STATE OF MAINE !f ":-' ! \I'D q'#~FILESJJPEIUOR COURT . -- ,r;,' '.','.;,.'~;"~~jl ,L. 5 " i- L. TI O R C$$@MINAL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CR-05-229 2025 :.gG 1 b A 11: 5 [ - r. 3 <- > ' ' . , , ' ,; . I--.,
STATE OF MAINE \-.I
v. RDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS -
JESSICA STREITBURGER, G S 14 a Defendant
This matter is before the court on defendants motion to suppress. Defendant is
charged by complaint with criminal Operating Under the Influence, second offense,
(class D) and Operating Without a License (class E). The Operating Without a License is
based upon allegations of defendant operating a motor vehcle in violation of a
restriction on her license.
On January 22, 2005, in the early morning hours around 4:00 a.m., a 23-year
veteran of the Maine State Police on Turnpike duty was at the Gardiner Police
Department where he had taken a detainee from a previous incident. He was advised
of a vehcle breakdown at mile 90 '/2 in the northbound breakdown lane of the Maine
State Turnpike in Litchfield. The temperature was approximately one degree below
zero. The officer observed the vehcle and its registration number and determined that
it was registered to a Jessica Streitburger, the defendant, and that her operator's license
had a " Q restriction meaning she was not licensed to operate a motor vehcle having
imbibed in alcohol. The officer then received a radio notice that the occupants were at
the Litchfield service area and he proceeded to that location. When the officer arrived
at the service area, he spoke to the station manager who advised h m that there were
two girls in the Burger King associated with the vehcle breakdown. When the officer
entered the Burger King, he observed three occupants in the customer area. Two females located at one table with no food or other evidence of dining at the table and
another individual sitting at a separate table. He approached the table occupied by the
two females and asked, "Are you with the disabled vehcle?" The defendant answered,
"Yes." The officer's next question was, "Who was the driver?" The defendant
answered, "I was." When the officer asked the defendant her name, he confirmed the
same name as the regstered owner. At that time, the officer observed that the
defendant had an odor of an alcoholic beverage and that the eyes were bloodshot.
The officer next asked, "How long have you been here?" and received a response
of, "A few minutes." Wishng to ask the defendant further questions under conditions
of privacy and to remove her from presence of the passenger of the vehcle, a witness,
he directed the defendant to follow h m to h s cruiser and she did so.
The officer's cruiser was equipped with a videotape recorder. The defendant
was asked to sit in the front seat with the officer. Prior to the tape recorder being
activated, the officer and the defendant had a conversation in w h c h the defendant
revealed she did not know what was wrong with the vehcle and she was not familiar
with the activities of a wrecker for that purpose. W.lule in the cruiser, the officer asked
the defendant, "How come you're drinlung?" mahng reference to her restricted license.
He also asked the defendant when she had her last drink, how long it had been since
the vehcle broke down, how much she had to drink, and where she had been drirkng.
Satisfied that the defendant had consumed alcohol and had driven the vehcle with a
restricted license, the officer had the defendant get out of the vehcle where he
conducted field sobriety tests recorded by the camera. Upon completion of the outside
tests, the officer and the defendant reentered the cruiser where a finger dexterity field
sobriety test was administered as well as an alphabet test. The officer then advised the
defendant that he believed she had had too much to drink and that it was h s intention to administer an intoxilyzer test. At that point, the officer was satisfied that he had
probable cause to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehcle w h l e under
the influence. A few minutes later the defendant exited the vehcle wherein the officer
placed her in handcuffs and returned her to the rear passenger seat of the cruiser.
While being driven to the Kennebec Sheriff's Office for purposes of
administration of the intoxilyzer test, the defendant made unsolicited comments, not
responsive to any questions by the officer.
The main thrust of the defendant's argument with regard to suppression of
statements made is an assertion that the officer violated the constitutional rights of the
defendant by aslung her questions with respect to operation without Miranda warning. . The defendant cites State v. Rossignol, 627 A.2d 524 in response to her perceived position
of the State that the questions were administrative questions and not part of a custodial
interrogation. State v. Rossignol distinguishes a custodial interrogation from
administrative questions, describing administrative questions as "not likely to elicit an
incriminating response, including those 'routine booking question[sI1 normally
attending arrest which seek 'biographical data necessary to complete boohng or
pretrial services' such as 'name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and
current age."' Citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582. Rossignol further tells us that
the scope of the administrative question exception should be strictly construed citing
United States v. Gotchis, 803 F.2d 74. Finally, Rossignol tells us, "If . . . the questions are
reasonably likely to solicit an incriminating response in a particular situation, the
[administrative question] exception does not apply." Citing Unites States v. Mata-
Abundiz, 7717 F.2d 1277.
