STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, SS DOCKET NO. CR 05-1019
STATE OF MAINE, ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S Plaintiff, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
v. DANIEL ROBERTS,
Defendant
On February 27, 2007 Petitioner, Daniel Roberts, was convicted of murder and sentenced
to 55-years in prison. Roberts now requests in his second motion for a new trial pursuant to 15
M.R.S. § 2138, his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Maine
Constitution. Roberts' main argument pertains to the advancements in DNA science and analysis
in the intervening-years since his conviction. Specifically, Roberts argues new DNA technology
shows that the State's main argument-that the victim could be definitively excluded as a source
of DNA on the chrome .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver found at the crime scene-was
incorrect and unfairly swayed the jury.
I. Facts:
Roberts and the victim-Melissa Mendoza-had previously been in a relationship and had
a daughter together named Savanna. The relationship was contentious to say the least. In July of
2005, a court awarded Roberts primary custody of Savanna. Going against the court's mandate,
Mendoza traveled to California with Savanna without seeking modification of the order and
without telling Roberts. After some effort, Roberts located Mendoza and traveled to California to
bring Savanna back to Maine after Savanna was turned over to the Stockton Police Department.
1 In response to Mendoza's unapproved trip to California, Roberts sought to limit Mendoza's contact
with Savanna to supervised visits. The District Court granted this request.
On Friday August 12, 2005 Mendoza had a supervised visit with Savanna at Roberts'
home. The visit-for which Roberts was not present-was supervised by a woman named Stacey
·Robitaille. 1 According to witnesses, Mendoza was not happy that the visit needed to be supervised
or that Robitaille was sleeping in Roberts' bedroom. When Roberts returned home he claims that
a few items were missing-including the handgun that was found next to Mendoza when she was
killed-.and that Mendoza had defaced a photo of Roberts and Savanna. After her visit ended,
Mendoza checked into a hotel in Auburn. According to Robitaille, Mendoza began making
harassing phone calls to Roberts' home and cellular phones starting at about 6:00 p.m. on August
14th. Multiple witnesses describe her as erratic and angry while slurring her words.2 Mendoza even
said to one witness that she, "hate[d] Danny. I hope he dies. I could kill him." (Pet. Mot. for New
Trial at 6). Finally, Roberts agreed to speak with Mendoza and at approximately 1:17 a.m. on
August 15, 2005, Mendoza pulled into Roberts' driveway. Less than five minutes later, Robe1ts
shot Mendoza in the back of the head in his garage.
Robe1ts argues that he was acting in self-defense. Roberts claims that he had placed a gun
in his back pocket because of Mendoza's previous threats to kill him. As Roberts tells it, Mendoza
walked into the garage with Robe1ts' missing chrome .38 in hand. After asking Mendoza what she
was doing she allegedly replied, "Dan, I'm going to kill you and I'm going to kill the baby." Id at
8. Mendoza then tUl'ned her back to Robe11s who then shot and killed Mendoza instantly.
1 Robitalle had frequently baby-sat Sava1U1a and was in the process of obtaining her degree in Early Childhood
Psychology from the University of Maine at Fa1mington. 2 At the time of her death, Mendoza's blood alcohol level was. 15 and she tested positive for Diazepam, which indicated she had been taking Valium. (Pet. Mot. for New Trial at 7).
2 The State argues the events happe11ed a bit differently. The State claims that Roberts knew
Mendoza would enter through the unlit garage; lied in wait; shot Mendoza in the back of the head;
and then planted the chrome .38 revolver next to Mendoza's body.
The State filed a motion to dismiss which the court herein denies and proceeds to analyze
Robert's motion for a new trial. The court based its denial on the failme of petitioner to file his
notice in less than 2-years before he filed his motion on June 24, 2019 and failure to show that
DNA improvements became available less than 2-years before he filed his motion.
