State of Maine v. O'Connell

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: December 11, 2017
• Docket: CUMcr-17-3831
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET CUMBERLAND, ss. PORTLAND Docket No. CR-17-3831

STATE OF MAINE ) ) ) V. ) ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S ) MOTION TO SUPPRESS ) SEAN O'CONNELL ) ) Defendant )

Defendant's Motion to Suppress came before the court for hearing on December 7, 2017. Defendant, Sean O'Connell, was present with his lawyer, Attorney Adam Sherman. Assistant District Attorney Carlos Diaz appeared on behalf of the State. The court heard testimony from Maine State Trooper Patrick Flanagan and viewed a video recording of Defendant's questioning by Trooper Flanagan in chambers after the hearing concluded. Defendant contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without having been provided the required Miranda warnings, and that accordingly the statements he made to Trooper Flanagan should be suppressed. "In order for the statements made prior to a Miranda warning to be admissible, the State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statements were made while the person was not in custody, or was not subject to interrogation." State v Bridges, 2003, ME 103, 829 A.2d 247, 254. The appropriate analysis for this determination is set forth in State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ,i 23, 928 A.2d 746, in which the Law Court explained:

A person not subject to formal arrest may be "in custody" if a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the defendant would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave or if there was a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. This test is an objective one, and we have stated in analyzing whether a defendant is in custody, a court may consider the following factors:

1) the locale where the defendant made the statements; 2) the party who initiated the contact; 3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the_ e~t.~°'L, .. -, '.'·._e,._, ~- .... -· .'

2 violence incident, Trooper Flanagan's cellphone rang. After taking the call (Trooper Flanagan testified that he spoke with State Trooper Burke, who reported that according to the complainant Defendant had pointed the firearm in an aggressive manner), Trooper Flanagan handcuffed Defendant and placed him in the Trooper's vehicle. On the drive to the jail, Defendant continued explaining what had happened on the highway while Trooper Flanagan remained silent. Upon arrival at the jail, Trooper Flanagan for the first time read Defendant his Miranda rights. Applying the factors set forth by the Law Court for assessing whether Defendant was "in custody" at the time Trooper Flanagan questioned him, the court finds as follows: Defendant made the statements at his place of business. Although Trooper Flanagan initiated the contact, the questioning was not coercive in character. Defendant was asked to "come on down" from the landing dock, and was told, "we're going to sit tight for a couple minutes" but was never told that he could not leave, nor did he express any interest in leaving. Rather, he conversed with Trooper Flanagan while leaning against the loading dock with his ankles crossed. His supervisor was present during much of the questioning. Two Portland police officers were present as well, but they did not participate in the questioning. Defense counsel suggested from Trooper Flanagan's testimony that the officers were there to "guard Defendant", but the officers were not captured by the camera lens, indicating that they were some distance away. Officer Flanagan, moreover, is heard telling them, "you guys can head out if you want, it's up to you" and "you guys don't have to stick around if you don't want." Although once in handcuffs Defendant was "in custody," no further interrogation took place. Violation of Miranda occurs when an individual is subjected to custodial interrogation without having been apprised of his or her constitutional rights. Here, suppression is not warranted because both elements were not present at the same time: At the time Defendant was interrogated by Trooper Flanagan, he was not in custody, and once in custody, he was not interrogated. Accordingly, based on the evidence adduced at hearing, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

DATED: /I /Ju- I 7 rench Un' 1ed Criminal Court Judge