State of Maine v. Peacock

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: August 23, 2018
• Docket: CUMcr-18-1981
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss Docket No.: CUMCD-CR-18-1981

STATE OF MAINE

v. ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TANNER PEACOCK DIS11ISS

The Defendant, having been charged with Failure to Report Accident (E) and Violation

of Condition of Release (E), moves to dismiss the charges under the court's authority to do so by

way of the so-called de minim.is statute. 17-A M.R.S.A § 12. The parties have agreed that the

court may refer to the police reports. The parties do not appear to contest any underlying factual

issue that may inform the de minimis analysis, but rather argue whether these facts and

surrounding circumstances leading to Mr. Peacock's criminal charges should constitute a de

minimis infraction leading to a dismissal.

Defendant was operating a vehicle registered to him in the early morning hours of March

5, 2018 when, as a result of his admittedly driving "way too fast" the vehicle appears to have left

the roadway and crashed into a railroad embankment off the public road. Yarmouth Police

officers deduced from Mr. Peacock's tracks that he ran from the scene, only to report his

transgression some six hours later. Mr. Peacock explained that he failed to immediately report

the accident, not because of his ignorance of the law, which would not be germane to the present

motion in any case, but rather because his phone was not working. That representation seems

somewhat undermined by the fact that at the time of his explanation to the police officer, he was

Entered on the Docket: i/i 4/t~ holding his phone intact. Mr. Peacock was also in near proximity to several alternative means to

report the accident, as it occurred near the center of Yarmouth village. More troubling, and

revealing, to the court is the six hours it took for Mr. Peacock to report the accident.

The de minimis statute should be applied sparingly and in the most patently obvious

cases where the conduct and surrounding circumstances can leave little doubt that a mechanical

application of the criminal statute would be unjust as falling outside the intent of the Legislature.

This is necessary as a matter of basic civics and fidelity to our constitutional architecture,

precisely because the statute itself authorizes an immodest judicial review of legislative intent

rather than simply the law as written, which is whatever any particular judge might believe it to

be based not on any objective indicia but merely a guess grounded upon a personal policy

preference. If that were not enough, the statute also invites the court to determine "customary

license and tolerance" given to certain conduct, which may otherwise be a violation of the law as

written but in the view of an unelected judge should not be. As fashionable as this exercise of

judicial vanity has become, whether authorized by statute or not, the facts and circumstances of

this case happily do not make for a close call.

There may be an extraordinary case which presents a Venn diagram intersection of facts

so clearly deserving of a dismissal and facts which the State nevertheless is insistent on

prosecuting. However, as a matter of practical observation and experience, one must conclude

that the foregoing species of cases, which might otherwise foist on the court the burden of

divining legislative intent and acceptable illegal behavior, are as rare as a unicorn. This is not

that case.

Mr. Peacock was on bail for Trafficking in Scheduled Drugs and Aggravated Trafficking

in Scheduled Drugs, for which he has since pled guilty and for which he is on probation. Mr.

2 Peacock did not deny his knowledge of the requirement to report an accident, only and

unbelievably, that he couldn't find an operational means of communication for the six hours after

the accident from the not-so-remote downtown Yarmouth area. Mr. Peacock was leaving a

friend's house in the Oakwood neighborhood before 5 a.m. at the time of the crash. At the very

least, the requirement to report should have been apparent to him in light of the damage to his

vehicle and the need for a tow truck. Mr. Peacock, on bail conditions at the time, should also

have known that he would be under scrutiny by law enforcement and that failure to fastidiously

comply with bail conditions could lead to additional criminal charges. The court concludes that

Mr. Peacock was acutely aware of his situation, which is why he ran from the accident and

reported it six hours later. The raison d'etre of the requirement to report an accident is obvious

and manifold. 1 As an initial matter, it allows law enforcement to investigate the cause of the

accident, whether any crimes were committed that caused the accident, and to prevent criminal

conduct from being concealed by, for example, by running from the scene and showing up to

report six hours later. State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 84 (Me. 1996) (factors to be considered by

the trial court in evaluating a de minimis challenge).

Defendant's arguments are appropriately directed to the State and to the court in

fashioning an appropriate sentence as this case works its way to a final resolution.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

1 It appears the Law Court takes the position that one factor toconsider in de minim.is cases is whether the defendant knew or should have known of the illegality of his conduct. The Court also enumerates several qualitative considerations for the court, such as the impact on the community by the criminal offense and the ''harm or evil caused by the infraction." State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 84 (Me. 1996). It is not clear how the defendant's knowledge of the law or its penalties can co-exist with the axiomatic rule that ignorance of the law "excuses no one." Jenks v. Mathews. 31 Me. 318, 320 ( I 850) ("It is a well known maxim that ignorance oflaw will not furnish an excuse for any person, either for a breach or an omission of duty." (quotation marks omitted)). It is even less clear under what remarkable circumstances the Superior Court is authorized the indulgence of acting as an unelected super-legislature in deciding that conduct made criminal by the first branch of government should be suspended because of what the court thinks the Legislature intended (in committee, in markup, on the floor, in the hallways) as opposed to the law it passed. The law as written comes with the beneficial feature of being able to be read by the citizens whose compliance is required by the State.

3 The Clerk is directed to enter this Order on the unified criminal docket by reference

pursuant to Maine Rule of Unified Criminal Procedure 53(a).

Date: August 23, 2018 Lance E Walker Justice, uperior Court