080951
STATE OF ~v1AINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET CUMBERLAND, ss. PORTLAND
Docket No. 15-2389
STATE OF 1v1AINE ) ) v. ) ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL ) PRODUCTION OF CELLPHONE PASSCODES ) MARQUISE TRANT )
The Grand Jury has indicted Marquise Trant with two counts of Aggravated Trafficking in Scheduled Drugs. (Class A). The State has also filed a request for Criminal Forfeiture of U.S. currency. On April 9, 2015 and again on April 14, 2015 the State orchestrated two controlled buys through a confidential informant. On both occasions the State alleges that Mr. Trant sold crack cocaine to the confidential informant. Based on these two buys, the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency arrested Mr. Trant on April 27, 2015. When he was arrested, the police seized two cell phones, an iPhone 4 and iPhone 6. The State obtained a search warrant authorizing a search of the seized cellphones for "[e]lectronically stored information including phone numbers, names, text messages, voice recordings, photographs, video clips, date and time stamps, and other electronic information; all of which may be contraband and evidence of the offenses of possession, furnishing, and/or trafficking scheduled drugs which are seizable pursuant to Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and/or Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 801." The State's Drug Enforcement Agency reported on April30, 2015 that it has been unable to execute the search on the seized phones because they are locked. See Report of Eric Pfeffer at ~1 ("In order to complete the part of the investigation I would need the pin/passcode/pattem to
unlock the above items. I'm requesting the owners of each device be compelled to release their pin/passcode/pattem to complete this portion of the investigation"). Accordingly, by motion filed June 11, 2015, the State "asks that this Court compel the Defendant to produce the passcodes for each phone.'' Subsequent to filing its motion, the State revised its position to indicate that it does not need a court order requiring Defendant to release his passcode, but rather seeks only that the Court compel the Defendant to himself insert the passcodes so that the State may gain access to the phones' contents. The court held a non-testimonial hearing on the State's Motion to Compel on June 26, 2015. Following a conference call with counsel, the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the State's motion to compel on September 29, 2015. 1 Attorney Devens Hamlen appeared on behalf of Defendant. Assistant Attorney General Lea-Anne Sutton appeared on behalf of the State. The court heard testimony from the arresting officer, Detective Bradley Rogers, and from Eric Pfeffer, as well as extensive oral argument. At hearing the State's wi1ness testified that the State of Maine does not have the technology required to access the information on either phone without Defendant's cooperation. The State indicated that there is a federal facility in Boston that can access encrypted information on cellphones, but only by destroying the phones, adding that in any event that facility is designated for homeland security purposes, not drug investigations. The State had initially thought that one of the phones was accessible by fingerprint, but has since determined that both phones are password, not fingerprint, protected. The State also acknowledges that when it first seized the phones there may have: been a window of time when it could have accessed the information stored on the phones, but decided to shut the phones down immediately after they were seized to avoid any possibility that Defendant might remotely delete or edit their contents. Having considered the facts adduced at hearing, counsel's oral argument, Defendant's Objection to State's Motion to Compel, filed September 29, 2015, and the State's Response to Defendant's Objection, filed October 5, 2015, the court concludes as follows. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend V. See also Me. Const. art. I, § 6 ("the accused . . . shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself'). It is well established that the constitutional right against self-incrimination is implicated only where there is compulsion of an incriminating testimonial communication. See, e.g., United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum), 670 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2012) ("An individual must show three things to fall within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment: 1) compulsion, 2) a testimonial communication or act, and 3) incrimination"); United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d
1 The court initially scheduled the hearing on August 11, 2015, but continued the matter at Defendant's request to allow him to have new counsel appointed.
