MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 77 Docket: Kno-24-164 Argued: May 8, 2025 Decided: August 19, 2025
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
HASAHN A. CARTER
CONNORS, J.
[¶1] Hasahn A. Carter appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered by
the trial court (Knox County, Hjelm, A.R.J.) following a four-day jury trial, for
robbery, elevated aggravated assault, kidnapping, burglary, theft by
unauthorized taking, criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon,
aggravated criminal trespass, cruelty to animals, and criminal mischief. Carter
contends that the suppression court (Billings, J.) erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence gathered from his cellphone. Carter further argues that the
trial court (Hjelm, A.R.J.) abused its discretion by denying his motion under
Maine Rule of Unified Criminal Procedure 17A(f) to subpoena privileged or
documentary evidence from a nonparty. We disagree and affirm the judgment. 2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s order
on the motion to suppress, see State v. Bailey, 2010 ME 15, ¶ 3, 989 A.2d 716,
and to the jury’s verdict, see State v. Rancourt, 435 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Me. 1981),
the record supports the following facts.
[¶3] The victims (husband, wife, son, and family dog) lived in Hope,
Maine, where the husband and wife owned and operated a medicinal marijuana
cultivation business on their property.1 On October 12, 2020, the victims were
at home watching television together in the parents’ second-floor bedroom,
where they eventually fell asleep. Struggling to sleep with everyone in the same
room, the father eventually moved to another bedroom in the home.
[¶4] Around 2:00 a.m., the mother awoke to a crashing sound. She
looked down the stairs to the first floor, where she saw a man with a mask
pointing a gun at her, saying, “We are the cops, you are drug dealers.” She
turned into her room, closed the door behind her, and told the intruder to leave
her house. The man ran up the stairs and kicked in her door. More men
followed up the stairs, but they went down the hallway out of the mother’s
1 We use the term “victim” to describe each family member who was present at the time of the
home invasion but note that the term may also include another immediate family member when—as is the case here—the underlying crime causes serious physical trauma or serious financial loss. See 17-A M.R.S. § 2101(2)(B)(1) (2025). 3
sight. She saw a total of four intruders during the home invasion; one of them
had a gun, and another carried a taser.
[¶5] The father awoke to his wife screaming and went to the door of the
bedroom where he was sleeping. When he opened the door, two masked men
were standing there. One of them was holding a gun in the father’s face. The
man with the gun pistol-whipped the father in the head. The men stripped the
father of what clothing he had on and zip-tied his hands and feet. They
proceeded to beat the father, breaking his orbital bone and sinuses.
[¶6] The masked man guarding the wife and son eventually brought
them into the room where the intruders were holding the father—who was
zip-tied and bleeding from the head. The intruders demanded eighty thousand
dollars before continuing to beat the father and electrocute him with the taser.
[¶7] Eventually, the intruders moved the victims to another room and
set a timer on one of their phones, telling the family that bad things would
happen if they did not have the money when the timer went off.
[¶8] Three of the intruders left to go to the shop where the parents ran
their marijuana cultivation business. After the three left, the man who stayed
guarding the family told the son to get the sheet off the bed to cover his father.
The father had a lot of blood on his hands from his head injury and was able to 4
slide his hands out of the zip ties but was unable to free his legs. The man led
the family to the parents’ bedroom, and in the process, the son retrieved
scissors from his mother’s office and gave them to his father. The father then
cut the zip ties that were binding his feet.
[¶9] Once the father was free from his restraints, he grabbed the man
holding them at gunpoint and pushed him down the stairs. As the man fell, he
grabbed the son, and they both fell to the landing below. The father jumped
down the flight of stairs and broke his foot when he landed. He then tackled the
man who had grabbed onto the son, and the two struggled on the landing before
the intruder ran away. The father yelled to his wife to call 9-1-1 and grab his
gun.
[¶10] The family then moved to a stairwell where they could lock the
doors while they were on the phone with the 9-1-1 dispatcher and waited for
law enforcement to arrive. At some point, the family heard a recurring alarm
from a phone that they located in the stairway where the father had struggled
with one of the intruders.2
2Although it is not clear when, at some point during the invasion, the intruders tased the family dog. The father removed a taser dart from the dog and gave it to the first responding officer. 5
[¶11] After law enforcement arrived and secured the area, the family
spoke with the responding officer and handed over the phone they found, which
the officer then locked in his police cruiser.
[¶12] The officer then canvased the area around the home and
discovered a black surgical mask. He did not touch the mask at that time
because a canine was coming to track and needed an article from which to get
a scent.
[¶13] The Knox County Sheriff’s Department on-call detective also
responded to the scene. The detective took possession of the cellphone found
in the stairway and eventually collected the black surgical mask that the officer
discovered near the house. The detective saw that the phone was low on
battery, so he plugged it into the power source in his cruiser and locked the
vehicle before eventually turning it over to a second detective the day after the
home invasion.
[¶14] Shortly after receiving the phone, the second detective activated
the emergency call button on the home screen without accessing the phone
through its passcode. He then called 9-1-1 and spoke to the dispatcher, who
gave him the associated phone number. The detective entered the number into
an online search and determined that it was associated with Verizon. He then 6
sent a preservation letter to Verizon and applied for a search warrant to search
the contents of the phone, which was granted. The search warrant and its
supporting affidavit did not include any information gathered through the
emergency call function.
[¶15] The detective received help searching the phone from an analyst
at the Androscoggin County Sheriff’s Office. The analyst utilized software called
GrayKey to bypass the phone’s passcode and extract data from the device. He
then focused his examination on data generated around the time of the offenses
and discovered that a “police scanner” app and a “police light” app were
downloaded the day before the home invasion. Further examination of the
phone uncovered the associated phone number and established Carter as a
suspect. The detective filed an inventory of the search with the court on
October 22, 2020. On October 26, 2020, the detective applied for and was
granted a second warrant to search the Verizon records and location data
associated with the phone, which showed that the device had traveled from
Brockton, Massachusetts, to Hope, Maine.3
[¶16] Based on the information he had gathered, the detective applied
for and was granted an arrest warrant. Local authorities arrested Carter in
This second warrant was not entered in evidence during the suppression hearing or otherwise 3
made part of the record on appeal. 7
Brockton, Massachusetts, and he was returned to Maine. The detective
received a court order to take a DNA sample from Carter, which was sent to the
state lab for comparison with a sample taken from the black surgical mask; the
two samples were a match.4
[¶17] In June 2022, a grand jury indicted Carter on the following eleven
counts: (1) robbery (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 651(1)(E) (2025); (2) robbery
(Class B), id. § 651(1)(A); (3) elevated aggravated assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 208-B(1)(A) (2025); (4) kidnapping (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 301(1)(B)(1)
(2025); (5) burglary (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(B)(1) (2025); (6) theft by
unauthorized taking (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(B)(1) (2025); (7) criminal
threatening with a dangerous weapon (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. §§ 209(1),
1604(5)(A) (2025); (8) terrorizing with a dangerous weapon (Class C), 17-A
M.R.S. §§ 210(1)(A),5 1604(5)(A) (2023); (9) aggravated criminal trespass
(Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 402-A(1)(A) (2025); (10) cruelty to animals (Class D),
4The DNA analyst from the state forensic laboratory testified that there was a random match probability of less than one in thirty-six billion.
5 Title 17-A M.R.S § 210 has since been amended to address the constitutional issues raised by Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023). See P.L. 2023, ch. 519, § 1 (effective Mar. 6, 2024) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 210 (2025)). As discussed below, the trial court dismissed Count 8 without objection from the State because, as charged, it was unconstitutional according to the Counterman decision. See infra ¶ 20. 8
17 M.R.S. § 1031(1)(D) (2025); (11) criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 806(1)(A) (2025).
[¶18] In October 2022, Carter filed a motion under M.R.U. Crim. P. 17A(f)
to subpoena privileged or documentary evidence from a nonparty. The court
(Hjelm, A.R.J.) denied that motion without a hearing because it was facially
insufficient under the Rule’s requirements. The defendant renewed that
motion in January 2023, and the court held a hearing at the end of April. The
renewed motion sought documents from the victims, including business
records covering a roughly seven-month period ending with the alleged offense
date concerning the names of people from outside Maine who purchased
marijuana from the victims, copies of their driver’s licenses or other
identification documents, the nature and dates of the transactions, the amount
of money involved in the transactions, and the amount of any balance owed by
the victims to those people. The court denied the renewed motion in limine in
early May of that year.
[¶19] In June 2023, Carter filed a motion to suppress the evidence
gathered from his cellphone. The suppression court (Billings, J.) held a hearing
on the motion in July 2023. The court made limited factual findings, which
included that the cellphone in question was found on a stairway in the home 9
where the alleged crimes occurred, that the cellphone was password protected,
and that around thirty hours after the phone was found, a detective activated
the phone’s emergency function from the phone’s lock screen to dial 9-1-1 and
obtained the phone’s number. Primarily relying on State v. Hill, the suppression
court denied Carter’s motion to suppress, reasoning that Carter had no
expectation of privacy in his phone number, and thus there was no search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See 789 S.E.2d 317, 318–21
(Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his own phone number, name on his cellular account,
or his date of birth, which were obtained by the officer dialing 9-1-1 from the
defendant’s phone).
