MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 165 Docket: Fra-16-559 Submitted On Briefs: June 29, 2017 Decided: July 25, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
CAROL ANN MURPHY
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Carol Ann Murphy acquires animals and then is unable or unwilling
to properly care for them. She has been twice convicted of cruelty to animals.
She has been ordered never to possess animals again. Notwithstanding that
order, when released from the four-year prison sentence imposed after her
second conviction for cruelty to animals and other crimes, see State v. Murphy,
2010 ME 140, 10 A.3d 697, she returned to acquiring a variety of animals,
including dogs, cats, chinchillas, rabbits, and a potbellied pig. Following a jury
verdict finding her in contempt of court, see 4 M.R.S. § 114 (2016); M.R.U.
Crim. P. 42; M.R. Civ. P. 66(c), the trial court (Franklin County, Stokes, J.) entered
a judgment on the contempt verdict and sentenced Murphy to 364 days in jail. 2
Murphy appeals, and, subject to a clarification of the nature of the adjudication,
we affirm that judgment.
[¶2] The evidence supporting the finding of contempt was uncontested
at trial and is more than sufficient to support the contempt finding. The
testimony provided unequivocal evidence that Murphy was, again, collecting a
number of animals.
[¶3] Although Murphy has appealed the contempt judgment, she does
not contest the facts supporting the finding of contempt. Instead, as she did at
trial, she presents a litany of frivolous and irrelevant challenges to the authority
of all involved in her case. Primarily, she argues that (1) the trial court had no
jurisdiction to hear the matter, (2) the appointments of both the trial judge and
the prosecutor to their offices were defective, (3) her two prior convictions are
void, and (4) the trial judge was biased against her.
[¶4] Contrary to her arguments, the court had jurisdiction, see State v.
Pelletier, 2015 ME 129, ¶¶ 3, 5, 125 A.3d 354; the appointments of the judge
and the prosecutor were not infirm, see Me. Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 8; 4 M.R.S. § 101
(2016); 30-A M.R.S. § 272 (2016); the prior convictions are valid, see Murphy,
2010 ME 140, ¶¶ 1-3, 10 A.3d 697; State v. Murphy, Mem-06-125 (July 27,
2006); see also 17 M.R.S. § 1031(3-B)(B) (2016); and the record demonstrates 3
no bias on the part of the judge. To the contrary, the judge consistently treated
Murphy with respect, in stark contrast to her disruptive and contemptuous
treatment of the judge. We do not discuss those challenges further. See Murphy,
2010 ME 140, ¶ 2, 10 A.3d 697.
[¶5] Murphy additionally contends that the State and the court violated
her constitutional rights in conducting the proceedings. The record reflects just
the opposite. We briefly examine this challenge only to recognize the trial
court’s patient and focused actions to protect Murphy’s constitutional rights
and assure that she received a fair trial despite her uncooperative, disruptive,
insolent, and disrespectful behavior during the trial.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Prior Convictions
[¶6] The events leading up to this case began at least as early as a 2004
case in which Murphy was convicted of cruelty to animals. Murphy appealed,
alleging Fourth Amendment violations that to this day she insists made that
proceeding and each subsequent proceeding void. Murphy, Mem-06-125
(July 27, 2006). We affirmed her conviction in that case. Id. When Murphy was
convicted a second time of cruelty to animals—and other crimes—the court 4
(Murphy, J.)1 included the lifetime prohibition on owning or possessing animals
in its judgment. See 17 M.R.S. § 1031(3-B)(B). We affirmed that conviction as
well. Murphy, 2010 ME 140, ¶ 19, 10 A.3d 697.
B. Contempt
[¶7] On September 25, 2014, after receiving information from Murphy’s
neighbor that she was again possessing animals, the State filed a complaint
alleging that Murphy was keeping or possessing dogs or cats in violation of her
lifetime prohibition against owning or possessing animals. The State’s
complaint sought punitive sanctions against Murphy for contempt of court. See
4 M.R.S. § 114; M.R.U. Crim. P. 42; M.R. Civ. P. 66. On October 1, 2014, police
and animal welfare personnel executed a search warrant at Murphy’s home,
where they seized four dogs, five chinchillas, two rabbits, two cats, and a
potbellied pig. Murphy was served with a uniform summons and complaint for
contempt on the same day.
