State of Maine v. Giardello

Maine Superior

State of Maine v. Giardello

DecidedJuly 15, 2015

DocketKENcr-14-1212

StatusUnpublished

This text of State of Maine v. Giardello (State of Maine v. Giardello) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State of Maine v. Giardello, (Me. Super. Ct. 2015).

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Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss DOCKET NO. CR-14-1212

STATE OF MAINE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) V. ) ORDER ON MOTION ) TO SUPPRESS JEREMY GIARDELLO, ) ) Defendant. )

This matter came before the court on Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence

obtained as a result of the stop of his vehicle on November 28, 2014. The State appeared and

was represented by ADA Frank Griffin. Defendant appeared and was represented by Jason

Jabar, Esq. The court heard the testimony of Waterville Police Officer Tristan Russell and of

Defendant's mother, Tammy Robinson. After hearing and upon consideration of the evidence,

the court finds and orders as follows.

At 10:46 p.m. on November 28, 2014, Defendant was operating his truck on Main Street

in Waterville. When first observed by the officer, Defendant was stopped in the right lane at the

red traffic light at the intersection with Waterville Commons, heading north. Traffic was light.

It had snowed approximately 10 inches the day before. The travel lanes were clear, but there

was some packed snow and/or ice in the center of the 4-lane road as depicted in Defendant's

Exhibits 2 and 3.

Officer Russell was only about a half car length behind Defendant. He watched

Defendant spin his rear tires and then slowly pull forward when the light turned green.

1 Defendant did not create any smoke nor did he make noise in doing so. 1 Defendant pulled

for~ard, then signaled and changed to the left lane. When he did so, he went too far left and

crossed into the oncoming lane by a small amount, approximately a foot. He traveled there for

no more than a couple of seconds and abruptly pulled back into the proper left travel lane. There

was no evidence that there was any traffic in the oncoming lane, and certainly no evidence that

his actions impeded or impacted any other vehicle. He proceeded without incident

approximately 725 feet to the intersection with the Interstate 95 on-ramp. He turned left onto the

on-ramp, where he was pulled over by Officer Russell. Defendant turned left onto the ramp

without using a left tum signal. However, he was in a left-tum only lane and had a green light.

There is no evidence of any oncoming traffic, or indeed of any traffic at that intersection other

than the officer behind him.

The State argues that Defendant failed to properly use a tum signal and thus committed a

traffic violation under 29-A M.R.S. § 2071 (2)(A), justifying the stop. Even if he did not commit

a violation, however, the State also argues that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to

articulable suspicion justifying the stop. Defendant argues that he committed no traffic violation,

and that his driving simply was not erratic or suspicious under the totality of the circumstances.

There is no question that a civil traffic violation provides adequate specific and

articulable facts for a stop. State v. Bolduc, 1998 ME 255 ~5. Such an infraction is not required,

however. A police officer must have "an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that either

criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety has occurred, is occurring, or is

about to occur." State v. Laforge, 2012 ME 65, ~8, 43 A.3d 961, quoting State v. Porter, 2008

1 See 29-A M.R.S. § 2079, providing that "acceleration may not be unnecessarily made so as to cause a

harsh and objectionable noise".

2 ME 175, ~ 8, 960 A.2d 321. The State has the burden to prove that the stop was based on a

reasonable and articulable suspicion.

A. Whether Defendant committed a civil infraction

The issue is whether Defendant committed a traffic infraction when he failed to use a turn

signal when turning left onto the highway ramp. Section 2071 of Title 29-A provides,

in relevant part: "An operator may not turn a vehicle without giving an appropriate signal if other

traffic may be affected by that movement." 29-A M.R.S. § 2071(2)(A).

In State v. Seavey, the Law Court construed the predecessor statute of section 2071. State

v. Seavey, 564 A.2d 388 (Me. 1989). The Law Court held that the defendant had committed the

traffic violation when, traveling in the opposite direction from the officer, defendant entered an

intersection and turned right without using a signal. The officer intended to turn left at the same

intersection and was the only traffic in the vicinity. The court affirmed and quoted the trial

court's analysis:

The statute dealing with tum signals, 29 M.R. S .A. § 1191, requires the use of a tum signal for every tum "in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement." Clearly, it was the intent of the Legislature to mandate the use of a turn signal any time any other vehicles might be affected by the turn. If there is no other traffic whatsoever, a turn signal is not required.

The issue is not whether this police officer's actions as a driver were in fact affected, but whether the defendant should have concluded that the police car was "other traffic [that] may be affected" (emphasis supplied).

Seavey, 564 A.2d at 389. Seavey addressed a situation where there was an oncoming vehicle,

and it is less clear that traffic may be affected if it is behind Defendant in a left tum-only lane.

Nonetheless, although not binding, the U.S. District Court in Maine has held that a signal is still

required.

3 In United States v. Mercer, the Magistrate Judge ruled that a turn signal is required in a

dedicated turning lane even if the only traffic is behind Defendant in the same lane.

In sum, Seavey suggests that, pursuant to section 2071(2)(A), a motorist must signal a turn unless there is no other traffic present. Even assuming, arguendo, that Seavey leaves the door open to a finding that there are circumstances when other traffic is present and might not be affected by the failure to signal a turn, that was not the case when the defendant made the turn at issue. As the government argued, traffic might have been affected had the defendant moved into the right-hand turning lane as he approached the intersection. Had he signaled left, he would have made his intention clear. In addition, a signal would have alerted drivers approaching from behind, whose view of both the intersection ahead and the left-hand turning signs on the roadway might have been obscured, that a turn was required.

United States v. Mercer, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73398, 29 (D. Me. 2014), adopted in United

States v. Mercer, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72976 (D. Me., May 29, 2014). While the ruling in

Mercer is not binding on this court2 , it is a persuasive reading of Seavey. This court finds that

Mr. Giardello committed a civil infraction when he failed to signal his turn, and that is sufficient

justification for the stop.

B. Reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal conduct was occurring

Even if Defendant did not commit a civil infraction, the stop is constitutional if there is

objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is involved.

Defendant argues that this case is analogous to and controlled by State v. Caron, 534 A.

2d 978 (Me. 1987). There, the trooper pulled the defendant over when he observed a "single,

brief straddling of the center line of the undivided highway, with no oncoming traffic in sight

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