State of Louisiana Versus Shecorey Young

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: January 13, 2025
• Docket: 24-K-489
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-K-489

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

SHECOREY YOUNG, ET AL. COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

January 13, 2025

Linda Wiseman First Deputy Clerk

IN RE STATE OF LOUISIANA

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE DONALD A. ROWAN, JR., DIVISION "L", NUMBER 16-5624

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker, Stephen J. Windhorst, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

WRIT GRANTED

The State seeks a supervisory review of the trial court’s severing of the

defendant Shecorey Young from his co-defendants. For the following reasons, we

grant this writ application.

Procedural Background

On May 4, 2017, Shecorey Young (“Young”), Rashaud Robinson

(“Robinson”), and Demetrius Williams (“Williams”) were jointly indicted for

Second Degree Murder, Attempted Second Degree Murder, and related crimes.

The defendants pled not guilty. The State initially tried Robinson separately, with

that trial resulting in a hung jury. See State v. Robinson, 23-270 (La. App. 5 Cir.

6/23/23), 368 So.3d 730, 731, writ denied, 23-971 (La. 11/15/23), 373 So.3d 74.

The State filed a notice to try defendants jointly. On July 9, 2024, the case against

all three defendants proceeded to trial, and on July 11, 2024, the trial court

declared a mistrial.

24-K-489 On August 2, 2024, the State filed a memorandum responding to the

defendants’ motions to sever. In that memorandum, the State addressed

Robinson’s motion to sever, Young’s Bruton invocation, and Robinson’s motion in

limine. On that same date, the court held a pretrial hearing and discussed the

admissibility of jail calls evidence and motions to sever. The trial court did not

make any rulings.

At the September 26, 2024 hearing, the trial judge severed the defendant

Young from his co-defendants. This writ application followed.

Discussion

In its writ application, the State argues that the trial court erred in severing

defendant Young from his co-defendants. It further contends that Young did not

carry his heavy burden of showing specific prejudice to override the presumption

that jointly indicted defendants should be tried together under La. C.Cr.P. art. 704.

The State asserts that Young’s “Bruton issue” stemming from his complaint about

the playing of incriminating jail calls at trial is without merit, given that Bruton

does not apply to non-testimonial statements such as jail calls. It further contends

that Young also does not show that he and his co-defendants have antagonistic

defenses, the primary basis for showing entitlement to severance.

At the September 26, 2024 hearing, the prosecutor maintained that there was

no Bruton issue because jail calls were not Bruton. Additionally, he argued that

the jail calls were linked to all three defendants so that there was no prejudice, and

therefore, severance was not warranted.

The trial judge severed Young from his co-defendants, stating in pertinent

part:

Well, I’ve wrestled with it. I’ve looked at it. I disagree as it applies to Mr. Young. I believe that Mr. Young should be severed out. I’ll note your objection to that. I’ve listened to the jail calls. I was only able to get through maybe close to two-thirds of the calls. I’ve got to be honest with you, I don’t understand half of it. I’ll try to

2 finish it; but it’s very tedious to have to replay it, listen to it, replay it to understand what’s going on[.]

The trial judge subsequently said he was not ruling on the jail call recordings

because he had not finished listening to them. Therefore, the trial court did not

introduce the jail calls into evidence.

There is scant evidence to support the trial court’s grant of the motion to

sever. The trial court ruled on the motion to sever prematurely because it had not

ruled, and still has not ruled, on the admissibility of the jail calls.1 For this reason,

we grant this writ application and remand for a ruling on the admissibility of the

jail calls. The transcript of this hearing indicates that the State has not identified

the exact portions of the jail calls it intends to introduce and that the trial judge

cannot understand a large portion of the calls. For this reason, we order the state to

provide the trial court with the redacted audio and a certified transcription of the

specific portions of the calls it seeks to introduce so that the trial judge can

adequately rule on the admissibility of the calls. Once the admissibility of the jail

calls is determined, Young can re-urge his motion to sever.

Conclusion

For the preceding reasons, we are granting this writ application and vacating

the grant of the motion to sever.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 13th day of January, 2025.

JJM

1 As pointed out by the dissent, the trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion to sever. However, the dissent overlooks the fact that in this case, the trial judge ruled on the motion to sever without considering all of the evidence, i.e., the jail calls. 3 STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-K-489

WICKER, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS I concur with the writer’s conclusion, but write separately, first to

emphasize that we are not reversing the trial court’s decision to sever defendant’s

trial from his co-defendants’. Rather, we find only that the trial court must

complete its review of the recorded jail house calls before ruling upon the

defendant’s motion to sever. Therefore, we have vacated the trial court’s

judgment to sever defendant’s trial, to be again addressed by the trial court upon

completion of its review process. Given the trial court’s stated difficulty hearing

the audio recording of the recorded phone calls, we have also ordered the State to

provide the trial court with written transcripts of all of the jail house calls it intends

to introduce at trial either in its case in chief or rebuttal case, or on cross

examination of any defense witnesses who may testify in order to aid and assist

the trial court in its review of the audio tapes. We have also ordered the State to

clearly identify to the court and to opposing counsel any calls that it intends to

introduce at trial.

