense conviction,’ subjecting [the] defendant to lifetime conditional release”).
2 1(a) (2012). Jones entered a Norgaard plea‡, claiming that he was intoxicated at the time
of the offense and did not know what he was doing. The state agreed to dismiss the
remaining charge in the complaint and the criminal-sexual-conduct charge from October
2014. The only agreement regarding sentencing was that Jones was not subject to an
aggravated sentence. After the guilty plea was accepted, Jones’s attorney requested that
the district court “require” a psychosexual evaluation be completed as part of the
presentence investigation (PSI) because court services is generally unwilling to do one
when the presumptive sentence is a prison sentence. The district court agreed to order the
evaluation.
On August 12, 2015, the PSI was completed. It noted that, despite acknowledging
his “significant addiction to alcohol,” Jones had not done a chemical-dependency
evaluation. Additionally, while Jones reported interest in inpatient care for his alcohol
abuse, there was no indication that he had been accepted into a program. The PSI
indicated that (1) Jones was not particularly amenable to probation, (2) there were no
compelling or substantial circumstances distinguishing Jones from other offenders,
(3) Jones should not be considered for a downward departure, and (4) Jones presented a
high risk for recidivism. It was recommended that Jones receive the presumptive
sentence of 144 months in prison. Court services did not complete a psychosexual
‡ “A plea constitutes a Norgaard plea if the defendant asserts an absence of memory on the essential elements of the offense but pleads guilty because the record establishes, and [he] reasonably believes, that the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.” Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009).
3 evaluation. The PSI noted that Jones would be offered a psychosexual evaluation and
sex-offender treatment while incarcerated.
At the sentencing hearing, Jones’s attorney requested a continuance in order for
Jones to complete a psychosexual evaluation because it might show that Jones is suitable
for a downward dispositional departure. Jones’s attorney argued that Jones should
receive a departure because he had no prior criminal record, had a history of being
victimized, had no disciplinary problems while incarcerated awaiting disposition of the
matter, participated in a large number of programs, was involved with the ministry, was
involved in AA, and sought programming for alcohol and chemical-dependency issues.
But the district court stated:
[T]he statute [Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a)] under which [Jones] entered his plea of guilty . . . [provides] that unless a longer mandatory minimum sentence is otherwise required by law or the sentencing guidelines provide for a longer presumptive executed sentence, the [c]ourt shall presume that an executed sentence of 144 months must be imposed . . . . So the [c]ourt, in reviewing that statute, would indicate that to mean that the [c]ourt is to impose . . . the 144 months.
The district court sentenced Jones to 144 months in prison. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Psychosexual evaluation
Jones first argues that the district court failed to either ensure that he completed a
psychosexual evaluation or waive the evaluation requirement.
When a person is convicted of a sex offense, the court shall order an independent professional assessment of the offender’s need for sex offender treatment to be completed before sentencing. The court may waive the assessment if:
4 (1) the Sentencing Guidelines provide a presumptive prison sentence for the offender, or (2) an adequate assessment was conducted prior to the conviction.
Minn. Stat. § 609.3457, subd. 1 (2012). Jones claims that the district court failed to
explicitly waive the assessment. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which an
appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014).
There is nothing in the statute prescribing the manner in which a district court
waives an assessment. Likewise, there is nothing in the statute requiring the district court
to make findings that support its waiver of the assessment requirement. Jones cites no
caselaw instructing on the manner in which a district court may waive the assessment
requirement. And there is no requirement that an assessment be done prior to sentencing
when the guidelines provide for a presumptive prison sentence.