[¶8] Almost immediately, and without the assistance of counsel, Murphy
began filing a plethora of court papers. Murphy’s inscrutably dense filings, all
based on fanciful and jumbled legal theories, alleged a variety of structural and
1 The trial court and the defendant are not related. State v. Murphy, 2010 ME 140, ¶ 2 n.3, 10 A.3d
697. 5
procedural defects that she insisted had divested the Superior Court of
jurisdiction to hear the case, violated her constitutional rights, and voided any
prior judgments. Although it is not clear whether Murphy is relying on
admiralty law or the Uniform Commercial Code, none of her theories has a basis
in Maine law, applicable federal law, or constitutional concepts.
[¶9] Nor did Murphy attempt to address her challenges to the court in a
coherent fashion. Instead, the docket entries reveal that Murphy failed to
appear for hearings, and yet, despite the eventual appointment of counsel to
represent her, she continued to file copious documents in the trial court,
including two interlocutory appeals, all of which extended the proceeding over
the following two years.
C. Trial
[¶10] Finally, on November 16, 2016, after considerable effort to
document that Murphy had notice of the trial date, the court held a jury trial.
Murphy elected to represent herself after the court had appropriately warned
her that representing herself could put her at a disadvantage, that she would be
subject to the same rules as an attorney would be, and that she was entitled to
appointed counsel. See State v. Hill, 2014 ME 16, ¶¶ 6-8, 86 A.3d 628. The court
appointed standby counsel who had previously worked with Murphy to act as 6
Murphy’s “assistant” during parts of the trial. The court even exceeded due
process requirements by allowing Murphy to be seated at a table behind the
bar and to be accompanied by a personal support person, Richard Suchar,2 with
whom she was allowed to consult during the trial.
[¶11] Murphy made an opening statement in which she accused the
court of not understanding the Constitution and contended that her 2004
conviction was “void.” Two police officers and an animal welfare agent testified
for the State, and Murphy declined to cross-examine them. The 2010 judgment
and commitment prohibiting her possession of animals was admitted in
evidence, as were other documents. The State’s evidence, unrebutted by
Murphy, demonstrated that she was, again, acquiring animals; that her house
was severely cluttered; that several rooms were soaked in animal urine and
feces; and that Murphy did, in fact, possess animals in defiance of the court
order.
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 165 Docket: Fra-16-559 Submitted On Briefs: June 29, 2017 Decided: July 25, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
CAROL ANN MURPHY
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Carol Ann Murphy acquires animals and then is unable or unwilling
to properly care for them. She has been twice convicted of cruelty to animals.
She has been ordered never to possess animals again. Notwithstanding that
order, when released from the four-year prison sentence imposed after her
second conviction for cruelty to animals and other crimes, see State v. Murphy,
2010 ME 140, 10 A.3d 697, she returned to acquiring a variety of animals,
including dogs, cats, chinchillas, rabbits, and a potbellied pig. Following a jury
verdict finding her in contempt of court, see 4 M.R.S. § 114 (2016); M.R.U.
Crim. P. 42; M.R. Civ. P. 66(c), the trial court (Franklin County, Stokes, J.) entered
a judgment on the contempt verdict and sentenced Murphy to 364 days in jail. 2
Murphy appeals, and, subject to a clarification of the nature of the adjudication,
we affirm that judgment.
[¶2] The evidence supporting the finding of contempt was uncontested
at trial and is more than sufficient to support the contempt finding. The
testimony provided unequivocal evidence that Murphy was, again, collecting a
number of animals.
[¶3] Although Murphy has appealed the contempt judgment, she does
not contest the facts supporting the finding of contempt. Instead, as she did at
trial, she presents a litany of frivolous and irrelevant challenges to the authority
of all involved in her case. Primarily, she argues that (1) the trial court had no
jurisdiction to hear the matter, (2) the appointments of both the trial judge and
the prosecutor to their offices were defective, (3) her two prior convictions are
void, and (4) the trial judge was biased against her.
[¶4] Contrary to her arguments, the court had jurisdiction, see State v.
Pelletier, 2015 ME 129, ¶¶ 3, 5, 125 A.3d 354; the appointments of the judge
and the prosecutor were not infirm, see Me. Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 8; 4 M.R.S. § 101
(2016); 30-A M.R.S. § 272 (2016); the prior convictions are valid, see Murphy,
2010 ME 140, ¶¶ 1-3, 10 A.3d 697; State v. Murphy, Mem-06-125 (July 27,
2006); see also 17 M.R.S. § 1031(3-B)(B) (2016); and the record demonstrates 3
no bias on the part of the judge. To the contrary, the judge consistently treated
Murphy with respect, in stark contrast to her disruptive and contemptuous
treatment of the judge. We do not discuss those challenges further. See Murphy,
2010 ME 140, ¶ 2, 10 A.3d 697.
[¶5] Murphy additionally contends that the State and the court violated
her constitutional rights in conducting the proceedings. The record reflects just
the opposite. We briefly examine this challenge only to recognize the trial
court’s patient and focused actions to protect Murphy’s constitutional rights
and assure that she received a fair trial despite her uncooperative, disruptive,
insolent, and disrespectful behavior during the trial.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Prior Convictions
[¶6] The events leading up to this case began at least as early as a 2004
case in which Murphy was convicted of cruelty to animals. Murphy appealed,
alleging Fourth Amendment violations that to this day she insists made that
proceeding and each subsequent proceeding void. Murphy, Mem-06-125
(July 27, 2006). We affirmed her conviction in that case. Id. When Murphy was
convicted a second time of cruelty to animals—and other crimes—the court 4
(Murphy, J.)1 included the lifetime prohibition on owning or possessing animals
in its judgment. See 17 M.R.S. § 1031(3-B)(B). We affirmed that conviction as
well. Murphy, 2010 ME 140, ¶ 19, 10 A.3d 697.
B. Contempt
[¶7] On September 25, 2014, after receiving information from Murphy’s
neighbor that she was again possessing animals, the State filed a complaint
alleging that Murphy was keeping or possessing dogs or cats in violation of her
lifetime prohibition against owning or possessing animals. The State’s
complaint sought punitive sanctions against Murphy for contempt of court. See
4 M.R.S. § 114; M.R.U. Crim. P. 42; M.R. Civ. P. 66. On October 1, 2014, police
and animal welfare personnel executed a search warrant at Murphy’s home,
where they seized four dogs, five chinchillas, two rabbits, two cats, and a
potbellied pig. Murphy was served with a uniform summons and complaint for
contempt on the same day.
[¶8] Almost immediately, and without the assistance of counsel, Murphy
began filing a plethora of court papers. Murphy’s inscrutably dense filings, all
based on fanciful and jumbled legal theories, alleged a variety of structural and
1 The trial court and the defendant are not related. State v. Murphy, 2010 ME 140, ¶ 2 n.3, 10 A.3d
697. 5
procedural defects that she insisted had divested the Superior Court of
jurisdiction to hear the case, violated her constitutional rights, and voided any
prior judgments. Although it is not clear whether Murphy is relying on
admiralty law or the Uniform Commercial Code, none of her theories has a basis
in Maine law, applicable federal law, or constitutional concepts.
[¶9] Nor did Murphy attempt to address her challenges to the court in a
coherent fashion. Instead, the docket entries reveal that Murphy failed to
appear for hearings, and yet, despite the eventual appointment of counsel to
represent her, she continued to file copious documents in the trial court,
including two interlocutory appeals, all of which extended the proceeding over
the following two years.
C. Trial
[¶10] Finally, on November 16, 2016, after considerable effort to
document that Murphy had notice of the trial date, the court held a jury trial.
Murphy elected to represent herself after the court had appropriately warned
her that representing herself could put her at a disadvantage, that she would be
subject to the same rules as an attorney would be, and that she was entitled to
appointed counsel. See State v. Hill, 2014 ME 16, ¶¶ 6-8, 86 A.3d 628. The court
appointed standby counsel who had previously worked with Murphy to act as 6
Murphy’s “assistant” during parts of the trial. The court even exceeded due
process requirements by allowing Murphy to be seated at a table behind the
bar and to be accompanied by a personal support person, Richard Suchar,2 with
whom she was allowed to consult during the trial.
[¶11] Murphy made an opening statement in which she accused the
court of not understanding the Constitution and contended that her 2004
conviction was “void.” Two police officers and an animal welfare agent testified
for the State, and Murphy declined to cross-examine them. The 2010 judgment
and commitment prohibiting her possession of animals was admitted in
evidence, as were other documents. The State’s evidence, unrebutted by
Murphy, demonstrated that she was, again, acquiring animals; that her house
was severely cluttered; that several rooms were soaked in animal urine and
feces; and that Murphy did, in fact, possess animals in defiance of the court
order.
[¶12] After the State rested, Murphy testified on her own behalf.
Murphy’s testimony echoed her opening statement, insisting that the court had
no jurisdiction to decide the case against her. She also directly challenged the
2 Suchar has, himself, challenged the authority of a number of state actors in other matters. See
State v. Suchar, Mem-11-148 (Sept. 29, 2011); State v. Suchar, Mem-11-1 (Jan. 27, 2011). 7
prosecutor’s authority, asserting that his appointment was somehow defective
and therefore the proceeding was a nullity. Murphy’s court-appointed counsel
then called and briefly examined each of the State’s witnesses.
[¶13] After Murphy made a closing statement in which she again insisted
that the entirety of the proceedings against her violated her constitutional
rights, the jury found Murphy in contempt. Two days later, and before the court
issued a judgment on the verdict, Murphy filed a notice of appeal.
[¶14] Addressing Murphy at sentencing on December 2, 2016, the court
said, “I cannot imagine a situation where a defendant has been more
contemptuous of lawful court authority than Ms. Murphy has.” Turning to the
imposition of a punitive sanction, the court stated, “[A]s I understand the law
with respect to plenary contempt, it must be treated as a Class D offense. So the
maximum penalty that I may impose is a 364-day sentence. . . . A fine means
nothing in this case; it accomplishes absolutely nothing.”
[¶15] The court entered a judgment on the verdict on December 2, 2016,
sentencing Murphy to 364 days’ imprisonment.3 The judgment classified the
adjudication of contempt as a Class D crime. Murphy’s notice of appeal was
3 The State does not challenge the court’s determination that the length of the sentence was
limited by law to 364 days. 8
docketed on December 15, 2016. See M.R. Civ. P. 66(c)(5); see also 15 M.R.S.
§§ 2115, 2115-B(1) (2016); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(1), (b)(2)(A).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶16] The court’s actions here demonstrate the court’s patient diligence
in assuring that Murphy received the fairest trial possible despite her obstinate
refusal to respond to the elements of the charge against her. The court
appointed counsel to assist Murphy and warned her of the potential
consequences of representing herself when she largely refused counsel’s
assistance. Murphy received considerable latitude in her testimony and in her
opening and closing statements. The court responded with consistent restraint
to Murphy’s disrespectful and disruptive behavior and maintained the integrity
of the proceeding to its completion.
[¶17] Murphy received all of the due process safeguards provided by
Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 66(c). She had notice of the contempt charge, an
opportunity to be heard, and a full opportunity to present evidence. See M.R.
Civ. P. 66(c)(2); see generally M.R.U. Crim. P. Her case was heard by a properly
constituted jury in a trial in which the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
that she was in contempt. See M.R. Civ. P. 66(c)(2)(D). Murphy had access to
appointed counsel throughout the trial. See M.R. Civ. P. 66(c)(2); M.R.U. 9
Crim. P. 44(a)(1). Without question, Murphy received the fair trial to which the
Constitution entitles her.4
The entry is:
Judgment corrected by striking the “Class D” classification of the adjudication of contempt. As modified, judgment affirmed.
Carol Ann Murphy, appellant pro se
Andrew S. Robinson, District Attorney, and Joshua W. Robbins, Asst. Dist. Atty., Office of the District Attorney, Farmington, for appellee State of Maine
Franklin County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2014-950 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
4 We note, sua sponte, that the classification of the contempt adjudication on the judgment and
commitment as a Class D crime is not correct. The rule’s reference to a Class D crime assures that the defendant receives all the protections a defendant would receive when charged with a Class D crime, but the adjudication of contempt stands alone. M.R. Civ. P. 66(c)(2); State v. St. Onge, 2011 ME 73, ¶ 17, 21 A.3d 1028. On return to the Superior Court, the docket entries must be corrected to indicate that Murphy was convicted of contempt and sentenced to 364 days in prison. See St. Onge, 2011 ME 73, ¶ 18, 21 A.3d 1028.