State of Maine v. Hanlon

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedOctober 16, 2009
DocketCUMcr-08-472
StatusUnpublished

This text of State of Maine v. Hanlon (State of Maine v. Hanlon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Maine v. Hanlon, (Me. Super. Ct. 2009).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE

Cumberland, ss UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET COURT Location: Portland Docket No. CR-08-472 I ,

v. ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT Misty Hanlon SENTENCE

In this matter, the defendant was indicted for operating after revocation (Class C), in violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 2557-A(1)(2)(D)(1) 1 • She was convicted after a jury trial. At trial, the defendant jury-waived the issue regarding whether she had suffered previous convictions for operating after revocation (the element alleged in the Indictment that provided for the prohibited conduct to be classified as a Class C felony rather than a Class D misdemeanor). The parties stipulated that the defendant had suffered the prior convictions specifically referenced as numbers 2-6 in the Indictment, and the court found that the defendant had committed those offenses. The defendant was sentenced to 3 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections and a $1,000.00 fine. The defendant filed a Notice of Appeal but did not file a brief when it was due. She moved to dismiss her appeal. Her motion was granted and her appeal was dismissed. The defendant then filed her Motion to Correct Sentence. In her Motion to Correct Sentence, the defendant asserts that none of her convictions referenced in numbers 2-6 of the Indictment qualify as prior convictions under the applicable portion of subsection 2 of 29-A M.R.S. § 2557-A that mandates her crime as a class C felony. A person who engages in the conduct that constitutes the crime of operating after revocation (defined in subsection 1), and who has not previously been convicted of certain specific crimes in the motor vehicle code, commits a Class D crime. Subsection (2) (A) (1) provides that a person is guilty of a Class D crime if the person engages in the conduct that constitutes the crime (defined in subsection 1), and "The person has not been convicted for operating after revocation under this section or under former Title 29, section 2298 within the

1 Subsection 1 of29-A M.R.S. § 2557-A defines the conduct that constitutes the t¥iM~ 8£T 16 '09 operating a motor vehicle after having been declared an habitual offender. Subsection 2 of29-A M.R.S. § 2557-A details the penalties that apply for a violation of subsection 1. Those penalties (the designated class of the crime as well as any minimum mandatory sentence) are determined by the prior motor vehicle record of a person convicted of violating subsection 1. previous 10 years." Based upon the charge in the Indictment, the penalty provision of§ 2557-A applicable to the defendant is found in subsection (2) (D) (1). That subsection provides that a person is guilty of a Class C crime if the person engages in the conduct that constitutes the crime (defined in subsection 1), and "The person has 3 or more convictions for operating after revocation under this section or under former Title 29, section 2298 within the previous 10 years." In the context of this case, it is important to briefly note the codification history of the operating after revocation statute. From 1979 to 1993, the statute was located at 29 M.R.S.A. § 2298. From 1993 to 1995, it was located at 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2557. From 1995 to present, it is found at 29-A M.R.S. § 2557-A. Throughout the last thirty years, the legislature has amended the operating after revocation statute many times. At times, it has increased the severity of, and penalties for the offense. At other times, it has done just the opposite. A literal reading of the penalties provision of the statute that the defendant was charged under, subsection (2) (D) (1), does not include prior convictions for 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2557, the operating after revocation statute in effect from 1993 to 1995. Subsection (2) (D) (1) only includes prior convictions for the operating after revocation statute under 29 M.R.S.A. § 2298 (the statute in effect from 1979 to 1993), and under 29-A M.R.S. § 2557-A (the current statute that has been in effect since 1995)? All of the defendant's prior convictions proven at trial (numbers 2-6 in the Indictment) are convictions under 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2557, the statute in effect from 1993 to 1995. "It is a well recognized principle of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be construed strictly and that a criminal offense cannot be created by inference or implication, nor can the effect of a penal statute be extended beyond the plain meaning of the language used." State v. Ashby, 743 A. 2d 1254, 1257 (Me. 1999), quoting Davis v. State, 306 A. 2d 127, 129 (Me. 1973). Our Law Court in Kimball v. LURC, expressly discussed the purposes to be effectuated by application of the rules of statutory construction.

First, the court should give meaning to the language chosen by the Legislature to the greatest extent possible. Second, the court has no role in attempting to divine legislative intent where the words chosen by the Legislature are clear and unambiguous. And finally, only when the words are susceptible of multiple meanings, or render the enactment an absurdity or nullity, should the court explore indicia of legislative intent. Kimball v. LURC, 745 A.2d 387,392 (Me. 2000).

2 In fact, all four of the separate portions of subsection 2 only include prior convictions for § 2298 and§ 2557-A, not for§ 2557. In the instant case, the words chosen by the legislature in§ 2557-A, subsection 2 are clear and unambiguous. The words are not susceptible of multiple meanings. They do not render application of the statute a nullity or an absurdity. The language chosen by the legislature does seem to provide for curious results, because convictions for operating after revocation when the applicable conduct occurred between 1993 and 1995 do not count to enhance the penalties for current conduct while all other convictions for operating after revocation do count.

The omission of§ 2557 from the penalties subsection of§ 2557-A is all the more curious in light of the fact that the Legislature saw fit to specifically include § 2557 in other similar contexts in both the Motor Vehicle and Criminal Codes. In one notable example, the Aggravated Operating after Revocation statute, the Legislature specifically includes "former section 2557," as well as current section 2557-A as eligible prior convictions to enhance penalties. 29-A M.R.S. § 2558 (2). Other examples can be found in 29-A M.R.S. § 2431 (4) (statements by an accused to prove operation without further proof of corpus delicti), 29-A M.R.S. § 1357 (2) (A) (5) (qualification to provide advanced driver education) and 17-A M.R.S. § 1349 (1) (eligibility for a sentence that includes administrative release). Perhaps the omission of § 2557 from subsection 2 of the current operating after revocation statute is an oversight. If so, the Legislature can easily rectify that. However, in the context of the instant case, and with application of the rules of statutory construction, the court agrees with the assertion set forth in Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence that none of her previous convictions proven at trial operate to enhance the classification of her crime to the felony level.

IT IS ORDERED:

Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence is GRANTED. The Clerk is requested to schedule this matter for resentencing at the earliest convenient time.

Date: Jeff Moskowitz, Judge STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT vs CUMBERLAND, ss. MISTY M HANLON Docket No PORSC-CR-2008-00472 5E LANCASTER ST PORTLAND ME 04101 DOCKET RECORD

DOB: 12/25/1981 Attorney: VANESSA BARTLETT State's Attorney: STEPHANIE ANDERSON VANESSA BARTLETT, ATTY AT LAW 173 PARK ROW PO BOX 886 BRUNSWICK ME 04011-0886 APPOINTED 05/19/2009

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Related

State v. Ashby
1999 ME 188 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1999)
Kimball v. Land Use Regulation Commission
2000 ME 20 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2000)
Davis v. State
306 A.2d 127 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
State of Maine v. Hanlon, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-maine-v-hanlon-mesuperct-2009.