I --·- ·,
STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET CUMBERLAND, ss . PORTLAND / CUMCD-CR-16-6527
STATE OF MAINE ) ) ) V. ) MOTION TO SUPPRESS ) CLIFFORD RICHARDSON ) )
NOW COMES Defendant, Mr. Clifford Richardson, by and through counsel Devens M. Hamlen of The H&H LawCenter, and requests that this Honorable Court suppress any statements Mr. Richardson made during the custodial interrogation in Officer Phillip Jones's cruiser as well as at the Bridgton Police Department because those statements were obtained in violation of Mr. Morse's rights under Article 1, Sections 6 and 6-A of the Maine State Constitution and Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
As grounds for this Motion, Mr. Richardson respectfully states:
FACTS
1. The State had charged Mr. Morse with one Class B Felony of Unlawful
Sexual Contact and one Class D Misdemeanor of Unlawful Sexual Touching .
2. According to discovery provided by the State, the following events, relative
to this Motion, happened between October 1 and October 31, 2016:
3. On October 31, 2016, Officer Phillip Jones went to the Richardson's house
to talk to Richardson's about allegations made by K.D. Officer Jones told Mr.
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Richardson that he was not under arrest and they agreed to talk inside Mr. Richardson 's
home. Mrs. Richardson along with the Richardson's daughter and grandchildren were
present in the home. There were also a number of the Richardson 's dogs in the house.
4. Officer Jones explained that he was "used" to people being nervous and
that, due to "distractions" is was sometimes "easier" to talk alone with individuals.
Officer Jones asked to talk to Mr. Richardson outside and alone.
5. Once outside, Officer Jones asked Mr. Richardson why he thought the
police were at the house. Mr. Richardson explained that he had received some text
message regarding K.D.s allegations; he emphatically denied having any sexual contact
with K.D.
6. Officer Jones indicated in his police report that at that point, he offered to
talk to Mr. Richardson in his cruiser because it started to rain. He also reports that he
again told Mr. Richardson that he was not under arrest.
7. However, the recorded interview does not comport with this report. In the
recording, Mr. Richardson again emphasized that he felt very nervous. More
specifically, as Mr. Richardson is explaining the Richardson's relationship with K.D. he
states:
Mr. Richardson: From what I understand, she's had a pretty rough time at home with neglect ... not . .. (eh) don't get me wrong ... she's not ... not in a way that she's in harm.
Officer Jones: Right .. .
Mr. Richardson: I mean ... What I ... I'm sorry, I'm so nervous
Officer Jones: Have a seat . . .come over here ... you 're not in trouble but let's just sit and relax a little bit.
Page 2 of 18 )'~ ,,--. I
At that point, Mr. Richardson and Officer Jones got into the police cruiser.
8. Officer Jones begins by asking about the babysitting arrangements with
K.D., how often she was over at the house, and how the Richardson's viewed and
treated K.D. Mr. Richardson explained that he and his wife basically treated K.D. as a
their own grandchild and treated her with love because they felt as if she was not
getting loved at home.
9. As the interview goes on, Officer Jones talked about people being nervous
when he interviews them. About a third of the way through the interview, Mr.
Richardson tells Officer Jones that he is "scared to death." Officer Jones tells Mr.
Richardson that if he did nothing wrong, "there is nothing to worry about."
10. Officer Jones explained to Mr. Richardson that there was a forensic
interview with K.D . He goes on to say that some of K.D.s clothes were analyzed (it is
unclear by who) for mitochondrial DNA. He explained that skin cells go everywhere.
11. He then touched the dashboard of his cruiser and suggested that his
(Officer Jones's) DNA was now on the dashboard. Officer Jones goes on to explain how
the State, forensically, can find someone's DNA on clothing, outside of underpants or
even inside underpants. He concludes this part of the interview by telling Mr.
Richardson that he had reviewed all of the reports before he came to his house. As it
turns out, the State never tested K.D.'s clothing for DNA nor were there any reports
regarding DNA.
12. Officer Jones then explains how important it was for Mr. Richardson to tell
the truth and that he knew most of the answers to the questions he was asking; he also
explains that he saw some inconsistencies between his investigation and what Mr.
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Richardson was saying . Mr. Richardson continued to deny that any sexual contact had
occurred.
13. Towards the end of the interview, Officer Jones states that Mr.
Richardson 's denials were getting harder to believe. The interview goes on as follows:
Mr. Richardson: So, I'm going to jail
Officer Jones: No, I didn't say that ... If I thought that you needed to go to jail right now, I'd grab my handcuffs, put them on you , and we'd drive to jail.
14. Officer Jones then explains that he wanted to get to the truth and wanted
an open an honest conversation and once that happens "we can think about our
options." He tells Mr. Richardson that the "lie is worst part." Mr. Richardson again
denies doing anything to K.D.
15. They then discuss K.D. wearing a dress the last time she was over at the
house. Mr. Richardson explains at one point, K.D.'s dress accidently went up and he
pulled her dress down. He explains that any contact was inadvertent as he pulled her
dress back down. They then have a discussion about pornography. Mr. Richardson
emphatically denies showing any pornography to K.D . As Officer Jones continues to
express disbelief in Mr. Richardson 's statements, Mr. Richardson says, in resignation,
"o.k., I'm sunk."
16. After some more strong denials, Officer Jones appears to change tactics.
He explains to Mr. Richardson that, after interviews such as this one, people tend to go
far away or are so depressed that they hurt themselves. Mr. Richardson responds that
he has nothing to hide and that he has no intention of hurting himself.
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17. Sensing that Officer Jones was referring to jailing Mr. Richardson, Mr.
Richardson responds by saying, "but what you are saying is that I am looking at jail
time." The interview continues as follows :
Officer Jones: No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying that people that are gettin' (sic) investigated because of an allegation often times get very worried.
Mr. Richardson: I am .. . I am worried like you wouldn't believe ... I am scared to death . I've heard what happens to people who go to prison. Officer Jones: But did you do anything wrong? Mr. Richardson: No, I didn't.
Officer Jones: Then if you did nothing wrong , you have nothing to worry about.
Mr. Richardson: But you are telling me I did .
Officer Jones: I'm tell you that I have a very clear statement from a young lady that says there was misconduct. And I am telling you there is ... there are levels of evidence that are being analyzed. And I am telling you that If there is any actual crime here, we are going to find that crime and we are going to find it out. And the person who committed that crime is going to be held accountable.
That will happen.
Now if that person who committed that crime is going to deny, deny, deny deny until the final say, that I don't know what the sentencing will be : Normally if someone is open and honest about whatever they have done then we seek to try to help that person with treatment. We seek to help that person in the best way we can to preserve quality of life.
My biggest question for you is have you been honest with me. If you have not been honest with me then you have something serious to worry about. If you have not been honest with me, now is the time to be honest with me.
People that lie to me investigatin' (sic) . .. investigations like this I do lock up and throw away the key. That does happen. People that are open and honest, I try to make recommendations to the district
Page 5 of 18 J~ 1
attorney, I try to do everything I can to help that justice be served but assist quality of life.
I'm not making any promises but I am saying if you lie to me Cliff, if you lie to me, we will find out and we do take extreme sentencing measures when lying happens.
So, as long as you can sit here with me right now with your conscience clear that you have told me the truth. And if you have not, then now is the time, because when we step out of this car, I've taken your statement.
18. At that point, over an hour and 30 minutes into the interview and after
multiple denials, Mr. Richardson admits to touching K.D.'s vagina one time . The police
then arrested Mr. Richardson, brought him to the station, administered Miranda, and
obtained a similar confession. 1
LEGAL ARGUMENT
A) Initial, Un-Mirandized Statements
19. Article I, Section 6 of the Maine Constitution as well as the 5th Amendment
of the United States Constitution guarantees that the State cannot compel an individual
to incriminate themselves. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Missouri v. Seibert,
542 U.S. 600 (2004); State v. Nightingale, 2012 ME 132. Under Article 1, Section 6-A,
the Maine Supreme Court (herein referred to as the Law Court) has held that the Maine
Constitution provides greater protections than its federal'counterpart, especially with
respect to confessions and self-incrimination. See State v. Hunt, 2016 ME 172; State v.
1 It should be noted that Mr. Richardson has yet to review the actual audio of the second interrogation, therefore, he reseNes the right to make additional arguments once he has had a chance to listen to and review the second interrogation.
Page 6 of 18 (
Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 626-627 (Me . 1972)(rejecting the federal preponderance of
evidence standard with respect to confessions and declaring that the Maine Constitution
required that the State prove a confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt)).
20. "In order for statements made prior to a Miranda warning to be admissible,
the State must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the statements were made
while the person was not in custody, or was not subject to interrogation." State v.
Hassen, 2007 ME 77, ,I 1. In other words, the State is required to provide Miranda
warnings prior to a custodial interrogation. !g. Thus, "the United States Supreme Court
held that the prosecution may not use statements, either exculpatory or inculpatory,
resulting from custodial interrogation of a defendant 'unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."' State
v. Smith, 612 A.2d 231, 233 (Me. 1992)(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444)).
I) Mr. Richardson was in Custody
21. "A defendant is 'in custody' if subject to either: (a) a formal arrest; or (b) a
'restraint on freedom of movement [to] the degree associated with a formal arrest."'
State v. Michaud , 1998 ME 251, ,i 4 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322
(1994)); State v. Thibodeau, 496 A.2d 635 (Me. 1985). The Law Court has laid out a
number of objective factors when it decides whether an individual is in custody and will
examine the totality of circumstances. Michaud at ,i 4.
22. Mr. Richardson was in custody when Officer Jones interviewed him in his
police cruiser. See Thibodeau; but see State v. Williams, 2011 ME 36 (holding that,
based upon the totality of circumstances, Mr. Williams was not in custody when the
police interviewed him in the front seat of the cruiser). Officer Jones initiated the
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interview and took Mr. Richardson from the comfort of his home and the support of his
family and had him sit in the front seat of his cruiser. While it is true they were still in his
driveway (Thibod eau) and, for most of the interview, Officer Jones took a friendly tone
(Thibodeau), Mr. Richardson is an older man of somewhat limited mental abilities who
has never had any interactions with the police.
23. Mr. Richardson was also clearly nervous. Officer Jones mentioned,
offhandedly, that no one was in trouble. However, once they got to the cruiser, he never
specifically mentioned that Mr. Richardson was not under arrest and he never told Mr.
Richardson that he was free to leave.
24. Further, as the interview went on, it was clear to Mr. Richardson , by his
repeated concerns about going to jail, that knew he was the focus of the investigation.
As the Law Court has stated "[t]he court can consider, as it did here, the suspect's
awareness of the State's knowledge of circumstances tending to incriminate the suspect
in the commission of the crime so long as the reasonableness of the belief that one is in
custody is measured against that of a reasonable person innocent of any crime." State
v. Hewes, 558 A.2d 696, 699 (Me. 1989).
25. Therefore, under the totality of circumstances, Mr. Richardson was in
custody at the time Officer Jones questioned him.
II) The Police Interrogated Mr. Richardson and Mr. Richardson Made Incriminati ng Statements
26. While voluntary statements do not implicate Miranda, "the term
'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
Page 8 of 18 F ( -
response from the suspect." Smith, 612 A.2d at 233. Routine booking questions,
questions which the police ask to clarify a situation, ,and volunteered statements are not
subject to Miranda protections. See Miranda at 478; State v. Griffin, 2003 ME 13; State
v. Dom inique, 2008 ME 180. An admission can be "[a]ny statement by a defendant in a
criminal case which, in conjunction with proof of other facts and circumstances, tends to
prove guilt ... " State v. Jones, 405 A.2d 149, 151 (Me. 1979).
27. Officer Jones went to the Richardson's house to specifically question Mr.
Richardson about K.D.'s allegations. Without advising Mr. Richardson of his Miranda
rights, Officer Jones asked a multitude of questions that were likely to elicit an
incriminating response from Mr. Richardson.
28. Therefore, because Mr. Richardson's statements were taken in violation of
Miranda, the State cannot use them in trial to prove Mr. Richardson's guilt. Dominique,
2008 ME 180 at ,I 9.
111) Mr. Richardson's Statements Were Not Voluntary
29. Even if this Court does not find that the police violated Mr. Richardson 's
Miranda rights, because the State compelled an involuntary confession, pursuant to
Article 1, Section 6-A of the Maine State Constitution as well as the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, this Court must exclude
Mr. Richardson's confession. See generally State v. Hunt, 2016 ME 172.
30. Time and time again, the Law Court has reiterated the special protections
the Maine Constitution gives its residents, especially with respect to involuntary
confessions. See generally State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Me. 1972); State v. Wiley,
2013 ME 30; Hunt, 2016 ME 172. As explained in Collins and reiterated most recently in
Page 9 of 18 Hunt, "public policy and 'the values we find at stake' - namely, safeguarding 'the right of
an individual, entirely apart from his guilt or innocence, not be compelled to condemn
himself by his own utterances' - demand that, in Maine, the State must prove
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt."' Hunt at 1118, n. 4 (quoting Collins at 626
27).
31. In order to determine whether the State unconstitutionally compelled a
confession this Court must examine '"whether the State has obtained the confession in
a manner that comports with due process."' Hunt at 1119 (quoting, State v. Rees, 2000
ME 111135, 36. "'The Due Process Clause ... prohibits deprivations of life, liberty, or
property without fundamental fairness through the governmental conduct that offends
the community's sense of justice, decency, and fair play."' !g. (quoting, State v.
McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ,T 9). Through this rubric of fundamental fairness, the Law
Court, under a "totality of circumstances" test, examines whether a defendant's
statements were free and voluntary. lg_.
32. More specifically the Law Court has held that:
[T]he voluntariness requirement gives effect to three overlapping but conceptually distinct values: (1) it discourages objectionable police practices; (2) it protects the mental freedom of the individual; and (3) it preserves the quality of fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system. ·
Id. at ,T 20 (citing, State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497 , 500 (Me. 1983). Thus, the Hunt
Court reiterated "that a confession is involuntary when it is made under circumstances
that offend one of these fundamental values of social policy and constitutional law. !g.
33. Among·other circumstances the Law Court examines when determining
whether a confession is voluntary, the Court has spent time focusing on "police trickery"
Page 10 of 18 and times when the police make "threats, promises or inducements" in order to compel!
a confession. State v. George, 2012 ME 64, ,i 21; see e.g. State v. Tardiff, 374 A.2d
598 (Me. 1977); State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60; State v. Lavoie, 2010 ME 76; State v.
Nadeau, 2010 ME 71; State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87; State v. Theriault, 425 A.2d 986 (Me.
1981 ). The Law Court, in the majority of these cases, focused on somewhat vague
police statements that suggested things would be better if the defendant confessed
and/or told the truth. Nadeau at ,i 57; Dion at ,i 34; Theriault at 990.
34. However, the Law Court has taken issue with "officers' statements to
defendants ... when those statements involve false promises of leniency or
misrepresentations about legal rights." Hunt, 2016 ME at ,i 25; see also State v. Tardiff,
37 4 A.2d 598 (Me. 1977)(promise of less charges found improper); McConkie, 2000 ME
158 (promises of confidentiality held improper); State v. Dodge, 2011 ME 47 (promise of
confidentiality held improper); State v. Wiley, 2013 ME 30 (improper offer of leniency of
less jail time). Therefore, "'[a] confession is not voluntary where an interrogating officer,
with no more than apparent authority, leads a suspect to believe that a confession will
secure a favorable, concrete sentence, and that belief motivates the suspect to
confess."' Hunt at ,i 28 (quoting Wiley at ,i 31).
35. In an effort to clarify its position, the Law Court stated that "false promises
of leniency that induce a confession are improper and thus will weigh significantly into
our consideration of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a
confession must be suppressed." Id. at ,i 29 (original emphasis). Further, "[a] promise
involves leniency when it suggests that the process of prosecution or sentencing will
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somehow be 'better' for the defendant if the defendant confesses." lg_. (external citations
omitted).
36. In the present case, Officer Jones twice referred to "quality of life" in
juxtaposition to his references to his ability to lock up Mr. Richardson and "throw away
the key." (emphasis added). When phrased like this, Officer Jones is basically saying "I
can keep you out of jail (quality of life) if you confess." Otherwise, he will lock him up
forever and he and the prosecutor ("we") will take "extreme sentencing measures."
37. While Officer Jones does say that he could not make any promises, his
repeated use of "we" and "I" in conjunction with phrases such as "quality of life" and
"lock you up and throw away the key", and "extreme sentencing measures" conveys a
direct promise of leniency to Mr. Richardson, a promise Officer Jones cannot deliver on.
38. From the start of the interview, Mr. Richardson expressed a deep seated
fear of going to jail or prison. Officer Jones exploited that fear by making promises that
he could, essentially, keep Mr. Richardson out of jail as long as he confessed and/or
told the truth. Immediately following Officer Jones's false promises, Mr. Richardson
confessed; there can be no doubt Officer Jones's false promises induced Mr.
Richardson's confession. Hunt at ,r 31.
39. What's more, on two occasions during the interview, Officer Jones refers
to some DNA/forensic testing. The State never did any type testing on any of K.D.'s
clothes. Finally, Mr. Richardson is, upon information and belief, is not someone of high
intelligence which is something the court should also take into account. Id. at ,r 37.
40. Therefore, Officer Jones violated Mr. Richardson's due process rights
when he induced an involuntary confession and this Court must suppress any
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statements Mr. Richardson made to Officer Jones during this first, un-Mirandized
interview.
8) Subsequent Mirandized Statements
I) Mr. Richardson's Prior, un-Mirandized Statements and/or Involuntary Statements Render His Subsequent Miranda Waiver and Admissions Involuntary.
41. There are situations when the police obtain a custodial confession, then
give the individual Miranda warnings, and subsequently obtain the same or a similar
confession. See generally Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298 (1985); State v. Nightingale, 2012 ME 132. Courts sometimes refer to this
two-step process as "Miranda-in-the-middle" and depending on the specific facts, will
exclude both the pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements . Compare Seibert at 614
with Elstad at 315-316.
42. When the lack of Miranda is more than a mere "oversight" (Elstad at 315
316) the United States Supreme court has found that "[b]y any objective measure ... it
is likely that if interrogators employ the technique of withholding warnings until after
interrogation succeeds in eliciting a confession, the warnings will be ineffective in
preparing the suspect for successive interrogation, close in time and similar content."
Seibert at 613. The Court reasoned that:
Upon hearing warnings only in the aftermath of interrogation and just after making a confession, a suspect would hardly think he had a genuine right to remain silent ... A more likely reaction on a suspect's part would be perplexity about the reason for discussing rights at that point ... telling a suspect that 'anything you cay can and will be used against you,' without expressly excepting the statement just given, could lead to an entirely reasonable inference that what he has just said will be used, with subsequent silence of being no avail.
Page 13 of 18 ('° (~
Id.
43. The Court laid out a number of factors courts should examine to determine
whether "Miranda warnings delivered midstream could be effective enough to
accomplish their object." Id. at 615. That is, whether an individual felt as if they had a
"real choice between talking and not talking." J..g_. at 601 . Those factors include "the
completeness and detail of the questions arid answers in the first round of interrogation,
the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the
second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator's
questions treated the second round as continuous with the first." Id. In the present case,
the two interrogations were essentially identical save for the location and the police
administering Miranda. Therefore, given the reasoning laid out in Seibert, the similarity
of the two confessions, "[n]othing was said or done to dispel the oddity of warning about
legal rights to silence and counsel right after the police had led [Mr. Richardson] through
a systematic interrogation. "J.g_. at 616.
44. In Seibert's plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion.
Jg. at 618-622. Justice Kennedy agreed "with much in the careful and convincing
opinion for the plurality" but he took a slightly different approach. Id. at 618. Justice
Kennedy agreed that the technique the police used in Seibert undermined Miranda's
"meaning and effect." Id. at 621. However, before a court suppresses both pre and post
Miranda statements, Justice Kennedy would require some showing that the technique
used by the police was a deliberate attempt to undermine Miranda. Id. at 622.
45. Despite the Law Court's oft declaration that Maine Constitution provides
greater protection than its Federal counterpart (see supra), the Law Court adopted
Page 14 of 18 (-•''
Justice Kennedy's less protective deliberateness test. Nightingale, 2012 ME 132 at ,r
29 . Therefore, "the State bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the
evidence that the two-step procedure was not deliberately employed to undermine the
efficacy of the Miranda warnings." lg. The Court will examine the "totality of the objective
and subjective evidence" in order to determine if the police deliberately undermined
Miranda. lg. (quoting citations omitted).
46 . However, the Law Court has never addressed a situation where the police
induced a pre-Mirandized involuntary confession and then obtained the same or similar
confession after administering Miranda . Under the Maine Constitution's expand_ ed
rights, the coercive police tactic of using "Miranda-in-the-middle" renders both pre and
post Miranda statements involuntary and thus, inadmissible, this is especially true when
t~e pre-Miranda statements are involuntary and are suppressed because they violate
the defendants due process rights.
47. Indeed, the crux of Seibert, whether reading the lead opinion or Justice
Kennedy's concurrence revolves around voluntariness. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 620. Justice
Kennedy referenced Justice Souter's opinion with favor when he explained that:
[T]he two-step technique permits the accused to conclude that the right not to respond did not exist when the earlier incriminating statements were made. The strategy is based on the assumption that Miranda warnings will tend to mean less when rec1ted midinterrogation, after inculpatory statements have already been obtained. This tactic relies on an intentional misrepresentation of the protection that Miranda offers and does not serve any legitimate objectives that might otherwise justify its use.
lg. at 620-621 .
Page 15 of 18 (
48. The Nightingale Court addressed whether the defendant voluntarily
confessed. Nightingale, 2012 ME at ,i,r 31-36. However, Mr. _Nightingale never
challenged his first, Mirandized statements but argued police deception during the first
interview rendered his subsequent statements involuntary . .!Q. Mr. Richardson's case
presents a very different situation, a situation where he is challenging his initial
involuntary statements. He is also challenging his subsequent, Mirandized statements
as involuntary. See supra. The Nightingale Court did not examine whether the tactic of
"Miranda-in-the-middle" violates due process as explained in Hunt. Compare
Nightingale at ,i,r 31-36 with Hunt, 2016 ME at ,i,r 18-21.
49. Therefore, when examining a situation where the police question an
individual first and obtain in involuntary confession and only later Mirandize them, the
court still needs to examine whether the tactic violated due process, whether the
individual felt as if he or she had a "real choice"; and whether the waiver and confession
were voluntary. Hunt at ,m 19-21. Using "Miranda-in-the-middle" can be dispositive with respect to voluntariness and therefore, admissibility. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613.
50. Based on the reasoning in Seibert and the added Maine State
Constitutional protections, when the police use the "Miranda-in-the-middle" technique,
the court should find the subsequent confession involuntary. Therefore, in Mr.
Richardson's case, based on this reasoning, this Court must exclude all of Mr.
Richardson's incriminating statements made to the Bridgton Police.
WHEREFORE, the defendant, Mr. Clifford Richardson respectfully requests that this Court:
A) Suppress both pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements
Page 16 of 18 ,. / __: ( .
B) Hold a hearing and hear evidence on this Motion;
C) Issue a written order of facts and law; and
D) Grant such further relief as serves justice.
Dated:_ _ J--'--/;._/_i1--_ vens M. Hamlen, Esq . Maine Bar No. : 9973 Attorney for the Defendant
H&H LawCenter, P.A. 22 Monument Sq., Suite 404 PO Box 4784 Portland , ME 04112 207.221.6363 dham len@hhlawcenter.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Devens M. Hamlen, do hereby certify that on this date, I have delivered a copy of the foregoing attached Motion to Suppress to:
Cumberland County District Attorney's Office 142 Federal Street Portland, ME 04101
Dated :_'li__.__ (l/'--- (f_ _
Page 17 of 18 Maine Bar No. : 9973
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