II. Legal Standard for New Trial Under 15 M.R.S.A § 2138
"To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered DNA evidence obtained through a post
judgment motion for DNA analysis, a defendant must establish by clear and convincing evidence
one of three statutorily identified reasons for the granting of a new trial." State v. Reese, 2013
ME 10,123, 60 A.3d 1277. The first two subsections under 15 M.R.S. § 2138 require a
prerequisite showing that only the perpetrator of the crime could have been the source of the
DNA. In full, 15 M.R.S. § 2138(10) provides:
If the results of the DNA testing under this section show that the person is not the source of the evidence, the person authorized in section 213 7 must show by clear and convincing evidence that: A. Only the perpetrator of the crime or crimes for which the person was convicted could be the source of the evidence, and that the DNA test results, when considered with all the other evidence in the case, old and new, admitted in the hearing conducted under this section on behalf of the person show that the person is actually innocent. lfthe court finds that the person authorized in section 2137 has met the evidentiary burden of this paragraph, the court shall grant a new trial; B. Only the perpetrator of the crime or crimes for which the person was convicted could be the source of the evidence, and that the DNA test results, when considered with all the other evidence in the case, old and new, admitted in the hearing conducted under this section on behalf of the person would make it probable that a different verdict would result upon a new trial; or C. All of the prerequisites for obtaining a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are met as follows: 1) The DNA test results, when considered with all the other evidence in the case, old and new, admitted in the hearing conducted under this section on
3 behalf of the person would make it probable that a different verdict would result upon a new trial; 2) The proffered DNA test results have been discovered by the person since the trial; 3) The proffered DNA test results could not have been obtained by the person prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence; 4) The DNA test results and other evidence admitted at the hearing conducted under this section on behalf of the person are material to the issue as to who is responsible for the crime for which the person was convicted; and 5) The DNA test results and other evidence admitted at the hearing conducted under this section on behalf of the person are not merely cumulative or impeaching, unless it is clear that such impeachment would have resulted in a different verdict.
15 M.R.S. § 2138(10).
III. DNA Ev.idence:
1. DNA Testing in 2005
According to Petitioner's expett witness, Karl Reich, Ph.D.,3 the general process for
obtaining a DNA profile has not changed since the 2005 trial. (Aff. of Karl Reich at 2). The steps
of the general process are as follows: 1) Sample Collection; 2) DNA Extraction; 3) DNA
Pmification; 4) DNA Quantification; 5) Amplification; 6) Analysis; and 7) Computer Analysis.
Id. at 2-3. Reich notes that although the general process remains the same as it was in 2005, there
have been improvements in every step of the process except DNA Extraction. Id at 3-4.
The Maine State Police Crime Laboratory's findings from 2005 are as follows:
a. Item JB (pwab ofbutt ofRG40 Revolver):
Daniel Roberts' DNA was present on the RG40 Revolver. "The estin1ated probability of
selecting an wrrelated individual at random from the FBI Caucasian population having a DNA
3 Karl Reich has a doctorate in Molecular Biology and currently serves as the Chief Scientific Officer of Independent Forensics oflllinois. His extensive and impressive resume is attached to his affidavit.
4 profile matching Daniel Robe1is's four locus DNA profile ... is 1 in 269 thousand." Roberts does
not deny having held and used the RG40 Revolver on the night of Mendoza's death.
b. Item JC (Swab oftrigger o(RG40 Revolver):
Only a one locus DNA profile was obtained from this part of the RG40 from which Roberts could
not be excluded as a donor to the profile.
c. Item 2C l};wab o( red brown deposit from left side o[ Smith and Wesson
Revolver):
No DNA was obtained.
d. Item 2B (/nvab o( textured area on rubber grip o( the Smith and Wesson
Revolver):
Daniel Roberts' DNA was confirmed at 10 loci. "The estimated probability of selecting an
unrelated individual at random from the FBI Caucasian population having a DNA profile matching
Daniel Roberts' ten locus DNA profile, .. is 1 in 69.0 billion." Further, there was a minor DNA
profile present on 1he gun that did not match Mendoza. 4
e. Item 2C (Swab o[trigger ofthe Smith and Wesson Revolver}:
No DNA profile was obtained but male DNA was confirmed.
2. DNA Testing in 2018
In his affidavit, Dr. Reich outlines how DNA has improved in the past thirteen years. Id.
at 4-6. Overall, Dr. Reich opines that "improvements in the methods, procedures, reagents and
instrnmentation . , . have increased the sensitivity of the method such that it is now realistic to
propose obtaining probative DNA profiles from touched and handled items even down to single
4 This seems odd to the court: Roberts contends that Mendoza stole the gun about a week earlier-which means she was handling the gun for a week before it was discovered at the crhne scene---and yet her DNA was not proven to be on the gu,1 while his DNA was present at IO loci? If Mendoza had been handling the gun for a week prior to the shooting, isn't it more likely that her DNA would be more prevalent and his less-so?
5 fingerprints, which are arguably the smallest single source evidentiary items." Id. at 7. "DNA
testing has made significant strides in regard to the quality of DNA testing available including,
but not limited to, the sensitivity of the DNA amplification kits and an increased number of loci
included in the kits." (Sorenson Forensics: Forensic Case Review).
3. New DNA Conclusions
The Petitioner admits that the "new results are inconclusive, and do not definitively
establish that Mendoza was a contributor [of DNA on the Smith and Wesson Revolver]" but
maintains that "the testimony [at trial] that she could not have been a contributor severely
prejudiced Roberts, where it allowed the State to argue that Robe1is claim that Mendoza came
into the house armed with his gun was a complete sham, and that the physical evidence directly
contradicted his version of events, undermining Roberts' selt~defense claim and his credibility."
(Pet. Mot. for New Trial at 12).
Petitioner employed Sorenson Laboratories to review the DNA evidence from the trial,
and to run their own tests on the evidence. Id. at 4. Sorenson Forensics came to two relevant
conclusions. The first pertains to the swab of red brown deposit from the left side of the Smith
and Wesson revolver. In 2005, the Maine State Police Crime Laboratory determined that
Mendoza could be excluded as a donor on this item. According to Sorenson, however, "because
more information was obtained in the recent testing, the minor is now inconclusive and no longer
suitable for comparison. Therefore, no reference, including that of the victim, can be compared
to the minor." (Sorenson Forensics: Forensic Case Review). The second relevant c011clusion
pertains to the swab of the trigger of the Smith and Wesson revolver. In this case, no DNA
profile was obtained in 2005. In 2018, Sorenson "yielded a mixture of at least two contributors,
at least one of which is male." (Sorenson Forensics: Forensic Case Review). When boiled down,
6 in regard to this sample Sorenson came to the conclusion that "the new data that was obtained for
this item confirms that only one of the minimum of two contributors can be confirmed as male.
Since this mixture was deemed inconclusive, no comparisons can be made to it-meaning no
inclusions or exclusions can be made for any potential donor." (Sorenson Forensics: Forensic
Case Review) (emphasis added).
IV. Discussion
1. 15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)/A)and (B)
As mentioned above, in order to obtain a new trial under either of these two subsections,
the petitioner must first show that only the perpetrator of the crime could be the source of
the DNA evidence. Because both ofthese subsections require the same prerequisite
showing, it makes sense to decide whether or not this showing is present before analyzing
any further.
To be direct: it will be very difficult for Petitioner to make this initial showing. In short, it
will be difficult to make this showing for the simple fact that there are two unlmown sources of
DNA on the revolver. The Petitioner argues that one source comes from the first responder that
moved the gun while attending to Mendoza; and the other is Mendoza's. How can the court
reason that the one sample of DNA could only come from the perpetrator of the crime, while
Petitioner himself argues that someone other than the perpetrator of the crime left DNA of a
similar kind on the gun? This may be a different story if Mendoza's DNA was definitively on the
gun. But that is not the case. We are presented with two unidentified sources of DNA on the gun,
and Petitioner wants this court to take his theoiy of the case as truth and blindly land at the
7 decision that, because the new DNA evidence shows that Mendoza ,could not be excluded as a
source of DNA, that could only mean that Mendoza walked into the garage with the revolver in
hand with the intent to kill. Taken with all of the record evidence at the comt's disposal; it would
be improper to determine that only the perpetrator of the crime could be the source of the DNA
on the revolver.
2. 15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)(C)
15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)(C) "calls for a new trial if, among other requirements, the newly
discovered evidence would make it probable that a different vel'dict would result upon a new
tl'ial." Reese, 2013 ME at,r 30.
Petitioner argues that this new evidence-the fact that Mendoza cannot be excluded as a
possible source of the DNA on the revolver-undermines the State's argument at trial that
Roberts' theory of self-defense must be a sham because Mendoza could be excluded from the
pool of people who could have left DNA on the chrome Smith and Wesson !'evolver. According
to Petitioner, "[t]he State relied heavily on the fact that Mendoza was purportedly excluded as
one of the DNA contributors on the butt and trigger of the .38 caliber revolver. The State used
the expert's testimony to argue that Roberts' 'claim of self-defense is a made-up, manufactured,
contrived, fabricated, and invented st01y that has no basis in fact, the evidence or common
sense."' (Pet. Mot. for New Trial at 17). The comt agrees, to an extent, with Petitioner that the
State's case would have been diminished if the State could not have presented an expe1t witness
who was willing to testify that Mendoza could be definitively excluded as a source of DNA on
the .38 caliber revolver. Hearing an expert state "facts" about forensic evidence is powerful and
8 could certainly sway a jury. The colU't's job under this statutory provision is to decide whether or
not it is probable that a different outcome would result if the jury had not heard this testimony.
