State of Maine v. Evans

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: October 31, 2016
• Docket: KENcr-16-0927
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOO

STATE OF MAINE ) ) ) ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION v. ) TO SUPPRESS ) ) CHARLES EVANS, JR. )

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Suppress Search Warrant M.

R.U. Crim. P. 41A.

I. Statements of Fact

1. A warrant was requested by Augusta Police Department Detective

Matthew Estes on April 14, 2016.

2. The same warrant was reviewed, signed, and issued by Augusta

District Court Judge Stanfield on April 14, 2016.

3. The search warrant was executed on April 26, 2016 at the specified

address of 54 Middle St. Apt. 3, Augusta, ME.

4. The executed search warrant was returned, with inventory, to the

clerk's office on May 2, 2016.

5. The search warrant specifically stated that property to be seized

included "cellular phones and other electronic and/ or digital

transmitting devices ... "

6. The content information obtained in this case was obtained directly

from the phone by law enforcement officers and not from a

provider of an electronic communication service.

1 II. Conclusions of Law

Defendant brings this motion seeking to suppress all content discovered

on Defendant's cell phone pursuant to 16 M.R.S. § 645. Defendant argues that the

search of content on his cell phone following its seizure is governed by Maine

Revised Statutes Title 16, Chapter 3, Subchapter 10: "Portable Electronic Device

Content Information". According to Title 16, Section§ 643, "Notice must be given

to the owner or user of a portable electronic device whose content information

was obtained by a government entity." 16 M.R.S. § 643. This notice must be

provided within 3 days of obtaining the content information unless the State has

sought exception from the Court. Id. Where the State obtains content information

in violation of Subchapter 10, 16 M.R.S. § 645 requires that the evidence be

excluded. Defendant argues that because no notice was provided after the State

obtained content based information from Defendant's cell phone, the State

violated section 643 and the evidence should be suppressed pursuant to section

645.

The Court looks to the plain language of a criminal statute in order to

interpret the legislative intent, "avoiding absurd, illogical, or inconsistent

results." State v. White, 2001 ME 65, <[ 4, 769 A.2d 827; State v. King, 371 A.2d 640,

642 (Me. 1977). When interpreting statute, the Court must "consider the whole

statutory scheme for which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious

result, presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be achieved." State v. Day,

2000 ME 192, <[ 5, 760 A.2d 1039.

When interpreting the statute as a whole, it is clear that section 643

requires notice to be provided to a cell phone user every time cell phone content

2 has been obtained by a government entity. According to section 643, the required

notice must include:

A. The nature of the law enforcement inquiry, with reasonable specificity; B. The content information of the owner or user that was supplied to or requested by the government entity and the date on which it was provided or requested; and C. If content information was obtained from a provider of electronic communication service or other 3rd party, the identity of the provider of electronic communication service or the 3rd party from whom the information was obtained.

16 M.R.S. § 643(1). The legislative intent, as is evidenced by the plain language of

the statute, is to inform the user of the phone what information was searched for,

what information has been obtained from the phone, the date the information

was obtained, and the identity of the third party if a third party or provider of

electronic information provided the information. The Court would note that the

clear language of paragraph C ("if content information was obtained from a

provider or other third party ... ") supports the Court's finding that Section 643

requires notice to the cell phone owner or user in every instance, but requires

that additional information be contained in the notice provided to the owner or

user when the content is obtained from a provider or third party. To ensure that

this notice information has been provided, the legislature enacted a statutory

exclusionary rule that provides that "evidence obtained in violation of this

subchapter is not admissible in a criminal, civil, administrative or other

proceeding." 16 M.R.S. § 645.

Looking to the remainder of section 643 in an effort to interpret that

section as a harmonious whole, the Court notes further that section 643,

subsections 2 and 3 address two situations where notice is "not required" or

"precluded" and both refer to situations where the government entity is seeking

3 to obtain content information through a third party pursuant to section 642. Had

the legislature intended to provide notice only where the information was

obtained through a provider of electronic communication services, as the State

argues, it would have crafted subsection 1 with the language which is included

in both subsections 2 and 3: "A government entity acting under section 642 ... " 16

M.R.S. § 643 . That language is conspicuously missing from subsection 1.

For reasons that are not clear from the record, law enforcement chose to

seek permission from the Court to seize the contents of the phone without going

through a phone company. Under these facts, it would seem that notice to the

cell phone owner or user could have been provided consistent with the statute by

incorporating the notice in any inventory provided to the person from whom the

phone is seized, which in this case appears to have been the owner of the phone.

The statute in fact provides a variety of acceptable ways for this notice to

provided so long as it is "reasonably calculated to be effective as specified by the

court issuing the warrant."

The State's argument is also undercut by the creation of the "exclusionary

rule" by the Legislature. It would seem inconsistent with the intent behind this

extraordinary remedy to apply it only when law enforcement obtains the

information from a third party, and not directly from the owner or user, which is

what apparently occurred here. In creating this remedy the Legislature's clearly

intended to acknowlede the privacy interests of the owner or user, and it would

be difficult to discern why those interests would be diminished depending on

whether the information is taken directly from the device by law enforcement, as

opposed to going through a provider of electronic information.

4 Viewing the statute as a whole, the Court holds that the notice

requirements set forth in section 643 apply to the case at hand. The State violated

section 643 within Title 16, Chapter 3, Subchapter 10 by failing to provide

Defendant Evans with the required notice. Because of the State's violation, all

content information found on the phone will be suppressed pursuant to 16 1 M.R.S. § 645.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress is Grante~.

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the clerk is hereby directed to incorporate this

order by reference in the docket.

Dated Michaela Murphy Justice, Superior Court

1 Defendant also argues that all evidence obtained by the warrant issued April 14, 2016 should be suppressed because the warrant was returned five days after the expiration of the 14 day period for execution and return allowed by M.R.U. Crim. P. 41(g). The Law Court has consistently held that failure to strictly comply with the ministerial demands of the return of warrant and inventory "does not invalidate the search and seizure conducted pursuant to warrant." State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71,