The statute provides only that the district court may waive the assessment if the
guidelines provide a presumptive prison sentence. Jones’s presumptive sentence was 144
months in prison. The PSI noted that Jones will be offered a psychosexual evaluation and
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1889
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Ammanuel Ray Jones, Appellant
Filed August 8, 2016 Affirmed Worke, Judge
Fillmore County District Court File No. 23-CR-14-361
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brett A. Corson, Fillmore County Attorney, Preston, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.*
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
arguing that the district court failed to waive the requirement for a psychosexual
evaluation and abused its discretion by denying appellant a downward dispositional
departure. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 9, 2014, appellant Ammanuel Ray Jones was living with his then-fiancée
whose nieces and nephews were visiting for the night. The children had friends spending
the night with them, including 11-year-old S.L.B. While S.L.B. slept on the couch in the
living room, Jones lay on the floor next to the couch, put his hands in S.L.B.’s pants, and
penetrated her vagina with his finger. Jones was charged with first- and second-degree
criminal sexual conduct.
In October 2014, Jones was charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct—
victim mentally impaired/helpless. This matter involved a different victim. At a pretrial
hearing, Jones’s attorney indicated that the parties were attempting to settle both matters
because the two separate criminal-sexual-conduct cases presented the potential of Jones
receiving mandatory lifetime conditional release.†
On June 22, 2015, Jones pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct—
victim under 13 years of age, penetration—in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd.
† See State v. Nodes, 863 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 2015) (holding that “the first of two convictions entered at same hearing, but arising from separate behavioral incidents, was a ‘prior sex offense conviction,’ subjecting [the] defendant to lifetime conditional release”).
2 1(a) (2012). Jones entered a Norgaard plea‡, claiming that he was intoxicated at the time
of the offense and did not know what he was doing. The state agreed to dismiss the
remaining charge in the complaint and the criminal-sexual-conduct charge from October
2014. The only agreement regarding sentencing was that Jones was not subject to an
aggravated sentence. After the guilty plea was accepted, Jones’s attorney requested that
the district court “require” a psychosexual evaluation be completed as part of the
presentence investigation (PSI) because court services is generally unwilling to do one
when the presumptive sentence is a prison sentence. The district court agreed to order the
evaluation.
On August 12, 2015, the PSI was completed. It noted that, despite acknowledging
his “significant addiction to alcohol,” Jones had not done a chemical-dependency
evaluation. Additionally, while Jones reported interest in inpatient care for his alcohol
abuse, there was no indication that he had been accepted into a program. The PSI
indicated that (1) Jones was not particularly amenable to probation, (2) there were no
compelling or substantial circumstances distinguishing Jones from other offenders,
(3) Jones should not be considered for a downward departure, and (4) Jones presented a
high risk for recidivism. It was recommended that Jones receive the presumptive
sentence of 144 months in prison. Court services did not complete a psychosexual
‡ “A plea constitutes a Norgaard plea if the defendant asserts an absence of memory on the essential elements of the offense but pleads guilty because the record establishes, and [he] reasonably believes, that the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.” Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009).
3 evaluation. The PSI noted that Jones would be offered a psychosexual evaluation and
sex-offender treatment while incarcerated.
At the sentencing hearing, Jones’s attorney requested a continuance in order for
Jones to complete a psychosexual evaluation because it might show that Jones is suitable
for a downward dispositional departure. Jones’s attorney argued that Jones should
receive a departure because he had no prior criminal record, had a history of being
victimized, had no disciplinary problems while incarcerated awaiting disposition of the
matter, participated in a large number of programs, was involved with the ministry, was
involved in AA, and sought programming for alcohol and chemical-dependency issues.
But the district court stated:
[T]he statute [Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a)] under which [Jones] entered his plea of guilty . . . [provides] that unless a longer mandatory minimum sentence is otherwise required by law or the sentencing guidelines provide for a longer presumptive executed sentence, the [c]ourt shall presume that an executed sentence of 144 months must be imposed . . . . So the [c]ourt, in reviewing that statute, would indicate that to mean that the [c]ourt is to impose . . . the 144 months.
The district court sentenced Jones to 144 months in prison. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Psychosexual evaluation
Jones first argues that the district court failed to either ensure that he completed a
psychosexual evaluation or waive the evaluation requirement.
When a person is convicted of a sex offense, the court shall order an independent professional assessment of the offender’s need for sex offender treatment to be completed before sentencing. The court may waive the assessment if:
4 (1) the Sentencing Guidelines provide a presumptive prison sentence for the offender, or (2) an adequate assessment was conducted prior to the conviction.
Minn. Stat. § 609.3457, subd. 1 (2012). Jones claims that the district court failed to
explicitly waive the assessment. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which an
appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014).
There is nothing in the statute prescribing the manner in which a district court
waives an assessment. Likewise, there is nothing in the statute requiring the district court
to make findings that support its waiver of the assessment requirement. Jones cites no
caselaw instructing on the manner in which a district court may waive the assessment
requirement. And there is no requirement that an assessment be done prior to sentencing
when the guidelines provide for a presumptive prison sentence.
The statute provides only that the district court may waive the assessment if the
guidelines provide a presumptive prison sentence. Jones’s presumptive sentence was 144
months in prison. The PSI noted that Jones will be offered a psychosexual evaluation and
sex-offender treatment while incarcerated. The district court implicitly waived the
assessment requirement when it imposed the prison sentence.
Jones claims that the psychosexual evaluation was necessary to determine whether
he was amenable to probation. But the PSI indicated that he was not amenable to
probation. Additionally, Jones was aware that court services was unwilling to do a
psychosexual evaluation when the presumptive sentence was a prison sentence. Jones
knew that a psychosexual evaluation was not completed and there was nothing preventing
him from obtaining his own. See State v. Engebretson, No. A14-0717, 2015 WL 46520,
5 at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 5, 2015) (stating that the defendant who moved for a downward
dispositional departure presented the results of a psychosexual evaluation, which was
performed by an evaluator from a consulting group at the request of his attorney), review
denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2015). Because the statute does not mandate the manner in
which a district court is to waive a psychosexual assessment, the district court did not err.
Sentence
Jones also argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing the
presumptive sentence because it did so after misconstruing a statute’s penalty provision.
A district court must impose the presumptive sentence unless the case involves
“identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances” that warrant a departure. Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2012). Substantial and compelling circumstances are those
which “make the facts of a particular case different from a typical case.” State v. Peake,
366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985). The decision to depart from the presumptive
sentence is within the district court’s discretion and an appellate court will not reverse
absent a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Stanke, 764 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn.
2009). Only a “rare case” warrants reversal of the district court’s decision to decline to
depart. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
In imposing the presumptive 144-month prison sentence, the district court relied
on Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2(b) (2012):
Unless a longer mandatory minimum sentence is otherwise required by law or the Sentencing Guidelines provide for a longer presumptive executed sentence, the court shall presume that an executed sentence of 144 months must be imposed on an offender convicted of violating this section.
6 Sentencing a person in a manner other than that described in this paragraph is a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
Jones claims that the district court “misconstrued” the statute by concluding that it was
“bound” to impose the presumptive sentence.
The district court stated that the statute indicated that it “is to impose . . . the 144
months.” A district court must impose the presumptive sentence unless “identifiable,
substantial, and compelling circumstances” warrant a departure. Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.D.1. Thus, the district court was correct. Further, the district court is not required to
explain its reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence. State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d
77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985).
Jones claims that the district court should have granted a departure. However,
Jones did not even move for a departure. At sentencing, Jones’s attorney conceded that
he did not move for a downward departure because he could not make an argument to
support a departure without a psychosexual evaluation.
Jones and his attorney made arguments at sentencing that allegedly supported a
downward departure, including that Jones had no criminal record, had a history of being
victimized, was traumatized by his uncle’s death prior to the offense, was under the
influence and sleep deprived when he committed the offense, had no disciplinary
problems while incarcerated, participated in programs and received certificates, and has
community support. But the district court was also aware that Jones had another
criminal-sexual-conduct case involving another victim that was dismissed as part of the
plea agreement. And the PSI indicted that (1) Jones was not particularly amenable to
7 probation, (2) there were no compelling or substantial circumstances distinguishing Jones
from other offenders, (3) Jones should not be considered for a downward departure, and
(4) Jones presents a high risk for recidivism. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by imposing the presumptive sentence.
Affirmed.