STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A24-0532
Hennepin County Gaïtas, J.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: July 30, 2025 Office of Appellate Courts James Nyonteh,
Appellant.
________________________
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it excused a seated juror
for falling asleep during trial.
2. The State’s circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant committed the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
1 3. In addition to appellant’s conviction for first-degree premeditated murder,
the warrant of commitment erroneously includes convictions for first-degree domestic
abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder committed against the same victim.
4. Appellant’s claims in his pro se supplemental brief do not merit relief.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
OPINION
GAÏTAS, Justice.
A jury found appellant James Nyonteh guilty of first-degree premeditated murder,
first-degree domestic abuse murder, and second-degree intentional murder for killing his
wife, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing his minor stepdaughter.
The district court sentenced Nyonteh to life imprisonment without the possibility of release
and a consecutive prison term of 144 months. Nyonteh directly appeals his convictions,
arguing that the district court erred by dismissing a juror for sleeping at trial over Nyonteh’s
objection; that respondent State of Minnesota failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the stepdaughter feared imminent great bodily harm during the sexual assaults; and
that the district court erred by entering convictions for first-degree domestic abuse murder
and second-degree intentional murder, in addition to a conviction for first-degree
premeditated murder. In a pro se supplemental brief, Nyonteh argues that he was denied
his right to self-representation and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Because the district court did not err in dismissing the sleeping juror, the evidence was
sufficient to support Nyonteh’s first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction, and
Nyonteh’s pro se claims lack merit, we affirm in part. But because the warrant of
2 commitment erroneously includes convictions for first-degree domestic abuse murder and
second-degree intentional murder, we reverse in part and remand to the district court to
vacate those convictions.
FACTS
P.Y.—a mother of three children—and Nyonteh married in 2021 after being in a
relationship for a few years. They lived together, along with P.Y.’s children.
In March 2022, P.Y. called Champlin police to report that Nyonteh had been
molesting her 16-year-old daughter, S.Y. Police interviewed S.Y., who confirmed that
Nyonteh had sexually abused her on an ongoing basis.
Following the report of sexual abuse, Nyonteh packed his belongings and left the
family home. P.Y. and the children moved to the home of P.Y.’s brother. Less than three
weeks after the sexual abuse report, Nyonteh went to P.Y.’s brother’s house. Nyonteh
confronted P.Y. in the front yard as she arrived home from work and killed her using a
hatchet and a knife.
A grand jury indicted Nyonteh for first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.185(a)(1) (2020); first-degree domestic abuse murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(6)
(2020); second-degree intentional murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2020); and
first-degree criminal sexual conduct–fear of imminent great bodily harm, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1a(a) (Supp. 2021). 1 Nyonteh, who was represented by counsel, had a
jury trial.
1 We cite to the statutes that were in effect at the time of the offenses.
3 Sexual abuse of S.Y.
At trial, S.Y. testified that Nyonteh began molesting her when she was 14 years old.
She explained that the first time it happened, she awoke to Nyonteh kneeling at the end of
her bed with his fingers “in [her] private part.” The following day, Nyonteh told her that
he had joined a cult and that “in order for him to survive, . . . he had to have sex with
somebody who is still a virgin.” Nyonteh told S.Y. that the cult members were threatening
him and that they would kill P.Y. or S.Y.’s siblings if S.Y. did not “do it.”
S.Y. testified that Nyonteh first penetrated her vagina with his penis when she was
14 years old. Over the next few years, Nyonteh sexually penetrated S.Y. numerous times
in multiple locations, including the living room of their shared home, S.Y.’s bedroom,
P.Y.’s bedroom, Nyonteh’s friend’s basement, and the bathroom in a relative’s house in
Champlin where S.Y. stayed for some time.
S.Y. testified that each time she denied Nyonteh’s sexual advances, she would
receive threatening text messages from unknown phone numbers. She told the jury that
“[o]ver the course of two years,” she received these anonymous messages “[p]robably
mostly every day,” sometimes more than once per day. The text messages threatened that
if S.Y. did not follow the instructions provided or submit to Nyonteh’s advances, S.Y., her
mother, her biological father, and her siblings would be hurt or killed. Once, S.Y. told
Nyonteh that she planned to report the sexual abuse to her mother. S.Y. then received a
text message stating that both S.Y. and P.Y. would die. On another occasion, S.Y.
responded to a text from an unknown number, stating that she would no longer have sex
with Nyonteh. Following this response, S.Y. received another message from the unknown
4 number, which threatened to hurt S.Y.’s biological father and included a photo of him.
Sometimes the messages included photos of S.Y.’s other family members, the inside of her
home and bedroom, and cars used by her family members. S.Y. testified that these
messages made her feel “really scared” and “like [she] was just getting controlled.” The
messages led her to believe that the individuals who were threatening her were nearby.
S.Y. awakened one night to discover an apparent burglary of the family’s home.
The front door had been left open and the family’s belongings were strewn about. It was
later determined that Nyonteh had staged the burglary. Soon after this incident, which S.Y.
believed to be a burglary, S.Y. received a text message from an unknown number stating
that she either needed to have sex with Nyonteh to settle her “account” with the cult, or she
would “have to do everything no matter what.”
S.Y. testified that, soon after, she disclosed the abuse to her mother, who then
reported it to police. She explained during the trial that, although she had acknowledged
the sexual abuse when she initially spoke with the police, she did not reveal the full extent
of it then because she feared for her safety and the safety of her family due to the persistent
threats.
During a subsequent forensic interview, the interviewer observed that S.Y. appeared
afraid, especially when sharing the messages she had received on her phone from unknown
numbers. S.Y. also underwent a sexual abuse examination. During the examination, S.Y.
shared that her stepfather had raped her and that afterward she had experienced pain. An
internal examination showed that S.Y. had a “deep hymenal cleft,” which was consistent
with penetrative trauma.
5 A later examination of Nyonteh’s phone confirmed that the phone had been used to
send S.Y. messages and photos. Nyonteh had installed an application that allowed the
phone to send messages from different anonymous phone numbers.
Three weeks after P.Y. first reported the sexual abuse to the police, Nyonteh went
to S.Y.’s after-school job. When S.Y. went outside to empty the trash, she saw Nyonteh
get out of a white car. He approached S.Y., gave her a mailbox key, and asked how she
was doing. S.Y. said that she was “good” or “fine” and went back inside to her job. When
S.Y. finished her shift, the white car Nyonteh had gotten out of followed her on the freeway.
She called P.Y., extremely upset. P.Y. directed S.Y. to go directly to P.Y.’s brother’s
house, and then P.Y. called the police. When S.Y. arrived at P.Y.’s brother’s house, S.Y.
was “shaking” and “crying.”
P.Y.’s Death
Several hours after S.Y.’s encounter with Nyonteh, P.Y. finished work and went
home to her brother’s house. During the commute home, P.Y. was on the phone with her
friend, T.J. P.Y. parked outside her brother’s house and closed her car door. According to
her friend, P.Y. then began screaming. P.Y. told her friend, “It’s [Nyonteh]. He have [sic]
a knife. Call 911.” Her friend heard P.Y. telling Nyonteh, “You need to stop,” and
Nyonteh responding, “I just want to talk.” Her friend testified that she heard P.Y. say, “No
you don’t want to talk. You have a knife.” Her friend hung up, and she immediately called
N.T., the wife of P.Y.’s brother, who was inside the house. She instructed the brother’s
wife to go outside because Nyonteh was chasing P.Y. with a knife. The friend then called
911.
6 When the brother’s wife and S.Y. went outside, they discovered P.Y., who was cut
and bloodied and lifeless, on the ground. Nyonteh was not present. Police and paramedics
arrived, and P.Y. was ultimately pronounced dead.
Several hours later, Nyonteh was arrested in Fargo, North Dakota. He admitted to
police that he had stabbed P.Y. and struck her with a hatchet. Substantial physical evidence
confirmed Nyonteh’s confession. That evidence included a blood-like substance in several
places on the interior and exterior of Nyonteh’s car, blood matching P.Y.’s DNA profile
on both a knife and a hatchet found in the car, Nyonteh’s fingerprints on the knife, and a
receipt in Nyonteh’s wallet for the purchase of the knife and the hatchet just eight days
before P.Y.’s death. 2
The District Court’s Dismissal of Juror 18
Six days into Nyonteh’s jury trial, and over Nyonteh’s objection, the district
court excused a seated juror. The juror—Juror 18—had twice arrived late. Even more
concerning to the district court, Juror 18 had slept through some of the trial testimony on
multiple days.
On the second day of the trial, Juror 18 arrived more than 90 minutes late, delaying
the start of the proceedings. Subsequently, Juror 18 fell asleep three times during the
testimony of the police officer who took the initial report regarding Nyonteh’s sexual abuse
of S.Y. and the testimony of S.Y.’s forensic interviewer. During the forensic interviewer’s
testimony, the district court called for a “five-minute stretch break.” The district court then
2 The State also presented evidence of Nyonteh’s past physical and sexual abuse of two other individuals, which is not relevant to the issues presented here.
