STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT AROOSTOOK, ss DOCKET NO. CR-05-075 ..fi-. . 1 I
STATE OF MAINE 1 1 1 1 VS. 1 ORDER ON MOTION 1 TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 1 1 CHRISTOPHER SHUMWAY 1 Defendant 1
Pending before the court is the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The
Defendant raises six different challenges in this Motion. They relate to:
1. The Caribou Police Department's initial search of the Defendant's Bedroom and of his cell phone in Caribou on January 2,2005.
2. The Maine: State Police/Bangor Police Department initial search of Room 242 at Motel 6 in Bangor on January 3,2005.
3. The Maine: State Police arrest of the Defendant on January 3,2005 in Room 242 at Motel 6 in Bangor on January 3,2005.
4.The Maine State Police search by warrant of Room 242 on January 3,2005.
5. The Bangor Police Department's initial interview of the Defendant on January 3,2005
6. The Maine State Police subsequent interview of the Defendant at the Caribou Courthouse on January 4,2005. FINDINGS OF FACT
The court conducted a testimonial hearing on March 17,2006 and has now
considered the evidence presented along with the written submissions of the parties. The
court makes the follo-wingfindings of fact.
On January 2,2005 the decedent Erin Sperry and the Defendant were both
employed at Tim Horton's restaurant in Caribou, Maine. Both were working the evening
shift on that same date. At some point, late in the evening on January 2, patrons at the
restaurant reported hearing a scream and then noticed that no one seemed to be working
and that although it was open, the restaurant appeared to be abandoned. The patrons
called the local police who responded and discovered what appeared to be evidence of a
violent struggle.
The police ofl'icers determined that neither Ms. Sperry nor the Defendant was at
Tim Horton's working their assigned shifts. Police interviewed other Tim Horton
employees and determined that money, including both currency and rolled coins,
appeared to be missing from the office area of the restaurant and that Ms. Sperry's car
was gone. They discovered blood on the floor of the bathroom and what appeared to be
drag marks in that blood. They also discovered loose pieces of women's jewelry strewn
on the floor. The local law enforcement officers quickly deduced that something
untoward had occurn:d at the restaurant involving the Defendant and Ms. Sperry. The
Caribou officers enlisted the assistance of Maine State Police detectives in undertaking an
immediate investigation. These investigative efforts rapidly expanded beyond Caribou,
down 1-95 all the way to Bangor. Bangor based Maine State Police Detective Stephen Pickering was at home
during the early morning hours of January 3, 2006. Detective Pickering has been with the
Maine State Police for 28 years. He has been a sergeant with supervisory and
administrative respor~sibilitiesfor the past 3-?4 years and he has been a detective with
investigative responsibilities for homicides and major crimes for approximately the past
20 years.
Maine State F'olice Detective, Dennis Appleton, assigned to Aroostook County
called Det. Pickering at approximately 3 am on January 3,2006 and advised that he was
investigating a situation in Caribou and that developing evidence indicated that Tim
Horton's employee Christopher Shumway had apparently abducted and murdered his
supervisor, Erin Sperry, and that he appeared to be headed towards Bangor. Det.
Appleton advised Det. Pickering that other law enforcement officers had found a vehicle
matching the descrip1:ion of Ms. Sperry's vehicle off the road along the 1-95 interstate.
He also advised that 1:he body of a young deceased female matching the description of
Erin Sperry was in the vehicle. The body displayed traumatic injuries. Det. Appleton
also reported that there was fresh snow in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle and that
there was only one set of footprints leading away from the vehicle towards the road way.
Det. Pickering got up and dressed himself. He immediately called to enlist the aid
of officers from the Bangor Police Department. He asked that those officers commence a
canvassing of Bangoi- area hotels and motels to determine if the Defendant had rented a
room at one of them. The Bangor officers quickly determined that the Defendant had
checked into Room 242 at the Motel 6 in Bangor. Det. Pickering called Bangor Police Detective Darryl Peary to request that he respond to the motel and then he also departed
his home for the motel.
Investigating officers determined that the Defendant had checked into Room 242
at 2: 13 am on January 3, 2005. It appeared that he had paid for his room with cash,
including some rolled coins that were consistent with rolled coins reported missing from
Tim Horton's.
While awaiting the arrival of Det. Pickering, several Bangor police officers
remained at the motel and maintained surveillance on the Defendant's room,
commencing between approximately 2:30 am and 2:45 am.
Det. Peary lived closer to the motel and he arrived at approximately 4 am; shortly
before Det. Pickering. By this time, there were a number of Bangor police officers
present including Bar~gorPolice Department detectives Anna Fizell and Danyl Perry.
When Det. Pickering arrived, he became the primary officer on the scene. He decided to
call Assistant Attorney General Andrew Benson to apprise him of the situation and to get
guidance on how to proceed.
The officers formulated a plan to establish contact with the Defendant and engage
him in conversation regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of Erin Speny.
They first knocked at the door of Room 242 to determine if the Defendant would answer
the door. He did not and there was no other response to the knocking. A few minutes
later between 5:00 arrl and 5: 15 am, Det. Pickering instructed an officer to place a call to
the room. He did so, however, although Det. Pickering and the other officers could hear
the telephone ringing from inside the room, no one answered the call. Det. Pickering
testified that when there was no answer to the phone call, he made the decision to do a "well-being" check. I-Ie said that he based this decision on his experience that people who
find themselves in circumstances similar to the Defendant's will sometimes take their
own life.
Det. Pickerinp, acknowledged that by 5: 15 am, law enforcement officers had a
substantial basis to believe that the Defendant had abducted and murdered Erin Sperry.
He also acknowledged that for all intents and purposes, the Defendant was isolated in his
motel room and surrounded by police officers. There was no evidence that anyone else
was with the Defendant. There was no evidence that he was armed. There was no
evidence that he was aware of a police presence in the vicinity of his room. There were
no strange smells or smoke; nor any other indicators that something might be wrong with
the Defendant. There was no indication that the Defendant's lack of response might
simply have been attributable to his having been asleep at that early morning hour. There
also continued to be no sounds coming from Room 242.
It is obvious that police authorities had a strong interest in speaking with the
Defendant about the events originating at Tim Horton's restaurant in Caribou. Both Det.
Pickering and Det. Peary acknowledged this. Establishing contact with the Defendant to
see if he would talk with the police was the main purpose underlying the initial knock and
the subsequent phone call to Room 242. The officers never abandoned this objective.
However, when neither their knocks nor their phone call produced a response from
anyone inside the room, the officers considered a number of different possible
explanations for this lack of response.
One explanation would be that the Defendant was simply asleep at that early
morning hour. Another possible explanation was that the Defendant had harmed himself and was unable to respond. Det. Pickering testified that based on his many years of
experience, he knew .that it was a common occurrence for people involved in intense
circumstances such a:; those unfolding on January 3 to harm themselves resulting in a
murder suicide event. Detective Pickering testified that the lack of any response to either
knocking or to a phone call was a key factor in his determination to enter the room.
Det. Pickering; obtained a room passkey from motel management and opened the
door. A security chain prevented him from opening the door completely. The officers did
not try to establish verbal contact with the Defendant through the open door, instead, Det.
Pickering instructed one of the other officers to force the door open and the officer kicked
in the door. At least three Bangor police officers went all the way into the room; they had
their weapons drawn.
The offices found the Defendant sitting on the bed. He did not appear to be in any
distress. One officer cluickly checked the bathroom for weapons but found none. It was
readily apparent that the Defendant was fine. Det. Pickering then asked if the Defendant
would be willing to talk with them at that point or if they should get a warrant.' The
Defendant immediately responded that he wanted the police to obtain a warrant. Det.
Pickering signaled to the other three officers to leave and all of them immediately did so,
closing the door behind them at approximately 5:30 am. The police entry, observation of
the Defendant, brief verbal exchange and exit took approximately 30 to 45 seconds.
As a result of 1:his entry, the police obtained neither physical nor testimonial
evidence. They made no observations of anything other than that the Defendant was in
'The testimony did not indicate whether the Defendant and the officer were speaking of a search warrant or an arrest warrant. the room and unharmed; they asked no questions other than regarding whether the
Defendant would consent to speak with them.
Det. Pickering, decided to consult with the AAG again and after a brief telephone
conversation, he decided to begin preparations for obtaining a search warrant. Det.
Pickering and Det. Peary left the motel to go to the Bangor police department to begin
drafting a search war1,ant application. From ongoing contacts with police authorities in
Aroostook County, Det. Pickering had continued to acquire additional information
pertaining to the situation and by 5:30 am he felt that he had probable cause to believe
that the Defendant had committed the crime of murder against Erin Sperry.
Det. Pickering testified that he continued to evaluate the appropriate course of
action and that after further discussions he decided not to wait for a search warrant. He
testified that he had ongoing concerns regarding the Defendant's well being and he also
had concerns regarding the spoliation of evidence. Accordingly, Det. Pickering sent Det.
Peary and several Bailgor police officers back to the motel for the purpose of arresting
the Defendant. At approximately 6:45 am. Det. Peary and 5 or 6 other officers went to
Room 242, entered without either a search warrant or an arrest warrant and arrested the
Defendant for the criine of murder. Det. Pickering was not present for this entry and
arrest.
Upon entering the room, Det. Peary observed the Defendant with a broken
telephone cord aroun1;l his neck. He appeared to have ligature marks on his neck and
superficial cut marks on his wrists. Det. Peary concluded that the Defendant had made
efforts to take his own life prior to the time that the police had entered. Det. Peary
ordered the Defendant to get down on the floor and advised him that he was under arrest. It did not appear to the officers that the Defendant required any immediate medical
attention, so they did not take him for examination or evaluation by any medical
personnel. Instead, the officers took the Defendant into custody and transported him
directly to the interview room at the Bangor police station.
Subsequent to the initial police entry into Room 242, there had been no apparent
change in the surrounding circumstances, other than perhaps that the Defendant, who
may not previously hiive known the police were aware of his location was now himself
aware of a police presence at the motel and further he knew that the police were probably
engaged in the process of getting a search warrant or an arrest warrant or both. Except for
the police entry itself, there was no perceptible activity going on regarding Room 242
since police first arrived around 2:30 am.
In the meantime, Det. Pickering conferred with Maine State Police Det. John Cote
in Caribou regarding obtaining a search warrant for Room 242 at Motel 6. Maine State
Police Det. Daryl Pelletier to begin the process of applying for a search warrant. Within a
few hours, the officers had obtained a warrant authorizing a search of Room 242. Maine
State Police and Bangor Police Department officers executed that warrant and conducted
a search of the motel room that same day.
Bangor Policc: Detective Anna Fizell and Det. Peary interviewed the Defendant at
the Bangor police department. The interview room is approximately 4' by 8'. It
contained a small table and three chairs. There are no windows. There is only one door.
A telephone is located on the table. The interview was videotaped. The officers
commenced the interview by introducing themselves as police officers and asking the
Defendant if he would agree to speak with them. The Defendant agreed. The officers then read to the Defendant his Miranda rights. After advising the Defendant of each of
his rights, they asked him if he understood that right. They confirmed his understanding
of his rights by having him recite back to them his understanding of what the right
involved.
From the court's view of the videotape, it is apparent that during the interview,
the Defendant sat sluinped in a chair. The Defendant's mood was subdued and he was
despondent and dejected. He stated several times that he wanted to die. The volume of his
speech was low, at times barely audible. Nonetheless, the Defendant responded to their
questions appropriately. Through out the interview, he appeared conscience-stricken and
self-reproachful. His intellectual capacity was not impaired by drugs or alcohol. It is clear
to the court that he ur~derstoodeverything that the officers were saying to him.
Both of the interviewing officers were dressed in plain clothes. The videotape
makes it clear that the: tone of their speech was conversational and indeed,
compassionate. Neitlier displayed any manner or attitude of hostility or aggression
towards the Defendant during the interview. There was no evidence of coercion or other
effort to overcome the Defendant's fiee will. The interview lasted approximately one and
one half hours.
All of the evidence indicates that the Defendant is a person whose intellectual
level falls at the high end of average. All of the evidence indicates that the Defendant
understood the literal meaning of all of the words used during the course of his interview
and that his responses were appropriate to the questions asked.
On January 4, 2005, law enforcement officers transported the Defendant to the
Caribou Courthouse for purposes of his initial post arrest appearance before the court. Prior to the Defendant's appearance in court, Maine State Police Det. Dale Keegan and
Det. Darryl Pelletier approached the Defendant while he was speaking with his parents in
the law library downstairs at the Caribou Courthouse. Det. Keegan asked if the
Defendant would be willing to speak with them. The Defendant agreed. The Defendant's
parents were not present during the interview. Both officers were dressed in plain
clothes. Det. Keegan advised the Defendant of his Miranda rights; the Defendant
acknowledged that he understood them and he was able to explain his understanding of
each right to the officer after he was advised of that right. The interview was tape
recorded but not videotaped.
Although the Defendant's mood remained subdued, his responses were
appropriate to the questions posed and appeared to be freely given. There is nothing in
the audiotape to suggest to the court that the Defendant did not understand his rights.
The officers made no effort to coerce or force responses from the Defendant.
At hearing of this motion, each party presented expert testimony regarding the
Defendant's competency to waive his Miranda rights during each interview. The State
called Dr. Ann LeBlanc, Ph.D, Director of the State Forensic service. The Defendant
called Dr. Ronald Brown, Ph. D, a licensed clinical psychologist in private practice. Dr.
LeBlanc devotes her entire professional employment to forensic psychology. Dr. Brown
devotes approximately 20% of his practice to this endeavor. These experts expressed a
shared opinion that the Defendant's intellectual level of functioning would fall in a range
near the high end of average intelligence. They also agreed that the Defendant understood
the literal meaning of the words used in the police officer's advice of rights in each instance. They differed in their opinion regarding whether the Defendant suffered from a
major mental illness. Dr. Brown opined that the Defendant displayed indicators of
delusional thinking because he made references to an apparently non-existent character
named Leon who the Defendant suggested had been a witness to his attack upon Ms.
Sperry and who was in hot pursuit of him to exact vengeance. He concedes that there is
little objective evidence that the Defendant suffers from a major mental illness. The
essential basis for Dr. Brown's opinion on this point is the Defendant's own self report of
"Leon", a report that he did not make to either Dr. LeBlanc or Dr. Schetky during the
Stage I1 evaluations. Dr. LeBlanc opined that although the Defendant suffered from
posttraumatic stress clisorder and was incredibly lacking in interpersonal social skills, he
did not display any symptoms of psychosis or any other major mental illness.
Dr. LeBlanc and Dr. Brown also differed on the ultimate question regarding the
Defendant's competency to make a knowing and informed waiver of his rights.2 In
formulating his opinion, Dr. Brown used a set of criteria developed by a Dr. Grisso, a
widely recognized expert in the field. Dr. Brown opined that because the Defendant's
responses in his interviews did not make it clear that the Defendant understood that by
waiving his rights he set the adversarial process in motion and because he did not
manifest any indication that he engaged in a weighing of the consequences of waiving his
rights versus not waiving his rights, there could be no effective waiver.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
1. Initial Search of the Defendant's bedroom and of his cell phone on January 2, 2005.
2 Neither Dr. LeBlanc nor Dr. Shetky were asked to evaluate the Defendant's competency to waive his rights as part of their evaluation. The Defendant retained Dr. Brown for this specific purpose. The parties hiive agreed that the State will not use either the Defendant's cell
phone or any derivative information obtained from the cell phone at trial. This
stipulation obviates the need for any court ruling on this challenge.
2. Initial police search of Room 242 at Motel 6 on January 3,2005.
It is undisputed that police officers had no warrant authorizing their entry into the
Defendant's room on January 3,2005. Accordingly, a police entry could only be
authorized by the existence of probable cause plus the existence of exigent
circumstances. && of Maine v. Phillip Destafano and Kenneth Foisy, ANDSC-CR-85-
273, (Me. Super. Ct., And. Cty., May 27, 1986) (Lipez, J.) (citing State v. Boilard, 488
A.2d 1380, 1385 (Me. 1985). By the time of the initial entry in this case, police officers
clearly had probable (causeto believe that the Defendant would be found within Room
242 and probable cause to believe that he had committed a violent crime against Erin
Speny. The court finds however that although there was ample probable cause to believe
that the Defendant had committed a violent crime against Erin Speny, exigent
circumstances did noi. exist to justify the entry and that police entry into the Defendant's
hotel room was not permitted without a warrant.
Whether or not exigent circumstances exist is always case specific, but courts
have found such circumstances to exist where there was "hot pursuit"; threatened
destruction of evidence; risk that a suspect may flee undetected; and if there were danger
to the public or to the police. See U.S. v. McMackin, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15608 (D.
Me. Aug. 20, 2002). None of those circumstances existed in this case nor any other
circumstance that woilld have constituted a true emergency that did not allow police an
opportunity to obtain a warrant. In this case, the State points to Det. Pickering's testimony that he felt the need to
do a "well-being check" as the basis upon which to justify the initial entry into Room
242. The State also suggests there was a concern regarding the spoliation of evidence. In
a hypothetical sense these are valid considerations. Based on Det. Pickering's many
years of experience, there could be a valid and legitimate basis to consider the possibility
that the Defendant might harm himself or otherwise might be in need of aid.
