State of Maine v. Choice Tobacco, Inc.

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedApril 8, 2004
DocketKENcv-02-132
StatusUnpublished

This text of State of Maine v. Choice Tobacco, Inc. (State of Maine v. Choice Tobacco, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Maine v. Choice Tobacco, Inc., (Me. Super. Ct. 2004).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

CIVIL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. DO KEL NQ. CV- °F 132 D rk 4/2. ADDY

STATE OF MAINE,

Plaintiff

Vv. ORDER ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

CHOICE TOBACCO, INC., et al, ORDER

Defendant ”

This matter is before the court upon motion for temporary restramning ores by defendant. This is an enforcement action brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the State of Maine in accordance with the so-called “Big Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement.” The specific enforcement is under the “Escrow Statute” arising as a result of the Master Settlement Agreement and found in 22 M.R.S.A. § 1580-G et seq. The defendant seeks to enjoin the plaintiff Attorney General from removing its product from the directory of complying tobacco product manufacturers authorized to be sold in this State mandated by the so-called “Contraband Statute,” 22 M.R.S.A. § 1580-L, and to order the plaintiff to accept escrow payments for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 net of post-release determinations and without penalty.

The subject matter of this litigation is described by this court in its order on motions dated April 11, 2003. In summary, the defendant, a nonparticipating tobacco manufacturer under the Master Settlement Agreement, has been required under Maine law, in the event it chooses not to participate in the Master Settlement Agreement, to place in escrow certain amounts founded upon the number of its cigarettes sold in Maine during the year. The amount to be deposited is based upon a statutory formula.

The nonparticipating tobacco manufacturer is given an opportunity under this statute to provide evidence that the amount placed in escrow is in excess of that amount mandated by the Master Settlement Agreement. The Attorney General is authorized, upon receipt of such evidence, to effectuate a release of the excess escrowed funds. The circumstances under which the release is authorized was amended in the year 2003, subsequent to the years of obligation in question but while negotiations were taking place between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant argues, in its motion, that the plaintiff is seeking to retroactively apply an amendment to the statute as to the amount required to be escrowed. The State responds that the amendment of 2003 does not affect the amount required to be escrowed but affects the amount it is authorized to release. Because of the amounts involved and the relatively small size of the operation of the defendant, it seeks injunctive relief.

In order for this court to grant preliminary or permanent injunctive relief, it must find that four criteria are met:

(1) that defendant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted,

(2) that such injury outweighs any harm which granting the injunctive relief would inflict on the plaintiff,

(3) that defendant has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits (at most, a probability; at least, a substantial possibility),

(4) that the public interest will not be adversely affected by granting the injunction. Ingraham v. University of Maine, 441 A.2d 691 (Me. 1982) citing Women’s Community Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F.Supp. 542 (D.C. Me. 1979), UV Indus., Inc., v. Posner, 466

F.Supp. 1251 (D.C. Me. 1979). The Maine Tobacco Manufacturers Act found in 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 1580-G, 1580-H and 1580-I requires a tobacco product manufacturer selling cigarettes to consumers within this State to either become a participating manufacturer and perform its financial obligations under the Master Settlement Agreement or place into a qualified escrow fund by April 15 of a given year an amount based upon units sold the previous year according to a formula. The tobacco product manufacturer who places funds into escrow is entitled to receive interest and other appreciation on such funds as earned. These funds must be released from escrow only under two circumstances. The first is to pay a judgment or settlement on any claim brought against the tobacco product

manufactured by the State. Secondly,

to the extent that a tobacco product manufacturer establishes that the amount it was required to place into escrow on account of units sold in the State in a particular year was greater than the Master Settlement Agreement payments, . . ., that such manufacturer would have been required to make an account of such units sold had it been a participating manufacturer, the excess must be released from escrow and revert back to such tobacco product manufacturer.

22 M.R.S.A. § 1580-I(2)(A)(2). Prior to the effective date of Public Laws of 2003, Chapter 435, that section read: to the extent that a tobacco product manufacturer establishes that the amount it was required to place into escrow in a particular year was greater than the State’s allocable share of the total payments that such manufacturer would have been required to make in that year under the Master Settlement Agreement . . . had it been a participating manufacturer, the excess shall be released from escrow and revert back to such tobacco product manufacturer.

That has been the status of the so-called “Escrow Statute.” Title 22 M.R.S.A. § 1580-L is the so-called “Contraband Statute.” This statute

provides, among other things, that every nonparticipating manufacturer whose

cigarettes are sold in this State must prepare a certification to the Attorney General no

earlier than April 15 of each year and no later than April 30 of each year a certification that it is in full compliance with the Tobacco Manufacturers Act. Section 1580-L(3). In response, the Attorney General is required to develop and make available for public inspection a directory listing all tobacco product manufacturers that have provided accurate certification conforming to the law. Section 1580-L(6). Subsection A of subsection 6 provides that the Attorney General may not include in the directory names of the nonparticipating manufacturers that fail to provide the required certification and, further, subsection B provides that the Attorney General may not include a tobacco manufacturer in the directory who has not made all escrow payments as required.

It is undisputed that the defendant is a nonparticipating tobacco manufacturer. It is not disputed that the defendant has not made any payments into an escrow account nor provided any certification to the Attorney General in accordance with the statute for the years in question. It is the defendant's position that it should not do so until a matter of legal interpretation is resolved because it and the Attorney General differ over the proper amount to be retained in the escrow account for the years in question.’

Defendant argues that the effect of the amendment was to increase its net escrow requirement tenfold and that it is entitled to deposit in escrow in order to satisfy the Attorney General only the net amount taking into consideration its entitlement to release under the statute. Further, it argues it should only be required to deposit in escrow the net amount to be found after release required under the law prior to the amendment of 2003. Since the Attorney General removed the defendant from the statutory directory as of December of 2003 and as a result, the defendant is no longer

authorized to sell its cigarette products in the State of Maine, it asks this court to

| The legal dispute involves the question of retroactivity of the amendment to the law as described. But

for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001, those requirements existed long before the amendment to the law yet no escrow payments were made. mandatorily enjoin the Attorney General and require it to place defendant’s name in the directory.

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Related

Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen
477 F. Supp. 542 (D. Maine, 1979)
Ingraham v. University of Maine at Orono
441 A.2d 691 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1982)
UV Industries, Inc. v. Posner
466 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Maine, 1979)

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Bluebook (online)
State of Maine v. Choice Tobacco, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-maine-v-choice-tobacco-inc-mesuperct-2004.