This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-1919
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Aamir Karmoeddien, Appellant.
Filed December 7, 2015 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27CR146894
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
Michael J. Colich, Brooklyn Park City Attorney, Amanda J. Grossman, Assistant City Attorney, Colich & Associates, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the police officer lacked an objective basis to stop his
vehicle and that his test-refusal conviction must be reversed because Minnesota’s test-
refusal statute is unconstitutional. We affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of March 13, 2014, Brooklyn Park Police Officer Nicholas Joe
Courtwright (the officer) observed a 2002 Lincoln LS driven by appellant, Aamir
Karmoeddien, approximately 25-50 yards in front of him travelling westbound on
Brookdale Drive. The officer testified that the vehicle caught his attention because it
weaved within its lane two to three times within 30 to 60 seconds and crossed over the
fog line. He also stated that he noticed “suspended objects from [the] rearview
mirror.” The officer’s squad-car video camera shows appellant’s vehicle weaving from
side to side two to three times and crossing over the fog line, with a visible object
hanging from the rearview mirror.
The officer testified that when appellant rolled down the window, he observed an
“odor of alcoholic beverage coming from inside the vehicle,” which intensified as
appellant looked up and spoke to him. He also stated that appellant had bloodshot and
glossy eyes. Appellant refused to perform field sobriety tests or submit to a preliminary
breath test. The officer placed appellant under arrest on suspicion of DWI and
transported him to the Brooklyn Park Police Department.
2 The officer read appellant the Minnesota implied-consent advisory and then gave
him a phone and phone books to contact an attorney. He asked appellant whether he
would submit to a breath test, and appellant refused.
The state charged appellant with second-degree test refusal in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2012); second-degree driving while impaired in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2012); having an open bottle of alcohol in the vehicle
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.35, subd. 3(2012)1; and providing a peace officer with
a false name in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.506, subd. 1 (2012). Appellant moved to
dismiss the charges and suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that
the officer lacked a reasonable basis for the traffic stop. Appellant also moved to dismiss
the test-refusal count, arguing that Minnesota’s test-refusal statute is unconstitutional.
The district court denied both motions. The jury found appellant guilty of the first three
counts and acquitted him of providing a peace officer with a false name. This appeal
follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in holding that the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the traffic stop.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by concluding that the officer had a
reasonable articulable suspicion to support his stop, and therefore erred by denying
appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop. “When
reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we may independently
1 The open bottle of alcohol charge is not argued on appeal. As such, the facts regarding this charge have been omitted.
3 review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in
suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359
(Minn. 2004). This court “accept[s] the district court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012). “Findings of fact
are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, [the court is] left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846-47
(Minn. 2011).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. These rights under the Fourth Amendment extend to searches of motor vehicles.
See State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).
However, “an officer may, “consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a
brief, investigatory stop” of a motor vehicle provided that “the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d
390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673,
675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884–85 (1968))). This
court reviews de novo a district court’s determination of whether there was reasonable
suspicion to justify a stop. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 87. But this court reviews the factual
findings underlying that determination for clear error. State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 383
(Minn. 1998). Reasonable suspicion exists if, “in justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer [is] able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
4 rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S.
at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
The supreme court has held that an officer’s observation of a minor traffic
violation can support the officer’s reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of a vehicle.
See State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997) (“Ordinarily, if an officer
observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective
basis for stopping the vehicle.”).
Here, the district court concluded that the officer had a reasonable articulable
suspicion to justify stopping the vehicle based on the officer’s observation that
appellant’s vehicle “sufficiently” went over the fog line and because there was “an item
hanging from the rearview mirror.” Both of these observations are traffic violations.
Minn. Stat. §§ 169.18, subd. 7(a), .71, subd 1(2) (2012). Therefore, the officer had
reasonable articulable suspicions to stop appellant’s vehicle.
II. The district court did not err in holding that Minnesota’s test-refusal statute is constitutional.
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-1919
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Aamir Karmoeddien, Appellant.
Filed December 7, 2015 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27CR146894
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
Michael J. Colich, Brooklyn Park City Attorney, Amanda J. Grossman, Assistant City Attorney, Colich & Associates, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the police officer lacked an objective basis to stop his
vehicle and that his test-refusal conviction must be reversed because Minnesota’s test-
refusal statute is unconstitutional. We affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of March 13, 2014, Brooklyn Park Police Officer Nicholas Joe
Courtwright (the officer) observed a 2002 Lincoln LS driven by appellant, Aamir
Karmoeddien, approximately 25-50 yards in front of him travelling westbound on
Brookdale Drive. The officer testified that the vehicle caught his attention because it
weaved within its lane two to three times within 30 to 60 seconds and crossed over the
fog line. He also stated that he noticed “suspended objects from [the] rearview
mirror.” The officer’s squad-car video camera shows appellant’s vehicle weaving from
side to side two to three times and crossing over the fog line, with a visible object
hanging from the rearview mirror.
The officer testified that when appellant rolled down the window, he observed an
“odor of alcoholic beverage coming from inside the vehicle,” which intensified as
appellant looked up and spoke to him. He also stated that appellant had bloodshot and
glossy eyes. Appellant refused to perform field sobriety tests or submit to a preliminary
breath test. The officer placed appellant under arrest on suspicion of DWI and
transported him to the Brooklyn Park Police Department.
2 The officer read appellant the Minnesota implied-consent advisory and then gave
him a phone and phone books to contact an attorney. He asked appellant whether he
would submit to a breath test, and appellant refused.
The state charged appellant with second-degree test refusal in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2012); second-degree driving while impaired in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2012); having an open bottle of alcohol in the vehicle
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.35, subd. 3(2012)1; and providing a peace officer with
a false name in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.506, subd. 1 (2012). Appellant moved to
dismiss the charges and suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that
the officer lacked a reasonable basis for the traffic stop. Appellant also moved to dismiss
the test-refusal count, arguing that Minnesota’s test-refusal statute is unconstitutional.
The district court denied both motions. The jury found appellant guilty of the first three
counts and acquitted him of providing a peace officer with a false name. This appeal
follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in holding that the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the traffic stop.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by concluding that the officer had a
reasonable articulable suspicion to support his stop, and therefore erred by denying
appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop. “When
reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we may independently
1 The open bottle of alcohol charge is not argued on appeal. As such, the facts regarding this charge have been omitted.
3 review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in
suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359
(Minn. 2004). This court “accept[s] the district court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012). “Findings of fact
are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, [the court is] left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846-47
(Minn. 2011).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. These rights under the Fourth Amendment extend to searches of motor vehicles.
See State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).
However, “an officer may, “consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a
brief, investigatory stop” of a motor vehicle provided that “the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d
390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673,
675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884–85 (1968))). This
court reviews de novo a district court’s determination of whether there was reasonable
suspicion to justify a stop. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 87. But this court reviews the factual
findings underlying that determination for clear error. State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 383
(Minn. 1998). Reasonable suspicion exists if, “in justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer [is] able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
4 rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S.
at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
The supreme court has held that an officer’s observation of a minor traffic
violation can support the officer’s reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of a vehicle.
See State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997) (“Ordinarily, if an officer
observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective
basis for stopping the vehicle.”).
Here, the district court concluded that the officer had a reasonable articulable
suspicion to justify stopping the vehicle based on the officer’s observation that
appellant’s vehicle “sufficiently” went over the fog line and because there was “an item
hanging from the rearview mirror.” Both of these observations are traffic violations.
Minn. Stat. §§ 169.18, subd. 7(a), .71, subd 1(2) (2012). Therefore, the officer had
reasonable articulable suspicions to stop appellant’s vehicle.
II. The district court did not err in holding that Minnesota’s test-refusal statute is constitutional.
Appellant argues that Minnesota’s test-refusal statute violates his right to
substantive due process because it criminalizes his Fourth Amendment right to refuse a
warrantless search. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2, (“It is a crime for any person to
refuse to submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood, breath, or urine under section
169A.51 (chemical tests for intoxication), or 169A.52 (test refusal or failure; revocation
of license).”). Appellant further contends that the test-refusal statute violates the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine.
5 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that this court reviews de
novo. State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). The
reviewing court presumes that statutes are constitutional and will strike down a statute
only if absolutely necessary. State v. Melde, 725 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 2006). “[A]
party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that the statute violates a constitutional provision.” State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517,
519 (Minn. 2011).
Because appellant bases his substantive due-process argument on a Fourth
Amendment violation, we first decide whether a warrantless search of appellant’s breath
would have been constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Bernard,
859 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn. 2015). Appellant’s argument is unavailing in light of the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bernard.
In Bernard, the supreme court held that a warrantless breath test of the driver is
constitutional under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement. Id. at 772. The supreme court upheld the constitutionality of
Minnesota’s test-refusal statute as it applied to Bernard’s case, concluding that a
warrantless breath test did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it qualifies as a
search incident to Bernard’s valid arrest. Id.
Under the search-incident-to-arrest exception, an officer may search a suspect
when the officer has probable cause to arrest the suspect. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
338, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009). Probable cause to arrest exists when “the objective
facts are such that under the circumstances a person of ordinary care and prudence
6 [would] entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed.” State
v. Johnson, 314 N.W.2d 229, 230 (Minn. 1982) (quotation omitted). Here, the officer
observed an item hanging from appellant’s rearview mirror and observed appellant cross
over the fog line. He then detected the odor of alcohol emanating from appellant and
observed appellant’s bloodshot and glossy eyes. Accordingly, the officer possessed the
requisite probable cause to arrest appellant for suspicion of DWI.
Because the officer had probable cause to arrest appellant, a warrantless breath test
would have been constitutional as a search incident to a valid arrest. See Bernard, 859
N.W.2d at 767. Moreover, appellant’s reliance on McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556
(2013), is misplaced. McNeely only addressed the single-factor exigency exception to the
warrant requirement and the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to extend McNeely to the
search-incident-to-arrest exception. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 772 (“McNeely does not
foreclose our decision regarding the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant
requirement.”).
Appellant also argues that the test-refusal statute violates the unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine “because it compels the surrender of the constitutional right to
withhold consent to a warrantless search as a condition of driving.” This court recently
held that “Minnesota’s test-refusal statute does not violate the unconstitutional-conditions
doctrine by imposing a criminal penalty on a person who has been arrested for driving
while impaired and has refused to submit to a breath test.” State v. Bennett, 867 N.W.2d
539, 540 (Minn. App. July 27, 2015). Appellant’s unconstitutional-conditions challenge
fails under Bennett.
7 In sum, appellant’s argument that the government violated his right to due process
by threatening him with unauthorized criminal prosecution for test refusal fails because
application of the criminal test-refusal statute in this case would not have violated
appellant’s right to substantive due process and because the test-refusal statute does not
violate the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine.
Affirmed.