State of Maine v. Quinn
This text of State of Maine v. Quinn (State of Maine v. Quinn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
RECE! YER AND FILED STATE OF MAINE Kei EP CLDERIOR COURT SUPERIOR COURT
TO SUPPRESS - AIDAN T. QUINN, a4 oP COLE | Defendant he NOV 35 2004 This matter is before the court on defendant’s motion to suppress any and all evidence obtained by the State of Maine as a result of a stop and detention of the defendant by a member of the Waterville Police Department on October 25, 2003. During the evening of October 24" and the early morning hours of October 25%, 2003, a Waterville Police officer in a marked cruiser was on duty in the downtown area of Waterville. At approximately 2:00 a.m., he was in his vehicle parked in the parking lot of the Webber Insurance Agency on Spring Street near the intersection of Spring Street and Silver Street and an entrance to the Concourse. From that vantage point, he could observe the entire Concourse, including an internal intersection of travel lanes near the Concourse entrance from Main Street which is a four-way stop, 1.e., a stop sign in all four directions. He observed a Chevrolet Impala proceed from the Main Street entrance through the four-way intersection without stopping. The vehicle traveled toward the officer through the Concourse towards the intersection of Silver Street and Spring Street and stopped for the traffic light. When the light changed, the Chevrolet, later determined to be the vehicle the defendant was operating, proceeded at a high rate through the intersection onto Silver Street. The officer proceeded behind the defendant's vehicle at a distance of approximately three car lengths for a third to a half a mile observing the defendant traveling at the rate of 40 MPH. in the posted 25 M.P.H. zone of Silver Street. The officer also observed the defendant “weaving” from time-to-time by drifting within the fog line and the centerline. At times the left tires were on top of the centerline. Nearing the end of Silver Street, the officer observed the defendant slowing to 30 M.P.H., enter onto Kennedy Memorial Drive where it changes to four lanes and continue in the right travel lane. While on Kennedy Memorial Drive, the defendant's vehicle started to drift to the left over the white dotted line, the defendant put on his left turn signal and went into the left lane. As the vehicle approached the traffic lights at Shaw’s Plaza, the officer saw the traffic light change to yellow and observed the defendant brake the vehicle, then jolt forward through the light. The officer followed the defendant for about a quarter of a mile where the defendant was traveling 50 M.P.H. in the posted 35 M.P.H. zone. At the location of the Burger King near the entrance to Interstate 95, the officer activated his blue lights and strobe lights and observed the defendant put on his right turn signal and drift to the right lane. However, the defendant did not stop but, instead, continued on slowly. At that point, the officer gave a “short burst” of his siren while traveling through the Interstate 95 overpass and he notified his dispatch of the pursuit. Some distance later, in front of Charlie’s Ford dealership, the defendant’s vehicle stopped. The officer testified that his total observation of the defendant was approximately 2.7 miles. He further testified that he had a full and unobstructed view of the Concourse and, in particular, the four-way stop intersection. Defendant challenges the credibility of the officer’s testimony. He argues that because the officer testified as to multiple instances of violations causing an articulable suspicion that the operator was impaired, he acted on none of them until the vehicle 3 had traveled a substantial distance. The defendant would ask the court to find that the obvious inference from those facts are that the operation of the vehicle was sO marginally incorrect in each of the instances that they would not constitute an articulable suspicion and the officer had no legal and constitutional grounds for causing the stop and detention. Defendant further espouses a rather novel challenge to the credibility of the officer by suggesting improper bias and motivation. At the date and time in question, it was well known that a movie for television was being filmed in the Waterville/Skowhegan area by HBO. It was also well known that the participants in the movie frequented a location known as the Bread Box Café. The Bread Box Café is located such that it is adjacent to the Concourse and directly opposite across the Concourse from the officer’s location on Spring Street. A further inference is that the officer was observing the Bread Box Café and the vehicles leaving that establishment knowing that persons of some renown would be leaving and driving after an evening of socializing. The requested inference goes even further to suggest that the officer did not stop the vehicle because any of the complained of acts were sufficient in and of themselves, but because he suspected a “famous” person was driving and that he wanted to beef up his articulable suspicion. To support these inferences, the defendant submits a videotape from the squad room of the Waterville Police Department where the intoxilyzer was administered to the defendant. There are assertions that the officer told another Waterville Police officer that he stopped the defendant for driving 25 M.P.H. in a 40 M-P.H. zone, contrary to his testimony. The defendant further argues that the videotape shows that officers of the Waterville Police Department were ridiculing the defendant in his absence, laughing at 4 the arrest and otherwise acting unprofessionally such as to affect their credibility as witnesses in the entire transaction. In order to support the brief investigatory stop of a motor vehicle, such as the stop in this case, a police officer must have an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct or a civil violation has occurred, is occurring, or is about to Occur, and the officer’s suspicion must be “objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Cusack, 649 A.2d 16 (Me. 1994). This court must decide whether the officer possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion to support an investigatory stop of an automobile. State v. Brown, 675 A.2d 504 (Me. 1996). In order to disregard the specific uncontradicted observations of the officer that the defendant did not stop for a stop sign, exceeded the speed limit, in the early morning hours, weaving in his travel lane, the court would have to be satisfied that the events did not happen and the officer was participating in a “set up.” While it does appear to be an exceedingly long distance for time of observations and somewhat contrary to the officer's responsibility to interfere with a dangerous condition on the highway, and while it appears the conduct of the officers as recorded on the videotape could be considered something less than professional, the court finds no basis to conclude that the events observed by the officers did not happen. Instead, the conduct by the officer must be considered in light of the weight to be given by a factfinder of his testimony as to any relationship with impaired driving. The articulable suspicion standard is extremely low. Interpreting suspicious conduct in the operation of a vehicle is vital to the safety of other motorists on the highway. The court finds no constitutional infirmity under the facts of this motion. The entry will be: Defendant’s motion to suppress is DENIED. Dated: September _2¥ _, 2004 LEE Donald H. Marden Justice, Superior Court STATE ‘OF MAINE
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State of Maine v. Quinn, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-maine-v-quinn-mesuperct-2004.