State of Maine v. Schackelford
Opinion
STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET CUMBERLAND, ss. CRIMINAL ACTION DOCKET NO. CR-08-1841 1"'' vJ- (~~ i) vr' _ '-,'1-
' ,I I,
STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
v. ORDER & DECISION
MARK SCHACKELFORD,
Defendant.
The defendant, Mark Schackelford (Schackelford), is charged with one count of
Aggravated HOMV offender with a revoked license. Schackelford's license to operate a motor
vehicle was revoked in November 1998 under the Habitual Offender law. The Secretary of State
does not remove a habitual offender status until fines are paid, regardless of whether the original
period of suspension has ended. In this case, but for the unpaid fines, Schackelford would have
been eligible to petition for removal of his habitual offender status on March 9, 2007.
Schackelford alleges that 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2554, stating the process by which a habitual
offender may petition for relief from habitual offender status, is void for vagueness and has
moved to dismiss the complaint on this basis. For the reasons discussed below, his motion is
DENIED.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review.
A statute is considered unconstitutionally vague if"it 'fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden [or mandated] by the statute."'
Cobb v. Bd ofCounseling Profls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ,-r 26 896 A.2d 27I, 278 (citing
Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. I 56, I62, 92 S. Ct. 839, 3I L. Ed. 2d II 0 (1972)).
In determining whether a statute is vague, the court examines whether "its language either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must
guess at its meaning, or if it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."' See Uliano v. Bd. ofEnvtl. Prot., 2009 ME 89, ~15, 977 A.2d 400,408 (internal
citations omitted). Further statutory examination may be necessary if "legislation delegating
discretionary authority to an administrative agency ... fails to contain standards sufficient to
guide administrative action." ld. (internal citations omitted)).
II. Section 2554
The Defendant contends that 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2554 is void for vagueness, and as such
his one-count charge of Aggravated HOMV Offender with a Revoked License should be
dismissed. Section 2554 states:
1. Petition for relief. After 3 years from the date of revocation, a person may petition for relief from habitual offender status. The petition must be presented to the Secretary of State. 2. Grant of relief by Secretary of State. If public safety will not be endangered and the person has complied with the financial responsibility requirements [of 29- A M.R.S.A. § 1601 et seq.], the Secretary of State may relieve the person from status as an habitual offender and restore the person's license on appropriate terms and conditions. 3. Operating after habitual offender revocation. The Secretary of State may not restore a license if a charge [of operating after habitual revocation or aggravated operating after habitual offender revocation] is pending. If the Secretary of State subsequently determines that a license has been restored when [such] a charge [] was pending, the Secretary of State shall, without hearing, immediately reinstate the revocation and provide notice of the reinstatement. A license may not be issued to a person who has been convicted of a violation of [operating after habitual revocation or aggravated operating after habitual offender revocation] for a period of at least one year following the conviction or longer provided under [the pertinent statutes].
Schackelford contends that the statute is vague as to when the habitual offender status is
lifted, what factors the Secretary of State considers in determining whether to lift the status, and
the contingency of paying fines. The court disagrees. The plain language of the statute clearly
states how a habitual offender status can be removed: a person may petition for relief from the
Secretary of State after three years, the Secretary of State may grant the petition if public safety
will not be endangered, and the person has fulfilled their financial responsibilities. See 29-A
M.R.S.A. § 2554(1)-(2). The statute provides further guidance to the Secretary of State by
prohibiting the restoration of a license if the petitioner has been charged with operating after
revocation. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2554(3). Thus, the court disagrees with Schackelford's contention
that the statute is too vague for the public to follow.
The court further finds there are sufficient standards guiding the Secretary of State's
decision as to whether to reinstate an offender's license. See Uliano, 2009 ME 89, ~ 15, 977
A.2d at 408. "Statutes should be construed as a whole." Walters v. Ives, 1988 Me. Super.
LEXIS 137, 16 (June 6, 1988) (citing Inman v. Willinski, 144 Me. 116, 123, 65 A.2d 1, 5
( 1916) ). The meaning of a statute "is to be sought by an examination and consideration of all of
its parts and not from any particular word or phrase that may be contained in it. This is the
guiding star in the construction of any statute. Such a construction must prevail as it will form a
consistent and harmonious whole." !d.; see also State v. Day, 2000 ME 192, ~ 5, 760 A.2d 1039,
1040. In examining the entirety ofthe statute, the Secretary of State is to consider the time
passed since the date of revocation, public safety, whether the offender has satisfied his or her
financial responsibilities, and whether he or she has been charged with operating after habitual
offender revocation. See e.g. State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995) (noting that a
"driver's license ... , if abused, may be revoked in the name of public safety"). The court
concludes that§ 2554 provides the Secretary of State with sufficient guidelines to determine
whether to remove a habitual offender status, and as such Schackelford's claim fails.
Lastly, Schackelford asserts that the notice he received as to how to restore his license
failed to give adequate and understandable instructions. The court is not persuaded by this
argument, both for the reasons stated above, and because Schackelford' s Notice of Revocation
and Opportunity for Hearing provides adequate notice as it essentially reiterates the terms of the
statute in stating how to restore one's license. 1
CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss is therefore DENIED.
1 Schackelford's Notice of Revocation and Opportunity for Hearing states in pertinent part:
Your license and/or right to operate may be restored only by petitioning the Secretary of State .... At that time, if your petition is successful, you must file proof of financial responsibility and pay a $30.00 reinstatement fee before your license is restored. Note: Ifyou are convicted of operating a motor vehicle while this revocation is in effect, then you are subject to penalties of up to $5,000.00 and/or 5 years imprisonment and an additional revocation period of up to 3 years.
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT VS CUMBERLAND, ss.
MARK SHACKELFORD Docket No PORSC-CR-2008-01841 8 TERRI CIRCLE WESTBROOK ME 04092 DOCKET RECORD
DOB: 04/05/1977 Attorney: ANTHONY SINENI State's Attorney: STEPHANIE ANDERSON OFFICE OF ANTHONY SINENI III 701 CONGRESS STREET PORTLAND ME 04102 APPOINTED 09/15/2008
Charge(s)
1 OPERATE AFTER HABITUAL OFFENDER REVOCATION 08/03/2008 PORTLAND 2 PRIOR Seq 11243 29 -A 2557 -A (2) (C) Class C
Docket Events:
08/06/2008 FILING DOCUMENT - CASH BAIL BOND FILED ON 08/06/2008
08/06/2008 Charge(s): 1 HEARING - INITIAL APPEARANCE SCHEDULED FOR 09/09/2008 @ 1:00 in Room No. 7
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 08/06/2008 BAIL BOND - $300.00 CASH BAIL BOND FILED ON 08/06/2008
Bail Receipt Type: CR Bail Amt: $300
Receipt Type: CK
Date Bailed: 08/03/2008 Prvdr Name: MATTHEW PIERSOL Rtrn Name: MATTHEW PIERSOL 3RD PARTY DOB 2-28-61 WITH CONDITIONS/EO 08/29/2008 Charge(s): 1 SUPPLEMENTAL FILING - COMPLAINT FILED ON 08/28/2008
RS
09/09/2008 BAIL BOND - CASH BAIL BOND AMENDED ON 09/09/2008
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