7 made a record of its observations. The district court stated that Juror 18 “ha[d] fallen asleep
three times during the testimony [that] morning”—between 9:30 and 10:30 a.m. Initially,
the district court had been able to rouse Juror 18 by coughing loudly. But, according to the
district court, Juror 18 fell asleep two more times. The district court noted that it had called
Juror 18 to the bench to check in. During the conversation at the bench, Juror 18 explained
that he had been late due to traffic, and he was not typically awake during the time when
the court held its morning session. The district court impressed upon Juror 18 the
importance of arriving on time going forward.
Based on this record made by the district court, the prosecutor moved to dismiss
Juror 18. The prosecutor argued that Juror 18’s sleeping amounted to a failure of the juror
to fulfill his obligations. Nyonteh’s counsel objected, contending that the motion was
premature and noting that Juror 18 was the only Black juror on the panel. The district court
denied the prosecutor’s motion but warned that dismissal might be warranted if the juror
continued to sleep during the trial. Before resuming the testimony, the district court’s clerk
provided Juror 18 a cup of coffee.
The next day, Juror 18 arrived in court between 20 and 30 minutes late.
On the fifth day of trial, Juror 18 again slept during the testimony of two prosecution
witnesses—the pediatric nurse practitioner who examined S.Y. and a crime scene
investigator who processed Nyonteh’s car after P.Y.’s death. Minutes into the
investigator’s testimony, the district court called for another “five-minute stretch break”
and sent the jury out into the hallway. Juror 18 was again provided a cup of coffee. The
8 district court later explained for the record that it had ordered the stretch break because
Juror 18 had fallen asleep during the proceedings.
The prosecutor renewed the motion to excuse Juror 18, highlighting that Juror 18
had slept through the testimony of at least three witnesses on different days and that there
were seventeen more witnesses to be called. Nyonteh’s counsel again opposed the motion,
arguing that it was premature, that Juror 18 had not slept through all of the testimony, and
that the district court had been diligent about handling the situation. The district court
denied the prosecutor’s motion but expressed growing concern about the impact of
Juror 18’s sleeping during the proceedings.
On the sixth day of trial, Juror 18 slept during testimony again. The State moved
for a third time to excuse Juror 18. The prosecutor noted that the trial was “voluminous”
and “complex,” with more than 300 exhibits and numerous expert witnesses. Nyonteh’s
counsel objected and suggested that the district court have a formal hearing regarding the
prosecutor’s motion.
After the lunch break, the district court allowed the parties to present legal
arguments regarding the district court’s options for addressing Juror 18’s sleeping. The
district court took the prosecutor’s motion to excuse Juror 18 under advisement.
At the end of the day, and after allowing the parties to present additional arguments,
the district court granted the State’s motion to excuse Juror 18. The district court stated:
It is difficult for me to dismiss a juror over the defense’s objection, but I do think—I know expressed earlier was the idea that the defendant is really the one who is entitled to this, to the full and fair attention of all the jurors and that if he’s not going raise it, then I shouldn’t act on it. I do think the defendant is entitled to the full and fair attention of all the jurors. I have
9 no quarrel with that. I just don’t think that that constitutes veto power over excusing a juror that just isn’t giving their full and fair attention to the trial. I think that it is my job to ensure a—you know, justice and fairness for both sides of this case and, frankly, more importantly, the integrity of the system, that there are—that the jurors that go into deliberations are jurors who have made—well, I mean I think counsel is right. Nobody’s going to remember all the evidence in this case, and there’s a good reason that we have 12 jurors and that we memorialize evidence in the form of exhibits and the like and we allow jurors to ask questions, all of which I think is an implicit recognition that no juror will ever hold all of this in their head. And I think I noticed earlier that I’m something close to 70 pages of notes in my—and I’ve got one of the oversized notebooks that I take notes in. So I don’t expect that everyone would memorize that. But I do expect that, you know, in that notion of full and fair attention that we expect of jurors, and that’s just not happening with this juror. And as a consequence, I’m going to grant the State’s motion to excuse him, which means we will have one alternate. I am—I have put this off three times, and I think I’ve hit the point now where they’re just not capable—I’m making the factual determination that they’re just not capable of administering . . . their full and fair attention during this trial.
An alternate juror replaced Juror 18.
Nyonteh’s Testimony
Nyonteh testified on his own behalf. He denied sexually assaulting S.Y., and he
denied intentionally killing P.Y.
The Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury found Nyonteh guilty of all charges. 3 On the record, the district court
entered convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree criminal sexual
3 Nyonteh filed several post-verdict motions, including a motion for a new trial due to “irregularity in the proceedings and juror misconduct.” See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04, subd. 1 (providing a list of bases on which the district court may “grant a new trial,” including “[i]rregularity in the proceedings, or any order or abuse of discretion that deprived the defendant of a fair trial” and “jury misconduct”). The district court denied the motion.
10 conduct. The district court’s warrant of commitment, however, also includes convictions
for first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder. The district
court sentenced Nyonteh to life imprisonment without the possibility of release for
first-degree premeditated murder and to a consecutive prison term of 144 months for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Nyonteh directly appeals his convictions.
ANALYSIS
I.
Nyonteh first argues that the district court abused its discretion by excusing Juror 18
over Nyonteh’s objection. He notes that, in State v. Hallmark, we equated a claim that a
sleeping juror prejudiced the trial outcome to a juror misconduct claim. See 927 N.W.2d
281, 301 (Minn. 2019) (reviewing the appellant’s pro se argument that he was prejudiced
by a sleeping juror as a juror misconduct claim, which requires a party to show actual
misconduct and prejudice from the misconduct). Nyonteh contends that the district court
abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether
Juror 18’s sleeping constituted misconduct. He further argues that the district court abused
its discretion by excusing Juror 18 without considering whether the juror committed
misconduct that resulted in prejudice. 4 Nyonteh asks us to conclude that the removal of
Juror 18 amounted to a structural error that requires a new trial. Alternatively, Nyonteh
4 Although Nyonteh suggests that the district court’s decision implicated his constitutional rights—his right “to a chosen jury” and to be tried “by a particular tribunal”—he does not argue that he had a constitutional right to have Juror 18 serve on his jury.
11 seeks a remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issues of whether Juror
18 committed misconduct and whether the misconduct caused prejudice.
The State argues that we should not apply our law governing claims of juror
misconduct to the circumstances here, where the district court excused the juror for
repeatedly sleeping during trial testimony. It points out that we previously have reviewed
a district court’s decision to remove a seated juror for an abuse of discretion, affording the
district court wide latitude in making this decision. E.g., State v. Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275,
284–85 (Minn. 2003). The State urges us to apply this same standard in reviewing a district
court’s decision to remove a sleeping juror, and not to treat such claims as juror misconduct
claims. According to the State, the district court’s decision to remove Juror 18 was a proper
exercise of discretion and does not require reversal of Nyonteh’s convictions.
To decide these issues, we initially review our case law and procedural rules to
determine what law should govern a district court’s decision to remove a seated juror.
Then, in light of the applicable law, we consider the particular facts of this case.
A.
We have addressed a district court’s decision to remove a seated juror on one other
occasion. In Manley, which involved a criminal trial, a juror stated during jury selection
that her sister worked in the jurisdiction as a public defender. 664 N.W.2d at 283. When
questioned about the impact of her relationship with her sister on her impartiality, the juror
responded that she “did not feel that her sister’s position would influence her during the
trial.” Id. Ultimately, the juror was seated. Id. During the ensuing trial, the district court
noticed that the juror’s sister “was frequently present in the courtroom observing the trial.”
12 Id. at 283–84. The district court grew concerned about the presence of the sister in the
courtroom and, specifically, whether it was influencing the juror. Id. at 284. Given the
concern, the district court questioned the juror’s sister about any conversations she had
with the juror about the case. Id. The sister told the district court that she had asked the
juror for the defendant’s name, and when the juror explained that she could not discuss the
case, the sister assured her that she could disclose “the defendant’s name, the charges, the
judge, and the attorneys.” Id. at 284 n.4. After a weekend recess, the State noted its
concern about the juror’s ability to be impartial. Id. at 284. The district court questioned
the juror, and the juror revealed that her sister had been driving her to and from court during
the trial. Id. But the juror stated that her sister’s presence had not influenced her. Id. The
district court did not remove the juror. Id. However, the following day, the juror asked to
be excused. Id. She told the district court that her “association with [her] sister” could
impact her objectivity. Id. The district court then excused the juror and seated an alternate
juror. Id.
On appeal to this court, Manley argued that the district court erred by questioning
the juror and by eventually excusing her. Id. We observed that a district court’s decision
to excuse a seated juror was “somewhat analogous” to “the question [that] arises [during
jury selection] as to whether a prospective juror should be removed for cause.” Id. In those
situations, we noted, “we give great deference to the [district] court in making its
determination.” Id. We stated that a district court is responsible for ensuring that trial
proceedings are fair, and that when there are concerns about the fairness of the proceedings,
“it is appropriate for the [district] court to address those concerns.” Id. And we concluded
13 that there was no reason to treat a district court’s decision to remove a seated juror any
differently from the decision to remove a prospective juror for cause during jury selection.
See id. at 284–85. We then rejected Manley’s argument that the district court erred in
removing the juror from his jury panel, determining that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it questioned the sister and the juror, and when it excused the juror. Id.
Nyonteh argues that our decision in Manley should not apply when the juror’s
conduct is sleeping. Instead, he asks us to apply our case law governing juror misconduct
to sleeping juror claims. See State v. Pederson, 614 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Minn. 2000)
(outlining a framework for analyzing claims of juror misconduct, including requiring an
evidentiary hearing when a claimant shows a prima facie case of juror misconduct and
imposing a burden on the claimant to demonstrate that actual misconduct occurred and that
the misconduct caused prejudice); see also Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co.,
104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1960) (observing that the “better practice” in cases involving
alleged juror misconduct is for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing). Nyonteh
correctly notes that, in Hallmark, we cited juror misconduct cases when considering
Hallmark’s pro se claim that he was “prejudiced” because one of his alternate jurors fell
asleep during trial. 927 N.W.2d at 301.
However, our decision in Hallmark did not expressly adopt a juror misconduct
framework for cases involving sleeping jurors. Without detailed analysis, we stated in
Hallmark that to “succeed on a claim of juror misconduct, Hallmark must show ‘actual
misconduct’ by a specific juror and prejudice resulting from the misconduct.” 927 N.W.2d
at 301 (citation omitted). We then cited State v. Peterson, which holds that a party claiming
14 juror misconduct bears “the burden of demonstrating actual misconduct and prejudice.”
262 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Minn. 1978). And we cited State v. Danielson, which involved an
alleged sleeping juror. 150 N.W.2d 567, 568 (Minn. 1967). But Danielson did not hold
that a juror commits misconduct by sleeping. The entirety of our analysis in Danielson
regarding the allegation that a juror had fallen asleep was as follows:
With respect to the second claim of defendant, all that happened was that near the beginning of the trial the court asked one of the jurors whether he was paying attention or was, possibly, asleep; the juror answered that he was simply bowing his head. There is no further indication that he was actually sleeping. There is no showing of prejudice. This claim requires no further comment.
Id. Although our discussion in Hallmark may have been imprecise, we reject Nyonteh’s
argument that Hallmark requires a district court to apply our juror misconduct law in
deciding whether to excuse a sleeping juror. 5
We hold that falling asleep is not juror misconduct. Instead, it is conduct that may
impact or bear on a juror’s ability to serve fairly. In deciding whether to excuse a seated
juror during trial for sleeping—or for another reason related to the juror’s ability to fairly
serve—a district court must exercise its discretion. In exercising that discretion, a district
court should consider our procedural rule that requires jurors to be “[a]ble to render
satisfactory jury service.” Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 808(b)(5). A district court should also be
5 Nothing in this decision should be construed as changing our determination that Hallmark was entitled to no relief on his claim that he was prejudiced by the alleged sleeping of an alternate juror who did not participate in deliberations. Because the juror in Hallmark did not deliberate, Hallmark could not have been prejudiced. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 301.
15 mindful in criminal cases that, “[i]f a juror becomes unable to serve, an alternate juror must
replace that juror.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 9. Most importantly, we emphasize
that a district court must ensure that every trial is fair. Manley, 664 N.W.2d at 284. When
concerns arise about the ability of a seated juror to render satisfactory jury service, and
those concerns implicate the fairness of a trial, it is appropriate for the district court to
exercise its discretion to address those concerns. 6 See id.
With these principles in mind, we examine the facts presented in this case.
B.
Because Juror 18 did not commit juror misconduct by falling asleep, the district
court was not required to apply our juror misconduct law in considering the State’s motion
6 On the other hand, in cases involving allegations of juror misconduct, district courts must continue to follow our separate line of cases concerning juror misconduct. See Pederson, 614 N.W.2d at 730–31. Our review of Minnesota case law reveals that juror misconduct is uncommon. We have previously determined that a juror’s intentional alcohol intoxication to “an extent as to impair his faculties, and render him incapable of comprehending or appreciating the proceedings in court, or unfit him for an intelligent, fair, and impartial consideration of the case” may constitute juror misconduct. State v. Salverson, 91 N.W. 1, 3–4 (Minn. 1902). In Schwartz, we stated that “[c]ases may and do arise where a juror’s untruthful answering of questions propounded upon a voir dire examination will prevent a litigant from having a fair trial.” 104 N.W.2d at 303. Additionally, Rule 606(b) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence identifies the limited circumstances when a juror’s statement regarding “the verdict or indictment” will be admissible at any hearing concerning juror misconduct:
[A] juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or as to any threats of violence or violent acts brought to bear on jurors, from whatever source, to reach a verdict . . . .
Minn. R. Evid. 606(b).
16 to excuse Juror 18. We therefore reject Nyonteh’s argument that the district court erred
when it did not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Juror 18’s conduct was
actual misconduct that caused prejudice.
Because Juror 18’s sleeping raised a concern about Juror 18’s ability to render
satisfactory jury service, which implicated the fairness of Nyonteh’s trial, the district court
had discretion to address the concern in an appropriate manner. We review a district court’s
decision to excuse a seated juror to ensure the fairness of a trial for an abuse of discretion.
Manley, 664 N.W.2d at 285. “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on
an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Glover,
4 N.W.3d 124, 134 (Minn. 2024) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We discern no abuse of discretion. The record shows that Juror 18 slept multiple
times during trial testimony on at least four trial days, including testimony by the police
officer who responded to the initial report of S.Y.’s sexual abuse, the forensic interviewer
who interviewed S.Y., the pediatric nurse practitioner who examined S.Y., and the crime
scene investigator who processed Nyonteh’s car following the killing of P.Y. The district
court made diligent efforts to keep Juror 18 awake and engaged, including coughing loudly,
bringing Juror 18 to the bench to encourage him to stay awake, repeatedly calling for
mid-trial stretch breaks, and offering Juror 18 coffee. Additionally, the district court
explored the reasons for Juror 18’s inability to stay awake for testimony. The district court
stated, “I had no impression that it . . . [was Juror 18’s] intention to ignore the trial,” noting
that Juror 18 was “quite apologetic.” Further, the district court remarked,
17 [Juror 18] admitted to me that he’s just not the kind of guy that’s usually awake in the morning, and I think the other time he told me that he had been working at Walmart until 11:00 the night before. I assume he didn’t get to bed before midnight on that occasion.
Throughout the trial, the district court reiterated its concern about the impact of Juror 18’s
sleeping on the fairness of the proceedings. Ultimately, in the district court’s judgment,
Juror 18’s sleeping created an intolerable risk of unfairness to both the State and Nyonteh.
At that point, the district court excused Juror 18 and seated an alternate.
The district court made an extensive record of its concerns. It tried to change Juror
18’s behavior. It weighed the benefits and harms of excusing Juror 18 multiple times. And
it ultimately made a well-reasoned decision to excuse the juror in the interest of a fair trial.
We conclude that the district court’s decision to remove Juror 18 for sleeping was an
appropriate exercise of its discretion that does not warrant reversal of Nyonteh’s
convictions.
II.
Nyonteh next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction
for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. He argues that the State’s evidence failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt one element of the offense—that S.Y. reasonably feared
imminent great bodily harm during the sexual penetration. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342,
subd. 1a(a). The State responds that it presented ample evidence from which the jury could
conclude that it had satisfied its burden to prove this element.
“In a criminal proceeding, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the State must prove every element of the
18 offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Minn. 2020).
To convict Nyonteh of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, the State was required to
prove, among other elements, that the “circumstances existing at the time of the
act”—sexual penetration—“cause[d] [S.Y.] to have a reasonable fear of imminent great
bodily harm to [herself] or another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1a(a).
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must “view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury disbelieved any
evidence that conflicts with the verdict.” Culver, 941 N.W.2d at 142 (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The applicable standard of review depends on whether
the conviction—or, as in this case, the specific element at issue—is supported by direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence. State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 155 (Minn. 2024).
“[D]irect evidence is [e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and
that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d
592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer
whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). It “always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not
required with direct evidence.” Id. Both parties agree that the evidence of the element at
issue—reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm—was circumstantial.
“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence
as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable
doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473
19 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When an element is
supported by circumstantial evidence, we apply a heightened, two-step standard of review.
Segura, 2 N.W.3d at 155. First, we “identify the circumstances proved” by “winnow[ing]
down the evidence presented at trial to a subset of facts that are consistent with the jury’s
verdict.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We must “disregard all
evidence that is inconsistent with the verdict.” Id. Second, we “identify the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved when viewed as a whole and
not as discrete and isolated facts.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In step two, we “give no deference to the jury’s choice between reasonable
inferences.” Id. “The State’s circumstantial evidence is sufficient when the reasonable
inferences are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
We begin our analysis by identifying the circumstances proved regarding S.Y.’s fear
of imminent great bodily harm. Those circumstances are as follows:
Nyonteh first sexually penetrated S.Y. when she was 14 years old. She awoke to
Nyonteh’s fingers “in [her] private part.” The following day, Nyonteh told S.Y. that he
had joined a cult and that in order to survive, “he had to have sex with somebody who is
still a virgin.” He told S.Y. that the cult threatened to kill Nyonteh, S.Y., or her family
members if Nyonteh did not have sexual intercourse with S.Y. This scared S.Y.
S.Y. initially said no to Nyonteh’s requests for sex. A few weeks after Nyonteh’s
initial sexual assault, S.Y. began receiving text messages from unknown phone numbers
20 each time she denied Nyonteh’s sexual advances. These text messages threatened that, if
S.Y. did not submit to Nyonteh’s advances, she, her mother P.Y., her biological father, and
her siblings would be hurt or be killed. S.Y. felt “really scared” as a result of these
messages.
While S.Y. was still 14 years old, Nyonteh penetrated S.Y.’s vagina with his penis.
S.Y. cried and was in pain.
Text messages from unknown phone numbers threatened S.Y. that if she did not
have sex with Nyonteh, or if she disclosed the abuse, she or P.Y. would die in a car crash.
Sometimes, the texts would instruct S.Y. to have sex with Nyonteh immediately in a
specific room or else she or her mother would die in a car crash.
S.Y. received texts from unknown phone numbers that included photos of her
family, of her family’s cars, of her home, and of her bedroom. These messages made S.Y.
feel even more fearful. Specifically, she feared that the individuals who were threatening
her were nearby.
S.Y. once told Nyonteh that she planned to tell P.Y. about the sexual abuse. Shortly
after this conversation, S.Y. received a text message stating that if she told P.Y., both S.Y.
and P.Y. would die.
On one occasion, S.Y. replied to a text from an unknown number, stating that she
would no longer have sex with Nyonteh. In response, she received a photo of her biological
father and a threat that, if she did not continue to submit to Nyonteh, the cult would hurt
her father.
21 Shortly before S.Y. told her mother about Nyonteh’s sexual abuse, Nyonteh staged
a burglary of the family home. S.Y. woke up in the middle of the night to find the front
door open and belongings strewn about.
A few days later, S.Y. received text messages from an unknown number indicating
that she needed to have sex with Nyonteh to settle her “account” with the cult. The
messages stated that if S.Y. did not do so by a given deadline, the account would remain
open, and she would “have to do everything no matter what.”
When S.Y. told her mother about the sexual abuse days after the messages directed
her to settle her “account,” S.Y. asked her mother not to confront Nyonteh. S.Y. explained
that she was scared “they were going to do something to us . . . [b]ecause [S.Y.] kept on
getting threats that if [she] told, they were going to do something to” her family.
P.Y. reported the sexual abuse to the police. When officers arrived at the family
home, S.Y. cried and was afraid to tell the police about the abuse. She feared that the cult
would follow through on their threats to hurt or kill her family.
Having identified the circumstances proved, the next step of the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence analysis requires us to examine the reasonable inferences from these
circumstances and determine whether they are “consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Segura,
2 N.W.3d at 155 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nyonteh challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence as to only one element of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct—whether the “circumstances existing at the time of the [sexual penetration]”
22 caused “[S.Y.] to have a reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm to [herself] or
another.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1a(a).
Nyonteh concedes that the State’s circumstantial evidence supports the reasonable
inference that S.Y. may have believed she or others would suffer great bodily harm if she
refused Nyonteh’s sexual assaults. But he contends that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that she believed the great bodily harm would be “imminent.” Nyonteh asks us to
apply a dictionary definition of “imminent” that defines the term as meaning “immediate.”
Notably, Nyonteh’s jury was instructed that imminent means “immediate,” consistent with
the pattern jury instruction that was in effect at the time of Nyonteh’s trial. See
10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal,
CRIMJIG 12.03 (6th ed. Supp. 2022–2023) (issued in October 2022) (stating that “ ‘[t]o
fear imminent great bodily harm’ means that the person must fear that such harm will occur
immediately”). 7
The State, on the other hand, cites another dictionary that defines the word
“imminent” as “impending” or “about to occur.” It argues that “imminent” does not mean
“immediate,” and to sustain Nyonteh’s conviction, we need not determine that S.Y. feared
“immediate” great bodily harm to herself or another.
7 This version of the jury instruction existed until November 2024, when it was modified to remove the definition of imminent. Compare 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 12.01 (7th ed. 2023) (issued in December 2023) (still including, “ ‘To fear imminent great bodily harm’ means that the person must fear that such harm will occur immediately.”), with 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 12.01 (7th ed. 2024) (published in November 2024) (no longer defining “imminent”).
23 Whether the term “imminent” in the first-degree criminal sexual conduct statute
means “immediate” or “impending” is immaterial here. Under either definition advanced
by the parties, the trial evidence supports just one reasonable hypothesis—when Nyonteh
sexually penetrated S.Y., the circumstances caused her to reasonably fear imminent great
bodily harm to herself or others. The evidence of Nyonteh’s persistent and specific threats
to S.Y. about the great bodily harm that would occur to her or her family members—threats
that were sometimes accompanied by photos suggesting that the violence could
immediately occur—established beyond a reasonable doubt that S.Y. reasonably feared
imminent great bodily harm to herself or her family members. Nyonteh’s conduct made
S.Y. fearful of both immediate and impending great bodily harm. And the circumstances
proved are inconsistent with any rationale hypothesis that this teenager only believed that
the harm would occur later. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial evidence was sufficient
to prove that Nyonteh committed the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
against S.Y.
III.
Nyonteh argues that the district court erred by entering convictions for first-degree
domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder, in addition to his conviction
for first-degree premeditated murder. He contends that these convictions violate the
proscription against multiple convictions for the same conduct against the same victim.
The State agrees.
The jury found Nyonteh guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree
domestic abuse murder, and second-degree intentional murder for the death of P.Y.
24 Although the district court did not enter convictions for first-degree domestic abuse murder
or second-degree intentional murder orally on the record, Nyonteh’s warrant of
commitment includes convictions for all three offenses.
“Minnesota law protects defendants against duplicative convictions . . . for the same
conduct.” Tichich v. State, 4 N.W.3d 114, 124 (Minn. 2024). The district court may not
convict a defendant of “two counts of first-degree murder when both convictions are for
the same offense, are on the basis of the same act, and involve the same victim.” State v.
Balandin, 944 N.W.2d 204, 222 (Minn. 2020) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Additionally, a defendant may not be convicted of both first-degree murder and
a lesser degree of murder for the same conduct involving the same victim. Minn. Stat. §
609.04, subd. 1 (2024) (stating that a defendant “may be convicted of either the crime
charged or an included offense, but not both”); State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 697
(Minn. 2017) (“[E]very lesser degree of murder is an included offense.”).
Because Nyonteh’s charges for first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree
domestic abuse murder, and second-degree intentional murder were for the same conduct
involving the same victim—P.Y.—the district court erred by entering convictions for all
three offenses in the warrant of commitment. E.g., State v. Johnson, 773 N.W.2d 81, 89
(Minn. 2009) (concluding that the district court erred when it entered two first-degree
murder convictions and one second-degree murder conviction for the same conduct
involving the same victim). We therefore reverse in part and remand to the district court
to vacate Nyonteh’s additional convictions for first-degree domestic abuse murder and
second-degree intentional murder.
25 IV.
Finally, we turn to the arguments raised by Nyonteh in his pro se supplemental brief.
“Claims in a pro se supplemental brief that are unsupported by either arguments or citation
to legal authority are forfeited.” State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2021)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In his pro se supplemental brief, Nyonteh first claims that the district court erred by
denying him the right to represent himself. The record shows that before Nyonteh’s trial
commenced, he wrote a letter to the district court inquiring about representing himself,
among other things. After receiving Nyonteh’s letter, the district court addressed
Nyonteh’s inquiry about self-representation on the record. The district court stated, “I did
receive correspondence from the defendant. . . . It’s my understanding . . . that . . . at this
point there is no pro se motion.” Nyonteh’s attorney confirmed that the district court’s
understanding was correct. Nyonteh did not renew his inquiry about representing himself
or ultimately move to represent himself.
Given these circumstances, where Nyonteh did not assert his right to
self-representation, he forfeited any claim that the district court denied his right to
self-representation. See State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 278 (Minn. 2014) (stating that a
party forfeits a right when they fail to timely assert it). Moreover, beyond stating that the
district court deprived him of his right to represent himself, Nyonteh’s pro se supplemental
brief does not include any argument or citation to legal authority to support this claim. See
Montano, 956 N.W.2d at 650. Accordingly, we decline to address it.
26 Nyonteh also alleges in his pro se supplemental brief that he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Again, however, we decline to address this claim because
Nyonteh does not identify any specific conduct by his attorney, and he does not include
argument or citation to legal authority.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Nyonteh’s convictions for first-degree
premeditated murder and first-degree criminal sexual conduct, but we reverse his
additional convictions for first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree
intentional murder and remand to the district court to vacate those convictions.