STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT PENOBSCOT, SS. CRIMINAL ACTION DOCKET NO CR-09-35 ,.', .. ( . I : t~
STATE OF MAINE, FILED & ENTERED v. ORDER SUPFRlnR r,nIJRT TRAVISJ. NADEAU, JUL 1 0 2009
PENOBSCOT COUNTY
Hearing was held on the defendant's motion to suppress on May 28, 2009. The
State was represented by counsel, Greg Campbell, Esq., while the defendant was
present and represented by counsel, Michael Harmon, Esq. The primary issues raised in
this motion are the stop of defendant's motor vehicle and probable cause for arrest and
test.
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on November 29,2009, Officer Cox of the Millinocket
Police Department received a call from an off-duty officer indicating that the officer had
just seen Travis Nadeau and described the direction in which the Nadeau vehicle was
traveling. The officers had been trying to serve Nadeau with a SUbpoena because he
was a witness in a criminal case and they suspected that he had been trying to avoid
service. Officer Cox then noticed a person who he recognized as Travis Nadeau
operating his truck on Central St., approaching the officer. After the truck passed,
Officer Cox turned left and reversed his direction by going around one block and re
entering Central St. at which time he no longer saw the truck. He proceeded .2 to .3
miles on Central and as he approached Aroostook St. he noticed that the truck had
turned left onto that street and was approximately 100 yards away. The speed limit on
the relevant streets was 25 m.p.h. and Officer Cox testified that even though he could
not see the truck after his tum, he concluded that the driver of the truck had been exceeding the speed limit because he had accelerated after passing the officer on Central
St. and had made more progress than he thought likely if he had been traveling at 25
m.p.h. Officer Cox turned left on Aroostook and saw the truck turn right on Spruce St.
He testified that by visual observation he estimated the truck's speed to be 35 m.p.h.
and he also turned right onto Spruce. He then activated his blue lights as he went
through the next intersection whereupon the truck made two right turns, coming to a
complete stop at a stop sign while making the first turn, and stopped. To reach Mr.
Nadeau's home, one would have to continue to travel down Spruce St in the direction
both vehicles were traveling.
After stopping the defendant, officer Cox made observations and conducted field
sobriety tests that caused him to conclude that the defendant was under the influence.
When he told Mr. Nadeau that he was placing him under arrest for operating under the
influence, Mr. Nadeau struggled and resisted being handcuffed. Despite the officer's
use of the taser, Mr. Nadeau broke free and ran away. After about three hours, the
defendant came to the police station to surrender to the police and was taken into
custody. At that time he apologized, answered a few questions, and took a blood
alcohol test. Officer Cox testified at hearing that he still thought Mr. Nadeau was under
the influence but less so after surrender than previously. He also stated that Mr.
Nadeau was not drastically impaired, but was impaired to some extent.
Officer Cox testified that he was originally going to observe where the truck
went so that he could serve the subpoena, but specified excessive speed as a reason for
the stop. He said that the truck "might have made it to 30 m.p.h." and was concerned
that "he might run on me". The truck traveled for three blocks after Office Cox turned
on his blue lights. During his initial description of following the truck, Officer Cox
testified that he put his blue lights on to get through an intersection. During cross examination Officer Cox indicated that if Mr. Nadeau didn't go home, he would have
stopped him, admitted that he didn't mention in his police report that the truck was
traveling at 35 m.p.h., but only mentioned excessive rate of speed, and admitted that he
testified at a prior administrative suspension hearing that he stopped the defendant to
serve the subpoena.
An officer is justified in making an investigatory stop if, at the time of the stop,
the officer has an articu1ab1e suspicion of criminal activity and the suspicion is
objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. State v. Lear, 1998 ME 27315,
722 A.2d 1266. The officer must have actually entertained a suspicion and the court
must determine whether it was in fact reasonable. Not only does a reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity justify an investigatory stop, but also a
reasonable articulab1e suspicion of a civil violation can justify a stop, State v. Webber,
2000 ME 168, 759 A.2d 724; certain safety stops are permissible, State v. Pinkham, 565
A.2d 318 (Me. 1989); and certain organized roadblock stops are also permitted, State v.
D'Angelo,605 A.2d 68 (Me. 1994).
Based on the preceding facts, the court finds that in fact Officer Cox stopped the
defendant to serve the subpoena. He was concerned that Mr. Nadeau had been
avoiding the subpoena and wanted to serve it prior to the trial in which Mr. Nadeau
was to testify. Furthermore, he interpreted the series of turns that defendant made as a
present attempt to avoid service, even though a route to defendant's home involved
continued travel on Spruce St. The court does not find that the officer stopped Mr.
Nadeau for speeding because any excessive speed was minor and the officer had a
limited opportunity to estimate the defendant's speed. He didn't mention a specific
speed in his police report and had testified at an earlier license suspension proceeding
that he stopped Mr. Nadeau in order to serve the subpoena. The State also argues that even if officer Cox were not entitled to stop the
defendant for the reason existing at the time he turned on his blue lights, he had an
independent reason for stopping the defendant once the blue lights were turned on
because the defendant did not stop immediately. See Lear, supra.at W. Evidence of this
justification is sparse. After the officer turned on his blue lights, Mr. Nadeau traveled a
short distance of at most three blocks, traveled at a reasonable speed, and even came to
a complete stop at a stop sign before making his initial right turn. Furthermore, Officer
Cox did not use his siren. The court does not find that it is objectively reasonable to stop
a motorist for failure to stop under these circumstances.
The issue concerning this stop, therefore, is whether a police officer is entitled to
make a vehicle stop in order to serve a subpoena. The court has examined the case law
concerning the circumstances that can justify an investigatory stop and can find no
precedent that justifies a stop performed in order to serve a subpoena, nor does such a
stop fall under any of the traditional criteria. The State argues that this is a proper police
function and under the circumstances of this case, thatinclude the officer's subjective
belief that Mr. Nadeau had been avoiding the subpoena, it was reasonable to make the
stop. The court notes that according to M.R.Crim.P. 17, service of a subpoena is not
exclusively a police function because certain non-police officers can also make service.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT PENOBSCOT, SS. CRIMINAL ACTION DOCKET NO CR-09-35 ,.', .. ( . I : t~
STATE OF MAINE, FILED & ENTERED v. ORDER SUPFRlnR r,nIJRT TRAVISJ. NADEAU, JUL 1 0 2009
PENOBSCOT COUNTY
Hearing was held on the defendant's motion to suppress on May 28, 2009. The
State was represented by counsel, Greg Campbell, Esq., while the defendant was
present and represented by counsel, Michael Harmon, Esq. The primary issues raised in
this motion are the stop of defendant's motor vehicle and probable cause for arrest and
test.
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on November 29,2009, Officer Cox of the Millinocket
Police Department received a call from an off-duty officer indicating that the officer had
just seen Travis Nadeau and described the direction in which the Nadeau vehicle was
traveling. The officers had been trying to serve Nadeau with a SUbpoena because he
was a witness in a criminal case and they suspected that he had been trying to avoid
service. Officer Cox then noticed a person who he recognized as Travis Nadeau
operating his truck on Central St., approaching the officer. After the truck passed,
Officer Cox turned left and reversed his direction by going around one block and re
entering Central St. at which time he no longer saw the truck. He proceeded .2 to .3
miles on Central and as he approached Aroostook St. he noticed that the truck had
turned left onto that street and was approximately 100 yards away. The speed limit on
the relevant streets was 25 m.p.h. and Officer Cox testified that even though he could
not see the truck after his tum, he concluded that the driver of the truck had been exceeding the speed limit because he had accelerated after passing the officer on Central
St. and had made more progress than he thought likely if he had been traveling at 25
m.p.h. Officer Cox turned left on Aroostook and saw the truck turn right on Spruce St.
He testified that by visual observation he estimated the truck's speed to be 35 m.p.h.
and he also turned right onto Spruce. He then activated his blue lights as he went
through the next intersection whereupon the truck made two right turns, coming to a
complete stop at a stop sign while making the first turn, and stopped. To reach Mr.
Nadeau's home, one would have to continue to travel down Spruce St in the direction
both vehicles were traveling.
After stopping the defendant, officer Cox made observations and conducted field
sobriety tests that caused him to conclude that the defendant was under the influence.
When he told Mr. Nadeau that he was placing him under arrest for operating under the
influence, Mr. Nadeau struggled and resisted being handcuffed. Despite the officer's
use of the taser, Mr. Nadeau broke free and ran away. After about three hours, the
defendant came to the police station to surrender to the police and was taken into
custody. At that time he apologized, answered a few questions, and took a blood
alcohol test. Officer Cox testified at hearing that he still thought Mr. Nadeau was under
the influence but less so after surrender than previously. He also stated that Mr.
Nadeau was not drastically impaired, but was impaired to some extent.
Officer Cox testified that he was originally going to observe where the truck
went so that he could serve the subpoena, but specified excessive speed as a reason for
the stop. He said that the truck "might have made it to 30 m.p.h." and was concerned
that "he might run on me". The truck traveled for three blocks after Office Cox turned
on his blue lights. During his initial description of following the truck, Officer Cox
testified that he put his blue lights on to get through an intersection. During cross examination Officer Cox indicated that if Mr. Nadeau didn't go home, he would have
stopped him, admitted that he didn't mention in his police report that the truck was
traveling at 35 m.p.h., but only mentioned excessive rate of speed, and admitted that he
testified at a prior administrative suspension hearing that he stopped the defendant to
serve the subpoena.
An officer is justified in making an investigatory stop if, at the time of the stop,
the officer has an articu1ab1e suspicion of criminal activity and the suspicion is
objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. State v. Lear, 1998 ME 27315,
722 A.2d 1266. The officer must have actually entertained a suspicion and the court
must determine whether it was in fact reasonable. Not only does a reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity justify an investigatory stop, but also a
reasonable articulab1e suspicion of a civil violation can justify a stop, State v. Webber,
2000 ME 168, 759 A.2d 724; certain safety stops are permissible, State v. Pinkham, 565
A.2d 318 (Me. 1989); and certain organized roadblock stops are also permitted, State v.
D'Angelo,605 A.2d 68 (Me. 1994).
Based on the preceding facts, the court finds that in fact Officer Cox stopped the
defendant to serve the subpoena. He was concerned that Mr. Nadeau had been
avoiding the subpoena and wanted to serve it prior to the trial in which Mr. Nadeau
was to testify. Furthermore, he interpreted the series of turns that defendant made as a
present attempt to avoid service, even though a route to defendant's home involved
continued travel on Spruce St. The court does not find that the officer stopped Mr.
Nadeau for speeding because any excessive speed was minor and the officer had a
limited opportunity to estimate the defendant's speed. He didn't mention a specific
speed in his police report and had testified at an earlier license suspension proceeding
that he stopped Mr. Nadeau in order to serve the subpoena. The State also argues that even if officer Cox were not entitled to stop the
defendant for the reason existing at the time he turned on his blue lights, he had an
independent reason for stopping the defendant once the blue lights were turned on
because the defendant did not stop immediately. See Lear, supra.at W. Evidence of this
justification is sparse. After the officer turned on his blue lights, Mr. Nadeau traveled a
short distance of at most three blocks, traveled at a reasonable speed, and even came to
a complete stop at a stop sign before making his initial right turn. Furthermore, Officer
Cox did not use his siren. The court does not find that it is objectively reasonable to stop
a motorist for failure to stop under these circumstances.
The issue concerning this stop, therefore, is whether a police officer is entitled to
make a vehicle stop in order to serve a subpoena. The court has examined the case law
concerning the circumstances that can justify an investigatory stop and can find no
precedent that justifies a stop performed in order to serve a subpoena, nor does such a
stop fall under any of the traditional criteria. The State argues that this is a proper police
function and under the circumstances of this case, thatinclude the officer's subjective
belief that Mr. Nadeau had been avoiding the subpoena, it was reasonable to make the
stop. The court notes that according to M.R.Crim.P. 17, service of a subpoena is not
exclusively a police function because certain non-police officers can also make service.
Office Cox should have waited until the defendant stopped on his own before
attempting to serve the subpoena. Based on this analysis, the court grants the motion to
suppress with regard to the stop of defendant's vehicle and suppresses evidence
obtained after the stop, including observations, statements and field sobriety tests.
The question of the admissibility of the test result needs to be addressed
separately because of the intervening event, escaping, that took place between the time
of the stop and the taking of the test. Evidence must be excluded only if it has been obtained by exploitation of an illegality rather than by means sufficiently
distinguishable so as to purged by the primary taint. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.s.
471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441 (1963), State v. Grandmaison, 327 A.2d 868, 870 (Me.
1974). In this case the intervening event resulted in the defendant's voluntary surrender
at the police station three hours after the stop and submission to a blood alcohol test.
This court finds that this was a sufficiently intervening event to cause the test to be free
of the taint of the stop, but it is admissible only if there was probable cause to believe
the defendant was under the influence without considering evidence obtained directly
as a result of the stop. At the time Officer Cox administered the blood alcohol test, he
had observed the defendant driving a motor vehicle prior to the stop, but he testified to
no additional observations after the surrender concerning Mr. Nadeau's sobriety. He
did not testify to any specific observations made at the time of the surrender relevant to
sobriety, but only indicated an opinion that was not supported by specifics. Based on
this lack of evidence apart from information obtained directly as a result of the illegal
stop, the court concludes that the administration of the test was not supported by
probable cause and suppresses the test result.
Because the actions that constitute the escape are a sufficient intervening event,
nothing in the order should be regarded as affecting the admissibility of testimony, with
regard to the escape charge, concerning the arrest and subsequent absconding of the
defendant, which is not suppressed.
The clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference.
Dated: JULY 10, 2009 L/"-tio'¥--'--~"""""-='<---==--