This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-1904
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Jermaine Louis Fleming, Appellant.
Filed October 13, 2025 Affirmed Johnson, Judge
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CR-24-641
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Jermaine Louis Fleming pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person. The district court imposed a sentence of 60 months of imprisonment. We conclude that the district court did not err by denying Fleming’s motion for a downward
dispositional or downward durational departure. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2024, the state charged Fleming with four offenses: (1) possession of a
firearm by an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2022);
(2) possession of ammunition by an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2); (3) fifth-degree controlled-substance crime based on his alleged possession of
methamphetamine, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2022); and (4) fifth-
degree controlled-substance crime based on his alleged possession of fentanyl, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1).
The complaint alleged that, during the early morning hours of October 18, 2023,
Fleming was in the front passenger seat of a vehicle that was stopped by St. Paul police
officers because of a report that a shooting victim was inside the vehicle. The complaint
also alleged that, after Fleming exited the vehicle, officers saw blue pills on the seat where
he had been sitting, found a loaded .22-caliber revolver under the seat, and found a bag of
blue pills and other items in Fleming’s pockets. The complaint further alleged that one of
the blue pills found in Fleming’s pocket tested positive for fentanyl and that another
substance found on Fleming tested positive for methamphetamine.
In April 2024, the parties entered into a plea agreement. Fleming agreed to plead
guilty to the first charge, and the state agreed to dismiss the three remaining charges and to
refrain from objecting to Fleming’s request that he be released pending sentencing so that
he could participate in an inpatient drug-treatment program. At a plea hearing, Fleming
2 admitted that he possessed the .22-caliber revolver that was found under the front passenger
seat. The district court accepted Fleming’s plea and ordered his release pending
sentencing, with conditions, including the conditions that he remain law-abiding and
appear for sentencing in June 2024.
Before the date set for sentencing, Fleming filed a motion for a downward
dispositional or downward durational departure. But Fleming did not appear for sentencing
as scheduled. A warrant was issued for his arrest. He was taken into custody in July 2024.
Fleming appeared for sentencing in September 2024. He argued that he is
particularly amenable to probation on the grounds that he has the support of his family, had
completed an inpatient treatment program, was recommended for an intensive treatment
program, and wants to continue treatment. Fleming’s attorney asserted that he failed to
appear for the originally scheduled sentencing hearing because he did not receive any
assistance in the transition following his discharge from the inpatient treatment program.
As an alternative argument, Fleming requested a downward durational departure of 30
months of imprisonment on the ground that his offense is less serious than typical.
In response, the state argued that Fleming is not particularly amenable to probation
because he failed to appear for the originally scheduled sentencing hearing and committed
a new offense between his plea and his sentencing. The state also argued that Fleming is
not entitled to a downward durational departure because his conduct—possession of a
firearm by an ineligible person—is not less serious than the conduct typically associated
with the offense.
3 Fleming spoke in allocution. He explained that he was not provided an after-care
or step-down plan when he completed the inpatient treatment program but, rather, was
simply dropped off at his home. He acknowledged, however, that the events following his
discharge from the treatment program were his “fault” and that he “can’t blame nobody
else for me not following up.”
The district court directly responded to Fleming by stating, “I can certainly
understand and appreciate how frustrating going through that would have been,” and by
adding that Fleming was not given “the tools that [he] needed.” But the district court also
stated that “two things happened” that would inform its decision: “you didn’t show up for
court” and “you picked up a new charge.” The district court continued by stating that
Fleming violated conditions of his release even though he did not experience a relapse.
The district court also reasoned that there is no information to suggest that Fleming’s
offense is less serious than the typical firearm-possession offense.
Accordingly, the district court denied Fleming’s departure motion and imposed a
sentence of 60 months of imprisonment. Fleming appeals.
DECISION
Fleming argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a downward
departure from the presumptive sentence.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C (Supp. 2023). For any particular offense, the
guidelines sentence is “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal
history and offense severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (Supp.
4 2023). Accordingly, a district court “must pronounce a sentence . . . within the applicable
[presumptive] range . . . unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2023).
If a defendant requests a downward departure, a district court first must determine
whether “‘mitigating circumstances are present’” and, if so, whether “those circumstances
provide a ‘substantial[] and compelling’ reason not to impose a guidelines sentence.” State
v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Best,
449 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Minn. 1989), and Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1). If substantial
and compelling reasons exist, the district court has discretion to order a downward
departure. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308; Best, 449 N.W.2d at 427.
If a district court departs from the presumptive sentence, the district court is required
to state the reason or reasons for the departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.c (Supp.
2023). But if the district court does not depart, the district court is not required to state
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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-1904
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Jermaine Louis Fleming, Appellant.
Filed October 13, 2025 Affirmed Johnson, Judge
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CR-24-641
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Jermaine Louis Fleming pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person. The district court imposed a sentence of 60 months of imprisonment. We conclude that the district court did not err by denying Fleming’s motion for a downward
dispositional or downward durational departure. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2024, the state charged Fleming with four offenses: (1) possession of a
firearm by an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2022);
(2) possession of ammunition by an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2); (3) fifth-degree controlled-substance crime based on his alleged possession of
methamphetamine, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2022); and (4) fifth-
degree controlled-substance crime based on his alleged possession of fentanyl, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1).
The complaint alleged that, during the early morning hours of October 18, 2023,
Fleming was in the front passenger seat of a vehicle that was stopped by St. Paul police
officers because of a report that a shooting victim was inside the vehicle. The complaint
also alleged that, after Fleming exited the vehicle, officers saw blue pills on the seat where
he had been sitting, found a loaded .22-caliber revolver under the seat, and found a bag of
blue pills and other items in Fleming’s pockets. The complaint further alleged that one of
the blue pills found in Fleming’s pocket tested positive for fentanyl and that another
substance found on Fleming tested positive for methamphetamine.
In April 2024, the parties entered into a plea agreement. Fleming agreed to plead
guilty to the first charge, and the state agreed to dismiss the three remaining charges and to
refrain from objecting to Fleming’s request that he be released pending sentencing so that
he could participate in an inpatient drug-treatment program. At a plea hearing, Fleming
2 admitted that he possessed the .22-caliber revolver that was found under the front passenger
seat. The district court accepted Fleming’s plea and ordered his release pending
sentencing, with conditions, including the conditions that he remain law-abiding and
appear for sentencing in June 2024.
Before the date set for sentencing, Fleming filed a motion for a downward
dispositional or downward durational departure. But Fleming did not appear for sentencing
as scheduled. A warrant was issued for his arrest. He was taken into custody in July 2024.
Fleming appeared for sentencing in September 2024. He argued that he is
particularly amenable to probation on the grounds that he has the support of his family, had
completed an inpatient treatment program, was recommended for an intensive treatment
program, and wants to continue treatment. Fleming’s attorney asserted that he failed to
appear for the originally scheduled sentencing hearing because he did not receive any
assistance in the transition following his discharge from the inpatient treatment program.
As an alternative argument, Fleming requested a downward durational departure of 30
months of imprisonment on the ground that his offense is less serious than typical.
In response, the state argued that Fleming is not particularly amenable to probation
because he failed to appear for the originally scheduled sentencing hearing and committed
a new offense between his plea and his sentencing. The state also argued that Fleming is
not entitled to a downward durational departure because his conduct—possession of a
firearm by an ineligible person—is not less serious than the conduct typically associated
with the offense.
3 Fleming spoke in allocution. He explained that he was not provided an after-care
or step-down plan when he completed the inpatient treatment program but, rather, was
simply dropped off at his home. He acknowledged, however, that the events following his
discharge from the treatment program were his “fault” and that he “can’t blame nobody
else for me not following up.”
The district court directly responded to Fleming by stating, “I can certainly
understand and appreciate how frustrating going through that would have been,” and by
adding that Fleming was not given “the tools that [he] needed.” But the district court also
stated that “two things happened” that would inform its decision: “you didn’t show up for
court” and “you picked up a new charge.” The district court continued by stating that
Fleming violated conditions of his release even though he did not experience a relapse.
The district court also reasoned that there is no information to suggest that Fleming’s
offense is less serious than the typical firearm-possession offense.
Accordingly, the district court denied Fleming’s departure motion and imposed a
sentence of 60 months of imprisonment. Fleming appeals.
DECISION
Fleming argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a downward
departure from the presumptive sentence.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C (Supp. 2023). For any particular offense, the
guidelines sentence is “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal
history and offense severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (Supp.
4 2023). Accordingly, a district court “must pronounce a sentence . . . within the applicable
[presumptive] range . . . unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2023).
If a defendant requests a downward departure, a district court first must determine
whether “‘mitigating circumstances are present’” and, if so, whether “those circumstances
provide a ‘substantial[] and compelling’ reason not to impose a guidelines sentence.” State
v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Best,
449 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Minn. 1989), and Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1). If substantial
and compelling reasons exist, the district court has discretion to order a downward
departure. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308; Best, 449 N.W.2d at 427.
If a district court departs from the presumptive sentence, the district court is required
to state the reason or reasons for the departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.c (Supp.
2023). But if the district court does not depart, the district court is not required to state
reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence. State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925
(Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013); State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d
77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985).
This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s
denial of a request for a downward departure. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08. Only in a “rare
case” will an appellate court reverse a district court’s imposition of a presumptive sentence.
State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006) (quoting State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d
6, 7 (Minn. 1981)).
5 In this case, Fleming argues that the district court erred by concluding that he is not
particularly amenable to probation. Particular amenability to probation is one of the
mitigating factors recognized in the sentencing guidelines as a basis for a downward
dispositional departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7) (Supp. 2023). Particular
amenability to probation is not established if the defendant is only somewhat amenable to
probation. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308-09. Rather, the defendant must be “particularly”
amenable to probation in a way that “distinguishes the defendant from most others and
truly presents the substantial and compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify a
departure.” Id. at 309 (quotation omitted). In determining whether a defendant is
particularly amenable to probation so as to justify a downward dispositional departure, a
district court may consider, among other things, “the defendant’s age, his prior record, his
remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or
family.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). A district court need not discuss
all the Trog factors if the district court denies a motion for a downward dispositional
departure. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Minn. App. 2011).
The record shows that the district court carefully considered Fleming’s departure
motion and explained the reasons for its decision. The district court’s two primary reasons
for denying the motion are supported by the record, including the pre-sentence
investigation report. Fleming does not dispute that he did not appear for the originally
scheduled sentencing hearing. In addition, Fleming does not dispute that he was charged
with and pleaded guilty to a new offense after pleading guilty in this case. At the sentencing
hearing, Fleming’s attorney provided the district court with certain facts to put the new
6 offense in context, and the district court acknowledged those facts and demonstrated that
it understood the nature of the new offense.
On appeal, Fleming notes that he completed an inpatient treatment program between
his plea and his sentencing and, in addition, argues that he is particularly amenable to
probation because of the presence of several Trog factors. Specifically, he points to his
age (42 years old), the “decayed” and “waning” nature of his record of prior convictions,
his positive cooperation and positive attitude while in court, his remorse, and his support
from family members and a dispositional advisor. Most of these Trog factors were not
called to the district court’s attention at the sentencing hearing. We need not consider
whether the record supports Fleming’s argument concerning the Trog factors because, even
if the factors exist, they would not undermine the district court’s reliance on the two
specific recent events that demonstrate a lack of particular amenability to probation. Thus,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Fleming is not particularly
amenable to probation and by denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure.
Furthermore, the district court’s reason for denying Fleming’s alternative request
for a downward durational departure is supported by the record. Fleming admitted to
possessing a .22-caliber revolver despite being ineligible because of prior convictions. The
complaint indicates that the revolver was loaded. At sentencing, Fleming’s attorney did
not identify any particular reason why Fleming’s offense is less serious than typical. In
addition, the district court’s reasoning is consistent with the relevant caselaw. A durational
departure is appropriate only if “the defendant’s conduct in the offense of conviction was
significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the
7 crime in question.” State v. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d 153, 156-57 (Minn. 2015) (quotations
omitted). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Fleming’s
offense is not less serious than the typical offense and by denying his alternative request
for a downward durational departure.
Affirmed.