State of Maine v. Thomas W. Cost

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 57 Docket: Lin-25-379 Argued: May 7, 2026 Decided: July 9, 2026

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, LIPEZ, and TAUB, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

THOMAS W. COST

MEAD, J.

[¶1] Thomas W. Cost appeals from a judgment of conviction for domestic

violence criminal threatening (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(A) (2023),1

entered in the trial court (Lincoln County, Billings, J.) after a jury trial. Cost

argues that the court committed obvious error in failing to provide a

self-defense jury instruction for the charge of domestic violence criminal

threatening because the facts alone were sufficient to generate the need for the

instruction. We discern no error in the court’s failure to provide a self-defense

instruction on the charge and affirm the conviction.

1 Title 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(A) has since been amended, though not in any way that affects this

appeal. See P.L. 2023, ch. 465, § 7 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(A) (2026)). 2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[¶2] “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the

jury could rationally have found the following facts beyond a reasonable

doubt.” State v. Schooley, 2025 ME 84, ¶ 2, 345 A.3d 78.

[¶3] Cost and the victim were in a domestic relationship for several

years. On October 20, 2023, Cost and the victim became involved in an

argument during the late evening hours in their shared home. The altercation

escalated to physical contact.

B. Procedure

[¶4] On November 9, 2023, Cost was charged by complaint with

domestic violence assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2023), 2 and

domestic violence criminal threatening (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A.

[¶5] A jury trial took place on April 15 and 16, 2025. At trial, both Cost

and the victim testified regarding the events that gave rise to the charges.

[¶6] Cost testified that, after being provoked by the victim, he restrained

her by taking hold of her arms and escorted her to the bedroom where he sat

2 Title 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) has since been amended, though not in any way that affects this

appeal. See P.L. 2023, ch. 465, § 2 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2026)). 3

her down on the bed. He then stated that, while still holding her arms, he told

her, “stop attacking me, stop attacking me, are you done, are you done.”

[¶7] The victim, in stark contrast to Cost’s testimony, stated that Cost

pinned her down on to the bed, restrained one of her arms, and twice told her

“I will kill you” while driving his elbow into the side of her face. The victim

testified that she feared for her life during the attack and that the threat to kill

her was made while Cost was hurting her. She further testified that this was

the first time that Cost had threatened to kill her.

[¶8] The State, in closing, emphasized that the criminal threatening

charge was based on Cost’s spoken statement, “I will kill you.”

[¶9] The court provided the jury with a self-defense instruction as to only

the assault charge. Neither party objected to the instructions or suggested

additional instructions. The jury returned a not-guilty verdict on the charge of

domestic violence assault and a guilty verdict on the charge of domestic

violence criminal threatening.

[¶10] Cost filed a motion for a new trial on May 5, 2025. The court denied

the motion on May 23, 2025. Cost timely appealed from the judgment on

June 12, 2025. See M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(2)(C). 4

II. DISCUSSION

[¶11] Cost argues that the court’s failure to provide a self-defense

instruction as to the criminal-threatening charge constitutes obvious error.

[¶12] “We review jury instructions as a whole for prejudicial error, and

to ensure that they informed the jury correctly and fairly in all necessary

respects of the governing law. Further, when the claimed error is the omission

of a particular instruction, we will vacate the judgment only if the record

contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect

to the omitted element.” State v. Hofland, 2012 ME 129, ¶ 18, 58 A.3d 1023

(alteration, citation, and quotation marks omitted).

[¶13] “When, as here, no objection was made to the instructions as given,

we review the instructions only for obvious error, that is, highly prejudicial

error tending to produce manifest injustice.” State v. Villacci, 2018 ME 80, ¶ 9,

187 A.3d 576 (footnote and quotation marks omitted).

[¶14] Cost did not request a self-defense instruction to either charge at

trial despite having numerous opportunities to do so. Rather, the court

provided the self-defense instruction as to the first charge without being

requested to do so. The self-defense justification contained in 17-A M.R.S.

§ 108(1) (2026) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person is justified in using 5

a reasonable degree of nondeadly force upon another person in order to defend

the person . . . from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use

of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person.” To be entitled to an

instruction on the justification of self-defense, the defense must be generated

by the evidence presented. See State v. Herzog, 2012 ME 73, ¶¶ 8-9, 44 A.3d

307.

[¶15] In this case, Cost’s testimony fails to generate a basis for a

self-defense instruction regarding the statements attributed to him (i.e., “I will

kill you; I will kill you”) in part because Cost never acknowledged making them.

Instead, he testified that after restraining the victim on the bed and holding

onto her arms, he simply said, “stop attacking me, stop attacking me, are you

done, are you done.” In addition, under Cost’s own version of events, the victim

was restrained at the time of his statements, and the trial record is devoid of

any other evidence suggesting that the victim was imminently going to use

nondeadly force against him at the time. Thus, the evidence, taken as a whole,

fails to generate a self-defense instruction. The court committed no error, and

certainly not obvious error, by failing to provide a self-defense instruction to

the criminal-threatening charge.3

3Threatening to use deadly force is inherently nondeadly force. See 17-A M.R.S. § 108; State v. Cannell, 2007 ME 30, ¶ 7, 916 A.2d 231. We have not yet addressed whether words alone—a threat 6

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Scott F. Hess, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Scott F. Hess, LLC, Augusta, for appellant Thomas W. Cost

Natasha Irving, District Attorney, and Kent G. Murdick, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Lincoln County District Attorney’s Office, Wiscasset, for appellee State of Maine

Lincoln County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2023-727 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY

to kill—could constitute “nondeadly force” justifiably used to defend against an imminent threat of nondeadly force and thereby generate a self-defense instruction in a trial on a charge of criminal threatening pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 108. We do not address that question here because we conclude that the issue has not been raised by the evidence.