State of Maine v. Daniel L. Chase

2018 ME 14

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: January 23, 2018
• Status: Published

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2018 ME 14 Docket: Pen-17-251 Submitted On Briefs: November 29, 2017 Decided: January 23, 2018

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

DANIEL L. CHASE

PER CURIAM

[¶1] Daniel L. Chase appeals from a judgment entered by the District

Court (Bangor, Campbell, J.) after a bench trial. The court found that Chase

had committed the civil violations of improperly displaying a registration

plate, 29-A M.R.S. § 452(3) (2017), and failing to register a vehicle that is

operated or remains on a public way, 29-A M.R.S. § 351(1) (2017). Chase

argues that the court erred in finding that he committed the violations and

that the court proceedings violated the Due Process Clause, the Equal

Protection Clause, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.1 We affirm the

judgment.

1 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 12101-12213 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-108). 2

[¶2] Chase has not supplied a transcript of the trial proceedings or an

approved substitute for a transcript. See M.R. App. P. 5 (Tower 2016);2 M.R.

Civ. P. 91(f)(2)(B)(i). Thus, we have before us neither the testimony and

arguments presented by the parties, nor the court’s recitation of its factual

findings. Although we are able to review the exhibits in the court file, we lack

a record of the testimony authenticating and discussing those exhibits, and we

have no record of the findings that the court reached based on the testimonial,

photographic, and documentary evidence viewed as a whole. In such

circumstances, we “assume that there is sufficient competent evidence in the

record to support the trial court’s findings of fact.” Guardianship of Luneau,

2016 ME 127, ¶ 17, 147 A.3d 349. Although the statutes at issue may not be a

model of clarity, we cannot, on this record, conclude that the court erred in

finding that the State established the elements of each violation.3

[¶3] The issues of law that Chase raises are nearly all controlled by our

opinion in his earlier appeal from another similar judgment. See State v.

2 We cite to the Rules of Appellate Procedure that apply to this appeal, which was commenced

before September 1, 2017. See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled).

3 For instance, although there may be some ambiguity in the requirement that a registration

plate be displayed “horizontally,” 29-A M.R.S. § 452(1) (2017), we cannot know—without a transcript—whether the court found an improper display of registration plates on that basis. It may have instead found that Chase improperly displayed the plates either by failing to attach them “to the front and the rear of [the] vehicle,” id., or by failing to ensure that the “plates, including the numbers, letters and words, . . . always [are] plainly visible and legible,” 29-A M.R.S. § 452(4) (2017). 3

Chase, 2017 ME 43, 157 A.3d 1291. As there, the court appropriately

responded to Chase’s requests for accommodation due to disability, including

by providing Communication Access Realtime Translation (CART) to enable

Chase to read a real-time transcription of the proceedings while he was in the

courtroom. See id. ¶¶ 3, 6. The court was not, as Chase argues, required to

provide him with a lawyer, see 4 M.R.S. § 1801 (2017) (establishing the Maine

Commission on Indigent Legal Services to provide counsel paid for by the

State only for specified case types), or with differently worded versions of the

Maine Rules of Civil Procedure or the Maine Rules of Evidence—rules that we

were authorized to promulgate, see 4 M.R.S. § 8 (2017). See Chase, 2017 ME

43, ¶ 6 & n.3, 157 A.3d 1291.

[¶4] Chase additionally argues that he was deprived of due process and

the equal protection of the laws when the court denied his request for a jury

trial. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. First, to be clear, the Maine Constitution

does not guarantee the right to a jury trial in a civil traffic violation matter.

See State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703, 708-09 (Me. 1983) (citing Me. Const. art. I,

§ 20); see also Chase, 2017 ME 43, ¶ 5, 157 A.3d 1291. The Due Process

Clause’s guarantee of an impartial fact-finder also does not guarantee that a

jury will be the fact-finder in a civil matter. See In re L.T., 2015 ME 94, ¶ 20, 4

120 A.3d 650 (citing In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 16, 55 A.3d 463); see also

Chase, 2017 ME 43, ¶ 5, 157 A.3d 1291 (“[N]either the Maine Constitution, nor

any other authority, requires that a jury trial be available in a traffic matter.”).

Nor does the Equal Protection Clause require a jury to be the fact-finder when

Chase has not argued or shown that the court is treating similarly situated

defendants differently in cases involving alleged traffic violations based on

any challenged classification. State v. Bennett, 2015 ME 46, ¶¶ 16-20, 114

A.3d 994; see also Chase, 2017 ME 43, ¶ 5, 157 A.3d 1291.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Daniel Chase, appellant pro se

R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, and Mark A. Rucci, Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appellee State of Maine

District Court Violations Bureau docket number TI-2017-1235623 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY