State of Minnesota v. Amanda Lee Jensrud

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: June 10, 2024
• Docket: a231566
• Status: Published

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1566

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

Amanda Lee Jensrud, Appellant.

Filed June 10, 2024 Reversed and remanded Johnson, Judge

Anoka County District Court File No. 02-CR-19-4070

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Reilly,

Judge. ∗

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant ∗

to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

Amanda Lee Jensrud was placed on probation after she pleaded guilty to a drug-

related offense. The district court later revoked Jensrud’s probation and executed her

prison sentence after she admitted to violating multiple conditions of her probation. We

conclude that the district court erred when revoking Jensrud’s probation by not making

adequate findings concerning why the need for confinement outweighs the policies

favoring probation. We also conclude that the district court erred in its calculation of

Jensrud’s criminal-history score. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

In June 2019, police officers found approximately 268 grams of methamphetamine

in Jensrud’s home. The state charged Jensrud with first-degree controlled substance crime,

in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2018). Two months later, Jensrud and

the state entered into a plea agreement. Jensrud agreed to plead guilty to the charged

offense, and the state agreed to dismiss charges in another case.

The parties also agreed that Jensrud should be released pending sentencing so that

she could participate in an in-patient drug-treatment program. Between August 2019 and

June 2020, the district court furloughed Jensrud to treatment three times, but she absconded

at least twice. In addition, Jensrud did not appear for sentencing in October 2020.

Jensrud was apprehended in December 2020. The district court conducted a

sentencing hearing in March 2021. Before the hearing, Jensrud filed a motion for a

downward dispositional departure. The state did not oppose the motion. The district court

2 granted Jensrud’s motion and imposed a sentence of 150 months of imprisonment, stayed

execution of the sentence, and placed her on supervised probation, subject to several

conditions.

Four months later, in July 2021, Jensrud’s probation officer filed a report alleging

that Jensrud violated conditions of her probation by not submitting to chemical testing since

sentencing, by having no contact with her probation officer, and by not informing her

probation officer of her whereabouts. In December 2021, Jensrud’s probation officer filed

another report alleging that Jensrud violated conditions of her probation by not being in

contact with her probation officer and not providing her probation officer with contact

information. At a probation-violation hearing in January 2023, the parties agreed that, if

Jensrud admitted the alleged violations, the district court should order an intermediate

sanction of one year in jail and that, after 60 days, Jensrud should be eligible for a furlough

to an in-patient treatment facility. The parties further agreed that, upon her successful

completion of the in-patient treatment program, Jensrud should be eligible to serve the

remainder of the jail term on electronic home monitoring, with a condition that she submit

to random drug tests. The district court approved the agreement and ordered the

intermediate sanction.

Four months later, in May 2023, Jensrud’s probation officer filed a probation-

violation report alleging that Jensrud had twice tested positive for amphetamines and, when

told to report to the workhouse, removed her electronic-home-monitoring bracelet and

absconded. Two months later, Jensrud’s probation officer filed another probation-violation

3 report alleging that Jensrud had been charged and convicted of a new criminal offense and

admitted to using a controlled substance.

The district court conducted a probation-revocation hearing in July 2023. Jensrud

admitted the alleged violations. The district court revoked her probation and executed her

150-month prison sentence. Jensrud appeals.

DECISION

I. Revocation of Probation

Jensrud first argues that the district court erred by not making adequate findings

concerning the reasons for revoking her probation.

If a person violates one or more conditions of probation, a district court may either

continue the person on probation or revoke probation and execute the underlying sentence.

Minn. Stat. § 609.14 (2018); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3(2)(b)(iv)-(v). The

supreme court has prescribed a three-step analysis to guide district courts in determining

whether to revoke probation. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). A

district court may revoke probation only if the court (1) designates the specific conditions

of probation that have been violated, (2) finds that the violations were “intentional or

inexcusable,” and (3) finds “that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring

probation.” Id. In making these findings, a district court “must seek to convey [its]

substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.” State v. Modtland, 695

N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2005). This court applies a de novo standard of review to the

adequacy of a district court’s findings and an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a

district court’s ultimate decision to revoke probation. Id. at 605.

