State of Maine v. Pearson

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedNovember 14, 2007
DocketCUMcr-07-1451
StatusUnpublished

This text of State of Maine v. Pearson (State of Maine v. Pearson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Maine v. Pearson, (Me. Super. Ct. 2007).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. ,', ,,~\ ~rt. CRIMINAL ACTION .' , I " , I·"~ I '- ,~_. .;. ," ',' t-:',. ~J '") _ FleE _ r ..... DOCKET NO. CR-07-1151 V "'}~ CuM ~ I r dD')7 (I lit ,~ \;J .-', ,-q

STATE OF MAINE, t1 ("I """\

-"- .·..,'1 \ II 1:., Ii: U I plaintiff'" " I \

v. ORDER & DECISION

ZACKARY PEARSON

Defendant (18 2008 BACKGROUND

The defendant was charged with four counts of robbery on June 13, 2007

and was indicted on July 6. The State filed a notice of joinder on July 6, joining

Pearson's case with those of six other defendants who were also accused of being

involved in the robbery. Pearson filed the present motion for relief from prejudicial

j,oinder on September 17. For the reasons discussed below, the court denies the motion.

DISCUSSION

While "the court must balance the general policy in favor of joint trials against

the prejudice to a defendant which may result," the court is also afforded "substantial

discretion" to grant or deny a motion to sever. State v. Lakin, 2006 ME 64, C}[<]I 7-8, 899

A.2d 777, 779. The burden is on the moving party "to show facts prior to trial that a

joint trial would result in prejudice." Id. Here, the defendant has asserted that

introduction of certain admissions made by his co-defendants would violate his

constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, as the United States Supreme

Court decided in Bruton v. US., 391 U.s. 123 (1968).

The Law Court recently discussed the Bruton holding in Lakin, and reiterated that

when defendants are tried together in a single trial, an admission of a non-testifying defendant that implicates a co-defendant may not be used. Id. n.2, 899 A.2d at 778. To

do so violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the co­

defendant is prevented from cross-examining a non-testifying defendant about the

admission. Id. In these cases, it is appropriate to exclude or redact the admission, sever

the trials, or empanel multiple juries. Id. <[ 5,899 A.2d at 778. The Law Court upheld

the trial court's decision not to sever the trials of the two defendants, however, because

the State had agreed not to use either of the inculpatory statements, and the

presentation of mutually antagonistic defenses was not a ground for severance. Id. <[<[

5-13, 899 A.2d at 778-79.

In an earlier case, the Law Court discussed several post-Bruton decisions of the

United States Supreme Court, and ultimately determined that even when a confession is

redacted to exclude reference to a co-defendant, it may inappropriately implicate that

co-defendant. State v. Boucher, 1998 ME 209, <[<[ 11-16, 718 A.2d 1092, 1095-96. The

Court acknowledged that" a fair deletion of all references, express or implied, to any

other defendant is a proper and approved method of avoiding prejudice and the Bruton

dilemma." Id. <][ 12, 718 A.2d at 1095 (quoting State v. Wing, 294 A.2d 418, 422 (Me.

1972).) However, because testimony from witnesses indicated that four individuals

were involved in the crime and the witnesses named three of the four participants, the

deletion of the co-defendant from a defendant's confession was not enough to satisfy

the requirements of Bruton, because the confession "obviously referred directly to [the

codefendant]." Id. <[ 16, 718 A.2d at 1096. Yet in spite of the Bruton violation, the Court

affirmed the conviction because the inappropriately admitted confession was merely

2 cumulative, and "was entirely consistent with the rest of the State's evidence." Id. 'JI'JI

20-21, 718 A.2d at 1097. 1

In this case, there were seven defendants initially charged with robbery. One

defendant has already entered a plea and is available to testify. Three of the seven

defendants, including the defendant who has entered a plea, gave statements to the

police that implicate Pearson in the robbery. If the State sought to admit those

statements into evidence through the law enforcement officer who took them, and not

through the defendants who made them, Pearson's confrontation clause rights could be

violated, as would those of every other defendant implicated by the statement who

chooses not to testify. Redacting the statements to exclude any reference to the

existence of any other defendant would be appropriate.

However, the mere possibility of a Bruton violation does not necessarily require

severance (see footnote), and the State may choose to present its case in a way that does

not present Bruton problems. Furthermore, the defendant's concerns about Bruton

problems can be raised in a motion in limine or can be addressed at trial by the trial

judge.

CONCLUSION

The defendant's motion for relief from prejudicial joinder is DENIED.

DATED: November 13, 2007 Joyce \A~ Wheeler, Jus'tice J

1 It is also important to note that the Court upheld the trial court's decision not to sever the trials because the defendant hadn't alleged anything other than the possibility of a Bruton violation. Id.crr 10, 718 A.2d at 1095. Although there was indeed a Bruton violation, it would have been possible for the State to presentthe confession in a way that didn't violate the co-defendant's rights. rd, The only other arguments that Pearson has made for severance are that the statements will directly contradict his defense theory, and that the statements would be inadmissible hearsay if the trials were severed. However, the Law Court has said that mutually antagonistic defenses are not grounds for severance. Lakin, 2006 ME 64,

3 SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, 88. Docket No PORSC-CR-2007-01451 , '~"'. ~"9"

.,1 J,~: -P, 04062 DOCKET RECORD

':(','. :,'J82F.1 LEBRASSEUR State's Attorney: STEPHANIE ANDERSON PRC~M.~~& LEBRASSEUR, PC 482 CONGRESS ST. SUITE 300 PORTLAND ME 04101 APPOINTED 06/19/2007

ROBBERY OS/29/2007 SCARBOROUGH I,~ q1 2 ':) '1 17 - A 6 5 1 (1 ) (E) Class A

l~:.r)nBERY OS/24/2007 SCARBOROUGH o"l '1 2)4 17 - A 6 5 1 (1 ) (E) Class A Charged with COMPLAINT on Suppleme (JUS 2 / SCA

ROBBERY OS/24/2007 SCARBOROUGH ,: ," (1 '1 8 i3 4 17 - A 651(1) (B) (1) Class B Charged with COMPLAINT on Suppleme ~:()USE~ / SCA

EUBBERY OS/24/2007 SCARBOROUGH 1[:;'l17-A 651 (1) (B) (1) Class B Charged with COMPLAINT on Suppleme / SCA

,':LING DOCUMENT - CASH BAIL BOND FILED ON 05/31/2007

. ')/ ni\.'1. BOND - $50,000.00 SURETY BAIL BOND FILED ON 05/31/2007

Uc\~~ Amc: $50,000 Surety Type: SINGLE Surety Value: $1)0,000 ',~()Il:lCy: CUMBERLAND County Book ID: 25140 Book Page: 343 [:,:1::,' 13ctiled: OS/29/2007 Prvdr Name: KELLY L PEARSON len Issued: OS/29/2007 Rtrn Name: KELLY L PEARSON f.,':~n Ul,;charged:

"',! l'U PARTY. SEE CONDITIONS. r:I'C1U)'. {s): 1 HEARING - INITIAL APPEARANCE SCHEDULED FOR 06/18/2007 @ 8:30

l\;

'oj,-::,;): 1,2,3,4 ;J:: 0 iVlOnON FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 06/19/2007

..\ j" ( ",): 1, 2 , 3 , 4 Page 1 of 4 Prin~ed on: llil"J/:'UT/ ZACKARY PEARSON PORSC-CR-2007-01~51

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Related

State v. Boucher
1998 ME 209 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
State v. Wing
294 A.2d 418 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1972)
State v. Lakin
2006 ME 64 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2006)
State v. York
2006 ME 65 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2006)

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State of Maine v. Pearson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-maine-v-pearson-mesuperct-2007.