In the present situation, the administrative question exception has to apply. First
of all, the officer had no reason to believe any criminal activity had taken place as he was there simply to assist a stranded motorist on a bitter cold January morning.
Secondly, he already knew the name of the regtstered owner of the vehcle and, unlike
Rossignol, the inference that a regstered owner was the operator was already
established. Third, he knew that the registered owner of the vehcle had a restricted
license and that at 4:15 in the morning the officer was alert to note the presence of
alcohol. Fourth, at the very outset of any investigation dealing with the circumstances - of a broken down vehcle on a high-speed hghway, it would be the officer's
responsibility to distinguish the driver from the occupants. Finally, inasmuch as the
question was asked before the officer determined the aroma of alcohol, it was an
administrative question to determine if the person needing assistance in transportation
and disposition of the broken down automobile.
Having established a suspicion that the defendant had consumed alcohol and
operated a motor vehcle whle under the restriction, it was most appropriate to remove
the defendant from the presence of a potential sympathetic witness and also honor her
right to some degree of privacy in the investigation.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
STATE OF MAINE !f ":-' ! \I'D q'#~FILESJJPEIUOR COURT . -- ,r;,' '.','.;,.'~;"~~jl ,L. 5 " i- L. TI O R C$$@MINAL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CR-05-229 2025 :.gG 1 b A 11: 5 [ - r. 3 <- > ' ' . , , ' ,; . I--.,
STATE OF MAINE \-.I
v. RDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS -
JESSICA STREITBURGER, G S 14 a Defendant
This matter is before the court on defendants motion to suppress. Defendant is
charged by complaint with criminal Operating Under the Influence, second offense,
(class D) and Operating Without a License (class E). The Operating Without a License is
based upon allegations of defendant operating a motor vehcle in violation of a
restriction on her license.
On January 22, 2005, in the early morning hours around 4:00 a.m., a 23-year
veteran of the Maine State Police on Turnpike duty was at the Gardiner Police
Department where he had taken a detainee from a previous incident. He was advised
of a vehcle breakdown at mile 90 '/2 in the northbound breakdown lane of the Maine
State Turnpike in Litchfield. The temperature was approximately one degree below
zero. The officer observed the vehcle and its registration number and determined that
it was registered to a Jessica Streitburger, the defendant, and that her operator's license
had a " Q restriction meaning she was not licensed to operate a motor vehcle having
imbibed in alcohol. The officer then received a radio notice that the occupants were at
the Litchfield service area and he proceeded to that location. When the officer arrived
at the service area, he spoke to the station manager who advised h m that there were
two girls in the Burger King associated with the vehcle breakdown. When the officer
entered the Burger King, he observed three occupants in the customer area. Two females located at one table with no food or other evidence of dining at the table and
another individual sitting at a separate table. He approached the table occupied by the
two females and asked, "Are you with the disabled vehcle?" The defendant answered,
"Yes." The officer's next question was, "Who was the driver?" The defendant
answered, "I was." When the officer asked the defendant her name, he confirmed the
same name as the regstered owner. At that time, the officer observed that the
defendant had an odor of an alcoholic beverage and that the eyes were bloodshot.
The officer next asked, "How long have you been here?" and received a response
of, "A few minutes." Wishng to ask the defendant further questions under conditions
of privacy and to remove her from presence of the passenger of the vehcle, a witness,
he directed the defendant to follow h m to h s cruiser and she did so.
The officer's cruiser was equipped with a videotape recorder. The defendant
was asked to sit in the front seat with the officer. Prior to the tape recorder being
activated, the officer and the defendant had a conversation in w h c h the defendant
revealed she did not know what was wrong with the vehcle and she was not familiar
with the activities of a wrecker for that purpose. W.lule in the cruiser, the officer asked
the defendant, "How come you're drinlung?" mahng reference to her restricted license.
He also asked the defendant when she had her last drink, how long it had been since
the vehcle broke down, how much she had to drink, and where she had been drirkng.
Satisfied that the defendant had consumed alcohol and had driven the vehcle with a
restricted license, the officer had the defendant get out of the vehcle where he
conducted field sobriety tests recorded by the camera. Upon completion of the outside
tests, the officer and the defendant reentered the cruiser where a finger dexterity field
sobriety test was administered as well as an alphabet test. The officer then advised the
defendant that he believed she had had too much to drink and that it was h s intention to administer an intoxilyzer test. At that point, the officer was satisfied that he had
probable cause to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehcle w h l e under
the influence. A few minutes later the defendant exited the vehcle wherein the officer
placed her in handcuffs and returned her to the rear passenger seat of the cruiser.
While being driven to the Kennebec Sheriff's Office for purposes of
administration of the intoxilyzer test, the defendant made unsolicited comments, not
responsive to any questions by the officer.
The main thrust of the defendant's argument with regard to suppression of
statements made is an assertion that the officer violated the constitutional rights of the
defendant by aslung her questions with respect to operation without Miranda warning. . The defendant cites State v. Rossignol, 627 A.2d 524 in response to her perceived position
of the State that the questions were administrative questions and not part of a custodial
interrogation. State v. Rossignol distinguishes a custodial interrogation from
administrative questions, describing administrative questions as "not likely to elicit an
incriminating response, including those 'routine booking question[sI1 normally
attending arrest which seek 'biographical data necessary to complete boohng or
pretrial services' such as 'name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and
current age."' Citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582. Rossignol further tells us that
the scope of the administrative question exception should be strictly construed citing
United States v. Gotchis, 803 F.2d 74. Finally, Rossignol tells us, "If . . . the questions are
reasonably likely to solicit an incriminating response in a particular situation, the
[administrative question] exception does not apply." Citing Unites States v. Mata-
Abundiz, 7717 F.2d 1277.
In the present situation, the administrative question exception has to apply. First
of all, the officer had no reason to believe any criminal activity had taken place as he was there simply to assist a stranded motorist on a bitter cold January morning.
Secondly, he already knew the name of the regtstered owner of the vehcle and, unlike
Rossignol, the inference that a regstered owner was the operator was already
established. Third, he knew that the registered owner of the vehcle had a restricted
license and that at 4:15 in the morning the officer was alert to note the presence of
alcohol. Fourth, at the very outset of any investigation dealing with the circumstances - of a broken down vehcle on a high-speed hghway, it would be the officer's
responsibility to distinguish the driver from the occupants. Finally, inasmuch as the
question was asked before the officer determined the aroma of alcohol, it was an
administrative question to determine if the person needing assistance in transportation
and disposition of the broken down automobile.
Having established a suspicion that the defendant had consumed alcohol and
operated a motor vehcle whle under the restriction, it was most appropriate to remove
the defendant from the presence of a potential sympathetic witness and also honor her
right to some degree of privacy in the investigation. It also afforded an opportunity to
remove the defendant some distance from the restaurant in order to conduct the field
sobriety tests.
It appears from the evidence that the officer did not administer the Miranda
warning to the defendant until the time of the attempted administration of the
intoxilyzer test. On the face of h n g s , it would appear that the defendant was not in
any form of custody whle she was sitting in the passenger seat of the cruiser and until
she was formally arrested with the placing of the handcuffs. However, there are factors
specific to tEus case whch modify that conclusion. First, the officer already had clear
probable cause to arrest the defendant and to prevent her from further operating her
vehcle that morning by virtue of the odor of alcohol and the restricted license. Secondly, during the course of discussion, the officer made reference to talung the
defendant back to her vehcle in conjunction with the activities of the wrecker operator.
When she demurred, the officer stated, "You have to come with me," s o m e h n g less
than a mere invitation. Thrd, during the course of the period in the vehcle and before
the formal arrest, the officer stated, "I h n k you've had too much to drink" and advised
the defendant that he would require her to undertake the intoxilyzer test. From those
circumstances, the court believes it is reasonable to infer, that the defendant was not free
to leave, that she was going to be required to return with the officer to the disabled
vehicle and that a determination had been made that probable cause existe'd to arrest
her for Operating Under the Influence. Clearly, the responses to questions asked by the
officer in the cruiser with regard to the defendant's drinlung prior to and subsequent to
the administration of the field sobriety tests must be suppressed.
Such is not the case with unsolicited statements made by the defendant
subsequent to the arrest and during the course of being transported to the Kennebec
Sheriff's Office. At one point, when the defendant, out of the blue, advised the officer
she would not take the test, she made unsolicited statements with regard to drinlung
subsequent to the vehcle break down. It clearly appears the statements were made that
were not responsive to any questions by the officer and they would not be subject to
suppression.
For reasons stated herein, the entry will be:
Defendant's motion to suppress GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART in accordance with the above conclusions.
Dated: August 4 6 ,2005 *2%z- E n g d H. Marden Justice, Superior Court STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT VS KENNEBEC , S S . JESSICA M STREITBURGER Docket No AUGSC-CR-2005-00229 24 NEW STREET PORTLAND ME 04103 DOCKET RECORD
DOB: 09/15/1983 Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS State's Attorney: EVERT FOWLE NICHOLS WEBB & LORANGER PA 477 CONGRESS ST., SUITE 800 PORTLAND ME 04101 RETAINED 02/18/2005
Filing Document: CRIMINAL COMPLAINT Major Case Type: MISDEMEANOR (CLASS D,E) Filing Date: 03/29/2005
Charge ( s )
1 OPERATING UNDER THE INFLUENCE-NO TEST, 1 01/22/2005 LITCHFIELD PRIOR Seq 9883 2 9 - A 2411(l-A) (C) (2) Class D MAGUIRE / MSP 2 OPERATE VEHICLE WITHOUT LICENSE 01/22/2005 LITCHFIELD Seq 9 8 6 7 2 9 - A 1251 (1) (A) Class E MAGUIRE / MSP
Docket Events:
03/31/2005 Charge(s) : 1,2 TRANSFER - TRANSFER FOR JURY TRIAL ED1 ON 03/31/2005 @ 20:OO
TRANSFERRED CASE: SENDING COURT CASEID AUGDCCR200500721 FILING DOCUMENT - CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FILED ON 03/29/2005
Charge(s) : 1,2 HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT SCHEDULED FOR 04/06/2005 @ 10:OO in Room No. 1
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL Charge(s) : 1,2 HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT WAIVED ON 03/29/2005
Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS OTHER FILING - WITNESS LIST FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 02/18/2005
Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS MOTION - OTHER MOTION FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 02/18/2005
Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF REPORTS BY EXPERT WITNESSES. Charge(s) : 1,2 TRANSFER - TRANSFER FOR JURY TRIAL REQUESTED ON 02/18/2005
Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 02/18/2005 Page 1 of 3 Printed on: 08/16/2005 JESSICA M STREITBURGER AUGSC-CR-2005-00229 DOCKET RECORD
Attorney : MATTHEW NICHOLS Charge(s) : 1,2 OTHER FILING - OTHER DOCUMENT FILED ON 02/18/2005
Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS Party (s): JESSICA M STREITBURGER ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 02/18/2005
Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS Charge(s) : 1,2 PLEA - NOT GUILTY ENTERED BY COUNSEL ON 03/29/2005
Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS Charge(s) : 1,2 FINDING - TRANSFER FOR JURY TRIAL TRANSFERRED ON 03/31/2005
AUGSC 04/04/2005 Charge (s3 : 1,2 TRANSFER - TRANSFER FOR JURY TRIAL R E C W BY COURT ON 04/04/2005
RECEIVED FROM AUGUSTA DISTRICT COURT DOCKET NO: CR-05-721 04/04/2005 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 05/03/2005 @ 9:00
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 04/04/2005 HEARING - MOTION EXPERT WITNESS REPORT SCHEDULED FOR 05/03/2005 @ 9:00
05/03/2005 HEARING - MOTION EXPERT WITNESS REPORT NOT HELD ON 05/02/2005
05/03/2005 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTINUED ON 05/03/2005
05/03/2005 MOTION - OTHER MOTION WITHDIDRAWN ON 05/03/2005
MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF REPORTS BY EXPERT WITNESSES. 05/06/2005 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 06/06/2005 @ 9:00
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 06/03/2005 OTHER FILING - TRANSCRIPT FILED ON 06/03/2005
TRANSCRIPT OF BMV HEARING 06/07/2005 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS HELD ON 06/06/2005 DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS DA : PAUL RUCHA Reporter : PEGGY STOCKFORD Defendant Present in Court 06/07/2005 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS UNDER ADVISEMENT ON 06/06/2005 DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE 06/07/2005 CASE STATUS - CASE FILE LOCATION ON 06/06/2005 DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE 08/16/2005 CASE STATUS - CASE FILE RETURNED ON 08/16/2005
08/16/2005 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS GFSATED ON 08/16/2005 DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE Page 2 of 3 Printed on: 08/16/2005 JESSICA M STREITBURGER AUGSC-CR-2005-00229 DOCKET RECORD COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART 08/16/2005 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED ON 08/16/2005 DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL IN PART. 08/16/2005 ORDER - COURT ORDER ENTERED ON 08/16/2005
A TRUE COPY ATTEST : L
Clerk
Page 3 of 3 Printed on: 08/16/2005