[¶20] In November 2023, Carter filed a motion to dismiss Counts 1 and
8 of the indictment. The trial court (Hjelm, A.R.J.) held a hearing on the motion
at which the State agreed to dismiss Count 8 (terrorizing) based on potential
constitutional issues following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023). The court granted the motion to
dismiss Count 1 (Class A robbery) over the State’s objection because it
concluded that Count 1 did not include an allegation of the requisite state of
mind. 10
[¶21] The court held a four-day jury trial in December 2023, and the jury
returned guilty verdicts on all remaining counts. On March 28, 2024, the court
sentenced Carter to the following concurrent terms of imprisonment: twenty
years for kidnapping; ten years each for robbery, elevated aggravated assault,
and burglary; five years each for theft by unauthorized taking, criminal
threatening with a dangerous weapon, aggravated criminal trespass; eleven
months for cruelty to animals; and six months for criminal mischief. The court
suspended all but fourteen years of the concurrent sentences and imposed four
years of probation. Carter timely appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1); 15 M.R.S.
§ 2115 (2025).
II. DISCUSSION
A. We affirm the denial of Carter’s motion to suppress based on the independent source doctrine.
[¶22] We review the suppression court’s factual findings for clear error
and its ultimate determination regarding suppression de novo. State v. Bryant,
2014 ME 94, ¶ 8, 97 A.3d 595. Carter argues that the detective’s use of the
emergency call function on his cellphone constituted an unlawful warrantless
search under the Fourth Amendment; therefore, the court erred in denying his
M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A motion to suppress the evidence gathered from his 11
cellphone and any other evidence derived therefrom.6
[¶23] Our inquiry is not limited to the suppression court’s reasoning, and
we will affirm if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the decision.
See United States v. Gonzalez-Arias, 946 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 2019); see also State
v. Ouellette, 2024 ME 29, ¶ 11, 314 A.3d 253 (“We will uphold the court’s denial
of a motion to suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial
court’s decision.” (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶24] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
“The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and
seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). As a means of enforcing this right, the United States
Supreme Court developed the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States,
6 On appeal, Carter also argues that the Maine Constitution prohibits law enforcement’s warrantless use of the emergency call function on his cellphone. Carter, however, did not develop this argument before the trial court. Therefore, it is waived. See State v. Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶¶ 33-36, 302 A.3d 1; State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶ 20, 290 A.3d 533. Moreover, Carter has not raised any arguments regarding whether article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution includes an exclusionary rule, a prerequisite to the requested relief in this case. See Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶ 36, 302 A.3d 1 (“With respect to a claim that evidence should have been suppressed pursuant to the Maine Constitution, it is particularly important to develop an independent analysis of article I, section 5 because we have yet to rule definitively whether that provision even incorporates an exclusionary rule.”). 12
232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) and incorporated it to apply to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The rule prohibits the introduction of evidence
seized during an unlawful search as well as any derivative evidence discovered
as a result of that search. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37
(1988). But it is not without exceptions.7 Applicable here is the independent
source exception which, in keeping with the Fourth Amendment’s touchstone
principle of reasonableness, see Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250, “allows the admission
of evidence which was gained through an independent source as well as the
tainted source.” United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 740 (1st Cir. 1986).
Although the State argued before the trial court that the inevitable discovery exception to the 7
warrant requirement applied, we choose not to rely on that exception because it focuses on a hypothetical gathering of information after an alleged illegal search as opposed to the situation presented here where law enforcement actually gathered the same information through a legally obtained warrant. As we have previously stated, “[t]he inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule derives from the independent source doctrine, ‘but it differs in that the question is not whether the police did in fact acquire certain evidence by reliance upon an untainted source but instead whether evidence found because of a Fourth Amendment violation would inevitably have been discovered lawfully.’” State v. Storer, 583 A.2d 1016, 1019–20 (Me. 1990) (quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.4(a) at 378 (2d ed. 1987)). As described by the United States Supreme Court in Murray v. United States:
The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.