4 Jensrud challenges the district court’s findings only with respect to the third Austin

factor: that the “need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” See

Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. A district court may find that the third Austin factor is satisfied

if it finds that any of three sub-factors are present: (1) “‘confinement is necessary to protect

the public from further criminal activity by the offender,’” (2) “‘the offender is in need of

correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined,’” or (3) a

further stay of the sentence “‘would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation.’”

Id. at 251 (quoting A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, Probation § 5.1(a) (Approved

Draft 1970)).

In this case, the district court stated the following reasons for revoking Jensrud’s

probation:

I still recall when we initially met each other, with your other attorney, and you had described what you had been through and your life. And as [Jensrud’s attorney] indicates, addiction is a horrible, horrible thing. And I was giving you that opportunity at that time, and, you know, it didn’t work and you came back again. And I gave you an opportunity at that point. And in my mind, I can’t even see the difference between what I had done the last time, which was basically a year in the county jail. I was giving you a break by allowing you to do it on home electronic monitoring. But I have a responsibility, and I take that responsibility very seriously. In my mind, I understand that I’ve tried and I know you’ve tried and now we’ve got to look at something else.

And so with that, as indicated, this Court finds that the violations are willful, intentional, and without lawful excuse. In addition, this Court finds that the need for confinement outweighs the policy favoring probation. That confinement is appropriate and necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity. That Ms. Jensrud is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if she is

5 confined, and that the need to revoke your probation to show the severity, the seriousness, of the violation depreciates if not confined.

Jensrud contends that the district court’s findings are inadequate because they do

not provide a “substantive, case-specific” reason why the need for confinement outweighs

the policies favoring probation or “an explanation of the evidence” on which the district

court relied when making that determination. She cites Modtland for the proposition that

a district court’s findings are inadequate if a district court merely “recit[es] the three factors

and offer[s] general, non-specific reasons for revocation.” 695 N.W.2d at 608.

Jensrud is correct. The district court’s findings do not satisfy the requirements of

Modtland because they do not reveal any case-specific reasons why the need for

confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation or why any of the three sub-factors

are present. In the second paragraph quoted above, the district court merely recited the

three Austin factors and the related sub-factors. The first paragraph quoted above consists

of reasonably specific, case-related statements, but none of them relate to the third Austin

factor or the three sub-factors. The district court did not make adequate case-specific

findings to support its conclusions.

Notably, the state does not contend that the findings are adequate. Rather, the state

contends only that the findings are “thoroughly supported by the record.” We do not doubt

the adequacy of the record. But that is not relevant to our inquiry. The supreme court has

stated that “it is not the role of appellate courts to scour the record to determine if sufficient

evidence exists to support the district court’s revocation.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608.

Rather, appellate courts seek to ensure that district courts “create thorough, fact-specific

6 records setting forth their reasons for revoking probation.” Id. In this case, such reasons

are lacking.

Thus, the district court erred by not making adequate findings concerning the third

Austin factor. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

II. Criminal-History Score

Jensrud also argues that the district court erred in its calculation of her criminal-

history score.

In a felony case, a defendant’s presumptive sentence is determined by the severity

of the present offense and the defendant’s criminal-history score. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines

2 (Supp. 2019). A criminal-history score is the “sum of points” that are assigned for,

among other things, prior felony convictions and prior juvenile adjudications. Minn.

Sent’g Guidelines 2.B. The number of criminal-history points assigned to a prior felony

conviction depends on the severity level of the prior offense. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines

2.B.1. Generally, “the offender is assigned a particular weight for every felony conviction

for which a felony sentence was stayed or imposed before the current sentencing.” Minn.

Sent’g Guidelines cmt. 2.B.101.

Jensrud argues that the district court erred in two ways.

A.

Jensrud first argues that the district court erred by applying the 2018 sentencing

guidelines on the ground that, under the amelioration doctrine, the more-lenient 2019

guidelines apply.

7 “The amelioration doctrine applies an amendment mitigating punishment to acts

committed prior to that amendment’s effective date, if there has not been a final judgment

reached in the case.” State v. Robinette, 964 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Minn. 2021); see also State

v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485, 489 (Minn. 2017); State v. Otto, 899 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Minn.

2017). The amelioration doctrine is grounded in the principle that if the legislature has

amended a statute to mitigate criminal punishment, “the legislature has manifested its belief

that the prior punishment is too severe and a lighter sentence is sufficient.” State v.

Coolidge, 282 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Minn. 1979). As a consequence, “Nothing would be

accomplished by imposing a harsher punishment, in light of the legislative pronouncement,

other than vengeance.” Id. at 514-15. A defendant whose criminal case has not yet reached

final judgment may receive the benefit of the new, more lenient law, so long as there is no

“contrary statement of intent by the legislature.” Edstrom v. State, 326 N.W.2d 10, 10

(Minn. 1982).

Jensrud contends that the district court should have applied the 2019 sentencing

guidelines because of revisions concerning conviction-decay and custody-status points.

See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1.c, 2.B.2.a. She asserts that applying the 2019 version

of the guidelines would result in a lower criminal-history score and, accordingly, a shorter

presumptive sentence. The state concedes that the amelioration doctrine applies and that

Jensrud is entitled to be sentenced under the 2019 guidelines. We accept the state’s

concession. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by applying the 2018

sentencing guidelines, and we reverse and remand for resentencing under the 2019

sentencing guidelines. See Robinette, 964 N.W.2d at 151.

8 B.

Jensrud also argues that the district court erred by assigning her two criminal-history

points for a prior federal conviction for conspiracy to distribute marijuana.

In determining whether to assign criminal-history points for a prior non-Minnesota

conviction, a district court first must identify “the equivalent Minnesota offense based on

the elements of the prior non-Minnesota offense” and then must assign criminal-history

points accordingly. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.b. A district court should identify the

equivalent Minnesota offense by considering whether the non-Minnesota offense “is

defined as a felony, gross misdemeanor, or targeted misdemeanor in Minnesota” and by

examining “the sentence imposed.” Id. The district court should seek to “comply with the

sentencing guidelines’ mandate that the court determine how the offender would have been

sentenced had the offense occurred in Minnesota at the time of the current offense, not

when the offense actually occurred.” State v. Reece, 625 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Minn. 2001).

The state bears the burden of proving the facts necessary to include a non-Minnesota

conviction in a defendant’s criminal-history score. Williams v. State, 910 N.W.2d 736, 743

(Minn. 2018). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district

court’s assignment of criminal-history points based on a non-Minnesota conviction. Reece,

625 N.W.2d at 825.

Jensrud did not raise this particular issue in the district court. Nonetheless, a

defendant may argue for the first time on appeal that the state did not satisfy its burden of

proving the facts that support a criminal-history score. See State v. Strobel, 932 N.W.2d

303, 305-06 (Minn. 2019); State v. Scovel, 916 N.W.2d 550, 553 n.5 (Minn. 2018); State

9 v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Minn. 2007). If a defendant makes such an argument

for the first time on appeal, this court must examine the record to determine whether it

contains evidence supporting the district court’s calculation of criminal-history points. See

State v. Maley, 714 N.W.2d 708, 711-12 (Minn. App. 2006). If we determine that the state

did not satisfy its burden of proof because the appellant did not challenge the assignment

of criminal-history points at the time of sentencing, the case should be reversed and

remanded, and the state should be permitted on remand to “develop the sentencing record

so that the district court can appropriately make its determination.” State v. Outlaw, 748

N.W.2d 349, 356 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. July 15, 2008).

In this case, the record does not contain any evidence concerning Jensrud’s prior

federal conviction. Consequently, the state did not satisfy its burden of proof. It appears

that the evidence is lacking because Jensrud did not object to the assignment of criminal-

history points for the prior federal conviction. The state is entitled to an opportunity to

introduce evidence that would satisfy its burden of proving the facts necessary to include

a non-Minnesota conviction in a defendant’s criminal-history score.

Thus, the district court erred by assigning Jensrud two criminal-history points for

the prior federal conviction. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings and

for resentencing.

Reversed and remanded.