State of Louisiana Versus Terrance Mosley

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-KH-580
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-KH-580

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

TERRANCE MOSLEY COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

February 10, 2025

Linda Wiseman First Deputy Clerk

IN RE TERRANCE MOSLEY

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE E. ADRIAN ADAMS, DIVISION "G", NUMBER 23-1762

Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson, Stephen J. Windhorst, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

WRIT DENIED

Defendant/relator, Terrance Mosley, seeks review of the trial court’s August

29, 2024 denial of his application for post-conviction relief. In his APCR, relator

claimed his guilty plea was involuntary and he had ineffective assistance of counsel

because he had an evident intellectual disability, and the trial court should have

ordered a sanity commission.

The trial court denied relator’s APCR, finding that relator’s claim of an

involuntary guilty plea was “procedurally barred” under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4B

because relator failed to raise this claim in the proceedings leading to his conviction.

The trial court also found that even if the procedural bar did not apply, the court was

not required to order a mental exam in that there was no reasonable ground to doubt

relator’s mental capacity to proceed. The trial court rejected the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim on similar grounds, concluding nothing was presented to

trigger any competent defense attorney to request a sanity hearing. The trial court also pointed out that counsel negotiated and secured a favorable plea agreement that

limited relator’s exposure.

In this writ application, relator re-urges his claims of an involuntary guilty

plea and ineffective assistance of counsel. The two claims are interrelated because

both are based on relator’s alleged lack of mental capacity. In this regard, relator

relies on a 30-year old evaluation dated June 20, 1990, that recommended special

education classes when relator was in elementary school. Upon review, we find no

error in the trial court’s denial of relator’s APCR.

First, relator’s alleged new evidence, a 30-year elementary school evaluation

recommending special education classes, is insufficient for his claim. As concluded

by the trial court, relator was aware of this evidence before he pled guilty and did

not present it to the court. Thus, the trial court properly found this claim was

procedurally barred under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4B.

Second, the 30-year old evaluation recommending special education classes

fails to provide any reasonable grounds to doubt defendant’s mental capacity to

proceed at the time of guilty plea. La. C.Cr.P. art. 643; State v. Barnett, 18-254 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 4/3/19), 267 So.3d 209, 229. According to case law, reasonable grounds

to doubt the defendant’s mental capacity to proceed refers to information that,

objectively considered, reasonably raises a doubt about the defendant’s competency

and alerts the court to the possibility the defendant cannot understand the

proceedings, appreciate the significance of the proceedings, or rationally aid his

attorney in his defense. State v. Wilt, 14-823 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/29/15), 170 So.3d

317, 325, writ denied, 15-1055 (La. 5/2/16), 206 So.3d 877. The ordering of a

mental examination falls within the sound discretion of the court. State v. Victor,

13-888 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/14), 167 So.3d 118, 127.

Third, relator’s waiver of rights form, dated the same date on which he pled

guilty, reflects that relator confirmed he was able to read, write, and understand the English language, and that he had no physical or mental impairment affecting his

ability to enter this guilty plea. In addition, relator failed to describe any behavior

or present any evidence that may have alerted counsel or the trial court of any issue

with his competency.

Finally, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show for an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, that the performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms;

and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. There is a strong

presumption that counsel’s performance is within the wide range of effective

representation. State ex rel Sparkman v. State, 15-1726 (La. 10/17/16), 202 So.3d

488, 491. Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel and the reviewing court

does not judge counsel’s performance with the distorting benefits of hindsight, but

rather determines whether counsel was reasonably likely to render effective

assistance. State v. Soler, 93-1042 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/26/94), 636 So.2d 1069, 1075.

The U.S. Supreme Court has emphatically directed that, “in evaluating the

performance of counsel, strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law

and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic

choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the

extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on

investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691.

Relator’s waiver of rights form indicates relator faced a sentencing range of

five to twenty years before counsel negotiated a nine-year habitual offender sentence

to run concurrently with his ten-year sentence. As recognized by the trial court,

counsel negotiated a favorable plea agreement for relator, as a result of which he

was charged only as a second-felony offender. Considering the foregoing, we find relator cannot meet his burden for post-

conviction relief under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. We therefore find no error in the trial

court’s denial of relator’s APCR and deny this writ.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 10th day of February, 2025.

SJW MEJ JJM SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIRST DEPUTY CLERK SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS DAY 02/10/2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-KH-580 E-NOTIFIED 24th Judicial District Court (Clerk) Honorable E. Adrian Adams (DISTRICT JUDGE) Thomas J. Butler (Respondent)

MAILED Terrance Mosley #364080 (Relator) Dixon Correctional Institute Post Office Box 788 Jackson, LA 70748