State of Maine v. Olds

Maine Superior

State of Maine v. Olds

DecidedAugust 11, 2008

DocketKENcr-08-80

StatusUnpublished

This text of State of Maine v. Olds (State of Maine v. Olds) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State of Maine v. Olds, (Me. Super. Ct. 2008).

Pincite

Opinion

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v. DECISION AND ORDER

MICHELLE OLDS,

Defendant

Before the court is the defendant's motion to suppress. The defendant alleges

that her statements should be suppressed because they were taken in violation of her

Fifth Amendment rights. The defendant claims that she was in custody during the

interviews and was not apprised of her rights under Miranda. Furthermore, she claims

that the statements taken by law enforcement were involuntary.

On November 29, 2007, a detective of the Lewiston Police Department

investigating a theft contacted the defendant. The defendant indicated that she was

willing to talk with him regarding the incident. A police officer met the defendant in

the lobby of the police department and led her to a ten by ten room containing a table

and four chairs and no windows. The defendant voluntarily transported herself to the

police department following her phone conversation with the detective. The room had

an audio/ video system in operation; therefore, the interview was recorded.

During the interview, she admitted to the burglary and explained that her drug

problems led her to the need to enter the person's house and steal the property in

question. Initially, she denied the burglary but after further discussions with the police

officer she did admit to it. 2

Defendant was advised that she was not going to be arrested during the first

interview which lasted 45 minutes. She was allowed to leave the police department and

made an appointment with the detective to return to talk to another officer regarding

another issue.

The defendant did return at 3:00 p.m. and once again she was escorted to the

same room. She was introduced to an officer from the Maine DEA who wanted to talk

to her about another incident. The officer indicated that she was a potential suspect and

upon her second return at 3:00 p.m., it was expected that she would make further

incriminating statements. Following the statements made on tape, she was left alone to

write out her statement.

Discussion

Miranda

The defendant argues that she made statements as a result of a custodial

interrogation and that she was never read her Miranda rights.

"A Miranda warning is necessary only if a defendant is: (1) in custody; and (2)

subject to interrogation." State v. Higgins, 2000 ME 77, err 12, 796 A.2d 50, 54. The court

has set out many factors that the trial court is to view in their totality. In State v. Dian,

2007 ME 87, err 23,928 A.2d 746, 750-751, the court set out the following factors:

A person not subject to formal arrest may be in custody if a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the defendant would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave or if there was a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. This test is an objective one, and we have stated that in analyzing whether a defendant is in custody, a court may consider the following factors: (1) the locale where the defendant made the statement; (2) the party who initiated the contact; (3) the existence or nonexistence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent communicated to the defendant); (4) subjective views, beliefs or intent the police manifested to the defendant to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave; (5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the extent the 3

officer's response would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave; (6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive it); (7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings; (8) the number of law enforcement officers present; (9) of a degree of physical restraint placed upon a subject; and (10) the duration and character of the interrogation.

After reviewing the video tape and considering the facts presented at the hearing

in the context of the factors set out above, the court finds and concludes that the

defendant was not in custody necessitating the police advising the defendant of her

Miranda rights. In considering factors 4 and 5 above, it is clear that the police indicated

to the defendant that she was free to leave. As a matter of fact, she did leave following

one interview and returned on her own several hours later to meet with another police

officer. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the defendant did not believe

that she had the right to leave since she did leave voluntarily and did return on her own

hours later.

There was also no physical restraint as set out in factor 9 above. Furthermore, the

duration and character of the interrogation as explained in factor 10 above weighs in

favor of a finding that the defendant was not in custody. The interviews were of short

duration and they were not coercive in any respect.

The countervailing factors which weigh in favor of custody are that the location

of the interrogation was in the police department, which is certainly not familiar

surroundings to the defendant. However, this is not as significant a factor as it might be

since the defendant transported herself to the police department on her own for both

interviews. During the first interview, there was only one police officer and there were

two police officers present during the second interview. The defendant was certainly

the focus of the investigation and the police officers had probable cause to arrest her

based on the information they had regarding her participation in a felony. 4

After considering these factors mentioned above, the court finds and concludes

that the defendant was not in custody and therefore the circumstances did not

necessitate the law enforcement officers advising the defendant of her Miranda.

Voluntariness

There is no evidence indicating that there was any coercion or threats made to

the defendant necessitating a finding that the statements were involuntary. The taped

interview speaks for itself and, therefore, the court finds and concludes that the

defendant's motion to suppress should be denied.

The entry will be:

Defendant's motion to suppress is DENIED.

Dated: August IJ 2008 I

Attorney for the State of Maine

William Savage Assistant Attorney general 6 State House Station Augusta, ME 04333-0006

Attorney for the Defendant

C. Courtney Michalec 103 Park Street Lewiston, ME 04243-7206 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT vs KENNEBEC, ss. MICHELLE MARIE OLDS Docket No AUGSC-CR-2008-00080 150 BIRCHWOOD DRIVE SABATTUS ME 04280 DOCKET RECORD

DOB: 04/29/1965 Attorney: WILLIAM COTE State's Attorney: WILLIAM SAVAGE LASKOFF & ASSOCIATES 103 PARK ST PO BOX 7206 LEWISTON ME 04243-7206 RETAINED 02/07/2008

Filing Document: INDICTMENT Major Case Type: FELONY (CLASS A,B,C) Filing Date: 01/30/2008

Charge(s)

1 AGGRAVATED FURNISHING OF SCHEDULED DRUGS 01/20/2007 WINTHROP Seq 9391 17-A 110S-C(1) (K) Class B

Docket Events:

01/30/2008 FILING DOCUMENT - INDICTMENT FILED ON 01/30/2008

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