2 1129, 1131 (5th Cir, 1979) (same). The State argues that its pending motion does not implicate Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights on the ground that "production of the passcode is not testimonial." See Motion to Compel Passcode. The court is not persuaded by the State's argument on this point. 2 It follows from U.S. Supreme Court precedent that an "act of production itself qualifies as testimonial if conceding the existence, possession and control, and authenticity of the documents tend[s] to incriminate." United States v. Doe, supra, 670 F.3d at 1343 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)). While a defendant may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photography, or the taking of measurements, and may be compelled to provide a blood sample or a handwriting or voice exemplar, forcing a defendant to produce a passcode is distinguishable, as a passcode is not akin to physical characteristic evidence, but rather is the product of mental processes. See, e.g., id. at 1345 ("The Fifth Amendment privilege is not triggered where the Government m(:rely compels some physical act, ie., where the individual is not called upon to make use of the contents of his or her mind"); Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 271 ("Unlike the production of physical characteristic evidence, such as a fingerprint, the production of a password forces the Defendant to 'disclose the contents of his own mind"'). The State attempts to avoid the testimonial hurdle by suggesting that it is not interested in having Defendant disclose the passcode to them, but rather simply seeks a court order directing Defendant to open the phones so that the State may gain access to his stored information, an act that the State asserts is essentially physical. The court does not agree that in this case the Fifth Amendment issue may be avoided by requiring Defendant to himself open the phones. At its core, the privilege against self-incrimination "reflects our fierce unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt." Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990). "It is evident that a suspect is 'compelled to be a witness against himself at least whenever ht: must face the modem-day analog of the historic trilemma -- either during a criminal trial where the a sworn witness faces the identical three choices, or
2 The State's motion presents an issue of first impression in Maine. Moreover, despite the ubiquitous presence of cellphones today, only a few reported cases address Fifth Amendment concerns with respect to cellphone passwords. See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination as Applied to Compelled Disclosure of Password or Production of Otherwise Encrypted Electronically Stored Data, 84 A.L.R. 6th 251 (2015).
3 during custodial interrogation, where . . . the choices are analogous and hence raise similar concerns." Id The State is asking the court to compel Defendant to give the State access to his phones, and thus Defendant is presented with the choice of acknowledging either that he indeed can access them (thus potentially incriminating himself), or lying about his inability to do so. If the court were to issue the order sought by the State, and Defendant were to fail (or were unable) to cooperate, Defendant would be subject to contempt proceedings. Accordingly, the Court does not agree that the information sought by the State is non-testimonial. 3 Even though a passcode is a product of one's mind, and thus testimonial in nature, compelling production of a passcode does not offend the Fifth Amendment provided that the elements ofthe "foregone conclusion" doctrine are met. "The 'foregone conclusion' exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination provides that an act of production does not involve testimonial communication where the facts conveyed are- already known to the government, such that the individual 'add little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information."' Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.2d 605, 614 (Mass. 2014) (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)). In order for the foregone conclusion to apply, the State must establish that it already has knowledge of 1) the existence of the evidence demanded; 2) the possession or control of that evidence by the defendant; and 3) the authenticity of the evidence. ld Applying this analysis to the facts of this matter, the court finds that the State has failed to establish that production of the passcode would "add little or nothing to the sum total of the [State]'s information." The State knows that the iPhones exist and that they are passcode-protected. The State knows that the iPhones were found on Defendant's person, and that one of the phones belongs to Defendant's mother, who resides in Florida. The State knows that Defendant contacted the State's confidential informants by text message two weeks before his arrest, but does not know that the phones seized were the devices used by Defendant to send the text messages. The State knows
3 The Court recognizes that the line between testimonial and non-testimonial is very fine, and that application of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence produces what may appear to many to be an absurd result, whereby suspects who use a four-digit password to protect information on their electronic devices are given full sanctuary, and suspects who use their fingerprint to protect information are given no sanctuary. Given the daunting task of reconciling Fifth Amendment case-law (and the values underlying that jurisprudence) with the enormous challenges posed for law enforcement by modern encryption technology, resolution of the issues posed by password- protected cellphones may need to await consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court.
4 that when Defendant was asked to give the State his passcodes he did not indicate that he did not know them; rather, Defendant asked that he be allowed to talk to his lawyer before responding to the State's request. Thus, while it is highly likely that Defendant knows the passcodes, the State does not know that Defendant has or had control over the iPhones. Furthermore, the State acknowledges that it does not know what information is stored on the phones. Accordingly, compelling either production of the passcodes or Defendant's unlocking of the phones for the State's purposes would incriminate Defendant and authenticate whatever evidence is ultimately recovered. The State's relative lack of preexisting knowledge distinguishes this matter from those cases in which eourts have found the foregone conclusion exception applicable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, supra, 11 N.E.3d at 608 (holding that defendant could be compelled to provide his password to seized encrypted digital evidence "where the defendant's compelled decryption would not communicate facts of a testimonial nature to the Commonwealth beyond what the defendant already had admitted to investigators") (emphasis added); Baust, supra, 89 Va. Cir. At 271 ("'the passcode is not a foregone conclusion because it is not known outside of Defendant's mind. Unlike a document or tangible thing, such as an unencrypted copy of the footage itself, if the password was a foregone conclusion, the Commonwealth would not need to compel Defendant to produce it because they would already know it"). As the 11th Circuit noted in Doe, supra, 670 F.3d at 1347-49, the foregone conclusion does not apply where the State "has failed to show any basis, let alone shown a basis with reasonable particularity, for its belief that encrypted files exist on the [iPhones], that [Defendant] had access to those files, or that he is capable of decrypting the files." As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, whether the production of evidence in response to a governmental demand is testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes "depend[s] on the facts and circumstances of [each] particular case." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 757 (1966); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S., 201, 214-15 (1988). Based on the facts and circumstances of this particular case, given the dearth of preexisting knowledge possessed by the State, the court finds that the foregone conclusion exception does not apply in these circumstances, and accordingly finds that compelling Defendant to divulge the contents of his mind -- either by compelling him to surrender the passcodes or compelling him to himself open the phones -- would violate his privilege against self-incrimination protected by the Federal and Maine Constitutions.
5 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the State's Motion to Compel Passcodes is DENIED.
DATED:~ Judge
6 STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET CUMBERLAND, SS. DOCKET NO. CR-15-2389 06889 l STATE OF MAINE (_"
MOTION TO COMPEL '- I. . ...: ~· : ~' t- PASSCODE vs. . l) r .J MARQUISE T~~f~TJUN ll Hfl - .; . NOW COMES the Attorney for the State and moves this Court to compel the Defendant in this case to produce the passcodes to the telephone seized from him when he was arrested for the charges of Aggravated Trafficking in Sched. W Drugs. SA Brad Rogers of the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency has obtained a search warrant from a judge, who authorized such search because there is probable cause to search said phones. However, the State is unable to execute this search warrant because the phones are protected by passcodes that cannot be unlocked. Please see attached affidavit. Wherefore, in order to execute this search warrant, the State asks that this Court compel the Defendant to produce the passcodes for each phone. The State does not need to know what the passcode is. The State asserts that production of the passcode is not testimonial. The Defendant objects to producing the passcode. The State asks that this matter be set for a hearing on this issue.
Dated: June~. 2015 Lea-Anne Sutton Assistant Attorney General Maine Bar Number 8186
ORDER
Upon the State's Motion, it is hereby ORDERED that the Defendant be compelled to produce the passcode for each phone seized from him, so that law enforcement can execute a judicially authorized search warrant in this case.
Justice, Superior Court Maine Drug Enforcement Case# Agency DE-2015-0945 Continuation Report
Author IDate of Report ICSO Pfeffer, Eric R 04130/2015
DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION: 1. Currently conducting a search warrant on phones seized as evidence by Special Agent Rogers for MDEA case DE-2015-0945, warrant sign by the Honorable Judge Powers. I am unable to unlock the following phones for examination. Each phone listed below has its owners name listed.
a. iPhone 6 cellular phone, ~odel A 1549, gold and white in color, IMEI# 356991067963108, found on MARQUISE TRANT's person (DOB 11/09/1988)
b. iPhone 4 cellular phone, model A1387, white in color, IC# 579C-E2430A, found on MARQUISE TRANT's person (DOB 11/09/1988)
In order to complete the part of the investigation I would need the pin/passcode/pattem to unlock the above items. I'm requesting the owners of each device be compelled to relea8e their pin/passcode/pattern to complete this portion of the investigation.
2. I ~musing the UFED Touch made by Cellebtite to perform a Physical Extraction of the above Cellular devices; which requires the devices to be unlocked. I am certified CeUebrite Operator.
ATTACHMENTS:
DISTRIBUTION:
CASE STATUS:
AUTHOR'S SIGNA REVIEWER'S SIGNATURE DATE
Page I of I STATE OF MAINE CRIMINAL DOCKET VS CUMBERLAND, ss. MARQUISE TRANT Docket No CUMCD-CR-2015-02389 15453 PLANTATION OAKS DR TAMPA FL 33647 DOCKET RECORD DOB: 11/0911988 Attorney: VERNE PARADIE State's Attorney: STEPHANIE ANDERSON PARADIE SHERMAN WALKER & WORDEN 11 LISBON ST SUITE 202 LEWISTON ME 04240 WITHDRAWN 08111/2015 Attorney: DEVENS HAMLEN HEMINWA Y HAMLEN LAW CENTER PA 22 MONUMENT SQUARE SUITE 404 PO BOX4784 PORTLAND ME 04101 PARTIALLY INDIGENT 08/1112015 Filing Document: CRIMINAL COMPLAINT Major Case Type: FELONY (CLASS A,B,C) Filing Date: 04/29/2015 Charge(s) 1 AGGRAVATED TRAFFICKING OF SCHEDULED DRUGS 04/09/2015 PORTLAND Seq11550 17-A 1105-A(I)(B)(l) ClassA ROGERS I MDE 2 AGGRAVATED TRAFFICKING OF SCHEDULED DRUGS 04114/2015 PORTLAND Seq 11550 17-A 1105-A( l)(B)(l) Class A ROGERS I MDE 3 CRIMINAL FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 04/27/2015 PORTLAND Seq 7049 15 5826 Class U ROGERS MDE Docket Events: 04/29/2015 FILING DOCUMENT- CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FILED ON 04/29/2015
04/29/2015 Charge(s): 1,2,3 HEARING - INITIAL APPEARANCE SCHEDULED FOR 04/29/2015 at 01:00p.m. in Room No.
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 04/30/2015 Charge(s): I ,2,3 HEARING- INITIAL APPEARANCE HELD ON 04/29/2015 ROLAND A COLE , JUSTICE DA: JENNIFER ACKERMAN Defendant Present in Court FTR#1 04/30/2015 Charge(s): 1,2,3 PLEA- NO ANSWER ENTERED BY DEFENDANT ON 04/29/2015
04/30/2015 BAIL BOND- CASH BAIL BOND SET BY COURT ON 04/29/2015 ROLAND A COLE , JUSTICE $25,000. WI CONDS. 04/30/2015 HEARING- DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 07115/2015 at 10:00 a.m. in Room No. 7
04/30/2015 TRIAL- JURY TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR 08/10/2015 at 08:30a.m. in Room No. 11
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 04/30/2015 MOTION- MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 04/29/2015
MOTION- MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL GRANTED ON 04/29/2015 CR-200 Page 1 of 5 Printed on: 10/27/2015 MARQUISE TRANT CUMCD-CR-20 15-02389 DOCKET RECORD 04/30/2015 ROLAND A COLE, JUSTICE FULL REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTY FEES IF RELEASED ON BAIL 04/3012015 Party(s): MARQUISE TRANT ATTORNEY- PARTIALLY INDIGENT ORDERED ON 04/29/2015
Attorney: VERNE PARADIE 05111/2015 LETTER- FROM PARTY FILED ON 05/08/2015
FROM DEFENDANT REQUESTING NEW COUNSEL. COPY SENT TO ATTORNEY 5-11-15 0611112015 MOTION- MOTION TO COMPEL FILED BY STATE ON 06/1112015
DA: LEA-ANNE SU1TON TO COMPEL PASSCODE. 06/1112015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL SCHEDULED FOR 06/25/2015 at 01:00p.m. in Room No.
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 0611112015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL NOTICE SENT ON 06/1112015
06/2612015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL HELD ON 06/2512015 at 01:00p.m. in Room No. 1 MARY KELLY , JUDGE Attorney: VERNE PARADIE DA: LEA-ANNE SUTTON Defendant Present in Court ORAL ARGUMENT. NO MEMOS NEED BE FILED. ATTORNEY PARADIE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CASE LAW. TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. 06/26/2015 MOTION- MOTION TO COMPEL UNDER ADVISEMENT ON 09/29/2015 at 01:00p.m. in Room No. 7 MARY KELLY ,JUDGE 06/26/2015 CASE STATUS- CASE FILE LOCATION ON 06125/2015 JIM PAUL TURCOTTE, ASSISTANT CLERK CASE IS WITH JUDGE KELLY -MOTION UNDER ADVISEMENT. 07/06/2015 OTHER FILING- OTHER DOCUMENT FILED ON 07/06/2015
DA: LEA-ANNE SUTTON CONTINUATION REPORT FROM MDEA RE: CELL PHONES 0711512015 HEARING- DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE HELD ON 07115/2015 THOMAS D WARREN , JUSTICE Attorney: VERNE PARADIE DA: LEA-ANNE SUTTON CONTINUE TO TRIAL. NEW TRIAL DATE 9-14-15. 07/15/2015 TRIAL- JURY TRIAL CONTINUED ON 07/15/2015 THOMAS D WARREN , JUSTICE 07/15/2015 TRIAL- JURY TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR 09114/2015 at 08:30a.m. in Room No. 11
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 07/1612015 TRIAL- JURY TRIAL NOTICE SENT ON 07/16/2015
07116/2015 Charge(s): 1,2,3 SUPPLEMENTAL FILING- INDICTMENT FILED ON 07116/2015 SARAH HEAD , ASSIST ANT CLERK 07116/2015 Charge(s): I ,2,3 HEARING- ARRAIGNMENT SCHEDULED FOR 07122/2015 at 01:00p.m. in Room No.
CR-200 Page 2 of 5 Printed on: 10/27120 IS MARQUISE TRANT CUMCD-CR-2015-02389 DOCKET RECORD
07116/20 15 Charge( s): 1,2 ,3 HEARING- ARRAIGNMENT NOTICE SENT ON 07116/2015
07/22/2015 Charge(s): 1,2,3 HEARING- ARRAIGNMENT NOT HELD ON 07/22/2015 JIM PAUL TURCOTTE , ASSISTANT CLERK DEFENDANT NOT TRANSPORTED 07/22/2015 Charge(s): 1,2,3 HEARING- ARRAIGNMENT SCHEDULED FOR 07/24/2015 at 01:00p.m. in Room No. 1
07/31/2015 LETTER- FROM PARTY FILED ON 07/29/2015
FROM DEFENDANT REGARDING COUNSEL. COPY SENT TO ATTORNEY 7-31-15 08/07/2015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL SCHEDULED FOR 08/11/2015 at 09:00a.m. in Room No. 2 MARY KELLY , JUDGE NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 08/07/2015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL NOTICE SENT ON 08/07/2015 JIM PAUL TURCOTTE, ASSISTANT CLERK 08/11/2015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL CONTINUED ON 08/11/2015 JOYCE A WHEELER , JUSTICE Attorney: PATRICK NICKERSON DA: LEA-ANNE SUTTON IN CAHMBERS ORAL MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED. ATTY. PARADIS OFFICE TO NOTIFY COURT OF THE NAME OF ATTTORNEY TO BE APPOINTED. CASE TENATIVELY SET 9-21-15. 08111/2015 Charge(s): 1,2,3 HEARING- ARRAIGNMENT HELD ON 07/24/2015 THOMAS D WARREN , JUSTICE Attorney: PATRICK NICKERSON DA: HANNAH MAY Defendant Present in Court DEFENDANT INFORMED OF CHARGES. FTR I 08111/2015 Charge(s): 1,2,3 PLEA- NOT GUILTY ENTERED BY DEFENDANT ON 07/24/2015
08111/2015 BAIL BOND- CASH BAIL BOND CONTINUED AS SET ON 07/24/2015 THOMAS D WARREN , JUSTICE 08111/2015 TRIAL- JURY TRIAL CONTINUED ON 08111/2015
08111/2015 CASE STATUS - CASE FILE RETURNED ON 08111/2015
08/11/2015 CASE STATUS- CASE FILE LOCATION ON 08111/2015
ON MARIAH'S SHELF FOR RESPONSE FROM ATTY. PARADIS'S OFFICE WITH NAME OF ATTORNEY THAT SHOULD BE APPOINTED. 08/24/2015 MOTION- MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CNSL MADE ORALLY BY DEFON 08111/2015 MARY KELLY ,JUDGE 08/24/2015 MOTION- MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CNSL GRANTED ON 08111/2015 MARY KELLY ,JUDGE COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 08/24/2015 Party(s): MARQUISE TRANT ATTORNEY- WITHDRAWN ORDERED ON 08111/2015 CR-200 Page 3 of 5 Printed on: 10/27/2015 MARQUISE TRANT CUMCD-CR-20 15-02389 DOCKET RECORD
Attorney: VERNE PARADIE 08/24/2015 Party(s): MARQUISE TRANT ATTORNEY- PARTIALLY INDIGENT ORDERED ON 0811112015
Attorney: DEVENS HAMLEN 08/24/2015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL SCHEDULED FOR 09/08/2015 at 01:00p.m. in Room No.
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 08/24/2015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL NOTICE SENT ON 08/24/2015
08/26/2015 LETTER- FROM PARTY FILED ON 08/26/2015
FROM DEFENDANT REQUESTING A NEW ATTORNEY. COPY SENT TO ATTORNEY 8-26-15 09/03/2015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL NOT HELD ON 09/03/2015
09/03/2015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL SCHEDULED FOR 09/29/2015 at 01:00p.m. in Room No. 7 MARY KELLY ,JUDGE NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 09/03/2015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL NOTICE SENT ON 09/03/2015
09/29/2015 CASE STATUS- CASE FILE RETURNED ON 09/29/2015
09/29/2015 HEARING- MOTION TO COMPEL HELD ON 09/29/2015 MARY KELLY ,JUDGE Attorney: DEVENS HAMLEN DA: LEA-ANNE SUTTON STATE CALLS BRAD ROGERS AND ERIC PFEFFER. TESTIMONY AND CROSS EXAMINATION HELD. AAG SUTTON TO FILE RESPONSE TO DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OPPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL WITHIN 7 DAYS. FTR 7 09/29/2015 CASE STATUS- CASE FILE LOCATION ON 09/29/2015
IN JUDGE KELLY'S CHAMBERS. 09/29/2015 TRIAL- JURY TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR 11/16/2015 at 08:30a.m. in Room No. 11
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 10/02/2015 BAIL BOND- $25,000.00 CASH BAIL BOND FILED ON 10/02/2015
Bail Receipt Type: CR Bail Amt: $25,000 Receipt Type: CK Date Bailed: 09/30/2015 Prvdr Name: JOYCE DEES Rtrn Name: JOYCE DEES 409 3RD PARTY DOB 7-8-60 10/05/2015 OTHER FILING- OTHER DOCUMENT FILED ON 10/05/2015
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL. 10/27/2015 ORDER- COURT ORDER FILED ON 10/27/2015 MARY KELLY ,JUDGE ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF CELLPHONE PASSCODES THE STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL PASSCODES IS DENIED. 10/27/2015 CASE STATUS- CASE FILE RETURNED ON 10/27/2015
CR-200 Page 4 of 5 Printed on: 10/27/2015 MARQUISE TRANT CUMCD-CR-20 15-02389 DOCKET RECORD RETURNED TO PENDING SHELF 10/27/2015 MOTION- MOTION TO COMPEL DENIED ON 10127/2015
CR-200 Page 5 of 5 Printed on: 10/27/2015