State of Maine v. Morris

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: April 11, 2022
• Docket: CUMcv-21-3334
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET CUMBERLAND, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-21-03334

) STATE OF MAINE ) ) ) v. ) ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION ) TO SUPPRESS JEROME MORRJS ) ) Defendant ) ) ) )

Before the Com1 is Defendant Jerome Monis's ("Morris") Motion to Suppress

Statements and Evidence. For the reasons set forth herein, Morris's Motion is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Based on the testimony provided and exhibits admitted at hearing, as well as the parties'

filings in this case to date, the Comt finds that the following facts are supp01ted by the record:

In late June of 2021, the Maine Dmg Enforcement Agency ("MDEA") obtained

information that an individual who went by the street moniker "Ice" was traveling to Maine with,

and distributing - or "trapping" - illicit drugs. 1 This information was provided by a

confidential informant ("CI"), identified as CI 5638 by MDEA Agent Warren ("Wanen") at

hearing. The CI described Ice as being from the New York or Connecticut area, thirty seven

years old, clean shaven, clean cut, heavy set, and likely to be in possession of a backpack or

another, smaller, luggage transportation device. CI 5638 also informed Warren that Ice often

1"Trapping" is a term often used by law enforcement and other individuals directly involved in the drug trade that describes the process of selling and distributing contraband. traveled to Maine by bus and stayed at either 53 Briarwood Avenue or 61 Ridgeland Avenue

while in the State. Both homes are located in South Portland and known to police as being

associated with frequent drug activity. Based on the Cl's description oflce, and his known

association with the Briarwood and Ridgeland residences, MDEA identified a potential match

for Ice named Eliot Sibley. Sibley was later ruled out after a photo of him was shown to the CI

for corroboration.

On August 10th, 2021, the CI informed Warren that Ice may be traveling to Maine that

day. The CI was not able to confirm this information and, as such, no surveillance or interdiction

efforts were made by Warren or MDEA agents on that day". On August 13th, 2021, the CI again

informed Warren that Ice would be traveling to Maine. The CI did notgive an exact time for

Ice's arrival as he often traveled to Maine with little or no notice.

Beginning at approximately 5:30 pm on August 13th, MDEA Agent Warren and fellow

agent Matthew Morrison ("Morrison"), along with Portland regional MDEA task force assignees

Sergeant Calloway and Officer Demchak, began smveillance of the Portland Transportation

Center ("PTC"). 2 The PTC is a Portland based hub for Concord Coach Lines and the Amtrak

train. Agent Morrison was positioned closer to the PTC building and had a direct view inside

where he could see the exit/arrival terminals for both Concord Coach Lines and the Amtrak.

Agent Warren was positioned further away from the building itself but still had a line of sight

into the PTC.

Over the next five or so hours, Agents Warren and Morrison surveilled the PTC in search

of Ice. At one point, CI 563 8 joined Warren in his own vehicle with the goal of positively

identifying Ice were he to arrive at and exit the PTC. The CI joined the surveillance effort for

2At some point, the exact timing of which could not be ascertained from testimony at hearing, the surveillance team also contacted K-9 Officer Andrew Flynn of the Scarborough Police Department to gauge his and his K-9, Tucker's, availability to conduct a sniff-search if needed.

2 about two hours but ultimately left without identifying Ice. Around 10:40 pm, the last bus of the

day entered PTC and a man roughly matching Ice's description, wearing a backpack, a ballcap,

and a face mask lowered beneath his chin, exited the Concord Coach Lines an-ival terminal.

Agent Morrison first identified the man as a potential match and alerted Agent Wan-en, as well

as Officers Calloway and Demchak.

The man then exited the PTC and engaged one of two taxi drivers waiting for a fare. The

m.an did not enter the first taxi he engaged, but did enter the second, a minivan located directly

behind. The cab then exited the PTC, taking a right off PTC's access road, onto the Fore River

Parkway. Law enforcement followed the taxi closely with Agent Warren directly behind the cab

in an unmarked vehicle. Officers Calloway and Demchak were behind Warren in an unmarked

cruiser equipped with blue lights and other traditional features. Agent Morrison was delayed in

exiting the PTC and thus tailed the taxi from multiple car lengths behind.

The taxi turned right onto the Fore River Parkway and immediately merged onto

Interstate 295 ("I-295") traveling southbound, toward South Portland- the location ofboth the

Briarwood and Ridgeland addresses. The taxi traveled approximately two miles on I-295 to exit

three, where it departed the highway and .turned left on Westbrook Street in South Portland.

Before exiting 1-295, Agent Warren noticed and reported that one of the rear registration lamps

was out, in violation of29-A M.R.S. § 1909.

After turning left on Westbrook Street, the vehicle made a right on Broadway Street, a

main throughway in South Portland that offered access to the Country Gardens neighborhood,

the location of 53 Briarwood Avenue. The taxi then turned left onto Sokokis Street, moving

closer to the known trap house. Multiple officers reported at hearing that the taxi driver failed to

signal this tum in violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 2071(2).

3 .\ Pursuant to the instruction of Agent Warren and others in pursuit, Officers Calloway and

Demchak initiated a traffic stop immediately after the car turned onto Sokokis Street. The taxi

complied with the Officers' instruction and pulled to the right side of the roadway. Sergeant

Calloway approached and engaged the driver while Officer Demchak spoke with the man police

suspected to be Ice in the rear passenger seat. Sergeant Calloway obtained the necessary

information and documents from the driver and proceeded with the traffic stop.

Officer Demchak obtained a New York Driver's license from the passenger that

identified him as Jerome Morris, the Defendant here. As Officer Demchak spoke with Monis,

Morrison approached the rear passenger side window of the taxi and stood behind Officer

Demchak. As he did this, Officer WaiTen dialed a phone number he received from the CI that

supposedly belonged to a phone in Ice's possession. As Warren dialed the number, Mo1Tison

heard a phone in Morris's possession ring.

Morrison then asked Morris to step out of the vehicle and detained him, telling him he

was not free to leave. The law enforcement agents on scene then contacted Scarborough Police

Officer Andrew Flynn who was on duty with his drug detection K-9, Tucker. Within minutes,

Officer Flynn and Tucker aiTived on scene and, with the consent of the taxi driver, initiated a K­

9 sniff of the vehicle. 3 Tucker began at the rear of the vehicle and moved past the open, rear

passenger side door, where Officer Flynn observed a snap of Tucker's head consistent with his

identification of a scent of interest. Tucker then entered the vehicle through that open door and

alerted on the backpack appearing to be the one Morris had been wearing when he entered the

taxi.

3At hearing, Agent Warren estimated that nine minutes elapsed from the moment the traffic stop was initiated to the moment Officer Flynn and his K-9 Tucker anived to conduct a search of the vehicle. The exhibits corroborate this estimation.

4 After Tucker's indication on the backpack, Morrison searched the item, identifying and

removing multiple bags which contained white substances later confirmed to be cocaine,

rnethamphetamine, and fentanyl. Morris was then arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and

subsequently made statements that Morris contends are incriminating in nature.

After his arrest, Mo1Tis was charged with five counts, including Aggravated Trafficking

of Scheduled Drugs (Cocaine), Class A; Aggravated Trafficking of Scheduled Drugs (Fentanyl),

Class A; Aggravated Illegal Importation of Schedule W Drngs (Cocaine), Class A; Illegal

Importation of Scheduled Drugs (Fentanyl), Class B; and Criminal Forfeiture. On November 4th,

2021, Moni.s was indicted on these five counts, as well as two additional counts of Unlawful

Possession of Scheduled Dmgs, Class C (Cocaine and Fentanyl).

On February 2nd, 2022, Morris filed the instant Motion to Suppress seeking to suppress

the stop of the taxi, the subsequent search of the backpack and any incriminating statements

made that are fruit of the alleged unlawful conduct. A hearing was held on the Motion in the

Cumberland County Superior Court on March 21st, 2022.

DISCUSSION

In his Motion, Morris asks this court to suppress the initial stop of the taxi, as well as all

evidence gained from that supposed unlawful stop. To do this, he alleges that the traffic stop was

not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, that, in the event it was, such stop was

extended longer than was necessary to complete its mission in violation of Rodriguez v. United

States, and that the ultimate ~earch of the backpack which produced incriminating physical

evidence was not supported by probable cause.

I. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion for Traffic Stop

5 Morris's first argument for suppression of the traffic stop initiated by Sergeant Calloway

and Officer Demchak was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, the threshold level

needed to initiate such a stop under both the United States and Maine Constitutions

"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the

Maine Constitution protect motorists from being unreasonably stopped by police." State v.

LaForge, 2012 ME 65, ,i 8, 43 A.3d 961. For a traffic stop to be constitutional, "a police officer

must have an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that either criminal conduct, a civil

violation, or a threat to public safety has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur." State v.

Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, iJ 11, 814 A.2d 984.

"Reasonable articulable suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a

preponderance of the evidence." State v. Porter, 2008 ME 175, ,i 8, 776 A.2d 1223. The only

requirement that the Law Court has imposed on reasonable articulable suspicion is that such

suspicion be more than speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch. State v. Burgess, 2001 ME 117,

iJ 8, 776 A.2d 1223. Here, this Court finds that there was reasonable articulable suspicion that c1iminal

conduct had occmred, was occurring, or was about to occur. A review of officer testimony at

hearing and the stipulated exhibits support that the following facts infmm the objective analysis:

a CI who has assisted with investigations in the past and gone through the MDEA's vetting

process, reported that an individual who uses the street moniker "Ice" was traveling to Maine by

bus, for the purpose of distributing drugs. The CI.reported that Ice was a heavy set, clean cut and

clean shaven black male, approximately thirty seven years in age. The CI also reported that,

when in Maine, Ice stayed at- and ''trapped" out of- one of two residences that are known to

6 be part of the same dmg distribution network: 61 Ridgeland Avenue and 53 Briarwood A venue,

both located in South Portland.

At approximately 10:40 pm, on August 13th, ·2021, after receiving a tip from the same CI

that Ice was traveling to Maine and would be carrying a backpack or other smaller storage

device, a black male roughly matching the Cl's description oflce disembarked an inbound

Concord Coach Lines bus and exited the terminal. He engaged one taxi driver, declining to dde .

with him or her, and entered a second taxi located immediately behind the first. 4 The taxi exited

the bus station and turned onto the interstate headed in the direction of South Portland, the town

where 53 Briarwood Avenue and 61 Ridgeland Avenue are located. The taxi pulled off the

interstate in South Portland. Police followed the vehicle until it turned into the neighborhood

that included the 53 Bria1wood Avenue location and was stopped about two blocks from that

address.

Morris's appearance and activity once disembarking the Concord Coach Lines bus

sufficiently corroborated the Cl's tip that Ice would be traveling to Maine with the intent to

distribute dmgs. Taken altogether, this information, from the viewpoint of an objectively

reasonable officer, constitutes more than an unsubstantiated hunch. Therefore, this court

concludes that Sergeant Calloway and Officer Demchack's stop of the taxi Morris was traveling

in was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. 5

II. Rodriguez Violation

4 In isolation, the decision not to ride with one taxi would not indicate much. However, experienced criminal investigators testified at hearing that in their experience, such a "shopping" of taxis was indicative of drug activity. 5 As noted, there was also testimony that two civil traffic violations occurred which independently supported the

surveillance team's decision to stop the cab. Because the officers had sufficiently reasonable and articulable suspicion of trafficking to stop the vehicle based on information provided by the CI and another source of information. And because they confirmed by the apparent destination of the taxi, the court does not reach the traffic violations.

7 Since the stop was supported by articulable suspicion, Morris next argues that the traffic

stop continued longer than was necessary to complete the mission of the stop in violation of the

U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348,357 (2015).

In Rodriguez, the Court held that, absent reasonable mticulable suspicion to prolong a

traffic stop longer than necessary to complete the stop's purpose, the stop must terminate. Id.

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's traffic stop includes "ordinary

inquiries incident to the traffic stop." Id. at 357. Although an officer "may conduct ce1tain

um-elated checks during an othe1wise lawful traffic stop ... he may not do so in a way that

prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an

individual." Id. at 355. Ordinarily, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer's

traffic mission. Id.

Here, the stop was suppmted by reasonable articulable suspicion of dmg activity. The

stop was not overly burdensome given the nature of the suspicion. Furthermore,

in addition to what was known at the time of the stop, two more pieces of information became

known which bolstered officer suspicion. First, Morris told Officer Demchak that his address

was 61 Ridgeland Road, the other known, dmg-associated address in the suspected distribution

network. Second, approximately five minutes into the stop, mere moments after Officer

Calloway called the driver's infmmation in to dispatch for a records check, Agent Warren called

the phone number associated with Ice and a phone in Morris's possession rang.

Accordingly, objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity existed to

prolong the stop. There was no Rodriguez violation.

I. Search of Backpack

8 Morris's third argument for suppression is that law enforcement lacked the probable

cause needed to search the backpack M01Tis was wearing when he arrived, located inside the

taxicab on the rear driver's side passenger seat.

Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Me. Const. art. I,§ 5,

a warrantless search is generally umeasonable unless it was conducted pursuant to a recognized

exception to the wanant requirement. State v. Melvin, 2008 ME 118, 16,955 A.2d 245. One

such exception to the wanant requirement applies to automobiles whom law enforcement have

probable cause to believe possess contraband. See Carrollv. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149

(1975); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809-10, (1982). If the search and seizure without a

warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of

circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that

which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. Carroll, 267

U.S. at 149. A search of a vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment's protections against

umeasonable search and seizure "if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a wanant,

even though a wanant has not actually been obtained." Ross, 456 U.S. at 809. A lawful search of

a fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be

found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required

to complete the search. Id. at 821.

In this context, "probable cause exists where facts and circumstances within the

knowledge of the officers and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information would

wanant a prudent and cautious person" to believe that the vehicle subject to search contains

contraband. See State v. Lagasse, 2016 ME 158, ,r 13, 149 A.3d 1153. It includes the collective

information known to the police and is not limited to the personal knowledge of the arresting

9 officer, State v, Carr, 1997 ME 221, ,i 7, 704 A2d 353, and is an objective standard. State v.

Enggass, 571 A2d 823, 825 (Me. 1990).

When a dog sniff is involved in the police's investigation, "the question~ similar to

every inqui1y into probable cause - is whether all the facts surrounding the dog's alett, viewed

through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search

would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime,'' Florida v, Harris, 568 U.S, 23 7, 248 (2013 ).

"A sniff is up to snuff when it meets that test." Id.

In this case, the Court finds that the collective infotmation known to law enforcement at

the time they decided to search the automobile for drngs - and the backpack within it ­

supports a finding of probable cause. At the time law enforcement decided to search the vehicle

and the backpack, they had all the knowledge which infonned their stop of the vehicle. They also

had a statement from Morris that he lived at 61 Ridgeland Avenue, a residence far from the taxi's

location and an address known to be involved in drug distribution. They also were able to

identify one of the phones in Monis's possession as a match to the number for Ice provided by

the CI. Finally, they had an ale1t on the backpack by Tucker, a ce1tified drug detection K-9. All

of this information, taken together, would cause a reasonable and prudent person to believe that

the automobile contained conh·aband, Thus, the wanantless search of the automobile and the

backpack contained therein, was suppmted by probable cause and was not violative of Morris's

Fourth Amendment rights.

CONCLUSION

The traffic stop of the taxi Mon-is was riding in was supported by reasonable articulable

suspicion of criminal activity, This suspicion, bolstered by the ringing of a phone in Morris's

possession when a number associated with Ice was called and Morris's recitation of a known trap

10 house as his Maine address, also supported prolonging the traffic stop for the purposes of a dog

sniff. The indication of that dog on a backpack located within the taxi, combined with all other

knowledge known to officers at the time, constituted sufficient probable cause to search the

automobile for contraband. Jerome Morris's Motion to Suppress is Denied.

Dated: v/// / /L, L. Thomas R. McKean Justice, Maine Superior Comi