Additionally, there is always the possibility that a Defendant might destroy evidence in
his possession once he perceives that apprehension by law enforcement officers is
imminent.
However, based on the evidence presented, this court cannot conclude that a
threat of harm to the Defendant or the risk that evidence might be lost is anything other
than a mere possibility. The police had determined that the Defendant was present in
Room 242 shortly after he checked in. They were able to secure the premises and
thereby virtually assure that he could not leave the room without police awareness. There
were no sounds or srr~ellsor indicators of distress. Although the police point to the
absence of a response to either a knock at the door or a call to the room, the absence of a
response is as consist1:nt with sound sleep or just a desire to be left alone as it would be
with emergent need. 'The court concludes that more evidence than is present here is
required to support a finding of exigency. In the court's opinion, a finding of exigency
requires a demonstration of some specific threat of a particular harm to a particular
person or some specilic threat to particular evidence to lift these contentions out of the
realm of speculation. Cf. Id. (citing, United States v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965,969 (1st Cir.
1995). Clear evidenci: found after entry that the Defendant had in fact attempted to harm himself does not alter the court's conclusion. The validity of the police entry must be
determined upon the basis of what information was available prior to entry and not by
what was found after entry.
Accordingly, the court concludes that exigent circumstances did not exist at the
time of the initial police entry and that the entry therefore violated the Defendant's
Constitutional Rights under the Fourth Amendment.
As a consequence of this violation, the Defendant urges the court to suppress all
evidence obtained as the result of this violation pursuant to the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 47 1,484 (1 963). However, it is not
clear that the violation bore any "fruit" at all. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
only applies to evidence obtained a result of the violation of constitutional rights. State v.
St. Yves, 2000 ME 9'7,716, 751 A.2d 1018, 1022. It does not appear that police obtained
any physical evidence or any verbal evidence during this initial entry. They made only a
brief observation of the Defendant in the room.
As events continued to unfold during the day on January 3,2005, the bases for
police probable cause continued to grow and clearly it was only a matter of time before
police effected the Defendant's arrest and made essentially the same observations of the
Defendant that they made during the initial entry. Even if there were violations of
constitutional rights, when a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the police
would have inevitably have obtained disputed evidence exclusion is not required. See
State v. Thomas St. Y-, 2000 ME 97,7 18, 751 A.2d 1018, 1023. The court finds that
it was inevitable, indeed within a very short time, that the police were going to make the
same observations of the Defendant that they made during the initial entry to his room. Thus the court concludes that any taint associated with this entry would be removed by
the "inevitable discovery doctrine".
The court finds that the initial entry was unlawful but declines to order the
suppression of any e~ridencein this case based upon the initial warrantless entry.
3. Arrest of the Defendant at the time of the second entry to Room 242
The court fincls that the second police entry into Room 242 also violated the
Defendant's Fourth Pmendment rights. This too was a warrantless entry and the
evidence fails to establish any exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent or
exigency. Although, the police had apparently begun the process to obtain either an
arrest warrant or a search warrant, or both, they had obtained neither. Rather than wait
for the warrant, they grew impatient, and entered Room 242 in order to arrest the
Defendant.
It is quite clear that by the time of this arrest, the police had ample probable cause
to arrest the Defendant for murder. However, they did not have a warrant to enter or a
warrant to arrest the Defendant who at that time was in his motel room, the substantial
equivalent of his home. There were no exigent circumstances.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless
and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest.
While murder is hardly a "routine felony", the court can find no different standard for
murder cases. Thus it appears to the court that the second police entry into Room 242
was also unlawful. The Defendant seeks to have all of the evidence in this case, including his subsequent
statements to the pol:lce, suppressed. Notwithstanding its conclusions regarding the
validity of the police entry, the court agrees with the State that the Defendant is not
entitled to this relief.
In New York v. Harris, the Supreme Court wrote:
Even though -wedecline to suppress statements made outside the home following a Payton viol;ition, the principal incentive to obey Payton still obtains; the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements take, inside the home. (emphasis supplied). ..We hold that, where the police hak~eprobable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State':; use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the sta.tement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1990).
It does not ap:pear that police actually seized any physical evidence from Room
242 or obtained any verbal evidence while at the motel. Obviously, they seized the
Defendant and his clothing and pocket contents, but there was no other evidence
obtained. The Defend.ant argues that everything should be suppressed. The court
disagrees. First, aside from the Defendant's clothing and pocket contents, there is no
evidence to suppress. Second, it appears to the court, that the police gained no greater
access to the Defendant's clothing and effects by virtue of their unlawful entry than was
inevitable. It seems to the court that the Defendant's arrest was imminent under any
scenario and that the police were soon going to obtain possession of all of these same
items either pursuant to a warrant that was in process or incident to an imminent arrest.
The Defendant made no statements while at Room 242; the police obtained no
physical evidence; they made no observations that were not inevitable. Harris indicates
that only evidence ob1:ained by virtue of an illegal entry are subject to suppression on the basis of such a violai.ion. Id.at 19. Accordingly, the court declines to order suppression
of any evidence on the basis of the second violation of the Defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.
4. The Maine State Police Warrant Search of Room 242 on January 3,2005.
The Defendant argues that the underlying affidavit supporting the issuance of the
search warrant conta.~nsinformation illegally obtained during the illegal entries discussed
above and that this invalidates the search warrant. While the affidavit does contain
information obtained during both unlawful entries (See paragraphs 11 and 13), if this
information is simplq disregarded, ample probably remains for issuance of the search
warrant. Accordingly, the court denies the request to suppress any evidence obtained
during the warrant search.
5. The Bangor Police Department's initial interview of the Defendant on January 3,
2005.
A confession is admissible only if voluntary. State v. Philbrick, 481 A.2d 488,
494 (Me. 1984). "A confession is voluntary if it results from the free choice of a rational
mind, if it is not the product of coercive police conduct, and if under all circumstances its
admission would be fundamentally fair." State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 50 1 (Me.
1983). The court fincls that the Defendant was appropriately advised of his rights at the
time of this interview; that he understood them; that he was competent to make a
knowing, informed and voluntary waiver of those rights and that he in fact did so prior to
answering the officers' questions at the Bangor police department on January 3, 2005.
The Defendant has offered Dr. Brown's testimony that the police interview cannot
withstand scrutiny under a methodology and standards developed by Dr. Grisso. Dr. LeBlanc is also familiar with Dr. Grisso's work and although she agrees with his basic
methodologies, she did not apply them in this instance. There is no evidence in the record
that any existing law or professional standard of care requires adherence to Dr. Grisso's
methodology. Thus, it would appear to the court that Dr. Grisso's approach is simply one
approach that a mental health professional may or may not subscribe to.
Dr. LeBlanc did not reach the same conclusions as Dr. Brown regarding the
question of the Defendant's competence to waive his Miranda rights. Reasonable and
competent experts car1 and often do disagree on critical questions. This is one of those
cases.
The court has watched the videotaped interview and has listened to the audio
taped interview. Although the Defendant was despondent and overwhelmed by the
enormity of what he believed he had done, this emotional state was not inappropriate to
his circumstance and 1.n the court's opinion his emotional and psychological state did not
preclude him from making informed and voluntary choices under the law. A person may
be overwhelmed with remorse and regret and seek to relieve a guilty conscience by
accepting responsibility. Making this choice, as it appears the Defendant did, does not
render him incompetent. That a different person might have engaged in further reflection
or deliberation or might have engaged in a more disciplined evaluation or responded to
different stimuli and thereby have reached a different decision regarding waiver, does not
dictate a finding that the Defendant was incompetent for having made his choice in the
manner that he did or for the reasons that he did.
The court concludes that Dr. LeBlanc's assessment of the Defendant's
competence in making his waiver is the more persuasive one and most consistent with the court's own observation of the Defendant as he appears in the videotape. Accordingly,
the court finds that the Defendant did understand his rights and that he made an informed,
knowing, and voluntiiry decision to waive those rights on January 3, 2005.
6. The Maine State .Police subsequent interview of the Defendant at the Caribou Courthouse on January 4,2005.
The Defendant makes the same challenge to the second interview. Based on its
listening to the audio taped interview and accepting the opinion of Dr. LeBlanc rather
than of Dr. Brown, the court finds that the Defendant made a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his rights at the time of this second interview as well.
The entry shall be: Tlle Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied
'Date: June 5, 2006 JUSTICE, SUPERIOR COURT
FILED & ENTERED SUPERsOf?COURT
AROOSTOOK COUNTY