However, I also write separately to emphasize that I disagree with the

writer’s statement that “there is scant evidence to support the trial court’s grant of

the motion to sever.” Further, I agree entirely with the dissenter’s recitation of the

trial court’s history with this case, as well as the dissenter’s discussion of both the

applicable law and the trial court’s discretion to grant a severance “when the court,

on motion of the defendant, and after contradictory hearing with the district

attorney, is satisfied that justice requires a severance.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 704.

24-K-489 This defendant has been tried twice, with the first trial ending in a hung jury

and the second, joint trial (with Messrs. Robinson and Williams) ending in a

mistrial when the state tried to introduce tapes of jail house among Defendants

Williams, Robinson and Robinson’s brother, who was incarcerated at Angola.

Young was not a party to those calls. Those calls also apparently do not relate to

the crime for which the defendants are on trial and apparently do not refer to

Young at all.

The trial court is more than familiar with this case and opined that

Young’s case should be severed from the trial of the other two defendants, as has

been discussed in the thoughtful and well-reasoned dissent. While I agree with the

dissenter’s reasoning that the trial court is vested with great discretion in this

matter and did not lightly grant the severance, I continue to hold the opinion that

the trial court must first complete his review of the tapes of the calls before ruling

on the severance motion. Because we were not provided with any tapes or

transcripts of the jail house calls, we do not have sufficient evidence before us to

determine whether the severance was warranted. Should this Court be called upon

in the future to opine on any matters relating to the tapes of the jail house calls,

whether on application for supervisory writs or on appeal, the relevant filing

should include written transcripts of each of the jail house calls that the State

intends to introduce at trial as well as the audio recordings themselves.

FHW

2 STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-K-489

WINDHORST, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS

I respectfully dissent. Considering the record in this criminal case, the trial

court’s history with this case, and the trial court’s vast discretion, I would deny this

writ application.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 704 provides that trial of jointly indicted defendants may be

severed when the state elects to try them separately, or “when the court, on motion

of the defendant, and after contradictory hearing with the district attorney, is

satisfied that justice requires a severance.” [Emphasis added.] Defendant Shecorey

Young so moved, the trial court conducted a contradictory hearing with the district

attorney, and the trial judge concluded that justice requires severance.

Whether “justice requires a severance” must be determined by the facts of

each case. State v. Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729, 741 (La. 1984); State v. Condley, 04-

1349 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 904 So.2d 881, 890, writ denied, 05-1760 (La.

2/10/06), 924 So.2d 163. Louisiana jurisprudence clearly indicates that a trial

judge’s determination of whether to grant or deny severance rests in his sound

discretion, and this court will not reverse his ruling absent clear abuse. Id. The trial

court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion to

sever, and its determination should be upheld in the absence of an abuse of that

discretion. State v. Serigne, 16-1034 (La. 12/6/17), 232 So.3d 1227, 1231.

The trial judge in this case has presided over these cases for over seven years,

including a hung jury, and a second mistrial ordered well into the trial, upon his

24-K-489 finding that the trial of defendants jointly had become unjust. After the rigors of

picking a jury for three co-defendants charged with serious felonies—involving 72

peremptory challenges—and after opening statements and much evidence and

examination, trial courts do not grant mistrials for insignificant reasons. Against the

backdrop of this extensive experience, the trial judge made it clear that he believes

that “justice requires a severance” in this case. The trial judge further stated that by

granting the severance, he was not making a ruling on admissibility of the telephone

calls. Thus, he had reasons in addition to the Bruton concerns arising from possible

admission of the phone recordings.

The existence or non-existence of a Bruton issue among co-defendants is only

one of innumerable reasons for which a trial court could find that justice requires

severance. Regardless of the trial judge’s ultimate decision on admissibility of the

phone calls, he had plenty enough before him and through the history of the case to

soundly conclude that justice requires granting Young’s motion for severance.

Great deference in these matters is given to the trial judge’s discretion. In the

absence of an abuse of that discretion, we should not interfere with the trial judge’s

finding that justice requires severance here. This writ should be denied.

SJW

2 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIRST DEPUTY CLERK SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS DAY 01/13/2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-K-489 E-NOTIFIED 24th Judicial District Court (Clerk) Honorable Donald A. Rowan, Jr. (DISTRICT JUDGE) C. Gary Wainwright (Respondent) Thomas J. Butler (Relator) Darren A. Allemand (Relator)

MAILED Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr. (Relator) District Attorney Twenty-Fourth Judicial District 200 Derbigny Street Gretna, LA 70053