487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988). Thus, the independent source exception applies when, through a subsequent legal method (such as a warrant), law enforcement has in fact obtained the evidence being offered at trial, provided that the prior illegal search did not influence the decision to seek that warrant or provide information supporting probable cause. 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.4(a) at 378. The inevitable discovery doctrine differs from the independent source doctrine in that it is based on a hypothetical future discovery untainted by the first search. Id. Because we need not engage in a hypothetical here, the independent source exception applies. 13
[¶25] Under the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule,
the proper remedy is to excise the tainted information from the warrant and
supporting affidavit and then determine whether the remaining information
still establishes probable cause. See State v. Rabon, 2007 ME 113, ¶ 16, 930 A.2d
268. This process is typically warranted when “a search warrant was issued,
but some of the information used to establish probable cause is determined to
have been illegally obtained. If the [judge] would still have had probable cause
to issue the warrant without the allegedly unlawfully obtained information, the
independent source exception allows the admission of the evidence, and
suppression is not justified.” Id. (citation omitted).
[¶26] Assuming—without deciding8—that the detective’s use of the
emergency call function was a search under the Fourth Amendment and that a
warrant was required, the limited evidence gathered during that search is still
admissible because it was properly obtained during the subsequent search of
the phone pursuant to a legally obtained warrant supported by probable cause.
See State v. Thibodeau, 2000 ME 52, ¶ 6, 747 A.2d 596 (“The independent source
doctrine, however, permits the introduction of evidence initially discovered
8 We decline to determine whether the detective’s use of the emergency call function on the cellphone constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment because the answer is not necessary to the fair disposition of this case. 14
during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained through
independent legal activities that are untainted by the initial illegal activity.”
(quotation marks omitted)).
[¶27] Notably, in this instance, the detective’s use of the emergency call
function generated only the number associated with the cellphone, which he
used to serve a preservation letter on the cellphone carrier. After the detective
obtained the information to serve a preservation letter, he placed the phone in
a metal container, similar to a Faraday bag, to limit its connectivity. He then
began drafting a search warrant for the phone and never relied on the cellphone
number or the carrier as a motivation for seeking the warrant or as information
supporting probable cause to grant the warrant. Thus, no information needs to
be excised from the probable cause affidavit, and suppression would be
inappropriate as there was ample support for the issuance of the warrant to
search the phone. See Rabon, 2007 ME 113, ¶ 16, 930 A.2d 268 (“If the
magistrate would still have had probable cause to issue the warrant without
the allegedly unlawfully obtained information, the independent source
exception allows the admission of the evidence, and suppression is not
justified.”). 15
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carter’s Rule 17A motion.
[¶28] Carter argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his M.R.U. Crim. P. 17A(f) motion in limine seeking to subpoena business
records regarding out-of-state purchasers of marijuana from the victims’
cultivation business and that the denial limited his ability to present an
alternative suspect defense and impeach witnesses. See State v. Dube, 2014 ME
43, ¶ 8, 87 A.3d 1219 (“We review a trial court’s denial of a motion in limine for
an abuse of discretion and its legal conclusions de novo.”). Appellate review for
an abuse of discretion involves three questions: “(1) are factual findings, if any,
supported by the record according to the clear error standard; (2) did the court
understand the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given all the
facts and applying the appropriate law, was the court’s weighing of the
applicable facts and choices within the bounds of reasonableness.” State v.
Jeskey, 2016 ME 134, ¶ 49 n.13, 146 A.3d 127.
[¶29] Rule 17A(f) allows a defendant seeking the disclosure of privileged
or confidential documents from a nonparty to move in limine for a
determination from the court before serving a subpoena. M.R.U. Crim. P. 17A(f).
To succeed on that motion, the party must make a preliminary showing of the
following: 16
(1) the particular documents sought by the subpoena with a reasonable degree of specificity of the information contained therein; (2) the efforts made by the moving party in procuring the information contained in the requested documents by other means; (3) that the moving party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production of the documents; and (4) that the requested information is likely to be admissible at trial. The motion in limine shall be accompanied by a copy of the yet unserved subpoena.
Upon receipt of the motion, the court shall make a preliminary determination that the moving party has sufficiently set forth the relevancy, admissibility, and specificity of the requested documents.
Id. If the court determines that the moving party has met the required
preliminary threshold, it will direct the clerk to set the matter for a hearing. Id.
After the clerk issues notice of that hearing, the subpoena must be served on
the nonparty. Id. Upon receipt of the subpoena, the motion, and the notice, “the
subpoenaed individual or entity to whom the subpoena is directed shall either
submit the documentary evidence subject to the subpoena for in camera review
by the court or provide in writing reasons for the failure to submit the
documentary evidence for in camera review before the date of the hearing.” Id.
Following the hearing, the court may enter any orders necessary to protect the
confidentiality, privilege, or privacy of any party or nonparty. Id.
[¶30] Here, the trial court rejected the motion at the preliminary stage.
In his motion in limine, Carter provided two theories to support the production 17
of the requested documents: (1) to gain evidence to support an alternative
suspect defense and (2) to acquire impeachment evidence to challenge the
victims regarding whether their cultivation business engaged in illegal activity.
In denying the motion, the court concluded that Carter had not met his burden
in demonstrating relevancy, admissibility, and an inability to prepare for trial.
[¶31] Carter’s own filing with the trial court acknowledged that despite
this threshold requirement, the information he sought was to investigate
further whether any listed name had a connection to the home invasion, i.e., he
was using Rule 17A as a discovery tool, something we have clearly stated that
it is not. State v. Olah, 2018 ME 56, ¶ 24, 184 A.3d 360 (“Rule 17A(f) is not a
discovery device.”); see also State v. Marroquin-Aldana, 2014 ME 47, ¶ 37, 89
A.3d 519 (“[The defendant] failed to show what specific information the
application would contain that would be relevant to his defense. As we have
stated, Rule 17 is not a discovery device.” (citations omitted)); State v. Watson,
1999 ME 41, ¶ 5, 726 A.2d 214 (“The principal purpose of the subpoena duces
tecum is ‘to facilitate and to expedite the trial . . . [not to] expand the discovery
rights of the parties.’” (quoting 1 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice
§ 17.4 at IV–125 (1995))). 18
[¶32] Regarding the alternative suspect defense, the court discussed the
standard for admitting alternative suspect evidence, saying that it “must be
both foundationally admissible and, to satisfy the requirements of Maine Rules
of Evidence 401 and 403, carry sufficient probative value to raise a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant’s culpability by establishing a reasonable connection
between the alternative suspect and the crime.” Here, Carter was one of four
intruders; therefore, at best, he could point to an accomplice in the home
invasion, but that would likely not meet the admissibility threshold because it
does not raise a reasonable doubt regarding his connection to the crimes.
See State v. Daly, 2021 ME 37, ¶ 19, 254 A.3d 426 (“[A]lternative-suspect
evidence is admissible if (1) the proffered evidence is otherwise admissible,
and (2) the admissible evidence is of sufficient probative value to raise a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s culpability by establishing a reasonable
connection between the alternative suspect and the crime.” (quotation marks
omitted)).
[¶33] The court went on to reject the defendant’s argument that he could
not adequately prepare for trial without the evidence because it was necessary
to impeach the victims’ credibility. The court concluded that the specificity of
the defendant’s claims in his motion in limine suggested that he had the 19
necessary information, and the nature of the victims’ business was, at best, a
collateral matter. Therefore, the court would not permit a trial within the trial
regarding collateral impeachment issues. See M.R. Evid. 608(b) (giving the
court discretion to allow cross-examination but excluding extrinsic evidence
offered to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or
support the witness’s character for truthfulness). The trial court’s decision is
supported by the rules of evidence and our precedent. See M.R. Evid. 608(b);
State v. Coleman, 2018 ME 41, ¶ 15, 181 A.3d 689 (“The limited opportunity to
inquire, on cross-examination, into specific acts by the witness relating to the
witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, however, does not open
the door to the admission of extrinsic evidence relating to those acts.”).
[¶34] Ultimately, Rule 17A focuses on whether there is a reasonable
probability that, based on a defendant’s statement of relevancy, admissibility,
and specificity, the production of the requested documents could change the
outcome at trial. See Olah, 2018 ME 56, ¶ 32, 184 A.3d 360; Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987). Here, the trial court correctly understood the
law and reasonably concluded that Carter’s Rule 17A(f) motion did not satisfy
the preliminary standard because it did not meet the requirements as set forth
by the applicable rules. See Daly, 2021 ME 37, ¶ 19, 254 A.3d 426; Coleman, 20
2018 ME 41, ¶ 15, 181 A.3d 689. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. See People v. McCray, 12 N.E.3d 1079, 1081 (N.Y. 2014) (“[W]e have
no hesitation in agreeing with the courts below that [the requested documents]
are either cumulative or of little if any relevance to the case.”).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Michelle R. King, Esq. (orally), Thistle Weaver & Morris, Portland, for appellant Hasahn Carter
Christopher R. Fernald, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Knox County District Attorney’s Office, Rockland, for appellee State of Maine
Knox County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2021-659 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY