State of Maine v. Michael D. Figueroa

2016 ME 133, 146 A.3d 427, 2016 Me. LEXIS 142

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: August 16, 2016
• Status: Published

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2016 ME 133 Docket: Som-15-589 Argued: June 10, 2016 Decided: August 16, 2016

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

MICHAEL D. FIGUEROA

JABAR, J.

[¶1] Michael D. Figueroa appeals from a judgment of conviction of

unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(A)

(2015), entered in the Unified Criminal Docket (Somerset County, Mullen, J.)

after the denial of his suppression motion and upon his conditional guilty plea.

Figueroa contends that, because law enforcement did not specifically advise

him before a custodial interrogation that he had the right to the presence of

counsel during questioning, his statements during the interrogation must be

suppressed. Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree. Here, where

Figueroa was already represented by counsel who consented to the

interrogation in his absence, where Figueroa himself initiated the

interrogation by telling jail personnel that he wanted to talk with the officer 2

who later conducted the interrogation, and where Figueroa was clearly

advised before the commencement of the interrogation that he had the right

to counsel, we conclude that Figueroa was adequately advised of his

constitutional rights and that he effectively waived the privilege against

self-incrimination, rendering his statements admissible against him at trial.

We therefore affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the suppression court’s

decision, the motion record supports the following facts. See State v. Ntim,

2013 ME 80, ¶ 2, 76 A.3d 370. On April 7, 2015, Figueroa was arrested and

charged by uniform summons and complaint with aggravated trafficking in

scheduled drugs (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(H) (2015). After his

arrest, Figueroa was transported to the Somerset County jail, where he

received Miranda warnings1 and invoked his right to counsel. The record does

not illuminate what the Miranda warnings consisted of when they were

delivered on this occasion.

[¶3] Figueroa was indicted on April 30 on charges of aggravated

trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(H), the

1 We refer throughout this opinion to the constitutional safeguards established by the United

States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3

Class B trafficking charge of which he was later convicted, and unlawful

possession of scheduled drugs (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(B)(1)

(2014).2 On April 15, 2015, counsel was appointed to represent Figueroa.

[¶4] While in custody, Figueroa told jail personnel on multiple

occasions that he wanted to speak with Maine Drug Enforcement Agent Kelly

Hooper. When jail personnel relayed this information to Agent Hooper, she

contacted the prosecutor, who offered to reach out to Figueroa’s counsel and

advise him of Figueroa’s wishes. Figueroa’s attorney called Agent Hooper and

stated that although he could not be present during the time that Agent

Hooper proposed to meet with Figueroa, he did not object to the interview as

long as it was recorded. This conversation between Figueroa’s counsel and

Agent Hooper occurred about one week before the officer went to the jail and

interviewed Figueroa.

[¶5] On May 1, 2015, at 2:27 p.m., Agent Hooper met with Figueroa at

the jail without any others present. Agent Hooper began an audio recording

and then delivered the following Miranda warnings without using a Miranda

card or asking Figueroa to complete a written waiver form.

The statute has since been amended. See P.L. 2015, ch. 308, § 2 (effective Oct. 15, 2

2015). 4

[¶6] “Mike,” she stated, “you know you have a right to remain silent.”

“Yes,” Figueroa affirmed. Agent Hooper continued, “Anything you say can and

will be used against you in a court of law. You have a right to an attorney. If

you can’t afford one, one will be furnished to you through the courts, which in

fact you do have an attorney and [your attorney], um, has told me it’s okay to

talk with you. You requested to talk with me.” “Yes, ma’am,” Figueroa replied.

Agent Hooper stated, “If you don’t want to answer questions at any point,

stop. If you change your mind, umm . . . .” “I have nothing to hide, Kelly,”

Figueroa replied.

[¶7] Agent Hooper did not expressly inform Figueroa that he had a

right for counsel to be present during the interview.

[¶8] In the course of the interview, Agent Hooper asked questions

about the crimes that Figueroa had been charged with, and Figueroa made

incriminating statements. The tenor of the interview was congenial, and

Figueroa referred to Agent Hooper by her first name. The interview was not

lengthy. Agent Hooper employed no deceptive practices, and she did not

promise to provide Figueroa with any assistance.

[¶9] On August 24, 2015, Figueroa filed a motion to suppress the

statements that he had made to Agent Hooper on May 1, 2015. The court held 5

a hearing on the motion on November 3, 2015, during which it heard

testimony from Agent Hooper and admitted in evidence an audio recording of

the May 1 interview. On November 24, 2015, the court entered an order

denying Figueroa’s motion, concluding that although the Miranda warnings

provided were far from perfect, they were sufficient to intelligibly convey the

substance of Figueroa’s constitutional rights. The court also concluded that

Figueroa’s conduct during the interview demonstrated “an intentional

relinquishment or abandonment of known rights” that was “voluntary in the

sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice.” (Quotation

marks omitted.)

[¶10] On November 30, 2015, Figueroa entered a conditional guilty

plea to the Class B trafficking charge pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(a)(2),

reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.3 The court

then entered a judgment of conviction on the plea, sentencing Figueroa to ten

years’ incarceration with all but thirty months suspended followed by a term

of three years’ probation, and ordering him to pay a $400 fine. Figueroa

timely appealed to us. See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(A).

3 The State dismissed the remaining charges pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 48(a). 6

II. DISCUSSION

[¶11] Figueroa contends that Agent Hooper’s incomplete recital of the

Miranda warnings did not sufficiently communicate the substance of his right

against compulsory self-incrimination. He maintains that the warning that he

received was fatally defective because it only advised him of his right to

counsel generally, and entirely omitted any reference to his right to have

counsel present during the interview. He also insists that the infirmity of

Agent Hooper’s Miranda warning invalidated his waiver by depriving him of a

full awareness of the nature of the right that he abandoned.