The Petitioner further argues that had the jury been able to hear that Mendoza could not
have been excluded as a possible DNA source, this would have been "powerful evidence" and
would have "eviscerated the State's entire argument that the jury could definitively find
Mendoza did not touch the fiream1 because her DNA was not recovered." Id. However,
Petitioner overstates the value of the new evidence. The court must find that it is probable that a
different verdict would result upon a new trial. Even ifwe accept the conclusions of the newly
tested PNA as true, petitioner still falls short. At best this evidence proves merely that Mendoza
could have touched the gun. The conclusions go no fu1iher. There is no evidence to show that
Mendoza was in fact the person who touched the gun; she touched it before she was killed; she
intended-or even threatened-to ldll Roberts or Savanna; or that the jury would have been
persuaded in the slightest by this evidence.
Fu1iher, Petitioner attempts to distinguish this case from two Law Court decisions that
ruled "that the defendants did not make an adequate showing that the new DNA evidence
excluding them from evidence found at or near the scene would not have made a difference at
trial, this was because the defendants were unable to demonstrate that the newfound DNA
evidence was related to the 'real' perpetrator, or the homicide itself." (Pet. Mot. for New Trial at
18) (citing State v. Bates, 177 A.3d 621,626 (ME 2018); State v. Dechaine, 121 A.3d 76 (ME
2015)). The Petitioner's reliance on these cases is confounding. Petitioner attempts to argue that
DNA on a gun that was found at the crime scene-which may or may not have come from the
9 victim-is of a different kind than DNA found under a victim's fingernails, as in Dechaine. 5 In
this case, similar to Dechaine, we are presented with unidentified DNA left at the scene of the
crime. This DNA evidence, however, is even less helpful to the Petitioner than the DNA in
Dechaine. In Dechaine, the convicted could be conclusively excluded as a donor of the DNA
found under the victim's;fingernail, and yet, the Law Court concluded that when all of the
evidence was taken as a whole the petitioner could not make a claim under §2138(1 O)(C). Here,
Petitioner has not conclusively shown that Mendoza ever even touched the .38 caliber revolver
a gun he maintains she was in possession of for nearly a week prior to her death. The court's
skepticism about this point is referenced in footnote 4 above: Roberts claims that Mendoza stole
the gun a week before her death and he did not touch the gun on the night of the murder. If that
were the case, it seems implausible to the court that his DNA6 would be identifiable on the gun
and Mendoza's would not be. Therefore, the court concludes that it cannot say that Robetts has
met the standard under this subsection to the extent necessary to merit a new trial.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, Petitioner's request for a new trial based on the assertions that "the
testimony at trial was not accurate; the butt of the firearm had a mixture of three contributors,
and Mendoza cannot be excluded from the two minor contributors; and the trigger had a mixture
of two contributors, and Mendoza cannot be excluded from the sample." (Pet. Mot. for New
Trial at 2). Further, Petitioner claims that "[t]he new testing-which reveals a mixture of three
s In Dechaine, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping, sexually assaulting, and murdering a twelve-year-old girl. The Law Court detennined that "the court was justified in finding that there was no evidence that (the victim] had strnggled with her killer, meaning that it was entirely possible that the small amount of unidentified male DNA on her thumbnail was left there before her death by a person and in a manner altogether unrelated to he!' murder." Dechaine, 121 A.3d at 95. 6 Which was "touch DNA" (See Sorenson Forensics: Forensic Case Review).
10 profiles on the butt of the firearm~corroborates what Robetts has maintained from the outset:
that he touched the gun at some point given that he owned it, that Mendoza entered the home
armed with the fireann, and that the first responding officer moved the firearm prior to the
arrival of the paramedics and police photographer." Id (emphasis added). The Oxford English
dictionary defines "conoborate" as a verb that "confirm[s] or give[s] support to (a statement,
theory, or finding)." The coutt cannot say that this new testing in anyway confirms or even gives
support to the Petitioner's theory. At most, the court can only say that it does not rnle out what
the Petitioner claims. This, however, is not enough to make it probable that a different verdict
would result upon a new trial. Therefore, the court denies Petitioner's second motion for a new
trial.
The entry is: The Petitioner's Motion for a New Trial is hereby DENIED.
Pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 79(a) the Clerk is hereby directed to incorporate this Order by
reference in the docket.
Date: