State of Maine v. Lamont

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: November 2, 2021
• Docket: CUMcr-21-1921
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAlNE SUPERlOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVlLACTlON DOCKET NO.CR-21-01921

STATE OF MAINE, ) ) ) ) ORDER V. ) ) HANEEF LAMONT, ) ) DEFENDANT, ) )

Before the Court is the Defendant, 1-laneef Lamont's ("Lamont"), Motion to Dismiss the

one count indictment against him and the State's Motion to Amend the Complaint. For the

reasons set forth herein, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED and the State's Motion to

Amend count l of the superseding complaint is GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Hanccf Lamont ("Lamont") is charged with Aggravated Trafficking in Scheduled Drugs,

Class A, 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(l )(0). The following facts of the case arc assumed as true for

the purposes of the instant Motion and are taken directly from Lamont's Motion and the State's

reply. See State v. Collin, 1997 ME 6, 116, 687 A.2d 962(holding that territorial jurisdiction

should be decided by the jmy when there is a question of fact as to where the alleged criminal

conduct occurred, but can be decided by the court when the determination docs not require the

resolution of a fact1Ial dispute).

Lamont's indictment and arrest was the result of a criminal investigation conducted by

the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency (MDEA) into drug trafficking activity in the Brunswick area. That investigation led to the arrest of Orville Dawkins, a large-scale trafficker of cocaine.

Dawkins was charged with Aggravated Trafficking in Scheduled Drugs, Class A, and as part of

the resolution of his case, agreed to cooperate with the MDEA.

Dawkins' cooperation involved the identification of his supplier, Haneef Lamont, the

Defendant here. Dawkins told investigators that he had been purchasing cocaine from Lamont

for a period of approximately two years. Hawkins told MDEJ\ agents that, on two occasions, he

drove to New York City to purchase product from Lamont and that, on all other occasions, he

met Lamont in the parking lot of a Wal matt located in Sturbridge, Massachusetts. The last of

these transactions took place in New York City on December 28th, 2020, when Dawkins

purchased twenty four ounces of cocaine from Lamont for $30,000.

After getting Dawkins to cooperate, MDEA was able to build a case against Lamont

which led to his indictment and eventual arrest by the United States Marshals Service in New

York. The evidence against Lamont includes a positive identification of Lamont by Hawkins, a

series of text message communications between Hawkins and Lamont, EZ pass records from

Dawkins' vehicle, and cell phone location records from Lamont's phone. MDEA, through

Dawkins cooperation, also attempted to arrange a transaction bct\vcen Lamont and Dawkins in 1

which Lamont would travel to Maine and supply cocaine to Dawkins. This effort produced

multiple recorded phone calls which contained conversation between Lamont and Dawkins that

was consistent with arranging a drug transaction. MDEA's attempts were ultimately unsuccessful

and investigators proceeded to obtain an affcst warrant for Lamont based on the information they

had.

2 At no time during the course of the investigation into Lamont, nor during Lamont's

relationship with Dawkins, did he ever set foot in the State of Maine. In their respective filings,

and again at hearing, the parties stipulated to this fact.

On September 24th, 2021, Attorney Timothy Zerillo entered his appearance as counsel of

record for Lamont and on September 30th, 2021, he filed the instant Motion to Dismiss based on

Jack of jurisdiction. The State properly filed its reply on October 19th, and a hearing was held on

October 21st, at which the parties presented their respective arguments. After hearing, this Court

issued an order granting the State leave to file an amended complaint charging criminal

conspiracy and giving both parties until November I st, 2021, to further brief the jurisdictional

issues before the Court. On November I st, both Lamont and the State filed further briefing, and

the State filed an additional Motion to amend count l of the superseding complaint. The parties

then were heard on their further briefing at a second hearing on November 2nd. Against this

procedural and factual backdrop, the Court now renders this decision.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Amend Complaint

The State, along with their brief supporting their legal position on 17-A M.R.S. §

7(1)(C)'s applicability, filed a Motion to amend count I of the original complaint. The State

contends that this amendment is necessary to properly put the issue of accomplice liability before

this Court, fitting the complaint within the confines of 17-A M.R.S. § 7( I )(A). The Court hereby

grants the State's Motion to Amend count I of the complaint but, as discussed inji-a at 3, the

Court notes that Section 7( I )(A) does not confer jurisdiction over Lamont.

II. Motion to Dismiss

3 The issue raised by Lamont's Motion to Dismiss is whether this Court may properly

exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Lamont.