[¶12] When a defendant challenges the denial of a suppression motion

on the basis of an alleged Miranda violation, we review the suppression

court’s factual findings for clear error, and review de novo whether the

defendant received sufficient Miranda warnings, and whether the defendant

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the rights protected by

Miranda. See State v. Lockhart, 2003 ME 108, ¶ 21, 830 A.2d 433; State v.

Marden, 673 A.2d 1304, 1309 (Me. 1996). Here, because the suppression

court’s findings are uncontested, and because the State has not challenged the

suppression court’s determination that Figueroa was subjected to custodial 7

interrogation, we consider only the adequacy of Agent Hooper’s Miranda

warnings and the validity of Figueroa’s Miranda waiver.

[¶13] In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States

Supreme Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege against

self-incrimination is jeopardized by the compelling pressures inherent in

custodial interrogation. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35

(2000) (discussing Miranda). “To give force to the Constitution’s protection

against compelled self-incrimination, the Court established in Miranda certain

procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their

rights . . . before commencing custodial interrogation.” Florida v. Powell,

559 U.S. 50, 59 (2010) (quotation marks omitted). The Powell court reiterated

Miranda’s requirements that a suspect must be warned

(1) that he has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, (3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Id. at 59-60 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶14] To protect the rights that the warnings describe, Miranda also

established an exclusionary rule, conditioning the admissibility of a suspect’s

statement during custodial interrogation upon proof that the defendant 8

validly waived the privilege against self-incrimination after delivery of the

foregoing warnings. 384 U.S. at 476. “The warnings required and the waiver

necessary . . . are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to

the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.” Id. (emphasis

added). Thus, in order to demonstrate the admissibility of a suspect’s

statements during custodial interrogation, the State bears the burden of

proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) law enforcement

officers properly delivered Miranda warnings to the suspect before

commencing the interrogation, and (2) the suspect knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily waived the privilege protected by the warnings. Marden,

673 A.2d at 1308-09.

[¶15] “The prophylactic Miranda warnings are not themselves rights

protected by the Constitution but are instead measures to insure that the right

against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.” Duckworth v. Eagan,

492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).

For this reason, the rigidity of the Miranda doctrine does not extend to “the

precise formulation of the warnings” or otherwise require a “talismanic

incantation.” California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981). The safeguard of

the prescribed warnings may be satisfied by a “fully effective equivalent.” Id. at 9

360 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476). “In determining whether police

officers adequately conveyed the four warnings, . . . reviewing courts are not

required to examine the words employed as if construing a will or defining the

terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably

convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda.” Powell, 559 U.S. at 60

(alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).

[¶16] In State v. Ayers, we held that

[a]lthough some courts have required, strictly, that a person in custody be informed specifically of his right to the presence of an attorney during questioning, we regard as better reasoned those cases holding that Miranda . . . is directed to insuring that the substance of the constitutional rights of a person in custody be intelligibly conveyed to him.

433 A.2d 356, 365 (Me. 1981) (citations omitted). In Ayers, where the suspect

was clearly advised that he had the right to have an attorney present before

questioning began, and the officer asked whether the suspect would be willing

to talk without having an attorney present, we concluded that the suspect had

been adequately informed of the rights protected by Miranda. Id.

[¶17] Here, Figueroa was warned, in unqualified language, that he had

“a right to an attorney.” He was advised that the courts would furnish him an

attorney if he could not afford counsel, and was expressly reminded that he

did have an attorney. He was also advised that his attorney had consented to 10

the interview, which was about to occur in the attorney’s absence. Nothing in

the words used indicated that the right to counsel would be restricted after

the questioning commenced. Rather, when viewed in the context of the

surrounding circumstances, the warnings communicated an unqualified right

to counsel, which could have been invoked by Figueroa at any time. Cf. 2

Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6(a) (3d ed. 2007) (stating that

when a defendant in custody and the defendant’s attorney “actually arranged

for an interrogation session to occur,” that circumstance “may have some

bearing on the need for Miranda warnings”). Under the circumstances of the

interrogation—which Figueroa initiated and to which court-appointed

counsel consented—we conclude that Agent Hooper’s warnings regarding the

right to counsel adequately and effectively apprised Figueroa that he had the

right to the presence of counsel during questioning.

[¶18] Furthermore, the court did not err in finding that Figueroa

understood the substance of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the evidence

demonstrates that Figueroa effectively waived those rights by agreeing to

speak with Agent Hooper after she advised him of his right to remain silent,

his right to counsel, and the possible use of his statements. Figueroa was

specifically warned that the State would use his statements against him, and 11

was thereby advised of the consequences of his decision to speak with the

officer. “This is the ultimate adverse consequence [Figueroa] could have

suffered by virtue of his choice to make uncounseled admissions to the

authorities.” Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 293-94 (1988). We therefore

conclude that Figueroa knowingly and voluntarily spoke with Agent Hooper

after he was advised of his Miranda rights in a manner sufficient to protect

him from the “‘compelling pressures’ inherent in custodial police

interrogation,” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467),

and we affirm the denial of Figueroa’s motion to suppress.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

On the briefs:

Jeremy Pratt, Esq., and Ellen Simmons, Esq., Camden, for appellant Michael D. Figueroa

Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Joelle S. Pratt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Office of the District Attorney, Skowhegan, for appellee State of Maine 12

At oral argument:

Jeremy Pratt, Esq., for appellant Michael D. Figueroa

Joelle S. Pratt, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee State of Maine

Somerset County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2015-422 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY