State of Maine v. Schackelford

Maine Superior

State of Maine v. Schackelford

DecidedNovember 18, 2009

DocketCUMcr-08-1841

StatusUnpublished

This text of State of Maine v. Schackelford (State of Maine v. Schackelford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State of Maine v. Schackelford, (Me. Super. Ct. 2009).

Pincite

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET CUMBERLAND, ss. CRIMINAL ACTION DOCKET NO. CR-08-1841 1"'' vJ- (~~ i) vr' _ '-,'1- ' ,I I, STATE OF MAINE,

Plaintiff

v. ORDER & DECISION

MARK SCHACKELFORD,

Defendant.

The defendant, Mark Schackelford (Schackelford), is charged with one count of

Aggravated HOMV offender with a revoked license. Schackelford's license to operate a motor

vehicle was revoked in November 1998 under the Habitual Offender law. The Secretary of State

does not remove a habitual offender status until fines are paid, regardless of whether the original

period of suspension has ended. In this case, but for the unpaid fines, Schackelford would have

been eligible to petition for removal of his habitual offender status on March 9, 2007.

Schackelford alleges that 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2554, stating the process by which a habitual

offender may petition for relief from habitual offender status, is void for vagueness and has

moved to dismiss the complaint on this basis. For the reasons discussed below, his motion is

DENIED.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review.

A statute is considered unconstitutionally vague if"it 'fails to give a person of ordinary

intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden [or mandated] by the statute."'

Cobb v. Bd ofCounseling Profls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ,-r 26 896 A.2d 27I, 278 (citing

Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. I 56, I62, 92 S. Ct. 839, 3I L. Ed. 2d II 0 (1972)). In determining whether a statute is vague, the court examines whether "its language either

forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must

guess at its meaning, or if it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement."' See Uliano v. Bd. ofEnvtl. Prot., 2009 ME 89, ~15, 977 A.2d 400,408 (internal

citations omitted). Further statutory examination may be necessary if "legislation delegating

discretionary authority to an administrative agency ... fails to contain standards sufficient to

guide administrative action." ld. (internal citations omitted)).

II. Section 2554

The Defendant contends that 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2554 is void for vagueness, and as such

his one-count charge of Aggravated HOMV Offender with a Revoked License should be

dismissed. Section 2554 states:

1. Petition for relief. After 3 years from the date of revocation, a person may petition for relief from habitual offender status. The petition must be presented to the Secretary of State. 2. Grant of relief by Secretary of State. If public safety will not be endangered and the person has complied with the financial responsibility requirements [of 29- A M.R.S.A. § 1601 et seq.], the Secretary of State may relieve the person from status as an habitual offender and restore the person's license on appropriate terms and conditions. 3. Operating after habitual offender revocation. The Secretary of State may not restore a license if a charge [of operating after habitual revocation or aggravated operating after habitual offender revocation] is pending. If the Secretary of State subsequently determines that a license has been restored when [such] a charge [] was pending, the Secretary of State shall, without hearing, immediately reinstate the revocation and provide notice of the reinstatement. A license may not be issued to a person who has been convicted of a violation of [operating after habitual revocation or aggravated operating after habitual offender revocation] for a period of at least one year following the conviction or longer provided under [the pertinent statutes].

Schackelford contends that the statute is vague as to when the habitual offender status is

lifted, what factors the Secretary of State considers in determining whether to lift the status, and

the contingency of paying fines. The court disagrees. The plain language of the statute clearly

2 states how a habitual offender status can be removed: a person may petition for relief from the

Secretary of State after three years, the Secretary of State may grant the petition if public safety

will not be endangered, and the person has fulfilled their financial responsibilities. See 29-A

M.R.S.A. § 2554(1)-(2). The statute provides further guidance to the Secretary of State by

prohibiting the restoration of a license if the petitioner has been charged with operating after

revocation. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2554(3). Thus, the court disagrees with Schackelford's contention

that the statute is too vague for the public to follow.

The court further finds there are sufficient standards guiding the Secretary of State's

decision as to whether to reinstate an offender's license. See Uliano, 2009 ME 89, ~ 15, 977

A.2d at 408. "Statutes should be construed as a whole." Walters v. Ives, 1988 Me. Super.

LEXIS 137, 16 (June 6, 1988) (citing Inman v. Willinski, 144 Me. 116, 123, 65 A.2d 1, 5

( 1916) ). The meaning of a statute "is to be sought by an examination and consideration of all of

its parts and not from any particular word or phrase that may be contained in it. This is the

guiding star in the construction of any statute. Such a construction must prevail as it will form a

consistent and harmonious whole." !d.; see also State v. Day, 2000 ME 192, ~ 5, 760 A.2d 1039,

1040. In examining the entirety ofthe statute, the Secretary of State is to consider the time

passed since the date of revocation, public safety, whether the offender has satisfied his or her

financial responsibilities, and whether he or she has been charged with operating after habitual

offender revocation. See e.g. State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995) (noting that a

"driver's license ... , if abused, may be revoked in the name of public safety"). The court

concludes that§ 2554 provides the Secretary of State with sufficient guidelines to determine

whether to remove a habitual offender status, and as such Schackelford's claim fails.

3 Lastly, Schackelford asserts that the notice he received as to how to restore his license

failed to give adequate and understandable instructions. The court is not persuaded by this

argument, both for the reasons stated above, and because Schackelford' s Notice of Revocation

and Opportunity for Hearing provides adequate notice as it essentially reiterates the terms of the

statute in stating how to restore one's license. 1

CONCLUSION

The motion to dismiss is therefore DENIED.

1 Schackelford's Notice of Revocation and Opportunity for Hearing states in pertinent part: Your license and/or right to operate may be restored only by petitioning the Secretary of State .... At that time, if your petition is successful, you must file proof of financial responsibility and pay a $30.00 reinstatement fee before your license is restored. Note: Ifyou are convicted of operating a motor vehicle while this revocation is in effect, then you are subject to penalties of up to $5,000.00 and/or 5 years imprisonment and an additional revocation period of up to 3 years.

4 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT VS CUMBERLAND, ss. MARK SHACKELFORD Docket No PORSC-CR-2008-01841 8 TERRI CIRCLE WESTBROOK ME 04092 DOCKET RECORD

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