The jurisdiction of Maine's trial courts is exclusively statutory in nature. Ginn v.

Penobscot Co., 342 A.2d 270,274 (Me. 1975). It is elementary law that a state's statutes have no

extra territorial force, nor do its courts have any jurisdiction of offenses committed in other states

or foreign countries. State v. Baldwin, 305 A.2d 555, 559 (Mc. 1973). The existence of territorial

jurisdiction of the court over the defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 17-A

M.R.S. § 7(5).

A Maine trial court's "[t]erritorial" criminal jurisdiction is limited to the seven bases for

which 17-A M.R.S. § 7(1) provides. The three specific bases placed in issue here arc:

I. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person may be convicted under the laws of this State for any crime committed by the person's own conduct or by the conduct of another for which the person is legally accountable only if:

A. Either the conduct that is an element of the crime or the result that is such an clement occurs within this State or has a territorial relationship to this State;

B. Conduct occurring outside this State constitutes an attempt to commit a crime under the laws of this State and the intent is that the crime take place within this State; [or]

C. Conduct occurring outside this State would constitute a criminal conspiracy under the laws of this State, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within this State or has a territorial relationship to this State, and the object of the conspiracy is that a crime take place within this State;

17-A M.R.S. § 7(1 )(A)-(C).

The Defense argues that jurisdiction is improper under 17-A M.R.S. § 7(1)(A) and that

no alternative theory of liability such as accomplice liability, attempt, or conspiracy alters this

outcome. The State argues that either subsection (A), (B) or (C) of 17-A M.R.S. § 7( l)

sufficiently provides a basis for the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction. Because each subsection

4 is argued as an independent basis for jurisdiction by the State, the Court separately addresses the

applicability of subsections (A), (B) and (C) below.

A. Exercise of Jurisdiction Pursuant to 17-A 1\1.R.S. § 7(1)(A)

First, the State argues that Section 7( 1)(A) provides a basis for jurisdiction because under

17-A M.R.S. § 57(3)(A) Lamont is an accomplice to Dawkins' crimes in the State of Maine. The

Defense argues that the applicability of Section 7( 1)(A) is governed by State v. Slaboda, 2020

ME 103,237 A.3d 848, and that none of the scenarios which allow Section 7(l)(A) to confer

jurisdiction are present here.

Maine's accomplice liability statute provides that a person is an accomplice of another in

the commission of a crime if "with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the

crime, the person solicits such other person ... aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid such other

person in the commission of a crime." 17-A M.R.S. § 57(3)(A). The State contends that the

accomplice liability statute allows the Court to exercise jurisdiction under Section 7( 1)(A)

because when that section is read in conjunction with the accomplice liability statute, it covers

Lamont's extraterritorial conduct. This Court disagrees.

In Sloboda, the Law Court laid out four scenarios where Section 7(l)(A) may confer

jurisdiction upon the trial court: (I) When the conduct that is an element ofa crime has a

territorial relationship to Maine; (2) When the result that is an element of the crime has a

territorial relationship to Maine; (3) When the conduct that is an element of a crime occurred in

Maine; or (4) When the result that is an element of the crime occurred in Maine. Slaboda, 2020

ME I 03, 1[ 6, 237 AJd 848.

In the instant case, neither scenario one nor scenario two is applicable because the

conduct which led to charges against Lamont indisputably occurred outside the State of Maine.

s See Id. ("territorial relationship jurisdiction exists only when it is impossible to determine where

the conduct occurred in relation to the state boundary line.") Scenario three also fails to confer

jurisdiction for the same reason, leaving the State with one possible jurisdictional hook under

Section 7( 1)(A).

Scenario four, however, is also not applicable here because the crime that Lamont is

charged with, Aggravated Trafficking of Scheduled Drugs, Class A, contains no result clement.

A person is guilty of aggravated trafficking of cocaine if the person: (l) intentionally or

knowingly (2) trafficks in (3) what the person knows or believes to be a scheduled drug, (4)

which in fact is a scheduled drug, and (5) the drug is ... cocaine in a quantity of 112 grams or

more or cocaine in the form of cocaine base in a quantity of 32 grams or more. 17­

A M.R.S. § J 105-A(D).

The crime charged contains a mens rea, a conduct element, and three separate attendant

circumstances, but no result element. Accordingly, scenario four proffered by the Law Court in

Srare v. S/ohoda docs not allow this Court to exercise jurisdiction over Lamont either. Therefore,

jurisdiction is not proper pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 7( 1)(A).

B. Exercise of Jurisdiction Pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 7(1)(13)

Next, the State argues that this Court can exercise jurisdiction over Lamont pursuant to

Section 7(1 )(B) which allows the Court to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction if "Conduct

occurring outside this State constitutes an attempt to commit a crime under the laws of this State

and the intent is that the crime take place within this State." (emphasis added). The State argues

that the criminal attempt statute, when read in conjunction with Section 7(l)(B) covers Lamont's

extraterritorial conduct. The Defense counters that the facts currently before the Court plainly do

not constitute an attempt rendering Section 7(l)(B) inapplicable.

6 17-A M.R.S. § 152( 1) provides "A person is guilty of criminal attempt if, acting with the

kind of culpability required for the commission of the crime, and with the intent to cornplctc the

conunission of the crime, the person engages in conduct that in fact constitutes a substantial step

toward its commission." Crirninal Attempt docs not need to be separately charged, a charge of

the commission of a crirnc is deerncd to charge the attempt to eomrnit that crirne. 17-A M.R.S. §

152(3-A).

Thus, the inquiry for jurisdictional purposes is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt,

Lamont's conduct outside the State of Maine constitutes an atternpt to eomrnit a crime under

Maine's Laws and whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, Lamont had the intent that the crime take

place within the State.

Herc, there is no assertion from either the Defense or the State that Larnont did not

engage in the trafficking of cocaine. Based on the facts alleged, on multiple occasions, twice in

New York, and all other times in Massachusetts, Lamont, in fact, engaged in conduct constituting

the crime of aggravated trafficking. While an attempt to commit a crime is deerncd charged when

the underlying offense is brought, it may not be used as a jurisdictional hook when, as here, there

is no dispute that the Defendant committed the charged offense. If Section 7( 1)(13) did confer

jurisdiction here, it would offer the State an opportunity to circumvent Section 7( l )(A) whenever

the facts do not fit within that subsection's pararnctcrs. Atternpt, by definition, covers conduct

which stops short of cornrnission. Accordingly 17-A M.R.S. § 7(1 )(B) does not confer

jurisdiction over Lamont in this instance.

C. Exercise of Jurisdiction Pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 7(1)(C)

Lastly, the State alleges that this court can exercise jurisdiction over Lamont pursuant to

Section 7(1 )(C). Lamont argues that Section 7( l )(C) also fails to grant jurisdiction because no

7 "overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy" was taken by Lamont, in Maine, and because the

State cannot show that the object of the conspiratorial relationship between Lamont and Dawkins

was that cocaine be trafficked within Maine.

Section 7( l )(C) provides that Maine's trial cou11s may exercise their extraterritorial

jurisdiction when "conduct occurring outside this State would constitute a criminal conspiracy

under the laws of this State, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within this State

or has a territorial relationship to this State, and the object of the conspiracy is that a crime take

place within this State." Thus, in order for the State to carry its burden and this court to have

jurisdiction pursuant to this subsection, it must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (I) the

alleged conduct between Lamont and Dawkins constitutes a criminal conspiracy, (2) an overt act

in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy occurred in Maine, and (3) the object of the conspiracy

was that a crime take place within Maine.

Addressing first the existence of a criminal conspiracy, the Court turns to 17-A M.R.S.

M.R.S. § 151(1). A person is guilty ofa criminal conspiracy if, "with the intent that conduct be

performed that in fact would constitute a crime or crimes, the actor agrees with one or more

others to engage in or cause the performance of the conduct and the most serious crime that is the

object of the conspiracy is ... [aJ class A crime. 17-A M.R.S. § 151 (1 )(B). A person may not be

convicted of criminal conspiracy unless it is alleged and proved that the actor, or one with whom

the actor conspired, took a substantial step toward commission of the crime. 17-A M.R.S. §

151 (4 ). A substantial step is any conduct which, under the circumstances in which it occurs, is

strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor's intent to complete commission of the crime;

provided that speech alone may not constitute a substantial step. Id.

8 Here, Lamont and Hawkins' alleged conduct constitutes a conspiracy. The case against

each includes phone calls, other communications, and testimony from one of the conspirators

evidencing an intent to traffic cocaine. The evidence also sho\:vs an agreement between tbe two

to engage in trafficking and that Lamont took a substantial step towards the commission of the

crime of trafficking. On multiple occasions, Lamont agreed to and did deliver cocaine to

Dawkins. He also facilitated multiple transactions in which cash from Dawkins was exchanged

for cocaine. This delivery and facilitation is corroborative of the firmness of Lamont's intent to

complete the crime of aggravated trafficking.

Next, the Court needs to consider whether an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy

took place in Maine. The Defense contends that, in order for jurisdiction to be proper, that overt

act had to be done by Lamont, within Maine. This Court disagrees.

17-A M.R.S. § 7(1) allows a Maine trial court to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over

a criminally accused person when the charged crime is a result ofa "person's own conduct" or

"the conduct of another for which the person is legally accountable". As discussed supra, the

uncontested facts support the existence of a criminal conspiracy to traffic cocaine between

Lamont and Dawkins. Since all persons who engage in a conspiracy arc legally responsible for

the foreseeable criminal conduct of their fellow conspirators, Section 7( l )(C) may establish

jurisdiction over Lamont based on Dawkins' conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 73 F.3d

826,833 (8th Cir. 1996)("[AJ defendant may be held accountable for the criminal activities of

other co-conspirators which "fall within the scope of criminal activity [he] agreed to jointly

undertake, 11 including !!other drug transactions 11 which 1'arc part of the same course of conduct or

scheme."); United States v. Bingham, 81 l'.3d 617,727 (6th Cir. 1996)("[0]ne co-conspirator is

responsible for the conduct of another co-conspirator if that conduct was reasonably foreseeable

9 to him in furtherance of the execution of jointly undertaken criminal activity.") United States v.

Mothersi/1, 87 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 1996)("[ eJach party to a continuing conspiracy may be

vicariously liable for substantive criminal offenses committed by a co-conspirator during the

course and in the furtherance of the conspiracy, notvvithstanding the party's non-participation in

the offenses or lack of knowledge thereof.").

I-laving established that 17-A M.R.S. § 7(l)(C) may apply to Lamont based on Dawkins'

conduct, the question then becomes whether any of Dawkins conduct within the State of Maine

constitutes an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

An overt act, is an act that, in the eyes of the actor, is "adapted or suitable for the purpose

and must have reached far enough toward the accomplishment of the desired result that in the

ordinary and likely course of things, given the contemporaneous intent to [further the

conspiracy], the perpetrator would be in a direct, unequivocal movement toward [accomplishing

the conspiracy's object.]" State v. Powers, 386 A.2d 72 l, 726 (Mc. l 978).

In the instant case, Dawkins conducted a number of Maine based overt acts in furtherance

of the conspiracy to traffic cocaine. He had multiple conversations with Lamont from Maine

about obtaining product to distribute within the state, he obtained and carried cocaine across state

lines into Maine, and while within the state's borders he, in fact, sold and distributed cocaine.

Each of these acts were adapted and suitable for accomplishing the desired result of the

conspiracy and were taken with the intent to accomplish the conspiracy's object.

Lastly, the State must prove that the "object of the conspiracy was that a crime take place

in Maine." Lamont, in his brief, proffers a factual scenario which he says would more squarely

fit within Section 7( l )(C)'s parameters. Specifically, he constructs a fictional conversation

between two alleged conspirators who expressly agree to sell drugs "up in Maine." The Court

10 agrees that were such evidence of a conversation available, Section 7( 1)(C) would allow the

Court to exercise its jurisdiction over Lamont. However, the Court disagrees that this is the only

scenario where it could be found that the "object of the conspiracy" was to traffic cocaine in

Maine.

In the instant case, Lamont knew that Dawkins resided in Maine and that Dawkins was

traveling from Maine to Sturbridge or New York to buy cocaine from him. Lamont also knew

that Dawkins was returning to Maine, selling the product he distributed, and then returning for

more once that lot was depicted. There arc also recordings of conversations between Lamont and

Dawkins, in which Dawkins asks Lamont to come to Maine to distribute cocaine. Although

Lamont never agreed to engage in this controlled buy within Maine's borders, what inference

was Lamont to draw from Dawkins' request other than that Dawkins lived-and trafficked

drugs-in Maine. The Court is not convinced that Lamont did not know that the product he was

selling to Dawkins was sold in Maine. The facts, as alleged, establish beyond a reasonable doubt

that the object of the conspiratorial relationship between Dawkins and Lamont was to traffic

cocaine within Maine.

Accordingly, the State has met its burden, and has established jurisdiction over Lamont

pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 7( I )(C).

CONCLUSION

The State's Motion to amend count l of its complaint against 1-laneef Lamont is Granted.

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss due to a lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is denied.

Jurisdiction is improper pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § (1 )(A) and (B) but is proper pursuant to

Section 7(l)(C). This Court, therefore, may exercise its extraterritorial jurisdiction over Lamont.

11 Dated: