State of Maine v. Randall J. Weddle

2024 ME 26

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: April 16, 2024
• Docket: SRP-23-108
• Status: Published

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2024 ME 26 Docket: SRP-23-108 Argued: January 10, 2024 Decided: April 16, 2024

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

RANDALL J. WEDDLE

LAWRENCE, J.

[¶1] Randall J. Weddle appeals from the sentence the trial court (Knox

County, Stokes, J.) imposed on two counts of manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.

§ 203(1)(A) (2023), two counts of causing a death while operating under the

influence (Class B), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1-A) (2023), and eleven other

related charges.1 We affirmed the judgment of conviction in State v. Weddle,

2020 ME 12, 224 A.3d 1035, and we now affirm the sentence imposed by the

court.

1 Weddle was also convicted of one count of causing injury while operating under the influence

(Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1) (2023), one count of aggravated driving to endanger (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1-A) (2023), one count of driving to endanger (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1), and eight counts of violations of commercial motor carrier operator rules (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 558-A(1)(A) (2023). 2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the procedural record and our

2020 opinion affirming Weddle’s conviction, Weddle, 2020 ME 12, ¶¶ 3-9, 224

A.3d 1035. See Gordon v. State, 2024 ME 7, ¶ 2, 308 A.3d 228.

[¶3] “On March 18, 2016, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and

medical rescue personnel responded to a major motor vehicle accident on

Route 17 in Washington, Maine.” Weddle, 2020 ME 12, ¶ 3, 224 A.3d 1035. The

accident involved five vehicles, one of which was engulfed in flames, and

resulted in the death of two drivers. Id. After an investigation, officers

determined that Weddle, the driver of a larger tractor trailer, had caused the

accident. Id. ¶¶ 3-7. Hospital tests revealed that Weddle had alcohol in his

system. Id. ¶ 7. Several days after the accident, officers found a

three-quarters-full whiskey bottle and a shot glass in Weddle’s truck. Id. ¶ 7.

B. Procedure

[¶4] In June 2016, Weddle was charged by indictment with two counts

of manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A), two counts of aggravated

criminal operating under the influence (Class B), 29-A M.R.S.

§ 2411(1-A)(D)(1-A), one count of causing injury while operating under the 3

influence (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1), one count of aggravated

driving to endanger (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1-A) (2023), one count of

driving to endanger (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1), and eight counts of

violating commercial motor carrier operator rules (Class E), 29-A M.R.S.

§ 558-A(1)(A) (2023). Id. ¶ 8.

[¶5] The court held a jury trial from January 23 to 29, 2018. The jury

found Weddle guilty of all counts. On March 23, 2018, the court held a

sentencing hearing. The court conducted a Hewey sentencing analysis, see State

v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Me. 1993); 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C (2018),2

regarding the manslaughter counts. In setting the basic sentence at twenty

years, the court considered the nature and circumstances of the crime. 17-A

M.R.S. § 1252-C(1). Specifically, Weddle had operated a commercial vehicle

carrying a load of lumber when he was ill, fatigued, and taking prescription

medication for which the use of alcohol was contraindicated; and he had alcohol

above the legal limit in his system.3 He exceeded the fifty-mile-per-hour speed

2 Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C has since been repealed and replaced. See P.L. 2019, ch. 113, §§ A-1, A-2 (effective May 16, 2019) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1602 (2023)). 3 The court understood that Weddle’s prescription medication should not be taken in conjunction

with the use of alcohol, because the two substances together can intensify the impairment of a person’s mental and physical faculties, the same faculties that would be critical to the operation of an 80,000-pound, fully loaded tractor trailer. 4

limit by twenty to thirty miles per hour. The court also looked at comparable

cases provided by Weddle and noted that most, if not all, of the comparable

cases involved passenger automobiles, not commercial vehicles. The court

noted the need to take account of “the difference between an automobile -- a

passenger automobile and a commercial vehicle” weighing forty tons when

fully loaded; the latter is “a massive projectile” that “carries with it the potential

for lethality that is almost incalculable.”

[¶6] In setting the maximum sentence at thirty years, the court weighed

mitigating and aggravating factors. 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(2). For mitigating

factors, the court considered Weddle’s work history and his letter of remorse.4

For aggravating factors, the court considered the impact of the multiple-vehicle

crash on the victims and their families, Weddle’s criminal history (including

twelve prior OUI convictions, eleven speeding violations, and Weddle’s loss of

licenses in different states), and the need to protect the public. The court

concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.

[¶7] The court set the final sentence at thirty years, with all but

twenty-five years suspended, followed by four years of probation. The court

4The court also observed, however, that Weddle did not exhibit significant acceptance of responsibility for the crash, and it did not accord him “much mitigation on that score.” 5

believed that a period of supervision following Weddle’s release from

incarceration would protect the public. The court imposed a range of terms of

incarceration for the other counts to run concurrently with the two

manslaughter sentences.

[¶8] Weddle did not timely apply for review of his sentence. See M.R.

App. P. 2B(b)(1), 20(b). He filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 21,

2020. During the post-conviction review proceeding,5 the parties and the court

agreed to allow Weddle to apply for review of his sentence, see 15 M.R.S. § 2130

(2023) (permitting a post-conviction court to “grant[] the right to take an

appeal from the criminal judgment”), which he did. The Sentence Review panel

granted his application to appeal his sentence. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151-52 (2023).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶9] On appeal, Weddle challenges both the legality and propriety of the

sentence.6

5 Pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2131(1) (2023) and M.R. App. P. 19(f), Weddle filed an appeal seeking a

certificate of probable cause permitting our review of the post-conviction court’s denial of the remainder of his petition for post-conviction review. On February 9, 2024, we entered the denial of his request for a certificate of probable cause. 6Although Weddle did not raise the legality of the sentence in his direct appeal, State v. Weddle, 2020 ME 12, 224 A.3d 1035, the Sentence Review Panel and the Law Court have the statutory authority to review questions of legality in a discretionary sentence review. See State v. Murray-Burns, 2023 ME 21, ¶¶ 12-17, 290 A.3d 542; 15 M.R.S. § 2152 (2023). 6

A. Legality of the Sentence

[¶10] Weddle first argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because

it is not proportioned to the offense. We review de novo the legality and

constitutionality of a sentence. State v. Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 13, 184 A.3d 880.

We have established a two-part test to determine whether a sentence violates

the Maine Constitution.7 State v. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶¶ 18-19, 21 A.3d 1033;

Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 15, 184 A.3d 880; see Me. Const. art. I, § 9 (“[A]ll penalties

and punishments shall be proportioned to the offense.”). We consider “whether

the sentence imposed is greatly disproportionate” and “whether it offends

prevailing notions of decency, whether it shocks the conscience of the public,

or our own respective or collective sense of fairness, or whether it is inhuman

or barbarous.” Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 18, 21 A.3d 1033 (alterations and

quotation marks omitted). “Because the Legislature is the voice of the

sovereign people and thus expresses the people’s will, only the most extreme

punishment decided upon by that body as appropriate for an offense could . . .

be unconstitutionally disproportionate.” See State v. Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 23,

993 A.2d 14 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

The “United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Maine Constitution anticipates a 7

broader proportionality review than the Eighth Amendment.” State v. Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 26, 65 A.3d 1242; see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 982 (1991). 7

[¶11] When analyzing proportionality, we “begin by comparing the

gravity of the offense [to] the severity of the sentence.” Lopez, 2018 ME 59,

¶ 16, 184 A.3d 880 (quotation marks omitted). “We have previously compared

a defendant’s offense to his sentence by (1) evaluating where that defendant’s

term of imprisonment fell within the range of incarceration time authorized by

the Legislature, and (2) considering the facts of a case in conjunction with the

commonly accepted goals of punishment.” Id. (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

[¶12] We examine the plain language and occasionally the legislative

purpose and history of a classification of a crime to determine whether a

defendant’s term of imprisonment fell within the range of incarceration time

authorized by the Legislature. See Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 24, 993 A.2d 14;

Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 20, 184 A.3d 880; cf. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶¶ 28-29, 21 A.3d

1033. Here, 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(2)(A) permits a maximum term of

imprisonment of thirty years for manslaughter. See 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A).

Vehicular manslaughter was originally designated as a Class C offense,

permitting a maximum term of imprisonment of five years. See P.L. 1977,

ch. 510, § 40 (effective October 24, 1977) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 203(3)

(1977)); see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(C) (1975). The Legislature amended the 8

statute to reclassify vehicular manslaughter as a Class B crime in 1989, and then

in 1997 eliminated the distinction between vehicular manslaughter and other

forms of manslaughter by classifying any manslaughter charge as a Class A

crime. P.L. 1989, ch. 505, § 1 (effective Sept. 30, 1989) (codified at 17-A M.R.S.

§ 203(3)(A) (1989)); P.L. 1997, ch. 34, § 1 (effective June 26, 1997) (codified at

17-A M.R.S. § 203 (1997)).8 The evolving classification of manslaughter

committed while operating a vehicle “signals the Legislature’s greater disdain

for such serious criminal conduct” and its desire that such conduct be punished

consistently with manslaughter committed in other ways. Lopez, 2018 ME 59,

¶ 20, 184 A.3d 880 (quotation marks omitted). Weddle’s sentence does not

exceed the statutory maximum term of imprisonment of thirty years.

See Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 23, 993 A.2d 14.

[¶13] The court did not err in considering the facts of the case and the

goals of punishment. The court emphasized that Weddle was not only speeding

while ill, fatigued, and under the influence of prescription drugs and alcohol but

also behind the wheel of a large tractor trailer that the court characterized as a

8 The Legislature passed the1997 change because, in State v. Berube, 669 A.2d 170, 171-72 (Me.

1995), we vacated a conviction of a Class A manslaughter, because the court did not provide to the jury an instruction of a Class B manslaughter charge. See Summary of Legislation Before the Joint Standing Committees 7-8 (Aug. 1997) (“Public Law 1997, chapter 34 overrules State v. Berube to the extent that it makes all vehicular homicides a Class A crime.”). 9

“massive projectile,” “missile,” and “deadly weapon that’s traveling on the

road.” The sentence also observes the gravity of the crime’s effect on the

victims and their families. 17-A M.R.S. § 1151(8) (2018). Weddle’s sentence

considers his criminal history, including double-digit numbers of prior OUI

convictions and prior speeding violations, his history of losing driving

privileges in multiple states, and the necessity for years of incarceration to

deter further dangerous behavior by Weddle and to promote public safety. Id.

§ 1151(1). We therefore conclude that the sentence is not greatly

disproportionate to the offense,9 and proceed to analyze whether Weddle’s

sentence offends prevailing notions of decency.

[¶14] A sentence close to the maximum, such as the one at issue here, is

not necessarily “rare, extreme, or shocking,” because the Legislature accounted

for the sentence when it set that maximum. See Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 24, 993

9 Weddle cites some cases where defendants committed manslaughter while driving and received

more lenient sentences to suggest that his sentence is grossly disproportionate. See State v. Lowe, 2015 ME 124, ¶¶ 2-7, 15, 124 A.3d 156 (sentence of eight years in prison with all but eighteen months suspended and three years of probation); State v. St. Louis, 2008 ME 101, ¶¶ 2-5, 951 A.2d 81 (sentence of ten years in prison, with all but three and one-half years suspended, with six years of probation). However, those cases involve passenger automobiles, not a tractor trailer “missile” as the court here described. Lowe, 2015 ME 124, ¶¶ 2-7, 15, 124 A.3d 156; St. Louis, 2008 ME 101, ¶¶ 2-5, 951 A.2d 81.

In any event, we do not need to look at comparable sentences absent an inference of gross disproportionality. See State v. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 20 n.5, 21 A.3d 1033. The facts here do not give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality, so we need not compare Weddle’s sentence to the sentences imposed in Lowe and St. Louis. 10

A.2d 14. The surrounding facts and circumstances related to Weddle’s conduct

support the conclusion that the sentence was not barbarous: Weddle should

not have been driving a large, fully-loaded tractor trailer, but he did so,

traveling at speeds twenty to thirty miles per hour over the posted speed limit,

when he was ill, fatigued, and under the influence of prescription drugs and

alcohol. See, e.g., Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 20, 21 A.3d 1033 (observing that when

the manner in which a crime occurred is such that the Legislature could not

have envisioned a much worse scenario for the commission of the offense,

imposition of the maximum allowable sentence for such conduct “is not the

rare, extreme, or shocking case that would offend either the Eighth Amendment

or article I, section 9” of the Maine Constitution (quotation marks omitted)).

B. Propriety of the Sentence

[¶15] Weddle next challenges the propriety of the sentence. “We review

the sentencing court’s determination of the basic sentence de novo for

misapplication of legal principles and its determination of the maximum

sentence [and the final sentence] for abuse of discretion.” State v. Chase, 2023

ME 32, ¶ 28, 294 A.3d 154 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).

[¶16] A court is bound by the process and factors prescribed in 17-A

M.R.S. § 1252-C when sentencing a person convicted of a felony. See State v. 11

Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Me. 1993). The Hewey analysis consists of

three steps: (1) “determin[ing] a basic term of imprisonment by considering

the particular nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by the

offender”; (2) “determin[ing] the maximum period of imprisonment to be

imposed by considering all other relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating

and mitigating, appropriate to that case”; and (3) “determin[ing] what portion,

if any, of the maximum period of imprisonment should be suspended.” 17-A

M.R.S. § 1252-C.

[¶17] Contrary to Weddle’s arguments, the sentence imposed by the

court is not excessively harsh. At the sentencing hearing, the court conducted

a sentencing analysis following the statutory procedure.10 The court

considered both aggravating and mitigating factors in setting the maximum

sentence at thirty years. As a serious aggravating factor, the court considered

Weddle’s criminal history—which included twelve OUIs and eleven speeding

violations, multiple license suspensions, and other rules violations. As the court

noted, Weddle should not have been driving any vehicle, let alone a commercial

vehicle.

10 Weddle does not appear to challenge his basic sentence for a misapplication of principle. 12

[¶18] The court misapplied no legal principles in setting the maximum

sentence; although the court considered Weddle’s letter of remorse and work

history as mitigating factors, his criminal history, the impact on victims, and the

need to protect the public manifestly demonstrate that a maximum sentence of

thirty years is not excessive. The court carefully weighed the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances of Weddle’s case as required by section 1252-C(2)

and did not abuse its discretion. See, e.g., State v. Gatson, 2021 ME 25, ¶¶ 36-37,

250 A.3d 137.

[¶19] The court then considered the appropriateness of suspending a

portion of the sentence and placing Weddle on probation pursuant to section

1252-C(3). Although the court had doubts about Weddle’s prospects for

rehabilitation given his lengthy criminal record, it ultimately decided that a

long period of supervision for Weddle after his release would be important for

him, see State v. Black, 2007 ME 19, ¶ 14, 914 A.2d 723, and serve to protect the

public, see State v. Dalli, 2010 ME 113, ¶ 14, 8 A.3d 632. The resulting final

sentence was reasonable and conformed to the applicable sentencing factors,

and was therefore not an abuse of discretion.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed. 13

Michelle R. King, Esq. (orally), Irwin & Morris, Portland, for appellant Randall J. Weddle

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Jeffrey Baroody, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Knox County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2016-474 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY