MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 98 Docket: Ken-24-341 Argued: October 7, 2025 Decided: December 23, 2025
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
DENIS LEMIEUX
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Denis Lemieux appeals from a revocation of his probation by the
trial court (Kennebec County, Lipez, J.), claiming that his underlying conviction
is void. We do not reach the validity of the underlying conviction because we
affirm the trial court’s ruling that a defendant cannot use a probation
revocation proceeding to collaterally attack an underlying conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] On October 17, 2023, the trial court (Kennebec County,
Daniel Mitchell, J.) entered a judgment of conviction after Denis Lemieux
pleaded guilty to domestic violence terrorizing (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 210-B(1)(B)(1) (2025). 2
[¶3] The court sentenced Lemieux to three years of incarceration, with
all but eight months suspended, and probation. The probation conditions
included, among other things, that Lemieux refrain from all criminal conduct,
obtain permission before moving, and not have contact of any kind with three
named family members.
[¶4] On February 5, 2024, the State filed a motion to revoke Lemieux’s
probation, alleging that Lemieux made several threatening statements on social
media about two of the family members whom he was prohibited from
contacting. On June 3, 2024, the court (Lipez, J.) held a hearing on the State’s
motion. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Lemieux’s
social media statements constituted direct and indirect contact with the family
members in violation of protection orders and his probation conditions. In
addition, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Lemieux
inexcusably failed to comply with probation conditions regarding substance
use evaluation and counseling, psychological evaluation and counseling, and
notifying probation before moving. Accordingly, the court partially revoked
Lemieux’s probation .
[¶5] After the hearing, the court received briefing regarding the
appropriate sanction and held a sentencing hearing. Lemieux argued that the 3
court should address whether the terrorizing statute under which he was
convicted was constitutional in light of a recent United States Supreme Court
decision. Lemieux contended that if the underlying conviction is
unconstitutional, the probation court should “treat the motion for probation
violation as if it’s missing the most core element,” that is, “an underlying
conviction and a valid sentence.”
[¶6] The court concluded that it could not address the collateral attack
during the probation-revocation proceeding because the proper avenue for
challenging the constitutionality of the underlying conviction is through
post-conviction review. The court sentenced Lemieux to serve eighteen
months of the suspended portion of his sentence. Lemieux filed a motion for
further findings, which the court denied. Lemieux timely filed an appeal of his
probation revocation pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1813 (2025). On January 30,
2025, we granted a certificate of probable cause permitting full appellate
review.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] Lemieux argues that before revoking his probation, the court should
have examined the constitutionality of the statute under which he was
convicted. The State contends that a review of the statute’s constitutionality 4
was unavailable because the only means of collaterally attacking a conviction is
through the post-conviction-review process. The State acknowledges that we
have expanded relief in circumstances where a defendant has asserted
ineffective assistance of counsel at probation-revocation proceedings. See
Petgrave v. State, 2019 ME 72, 208 A.3d 371.
[¶8] Lemieux asserts that authorities prohibiting contesting the validity
of a judgment during a post-conviction proceeding are not applicable to his
circumstances because “the facial [un]constitutionality of a statute renders the
court without jurisdiction to impose further sanction.” Lemieux argues further
that Petgrave supports his claim that the trial court can consider the
constitutionality of an underlying conviction at a probation-revocation hearing
because his claim involves an assertion of a violation of a fundamental right.
See id.
[¶9] We review an order revoking probation for an abuse of discretion.
Spinney v. State, 2017 ME 9, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 138. We have consistently held that
post-conviction review is the exclusive avenue, besides a direct appeal, for
challenging an underlying judgment.1 See State v. Loi Ngo, 2007 ME 2, ¶ 4, 912
1 There is considerable federal jurisprudence surrounding this issue. See United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 828 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he underlying validity of a conviction cannot be asserted as a defense in a probation revocation proceeding [but the conviction] may be collaterally attacked . . . in a separate proceeding . . . .”); United States v. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065, 1068 5
A.2d 1224 (“[T]he post-conviction review process is the exclusive means for
judicial review.”); State v. Trott, 2004 ME 15, ¶ 8, 841 A.2d 789 (“[E]xcept for
direct appeals from a criminal judgment[,] the statutory
[post-conviction-review process is] the exclusive method of review of
. . . criminal judgments.” (quotations omitted)).
[¶10] In 2012, we held that a defendant may not collaterally attack a
prior conviction used for sentence enhancement by claiming that the
underlying guilty plea leading to the prior conviction was not based on an
effective waiver. State v. Johnson, 2012 ME 39, ¶ 23, 38 A.3d 1270. We reasoned
that “[a]llowing a collateral attack in cases like [that one] would provide
convicted defendants an incentive to forego a timely appeal or petition for
post-conviction review, knowing that they will never lose the ability to
challenge the validity of the conviction if, in the future, it is relied upon by the
State to enhance a new criminal charge.” Id. ¶ 21.
(9th Cir. 2014) (“An appeal challenging a probation revocation proceeding is not the proper avenue through which to attack the validity of the original sentence.” (quoting United States v. Gerace, 997 F.2d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1993))); United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 778–79 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[W]e hold that defendant may not collaterally attack his underlying conviction at a probation revocation hearing. . . .”). 6
A. Petgrave
[¶11] In Petgrave, we established a new procedure for a defendant
asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in circumstances where no
statutory procedure to enforce the right to counsel existed. 2019 ME 72, ¶ 1,
208 A.3d 371. In that case, Jonathan Petgrave pleaded guilty to a charge of
unlawful possession of a scheduled drug. Id. ¶ 2. Petgrave’s sentence included
two years of probation. Id.
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 98 Docket: Ken-24-341 Argued: October 7, 2025 Decided: December 23, 2025
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
DENIS LEMIEUX
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Denis Lemieux appeals from a revocation of his probation by the
trial court (Kennebec County, Lipez, J.), claiming that his underlying conviction
is void. We do not reach the validity of the underlying conviction because we
affirm the trial court’s ruling that a defendant cannot use a probation
revocation proceeding to collaterally attack an underlying conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] On October 17, 2023, the trial court (Kennebec County,
Daniel Mitchell, J.) entered a judgment of conviction after Denis Lemieux
pleaded guilty to domestic violence terrorizing (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 210-B(1)(B)(1) (2025). 2
[¶3] The court sentenced Lemieux to three years of incarceration, with
all but eight months suspended, and probation. The probation conditions
included, among other things, that Lemieux refrain from all criminal conduct,
obtain permission before moving, and not have contact of any kind with three
named family members.
[¶4] On February 5, 2024, the State filed a motion to revoke Lemieux’s
probation, alleging that Lemieux made several threatening statements on social
media about two of the family members whom he was prohibited from
contacting. On June 3, 2024, the court (Lipez, J.) held a hearing on the State’s
motion. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Lemieux’s
social media statements constituted direct and indirect contact with the family
members in violation of protection orders and his probation conditions. In
addition, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Lemieux
inexcusably failed to comply with probation conditions regarding substance
use evaluation and counseling, psychological evaluation and counseling, and
notifying probation before moving. Accordingly, the court partially revoked
Lemieux’s probation .
[¶5] After the hearing, the court received briefing regarding the
appropriate sanction and held a sentencing hearing. Lemieux argued that the 3
court should address whether the terrorizing statute under which he was
convicted was constitutional in light of a recent United States Supreme Court
decision. Lemieux contended that if the underlying conviction is
unconstitutional, the probation court should “treat the motion for probation
violation as if it’s missing the most core element,” that is, “an underlying
conviction and a valid sentence.”
[¶6] The court concluded that it could not address the collateral attack
during the probation-revocation proceeding because the proper avenue for
challenging the constitutionality of the underlying conviction is through
post-conviction review. The court sentenced Lemieux to serve eighteen
months of the suspended portion of his sentence. Lemieux filed a motion for
further findings, which the court denied. Lemieux timely filed an appeal of his
probation revocation pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1813 (2025). On January 30,
2025, we granted a certificate of probable cause permitting full appellate
review.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] Lemieux argues that before revoking his probation, the court should
have examined the constitutionality of the statute under which he was
convicted. The State contends that a review of the statute’s constitutionality 4
was unavailable because the only means of collaterally attacking a conviction is
through the post-conviction-review process. The State acknowledges that we
have expanded relief in circumstances where a defendant has asserted
ineffective assistance of counsel at probation-revocation proceedings. See
Petgrave v. State, 2019 ME 72, 208 A.3d 371.
[¶8] Lemieux asserts that authorities prohibiting contesting the validity
of a judgment during a post-conviction proceeding are not applicable to his
circumstances because “the facial [un]constitutionality of a statute renders the
court without jurisdiction to impose further sanction.” Lemieux argues further
that Petgrave supports his claim that the trial court can consider the
constitutionality of an underlying conviction at a probation-revocation hearing
because his claim involves an assertion of a violation of a fundamental right.
See id.
[¶9] We review an order revoking probation for an abuse of discretion.
Spinney v. State, 2017 ME 9, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 138. We have consistently held that
post-conviction review is the exclusive avenue, besides a direct appeal, for
challenging an underlying judgment.1 See State v. Loi Ngo, 2007 ME 2, ¶ 4, 912
1 There is considerable federal jurisprudence surrounding this issue. See United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 828 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he underlying validity of a conviction cannot be asserted as a defense in a probation revocation proceeding [but the conviction] may be collaterally attacked . . . in a separate proceeding . . . .”); United States v. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065, 1068 5
A.2d 1224 (“[T]he post-conviction review process is the exclusive means for
judicial review.”); State v. Trott, 2004 ME 15, ¶ 8, 841 A.2d 789 (“[E]xcept for
direct appeals from a criminal judgment[,] the statutory
[post-conviction-review process is] the exclusive method of review of
. . . criminal judgments.” (quotations omitted)).
[¶10] In 2012, we held that a defendant may not collaterally attack a
prior conviction used for sentence enhancement by claiming that the
underlying guilty plea leading to the prior conviction was not based on an
effective waiver. State v. Johnson, 2012 ME 39, ¶ 23, 38 A.3d 1270. We reasoned
that “[a]llowing a collateral attack in cases like [that one] would provide
convicted defendants an incentive to forego a timely appeal or petition for
post-conviction review, knowing that they will never lose the ability to
challenge the validity of the conviction if, in the future, it is relied upon by the
State to enhance a new criminal charge.” Id. ¶ 21.
(9th Cir. 2014) (“An appeal challenging a probation revocation proceeding is not the proper avenue through which to attack the validity of the original sentence.” (quoting United States v. Gerace, 997 F.2d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1993))); United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 778–79 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[W]e hold that defendant may not collaterally attack his underlying conviction at a probation revocation hearing. . . .”). 6
A. Petgrave
[¶11] In Petgrave, we established a new procedure for a defendant
asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in circumstances where no
statutory procedure to enforce the right to counsel existed. 2019 ME 72, ¶ 1,
208 A.3d 371. In that case, Jonathan Petgrave pleaded guilty to a charge of
unlawful possession of a scheduled drug. Id. ¶ 2. Petgrave’s sentence included
two years of probation. Id.
[¶12] One year after sentencing, the State moved to revoke Petgrave’s
probation. Id. ¶ 3. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the probation. Id.
Petgrave, with new counsel, filed a petition for post-conviction review in the
trial court, alleging that his counsel had been ineffective at the revocation
hearing. Id. ¶ 5. The trial court concluded that the post-conviction-review
process is unavailable in a probation-revocation proceeding and dismissed
Petgrave’s petition. Id. ¶ 9; see 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121-2122 (2018).2 As a result,
Petgrave’s only available option to contest his probation revocation was to file
a discretionary appeal to the Law Court. Petgrave, 2019 ME 72, ¶ 10, 208 A.3d
371.
Title 15 M.R.S. § 2121 has since been amended, though not in any way that affects the present 2
case. See P.L. 2019, ch. 113, § C-37 (emergency, effective May 16, 2019) (codified at 15 M.R.S. § 2121(2) (2025)). 7
[¶13] Before Petgrave’s appeal, we did not, in criminal cases, consider
claims of ineffective assistance on direct appeal from convictions or probation
revocations but considered such claims only on appeal from a
post-conviction-review proceeding, Petgrave was therefore deprived of an
opportunity to obtain an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id.; see State v. Nichols, 1997 ME 178, ¶¶ 4-5, 698 A.2d
521. This led us to develop a procedure to allow a defendant to pursue a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel at a probation revocation hearing. Petgrave,
2019 ME 72, ¶ 15, 208 A.3d 371.
[¶14] Unlike Petgrave, Lemieux is not unable to assert his claim due to a
lack of a statutory procedure. On the contrary, a post-conviction-review
proceeding is the exact procedure to challenge a conviction that a defendant
claims becomes void.3 See 15 M.R.S. § 2122 (2025). “The fact that a party has
not availed himself of the specified rule or statute in a proper and timely
manner, or anticipates that the procedure may not provide complete relief or
3 Prior to the probation-revocation hearing, Lemieux’s counsel filed a petition for post-conviction
review, arguing that the underlying conviction was unconstitutional. On April 24, 2024, the court denied the petition and asked counsel to follow procedures laid out in 15 M.R.S. § 2129 (2025) and Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure 67 and 68. During oral arguments, Lemieux’s counsel stated that the petition for post-conviction review has been stayed pending this appeal. 8
would be unconstitutional as applied, does not change the fact that a procedure
has been made available.” Loi Ngo, 2007 ME 2, ¶ 6, 912 A.2d 1224.
[¶15] Given that a procedure exists, and remains available, for Lemieux
to contest the validity of his underlying conviction, we see no reason to expand
the methods available to him for relief. As a result, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that it was not required to consider the
constitutionality of Lemieux’s underlying conviction before revoking his
probation. The proper and exclusive mechanism for challenging an underlying
conviction is through a petition for post-conviction review.
The entry is:
Judgment of probation revocation affirmed.
Daniel Lawson, Esq. (orally), Capital Region Public Defender’s Office, Augusta, for appellant Denis Lemieux
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Jacob Demosthenes, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Office of the District Attorney, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2023-308 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY