State of Maine v. Streitburger
Opinion
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TI O R C$$@MINAL ACTION
KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CR-05-229 2025 :.gG 1 b A 11: 5 [ -
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STATE OF MAINE \-.I
v. RDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS -
JESSICA STREITBURGER, G S 14 a Defendant
This matter is before the court on defendants motion to suppress. Defendant is charged by complaint with criminal Operating Under the Influence, second offense, (class D) and Operating Without a License (class E). The Operating Without a License is based upon allegations of defendant operating a motor vehcle in violation of a restriction on her license.
On January 22, 2005, in the early morning hours around 4:00 a.m., a 23-year veteran of the Maine State Police on Turnpike duty was at the Gardiner Police Department where he had taken a detainee from a previous incident. He was advised of a vehcle breakdown at mile 90 '/2 in the northbound breakdown lane of the Maine State Turnpike in Litchfield. The temperature was approximately one degree below zero. The officer observed the vehcle and its registration number and determined that it was registered to a Jessica Streitburger, the defendant, and that her operator's license had a " Q restriction meaning she was not licensed to operate a motor vehcle having imbibed in alcohol. The officer then received a radio notice that the occupants were at the Litchfield service area and he proceeded to that location. When the officer arrived at the service area, he spoke to the station manager who advised h m that there were two girls in the Burger King associated with the vehcle breakdown. When the officer entered the Burger King, he observed three occupants in the customer area. Two females located at one table with no food or other evidence of dining at the table and another individual sitting at a separate table. He approached the table occupied by the two females and asked, "Are you with the disabled vehcle?" The defendant answered, "Yes." The officer's next question was, "Who was the driver?" The defendant answered, "I was." When the officer asked the defendant her name, he confirmed the same name as the regstered owner. At that time, the officer observed that the defendant had an odor of an alcoholic beverage and that the eyes were bloodshot.
The officer next asked, "How long have you been here?" and received a response of, "A few minutes." Wishng to ask the defendant further questions under conditions of privacy and to remove her from presence of the passenger of the vehcle, a witness, he directed the defendant to follow h m to h s cruiser and she did so.
The officer's cruiser was equipped with a videotape recorder. The defendant was asked to sit in the front seat with the officer. Prior to the tape recorder being activated, the officer and the defendant had a conversation in w h c h the defendant revealed she did not know what was wrong with the vehcle and she was not familiar with the activities of a wrecker for that purpose. W.lule in the cruiser, the officer asked the defendant, "How come you're drinlung?" mahng reference to her restricted license. He also asked the defendant when she had her last drink, how long it had been since the vehcle broke down, how much she had to drink, and where she had been drirkng. Satisfied that the defendant had consumed alcohol and had driven the vehcle with a restricted license, the officer had the defendant get out of the vehcle where he conducted field sobriety tests recorded by the camera. Upon completion of the outside tests, the officer and the defendant reentered the cruiser where a finger dexterity field sobriety test was administered as well as an alphabet test. The officer then advised the defendant that he believed she had had too much to drink and that it was h s intention to administer an intoxilyzer test. At that point, the officer was satisfied that he had probable cause to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehcle w h l e under the influence. A few minutes later the defendant exited the vehcle wherein the officer placed her in handcuffs and returned her to the rear passenger seat of the cruiser.
While being driven to the Kennebec Sheriff's Office for purposes of administration of the intoxilyzer test, the defendant made unsolicited comments, not responsive to any questions by the officer.
The main thrust of the defendant's argument with regard to suppression of statements made is an assertion that the officer violated the constitutional rights of the
defendant by aslung her questions with respect to operation without Miranda warning.
.
The defendant cites State v. Rossignol, 627 A.2d 524 in response to her perceived position
of the State that the questions were administrative questions and not part of a custodial interrogation. State v. Rossignol distinguishes a custodial interrogation from administrative questions, describing administrative questions as "not likely to elicit an incriminating response, including those 'routine booking question[sI1 normally attending arrest which seek 'biographical data necessary to complete boohng or pretrial services' such as 'name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age."' Citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582. Rossignol further tells us that the scope of the administrative question exception should be strictly construed citing United States v. Gotchis, 803 F.2d 74. Finally, Rossignol tells us, "If . . . the questions are reasonably likely to solicit an incriminating response in a particular situation, the [administrative question] exception does not apply." Citing Unites States v. Mata- Abundiz, 7717 F.2d 1277.
In the present situation, the administrative question exception has to apply. First of all, the officer had no reason to believe any criminal activity had taken place as he was there simply to assist a stranded motorist on a bitter cold January morning.
Secondly, he already knew the name of the regtstered owner of the vehcle and, unlike Rossignol, the inference that a regstered owner was the operator was already established. Third, he knew that the registered owner of the vehcle had a restricted license and that at 4:15 in the morning the officer was alert to note the presence of
alcohol. Fourth, at the very outset of any investigation dealing with the circumstances -
of a broken down vehcle on a high-speed hghway, it would be the officer's
responsibility to distinguish the driver from the occupants. Finally, inasmuch as the question was asked before the officer determined the aroma of alcohol, it was an administrative question to determine if the person needing assistance in transportation and disposition of the broken down automobile.
Having established a suspicion that the defendant had consumed alcohol and operated a motor vehcle whle under the restriction, it was most appropriate to remove the defendant from the presence of a potential sympathetic witness and also honor her right to some degree of privacy in the investigation. It also afforded an opportunity to remove the defendant some distance from the restaurant in order to conduct the field sobriety tests.
It appears from the evidence that the officer did not administer the Miranda warning to the defendant until the time of the attempted administration of the intoxilyzer test. On the face of h n g s , it would appear that the defendant was not in any form of custody whle she was sitting in the passenger seat of the cruiser and until she was formally arrested with the placing of the handcuffs. However, there are factors specific to tEus case whch modify that conclusion. First, the officer already had clear probable cause to arrest the defendant and to prevent her from further operating her vehcle that morning by virtue of the odor of alcohol and the restricted license.
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