State of Maine v. Johnson

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedMarch 3, 2003
DocketKENcr-02-274
StatusUnpublished

This text of State of Maine v. Johnson (State of Maine v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Maine v. Johnson, (Me. Super. Ct. 2003).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE

fyunod °° “ay SUPERIOR COURT os, CIVIL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. — gyno™ es 9 DOCKET NO. CR-02-274 Coz §0 aw Te We es J? De

STATE OF MAINE upieisact WAU N

v. qais 3 gos ORDER ON MOTIONS ALPHONSO JOHNSON, DONALD L- GAFISRECHI

Defendant MAR 12 2003

This matter is before the court on two motions by the defendant, both filed October 1, 2002. In his “motion to suppress statements, admissions, confession,” the defendant challenges the right of the State to use statements made by him given “with promises of leniency” (motion) to police officers in an interview of July 8, 2002. In the second “motion to suppress stop, arrest, search, seizure and derivative evidence,” defendant challenges the lawfulness of the stop of his vehicle on July 7, 2002, with attendant arrest, search and seizure.

At the hearing on the motions an Augusta police officer testified that while traveling southerly on Route 27 a number of yards northerly of the Irving Truck Stop near the Interstate 95 exit, he met an oncoming vehicle detected by his radar speed indicator traveling at 61 m.p-h. in the 35 m.p.h. zone. Affecting a U-turn, the officer pursued the vehicle stopping it in the vicinity of an entrance to an industrial plant site approximately three-quarters of a mile distant from the clock. The officer approached the vehicle and saw the operator, an African-American male, with a young Caucasian female passenger. Upon acquisition of the driver’s identification and communications with a data site, the officer determined that the operator of the vehicle, the defendant, was the subject of a warrant for arrest out of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

After calling for and receiving backup, the officer affected an arrest of the defendant on the warrant and placed him in his cruiser in restraint. The passenger was detained and placed in the cruiser of the backup police officer. The officers then proceeded to conduct a search of the passenger compartment of the motor vehicle incident to the arrest. The arresting officer proceeded to examine the driver’s side of the front portion of defendant’s vehicle while the backup officer searched the passenger side. After finding no contraband, in accordance with standard practice of the Augusta Police Department, the officers swapped areas of search. During the examination of the driver’s compartment, the backup officer noted an area near the accelerator pedal that appeared to be disturbed. This is a part of the lower trim of the Saturn sedan known as an “extension.” It is a plastic panel that covers the center console area under the dashboard.

The defendant’s vehicle is a 1996 SLZ four-door Saturn. The two front seats are divided in the middle by a console running from an area between the seats to the dashboard. In front of the console and underneath the dashboard is an area containing wires and other equipment servicing the dashboard. The front area is covered on both sides by a plastic panel known as an “extension”. Both of these extension panels are held in place by plastic tabs which fit into holes or grooves attached to the console at the rear side, but are attached at the front side with Velcro strips on a brace and on the extension. To open these panels, one simply needs to grasp the forward edge of the panel and release the Velcro causing the panel to swing on its tabs and become detached. On the passenger side, the panel has a particular finger hole inasmuch as the panel covers the fuse box and therefore it is reasonable to assume that any operator of the vehicle wishing to replace a fuse would have easy access to do so. The panel on the driver’s side does not have such a finger hole but the attachment mechanism is

essentially the same. While there was no evidence of any item of equipment behind the

2 driver’s side panel that would cause an operator to routinely access the area, it is clear that it is a simple matter for a person occupying the driver's seat to lean forward, place his or her hand within a few inches of the accelerator pedal, grasp the forward edge of the panel and pull, easily removing it for access to the area.

Indicating that the driver’s side panel appeared to have been disturbed, the backup officer did reach to the forward edge of the panel and remove it. Immediately thereafter he reached into the space provided and took possession of the contraband which gives rise to the indictment of the defendant for aggravating trafficking in scheduled drugs (class A).

The first issue is the lawfulness of the stop. Notwithstanding the testimony of the Augusta Police Officer, the defendant and his passenger testified that they came off Interstate 95 having driven nonstop from Manchester, New Hampshire. The exit ramp would have taken them under the Interstate and a few hundred yards north when, they testified, they made a left-hand turn into the Irving Truck Stop where they purchased supplies and something to eat. They say they then took their drinks in paper cups with them as they left the truck stop and proceeded to its entrance to Route 27. Both witnesses indicated there was very little traffic but they observed the Augusta Police cruiser proceeded southerly on Route 27. They say the cruiser stopped and blinked its lights indicating permission for the defendant to proceed out of the Irving Truck Stop and make a left-hand turn northerly onto Route 27. The defendant says that as he made the turn and gestured to the police officer in thanks for allowing him to proceed, they made eye contact. He says the officer immediately made a U-turn and stopped the defendant's vehicle within seconds of the eye contact. The conclusion the defendant wishes the court to make from these circumstances is that the officer immediately

recognized an African-American operating a motor vehicle with out-of-state plates and

3 with a young Caucasian female, somewhat late at night giving rise to an inappropriate stop based upon those circumstances rather than appropriate and lawful articulable suspicion that an unlawful act might be taking place.

Obviously, if the defendant was exiting the Irving Truck Stop, he could not have reached a speed of 61 m.p.h. between the truck stop entrance and the entrance to the business park only a couple hundred yards away. This would suggest that the testimony by the police officer that the vehicle was stopped for probable cause of speeding is a falsehood and further, that it was a pretextual stop of a vehicle based upon a racial profile.

Utilizing those methods of assessing credibility that are routinely provided to juries when they are the trier of fact, the court concludes that the officer’s testimony 1s more credible than that of the defendant and his passenger notwithstanding the assertion by the defendant that the presence in the stopped vehicle of drink containers identified with the food vendor at the Irving Truck Stop would corroborate their testimony. In the absence of any other evidence to even the slightest degree that the officer deliberately stopped this vehicle for racial reasons, the court finds no basis to question the ability of the officer to observe, his experience in law enforcement, the knowledge of the area, and his motivation to tell the truth as compared to the clear and present interest of the defendant in his own best self-interest.’

Having decided, then, that the stop was lawful, the court must then examine the

search. It is undisputed that the defendant was wanted by the Haverhill,

1 The court has to make a decision based upon credibility. It is not incredible that a Maine police officer would stop a vehicle late at night with an adult minority as operator of a vehicle with out-of-state plates and carrying a minor Caucasian female. If this were the sole ground for the stop, it clearly would be unlawtul.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Chimel v. California
395 U.S. 752 (Supreme Court, 1969)
New York v. Belton
453 U.S. 454 (Supreme Court, 1981)
United States v. Michael Patterson
65 F.3d 68 (Seventh Circuit, 1995)
State v. Ireland
1998 ME 35 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
State v. Johnson
2005 ME 46 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
State of Maine v. Johnson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-maine-v-johnson-mesuperct-2003.