This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-1584
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Adam Michael Lee, Appellant
Filed August 24, 2015 Affirmed Chutich, Judge
Sherburne County District Court File No. 71-CR-13-1231
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, Leah G. Emmans, Assistant County Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica Surges Shacka, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Chutich,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUTICH, Judge
Appellant Adam Lee challenges the imposition of the mandatory minimum
sentence for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by not granting him a dispositional departure. Because the district
court carefully considered the relevant departure factors before exercising its broad
discretion to impose a presumptive sentence, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2005, Adam Lee was the track coach at Apollo High School in St. Cloud. He
became acquainted with H.G., the track team’s manager, who was 15 years old at the
time. Lee held a position of authority over H.G.
One night in May 2005, Lee had sexual intercourse with H.G. The two chatted
online, and then Lee said that he would pick up H.G. from her grandparents’ house late in
the evening. After picking her up, Lee drove the two to a gravel road where they had
intercourse.
H.G. did not report this incident until 2011 and 2013.1 The state charged Lee with
first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342, subd. 1(b),
.343, subd. 1(b) (2004). Lee agreed to plead guilty to first-degree criminal sexual
conduct while retaining the right to request a dispositional departure; in exchange, the
state agreed to seek only the mandatory minimum sentence of 144 months. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2(b) (2004). Sentencing was to occur in April 2014, but the district
court postponed the hearing when it received new information, including a Sheriff’s
Incident Report about possible child pornography on Lee’s computer.
The district court considered Lee’s downward dispositional motion at the next
sentencing hearing. Lee’s Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor testified about Lee’s progress
1 It is unclear from the record why the incident was reported twice.
2 staying sober. H.G. spoke about how this encounter has continued to negatively affect
her life. The district court also considered two psychosexual evaluations: one from 2014
attached to the presentence investigation report, and one from 2013 conducted for a
separate case.2 Lee also spoke at the hearing.
The district court thoroughly weighed and discussed the pertinent factors from
State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1982), in explaining its decision that a dispositional
departure was not appropriate. It found that Lee’s age, 25 at the time of the offense, did
not weigh in favor of departure, given his position of authority over H.G. The district
court found that Lee’s prior criminal record did not directly affect that Trog factor:
although he had no criminal record at the time of the offense, the district court was
concerned about his subsequent offenses and convictions.
The district court noted that Lee had consistently expressed remorse before the
court. But it also stated that in his psychosexual examination, Lee said that the offense
occurred when H.G. was 16 years old.3 And it further stated that Lee did not report the
sexual conduct to law enforcement in his earlier case. More importantly to the district
court, in his first psychosexual examination, Lee did not disclose this incident; this failure
to disclose did not demonstrate remorse.
2 In 2013, Lee pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct and soliciting a child to engage in sexual conduct. The charges stemmed from Lee having sex with a 17- year-old student, exchanging sexual texts with a ninth-grade student, and messaging a 13- year-old student. 3 Lee pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct/position of authority. This crime requires that the victim be “at least 13 years of age but less than 16 years of age.” Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(b). Therefore, had H.G. been 16 years old at the time, Lee could not be found guilty.
3 As to Lee’s cooperation, the district court noted that he cooperated by pleading
guilty. But the district court also found that he failed to cooperate by not disclosing the
sexual conduct earlier and by not disclosing the extent of his relationship with
pornography. The district court found that Lee’s attitude in court was appropriate. But
the district court was troubled by discrepancies in Lee’s statements. It noted that Lee
testified at the guilty plea hearing that the sexual conduct occurred in May and then stated
in his psychosexual evaluation that the incident occurred later that summer, when H.G.
would have been 16.
Finally, the district court found that Lee’s support from his family and friends
somewhat favored departure. But the district court further stated that a text Lee had sent
to his wife was “tantamount to a threat of retaliation.”
Considering all the circumstances, the district court found it had no grounds under
the Trog factors to determine that Lee was so amenable to treatment or probation to
justify a downward departure. It sentenced Lee to 144 months in prison, the mandatory
minimum sentence. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2(b). Lee appealed.
DECISION
We afford a district court “‘great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and
reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto, 855
N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn.
1999)). Only in a rare case will we reverse a district court’s imposition of the
presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
4 A district court must pronounce a presumptive sentence unless substantial and
compelling circumstances exist; accordingly, it may depart only if aggravating or
mitigating circumstances are present. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308. “Although the [district]
court is required to give reasons for departure, an explanation is not required when the
court considers reasons for departure but elects to impose the presumptive sentence.”
State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985). Furthermore, we “may not
interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion, as long as the record shows
the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented
before making a determination.” Id. at 80-81.
Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree carries a presumptive sentence of 144
months in prison, and sentencing an offender to any other sentence is considered a
departure from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2(b)
(2004); Minn. Sent.
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-1584
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Adam Michael Lee, Appellant
Filed August 24, 2015 Affirmed Chutich, Judge
Sherburne County District Court File No. 71-CR-13-1231
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, Leah G. Emmans, Assistant County Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica Surges Shacka, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Chutich,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUTICH, Judge
Appellant Adam Lee challenges the imposition of the mandatory minimum
sentence for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by not granting him a dispositional departure. Because the district
court carefully considered the relevant departure factors before exercising its broad
discretion to impose a presumptive sentence, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2005, Adam Lee was the track coach at Apollo High School in St. Cloud. He
became acquainted with H.G., the track team’s manager, who was 15 years old at the
time. Lee held a position of authority over H.G.
One night in May 2005, Lee had sexual intercourse with H.G. The two chatted
online, and then Lee said that he would pick up H.G. from her grandparents’ house late in
the evening. After picking her up, Lee drove the two to a gravel road where they had
intercourse.
H.G. did not report this incident until 2011 and 2013.1 The state charged Lee with
first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342, subd. 1(b),
.343, subd. 1(b) (2004). Lee agreed to plead guilty to first-degree criminal sexual
conduct while retaining the right to request a dispositional departure; in exchange, the
state agreed to seek only the mandatory minimum sentence of 144 months. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2(b) (2004). Sentencing was to occur in April 2014, but the district
court postponed the hearing when it received new information, including a Sheriff’s
Incident Report about possible child pornography on Lee’s computer.
The district court considered Lee’s downward dispositional motion at the next
sentencing hearing. Lee’s Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor testified about Lee’s progress
1 It is unclear from the record why the incident was reported twice.
2 staying sober. H.G. spoke about how this encounter has continued to negatively affect
her life. The district court also considered two psychosexual evaluations: one from 2014
attached to the presentence investigation report, and one from 2013 conducted for a
separate case.2 Lee also spoke at the hearing.
The district court thoroughly weighed and discussed the pertinent factors from
State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1982), in explaining its decision that a dispositional
departure was not appropriate. It found that Lee’s age, 25 at the time of the offense, did
not weigh in favor of departure, given his position of authority over H.G. The district
court found that Lee’s prior criminal record did not directly affect that Trog factor:
although he had no criminal record at the time of the offense, the district court was
concerned about his subsequent offenses and convictions.
The district court noted that Lee had consistently expressed remorse before the
court. But it also stated that in his psychosexual examination, Lee said that the offense
occurred when H.G. was 16 years old.3 And it further stated that Lee did not report the
sexual conduct to law enforcement in his earlier case. More importantly to the district
court, in his first psychosexual examination, Lee did not disclose this incident; this failure
to disclose did not demonstrate remorse.
2 In 2013, Lee pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct and soliciting a child to engage in sexual conduct. The charges stemmed from Lee having sex with a 17- year-old student, exchanging sexual texts with a ninth-grade student, and messaging a 13- year-old student. 3 Lee pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct/position of authority. This crime requires that the victim be “at least 13 years of age but less than 16 years of age.” Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(b). Therefore, had H.G. been 16 years old at the time, Lee could not be found guilty.
3 As to Lee’s cooperation, the district court noted that he cooperated by pleading
guilty. But the district court also found that he failed to cooperate by not disclosing the
sexual conduct earlier and by not disclosing the extent of his relationship with
pornography. The district court found that Lee’s attitude in court was appropriate. But
the district court was troubled by discrepancies in Lee’s statements. It noted that Lee
testified at the guilty plea hearing that the sexual conduct occurred in May and then stated
in his psychosexual evaluation that the incident occurred later that summer, when H.G.
would have been 16.
Finally, the district court found that Lee’s support from his family and friends
somewhat favored departure. But the district court further stated that a text Lee had sent
to his wife was “tantamount to a threat of retaliation.”
Considering all the circumstances, the district court found it had no grounds under
the Trog factors to determine that Lee was so amenable to treatment or probation to
justify a downward departure. It sentenced Lee to 144 months in prison, the mandatory
minimum sentence. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2(b). Lee appealed.
DECISION
We afford a district court “‘great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and
reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto, 855
N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn.
1999)). Only in a rare case will we reverse a district court’s imposition of the
presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
4 A district court must pronounce a presumptive sentence unless substantial and
compelling circumstances exist; accordingly, it may depart only if aggravating or
mitigating circumstances are present. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308. “Although the [district]
court is required to give reasons for departure, an explanation is not required when the
court considers reasons for departure but elects to impose the presumptive sentence.”
State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985). Furthermore, we “may not
interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion, as long as the record shows
the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented
before making a determination.” Id. at 80-81.
Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree carries a presumptive sentence of 144
months in prison, and sentencing an offender to any other sentence is considered a
departure from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2(b)
(2004); Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.C (2004). The district court imposed that presumptive
sentence here.
Lee argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant him a
downward dispositional departure. He claims that his particular amenability to probation
and success in sex-offender treatment demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion. We disagree.
When a district court has discretion to depart, “it must exercise that discretion by
deliberately considering circumstances for and against departure.” State v. Mendoza, 638
N.W.2d 480, 483 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2002). The record
here demonstrates that the district court deliberately and thoroughly considered
5 circumstances for and against departure before exercising its broad discretion and
electing to impose a presumptive sentence. It discussed each Trog factor individually and
considered whether each factor weighed for or against departure. Given the district
court’s careful consideration of the record, we conclude that it properly exercised its
discretion by electing to impose the presumptive sentence. See State v. Pegel, 795
N.W.2d 251, 254-55 (Minn. App. 2011) (holding that the district court properly exercised
its discretion by not departing where the record showed that it considered all
circumstances).
Lee also submitted a pro se supplemental brief and a pro se reply brief, both of
which further argued why he should have received a downward departure. We have
carefully reviewed Lee’s claims but, for reasons discussed above, these arguments lack
merit.
Affirmed.