State of Maine v. Stanley

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: April 28, 2017
• Docket: WAScr-16-291
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE DISTRICT COURT WASHINGTON, SS. Machias Docket No. WASCD-16-CR-291, 292

STATE OF MAINE ) Plaintiff, ) ) ) v. ) ORDER ON MOTIONS ) TO SUPPRESS 1 ) KAYLA STANLEY and ) ERIC FLETCHER Defendants .)

Before the court for hearing on April 11, 2017, came Defendants' Motions to

Suppress. Present were Kayla Stanley and her attorney Matt Erickson, Esq., Eric

Fletcher and his attorney Don Brown, Esq., and the Statt,~ through District Attorney

Matt Foster. The court heard testimony from MDEA Agents Ryan Allen, Ralph Pineo,

Troy Bires and Timothy Frost. After hearing the court finds as follows.

Eric Fletcher ("Fletcher") and Kayla Stanley ("Stanley"), live and have a child

together. On July 13, 2016, Stanley and Fletcher were arrested by Maine Drug

Enforcement Agents. Fletcher was arrested on a warrant from Ilancock County for

Manslaughter and Trafficking in Scheduled Drugs. Stanley was arrested following a

search of Fletcher's vehicle in which she was a passenger. As a result of that search,

1 Each Defendant filed a motion to suppress seeking to suppress the evidence seized from a search of a common vehicle. The Motions were consolidated for hearing. l:NTF.RED ON DOCKET

1 MAY O2 2017 ·'/1, SHINGTON COUNTY COURTS officers discovered and seized scheduled drugs. Each defendant has since been

Lndicted for Aggravating Trafficking1 Unlawful Trafficking1 Un.lawful Furnishing and

Endangering the Welfare of a Child.> Each seeks lo suppress the evidence seized from

the vehicle.

On July 11·• or 12·\ 2016, Maine Drug Enforcement Agents met lo plan_to execute

a I Iancock County arrest warrant for Fletcher on .charges of Manslaughter and

Trafficking in Scheduled Drngs. 3 Senior Special Agent Troy Bires instructed agents 1 from Washington County lo proceed to Fletcher s house and observe the residence

until the Hancock agents could arrive to assist with the execution of the arrest warrant.

While Agents Ryan Allen and Ralph Pineo were observing the residence, Stanley,

Fletcher and their minor child exited their home, got in their vehicle and drove away,

apparently unaware they were being observed. Agents Pineo and /\llen informed the ·

I lancock. agents of the Defendants' departure and then followed the vehicle until the

vehicle entered a driveway off the Wing Siding Road in Harrington, Maine, some

several miles away. Neither Agent Allen nor Agent Pineo had the ability to initiate a

traffic stop for purposes of executing the arrest warrant because each was in an

unmarked vehicle without lights and siren.

7 Also as a result of the items seized from the vehicle, MDEA obtained a warrant for the search of Defendants' home. Neither Defendant contests the search warrant pertaining to the home or the items found therein. 3 ll was not clear to the court, based on the evidence submitted, just when the arrest warrant issued or when the alleged manslaughter and trafficking offense occurred.

2 Although there was some dispute about the order in which the agents arrived at

the residence on the Wing Siding Road, the court finds that Agent Allen essentially

arrived at the same time as the Fletcher vehicle and the remaining 3-4 agents arrived

within seconds after, all in separate vehicles. At this point the situation became fairly

chaotic. Some people from the residence were outside. Agent Allen, with weapon

drawn, ordered the defendants out of the car and approached the driver's side of

Fletcher's vehicle while announcing his authority. Agent Pineo then took Fletcher,

arrested him pursuant to the lawful warrant and removed him at least a full car length

away from Fletcher's own vehicle. Agent Bires, with gun drawn, ordered those

present to remain still and then secured those individuals. Bires went to the residence

to order people to exit in an attempt to secure the scene. The three individuals who

exited were searched for weapons. No weapons were found on them and the officers

had no reason to believe that any person on scene was dangerous or may access the

vehicle to acquire a weapon.

ln total there were five MDEA agents on scene, all simultaneously engaging in

various aspects of securing the area. In addition to the defendants and their infant

child, there were five bystanders. Once the police secured the scene, no one, including

Stanley, was within 15 feet of Fletcher's vehicle.

While Agents Bires, Allen, Frost and Bagley were securing the scene, Agent

Pineo moved Fletcher away from his vehicle and formally arrested him on the lawful

warrant. Fletcher was at least a full car length away from his own vehicle. He was

3 handcuffed and under the supervision of Agent Pineo, and he was not within reaching

distance of the passenger compartment of his vehicle. Similarly, Stanley, who had

been removed from the car and placed at least 15 feet away while under the

supervision of at least one of the agents, was not within reaching distance of the

vehicle.

While arresting Fletcher, Officer Pineo conducted search incident to arrest and

found a small container in Fletcher's shirt pocket which.contained a substance Fletcher

admitted was heroin. Once Pineo had conducted the search of Fletcher's person, . he ,'

secured the evidence in the trLick and placed Fletcher inside Pineo's vehicle. Pineo

stayed with Fletcher from that point on.

Once all present were secured and after Pineo had already arrested Fletcher,

Agents Bires and Frost searched the Fletcher vehicle, claiming to have done so because

of: (1) the existence of the arrest warrant; (2) Fletcher had heroin on his person; (3)

Bires believed Fletcher was at that particular residence to sell drugs; and (4) Fletcher

was a known trafficker whom they had been investigating for some time. Aside from

his beliefs about .Fletcher's involvement in trafficking, neither Agent Bires nor any

other witness provided any details about the basis for those beliefs. Nor did he or any

other wintess providf~ an explanation for why Fletcher was under investigation.

Neither Bires nor Alle11 listed any reasons whatsoever for searching the vehicle in the

report each prepared shortly after the July 13"', 2016 incident.

4 During the search of Mr. Fletcher's vehicle, Agents Bires and Frost found a white

bag and container beneath the front passenger seat. Inside the bag and the container,

they found chunks off a finger of heroin, a number of foil packets and various items of

drug paraphernalia. Cash was also found in the vehicle. Fletcher had by that point

already been arrested on the pending warrant. Based solely on the fruits of the search,

the agents then arrested Defendant Kayla Stanley. Each Defendant seeks to suppress

the fruits of vehicle search.

Agent Bires claimed he observed the search of Defendant Fletcher by the

arresting agent. The court does not find his testimony on this point credible. Agent

Bires also claimed that the arresting agent spoke to him about the results of the

patdown search and the heroin on Fletcher's person. The court does not find his

testjmony on this point credible either. At the time Agent Pineo was arresting and

searching Fletcher, Agent Bires was dealing with various people at the scene and

Agent Pineo testified that once he arrested Fletcher, he secured him in Agent Pineo\;

vehicle and stayed with him from that point on. At no time did Pineo inform the other

officers that he had discovered heroin on Fletcher's person and at no time did Agent_

Pineo direct the searching Agents to search the vehicle.

Discussion

The issue here presented is whether Agents Frost and Bires, who were aware of

the Hancock County arrest warrant but were not aware that Agent Pineo had found

5 contraband on .Fletcher pursuant to a search of his person incident to the arrest on that

warrant, had lawful authority to search Fletcher's vehicle which was not within

reaching distance of the Defendants Fletcher or Stanley.

The United States and Maine Constitutions guarantee the right to be secure from

unreasonable searches and seizures. In most instances, a warrantless search or seizure

is, as a matter of law, unreasonable and nms afoul of the constitution, unless the State

establishes that the circumstances surroundin 9 the search or seizure bring it within one

or more specific exceptions to the supreme law's favor and mandate for a warrant.

Two of the warrants are at issue in this case. Either the search of the Fletcher vehicle is

permissible as a search "incident to his arrest," or the search must be supported by

probable cause.

It has long been established that an officer may contemporaneously search a

defendant's person "incident to his arrest" on a lawful warrant, in order to protect the

officer and to preserve and secure evidence of crime. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.

364, 367 (1964). To this extent, the heroin found on Fletcher by Agent Pineo was

lawfully obtained and the defendants do not seek to suppress that evidence. The

search of Mr. Fletcher's person was contemporaneous with his arrest on a lawful

warrant. It was, therefore, reasonable and lawful.

The issue in this case is whether the doctrine of "search incident to arrest"

extends to Mr. Fletcher's vehicle. Under existing leg~l authority, "police may search a

vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching

6 distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to

believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.

332,351 (2009) (emphasis added). Here, at the time Agent Pineo searched Fletcher's

person, Fletcher was more than a car length away from his own vehicle and was · ·

handcuffed. Fletcher was thereafter placed inside Pineo's vehicle and in the Agent's

presence. Neither Fletcher nor Stanley was within reaching distance of the vehicle at

the time Agents Bires and Frost searched the vehicle. Moreover, no officer was in any

way concerned about either defendant being armed or dangerous. The court

concludes therefore that the search of Fletcher's vehicle fails to satisfy lhe Gant officer­

safety or "reaching distance" justification.

With respect to the second prong of the Ganl test, the First Circuit has defined'

"reason to believe" as requiring a "reasonable basis" to believe the vehicle contains

evidence of the offense ofarrest. United States v. Polanco,·634 F.3d 39, 42 (l·· Cir. 2011)

(emphasis added). Fletcher was arrested on a warrant for Manslaughter and

Trafficking in Scheduled Drugs, the circumstances of which the evidence at the

suppression hearing _did not reveal. The State offered no evidence to explain the

nahue of the allegations that resulted in the issuance of the arrest warrant. Nor did the

Slate offer evidence about when the alleged Manslaughter and Trafficking in

Scheduled Drug charges occurred or how soon before July 13••, 2016, the alleged

conduct occurred. On this record, it is impossible for the court to conclude that there

existed a "reasonable basis" to believe that Fletcher's vehicle contained evidence of

7 Manslaughter or Trafficking in Scheduled Drugs. Accordingly, the court concludes

that the State has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the search of Fletcher's

vehicle is supported by the Gant evidence-preservation justification.

Nonetheless, pursuant to the so-called "automobile exception," the existence of

probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity justifies a

warrantless and reasonable search of a motor vehicle. As noted by the First Ci~cuit in

Polanco, "the automobile exception is distinct from the evidence-preservation

component of Cant's search-incidei:t-to-arrest analysis." Polanco noted that the

"automobile exception extends beyond the crime of arrest." Although the Agents in this

case operated on the mistaken belief that they had full authority to search Fletcher's

vehicle as a search incident to his arrest on a lawful warrant, the issue for the court is

not whether the officers acted on the correct legal standard. The court's focus is on

whether the search of the vehicle was supported by probable cause.

A law enforcement officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the'facls

available to him would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that

contraband or evidence of a crime is present. See, United States v. White, 804 F.3d 132,

136 (1st Cir. 2015). Probable cause is a fluid concept. nlinois 'V. Gates, 462 U.S. 2.13,. 232,

235, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). The standard is satisfied when the totality • of the circumstances create a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a

particular place. White, 804 F.3d at 136. All that is required is the kind of fair

probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act. Id.; See

8 also United States 7J . Herrera-Castillo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4783, 2017 WL 87020 (D.P.R.

Jan. 10, 2017).

Again, Agent Bires testified that he searched the vehicle for the following

reasons: (1) the existence of the arrest warrant; (2) Fletcher had heroin on his person;

(3) Bires believed Fletcher was at that particular residence to sell drugs; and (4)

Fletcher was a known trafficker whom MDEA had been investigating for some time.

For the reasons al ready explained, the arrest warr~nt does not constitute a basis to

search the vehicle because the State failed to establish that there was a reason to believe

the vehicle contained evidence of the crime of arrest. The Court further finds that Agent

Bires failed to articulate sufficient facts upon which to base his bold belief .that

defendants were at the residence to sell drugs. The court further finds that Agent

Bires' assertion that Fletcher was a "lmown trafficker" is not supported by facts that

would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence

of a crime is present in the vehicle on the date of the search. The agents were engaged

in the execution of an arrest warrant, and the totality of the facts and circumstances do

not "create a fair probability" that evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle

on that day.

Accordingly, the search must stand, if at all, on whether the contraband foµ.nd on

Fletcher's person by Agent Pineo supports the search of the vehicle. The la~ ·has long

recognized that the police have probable cause to believe a· vehicle contains ev1d.ence of

a crime if a recent occupant of the vehicle has been found to 'be in possession of· ·

9 contraband. Here, the searching Agents Bires and Frost were not aware, however, that

the arresting Agent Pineo, had lawfully discovered heroin on Fletcher's person. There

is no question that Agent Pineo himself had authority to ~earch the Fletcher_vehicle,

but he did not do so. Though Agents Bires and Frost themselves were unaware of the

fruits of the Pineo search, it is necessary to examine the "collective knowledge

doctrine".

Under the collective knowledge doctrine, the court can look to the collective

knowledge of all the officers involved in a criminal investigation to determine whether q 'I an investigatory stop, search, or arrest complies with the Fourth Amendment. United

States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9"' Cir. 2007). The "focus is.upon the collective knowledge possessed by, and the aggregate information available to, all the officers

involved in the investigation." U.S. v. Fiasconaro, 315 F.3d 28, 36 (1" Cir. 2002).

Probable cause is evaluated by examining the collective information known to the

police al the time of the arrest or search, not merely the personal knowledge of the

arresting or searching officer. State v. Carr, 1997 ME 221, 704 A.2d 353. Therefore,' if

the police knowledge is sufficient in its totality to establish probable cause, an

individual officer's actions in making a warrantless search upon orders to do so will bi :

justified, even though that officer does not personally have all the information on

which probable ca use is based. United States 11. Meade 110 F.3d 190 (J.,Cir. 1997)

(emphasis added).

. ,10 Contrary to the broad principles enunciated in Sti1te ·u. Carr, 1997 MF 221 and the

other cases cited in the preceding paragraph, this court finds that the collective

knowledge doctrine requires that the officer who possesses the informal.ion which

establishes probable cause direct or at least communicate with the searching officer in

order for the arresting officer's knowledge to be imputed to the searching officer. As

explained by the First Circuit in Meade,

the collective-knowledge corollary of the fellow officer rule would seem to require, or at least presuppose, the flow of fr1forrnation from the officers with kn wledg·' off, .t~ tendi ng to establi. h. pr b blc cau t tho " lacking tha t kn v le lg (or, t le, st, Lo lhe dir cting or arresting offic r). W haven t d ir clly addr ssed th.' question wh "thPr th . col lective-knowledge ru l i · limited to situations in which the knowledge ve ts in a pertin ,nt individual. -- sud , s the · directing or arresting officer -- or whctlwr the rule broadly encompasses situations in which the officers or agency as a whole posses the requisite . information.

United Stales v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 194, 1997 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

The Meade court, having identified the possible limitation to the "collective

knowledge" rule did not, however, decide upon its applicability lo the facts of its case.

However, even in Carr, there was at a minimum radio contact between the officer who

possessed the knowledge and the officer who initially did not, such that there was a

flow of some information. Adri1ittcdly, it is not necessary for the officer who possesses

the knowledge to convey to the other officer all of the information that establishes

probable cause, but there must be some sorl of communication or directive or order so

that the imputation of knowledge can occur. Like the First Circuit, our own Law Court

in Carr recognized that" there may be cases "in which certain police information could

11 not be considered as supportive of probable cause if not communicated," noting that this

"rule must be applied on a case-by-case basis." State v. Carr, 704 A.2d 353, 356 (Me.

1997) citing State v. Parkinson, 389 A.2d 1, 8 at n.8 (Me. 1978). See also, United States v.

Alix, 630 F. Supp. 2d 145, 154 (D. Mass. 2009), finding stop invalid where there w~s

insufficient evidence that stopping officer was aware of information possessed by

other officer who possessed reasonable suspicion, and stating, "[t]here was none of the.

"flow of information" that the Meade Court indicated buttressed the collective

knowledge doctrine."

Since at the time of the search Agents Bires and Frost were unaware that

contraband had been found on Fletcher by Agent Pineo, this court finds that the search

of the Fletcher vehicle by Agents Bires and Frost was not supported by probable cause.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motions to Suppress are GRANTED.

The Clerk is directed to enter this Order upon the civil docket by reference pursuant to Rule 79(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure

Dated: April 28, 2017

David J. Mitchell Judge, Maine District Court