STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 25-K-23
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
JARRELL NEAL COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
February 24, 2025
Morgan Naquin Deputy Clerk
IN RE JARRELL NEAL
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE JACQUELINE F. MALONEY, DIVISION "D", NUMBER 23-4811
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Jude G. Gravois, and Marc E. Johnson
WRIT DENIED
Relator, Jarrell Neal, seeks this Court’s supervisory review of the trial
court’s ruling which granted the State of Louisiana’s motion to admit evidence
under La. C.E. art. 404(B) at relator’s upcoming trial for two counts of second
degree murder. For the following reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s ruling, and thus deny the writ application.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
For purposes of background, on May 21, 1998, a Jefferson Parish Grand
Jury indicted relator (Jarrell Neal), his older half-brother (Zannie Neal), and their
uncle (Arthur Darby), with two counts of first degree murder in violation of La.
R.S. 14:30.1 On February 27, 1999, a jury found relator guilty of two counts of
1 The trial court severed the brothers’ cases; see State v. Neal, 796 So.2d at 652. See Uniform Rules, Court of Appeal–Rule 2-1.14, which states, “Any record lodged in this court may, with leave of court, be used without necessity of duplication, in any other case on appeal or on writ.” first degree murder, and after a sentencing hearing, the jury returned with a death
recommendation on both counts. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed relator’s
convictions and sentences on June 29, 2001. State v. Neal, 00-674 (La. 6/29/01),
796 So.2d 649, 652-54, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1323, 152 L.Ed.2d
231 (2002). However, on May 20, 2022, relator’s writ of habeas corpus was
granted in federal court on grounds of trial and post-conviction counsels’
ineffectiveness, and his convictions and sentences were ordered to be set aside.
Neal v. Vannoy, 603 F.Supp.3d 310 (E.D. La. 2022). On October 12, 2023, a
Jefferson Parish Grand Jury returned an indictment charging relator with two
counts of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1.
On September 20, 2024, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Introduce
Evidence Under La. C.E. Article 404(B), seeking to introduce evidence of a prior
incident, occurring in 1996, involving relator and his brother that resulted in a
conviction. The State also sought to introduce a transcript of relator’s prior “note
of evidence” from 1996.
The State argued that evidence from the 1996 incident was admissible under
La. C.E. art. 404(B) to show motive, opportunity, plan, and absence of mistake. It
contended that the narcotics evidence demonstrated relator’s involvement in drug
distribution, the alleged motive for the homicides, while the firearms evidence,
including an AK-47-style rifle and ammunition, showed his access to a weapon
similar to the murder weapon. The State also asserted that relator’s explanation
during the 1996 case—that someone handed him incriminating evidence—
mirrored his defense in the first trial of this case, making the evidence relevant to
assess his credibility. Additionally, the State argued the evidence was more
As for Arthur Darby, in exchange for his testimony in both brothers’ cases, see Neal, 796 So.2d at 652, on December 1, 1999, he pled guilty to two counts of manslaughter in violation of La. R.S. 14:31 and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment on each count to run concurrently. probative than prejudicial and emphasized that remoteness affects weight, not
admissibility. To support its position, the State cited State v. Joseph, 16-349 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 12/14/16), 208 So.3d 1036, writ denied, 17-77 (La. 4/7/17), 218 So.3d
109, and State v. Everett, 11-714 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/12), 96 So.3d 605, 632-33,
writs denied, 12-1593, 12-1610 (La. 2/8/13), 108 So.3d 77.
Relator filed an Objection to State’s 404(B) Notice and Incorporated Motion
in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant “Bad Acts” Evidence. He argued that the State
broadly seeks to introduce evidence related to the 1996 incident at his trial for
second degree murder. He maintained that the evidence is unrelated to the charged
offense, has no bearing on any fact at issue, and is unnecessary to the State’s
narrative, warranting its exclusion. He provided that the State emphasized one
aspect of the 1999 trial defense, where he claimed to have been in the car during
the crime, unaware of the homicides, until his uncle returned to the car and handed
him a Norinco MAK-90 rifle. Relator contended that the State did not establish a
connection between that theory and his arrest years earlier for possession of a
different weapon, in a different jurisdiction, for unrelated crimes with no victims.
A hearing was held on the State’s notice of intent on November 15, 2024.
On the same day, the trial court granted the State’s notice of intent regarding
evidence of relator’s prior drug conviction and related facts, evidence of relator’s
prior possession of a Norinco AK-47 assault rifle, its ammunition, and magazine,
as well as relator’s “prior note of evidence.” The trial court ruled that evidence of
relator’s prior drug conviction, possession of a Norinco AK-47 rifle, ammunition,
and magazine, as well as his prior “notice of evidence,” was admissible. The court
found this evidence probative of motive, plan, and opportunity, outweighing any
prejudicial effect.
Relator argues herein that the trial court erred in admitting evidence from the
1996 incident, asserting it is irrelevant, cumulative, and highly prejudicial. He maintains that the firearm found in 1996 was different in make and model from the
murder weapon and that the incidents were separated by two years and a prison
term, negating any continuity or opportunity. He contends that mere proximity to
an unrelated firearm years earlier does not establish possession of the murder
weapon and improperly suggests a criminal propensity. Additionally, he
challenges the admissibility of his 1996 drug arrest, arguing it is unrelated to
proving motive, plan, or opportunity in the 1998 homicides. He asserts that the
two incidents are distinct and that the State’s reliance on this evidence to
corroborate a drug debt motive is improper under La. C.E. art. 404(B). Lastly, he
opposes the admission of his 1996 “notice of evidence,” contending it is premature
and irrelevant, as it is being used to rebut a defense theory not yet presented.
ANALYSIS
Generally, evidence of other crimes or bad acts committed by a criminal
defendant is not admissible at trial. State v. Neveaux, 23-477 (La. App. 5 Cir.
11/10/23), 377 So.3d 749, 757, writ denied, 23-1633 (La. 3/12/24), 381 So.3d 56.
Courts may not admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of a criminal
defendant in order to show that the defendant is a person of bad character who has
acted in conformity therewith. La. C.E. art. 404(B); State v. Hardy, 14-1569 (La.
11/21/14), 154 So.3d 537, 538. However, when evidence of other crimes tends to
prove a material issue and has independent relevance other than to show that the
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STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 25-K-23
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
JARRELL NEAL COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
February 24, 2025
Morgan Naquin Deputy Clerk
IN RE JARRELL NEAL
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE JACQUELINE F. MALONEY, DIVISION "D", NUMBER 23-4811
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Jude G. Gravois, and Marc E. Johnson
WRIT DENIED
Relator, Jarrell Neal, seeks this Court’s supervisory review of the trial
court’s ruling which granted the State of Louisiana’s motion to admit evidence
under La. C.E. art. 404(B) at relator’s upcoming trial for two counts of second
degree murder. For the following reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s ruling, and thus deny the writ application.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
For purposes of background, on May 21, 1998, a Jefferson Parish Grand
Jury indicted relator (Jarrell Neal), his older half-brother (Zannie Neal), and their
uncle (Arthur Darby), with two counts of first degree murder in violation of La.
R.S. 14:30.1 On February 27, 1999, a jury found relator guilty of two counts of
1 The trial court severed the brothers’ cases; see State v. Neal, 796 So.2d at 652. See Uniform Rules, Court of Appeal–Rule 2-1.14, which states, “Any record lodged in this court may, with leave of court, be used without necessity of duplication, in any other case on appeal or on writ.” first degree murder, and after a sentencing hearing, the jury returned with a death
recommendation on both counts. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed relator’s
convictions and sentences on June 29, 2001. State v. Neal, 00-674 (La. 6/29/01),
796 So.2d 649, 652-54, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1323, 152 L.Ed.2d
231 (2002). However, on May 20, 2022, relator’s writ of habeas corpus was
granted in federal court on grounds of trial and post-conviction counsels’
ineffectiveness, and his convictions and sentences were ordered to be set aside.
Neal v. Vannoy, 603 F.Supp.3d 310 (E.D. La. 2022). On October 12, 2023, a
Jefferson Parish Grand Jury returned an indictment charging relator with two
counts of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1.
On September 20, 2024, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Introduce
Evidence Under La. C.E. Article 404(B), seeking to introduce evidence of a prior
incident, occurring in 1996, involving relator and his brother that resulted in a
conviction. The State also sought to introduce a transcript of relator’s prior “note
of evidence” from 1996.
The State argued that evidence from the 1996 incident was admissible under
La. C.E. art. 404(B) to show motive, opportunity, plan, and absence of mistake. It
contended that the narcotics evidence demonstrated relator’s involvement in drug
distribution, the alleged motive for the homicides, while the firearms evidence,
including an AK-47-style rifle and ammunition, showed his access to a weapon
similar to the murder weapon. The State also asserted that relator’s explanation
during the 1996 case—that someone handed him incriminating evidence—
mirrored his defense in the first trial of this case, making the evidence relevant to
assess his credibility. Additionally, the State argued the evidence was more
As for Arthur Darby, in exchange for his testimony in both brothers’ cases, see Neal, 796 So.2d at 652, on December 1, 1999, he pled guilty to two counts of manslaughter in violation of La. R.S. 14:31 and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment on each count to run concurrently. probative than prejudicial and emphasized that remoteness affects weight, not
admissibility. To support its position, the State cited State v. Joseph, 16-349 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 12/14/16), 208 So.3d 1036, writ denied, 17-77 (La. 4/7/17), 218 So.3d
109, and State v. Everett, 11-714 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/12), 96 So.3d 605, 632-33,
writs denied, 12-1593, 12-1610 (La. 2/8/13), 108 So.3d 77.
Relator filed an Objection to State’s 404(B) Notice and Incorporated Motion
in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant “Bad Acts” Evidence. He argued that the State
broadly seeks to introduce evidence related to the 1996 incident at his trial for
second degree murder. He maintained that the evidence is unrelated to the charged
offense, has no bearing on any fact at issue, and is unnecessary to the State’s
narrative, warranting its exclusion. He provided that the State emphasized one
aspect of the 1999 trial defense, where he claimed to have been in the car during
the crime, unaware of the homicides, until his uncle returned to the car and handed
him a Norinco MAK-90 rifle. Relator contended that the State did not establish a
connection between that theory and his arrest years earlier for possession of a
different weapon, in a different jurisdiction, for unrelated crimes with no victims.
A hearing was held on the State’s notice of intent on November 15, 2024.
On the same day, the trial court granted the State’s notice of intent regarding
evidence of relator’s prior drug conviction and related facts, evidence of relator’s
prior possession of a Norinco AK-47 assault rifle, its ammunition, and magazine,
as well as relator’s “prior note of evidence.” The trial court ruled that evidence of
relator’s prior drug conviction, possession of a Norinco AK-47 rifle, ammunition,
and magazine, as well as his prior “notice of evidence,” was admissible. The court
found this evidence probative of motive, plan, and opportunity, outweighing any
prejudicial effect.
Relator argues herein that the trial court erred in admitting evidence from the
1996 incident, asserting it is irrelevant, cumulative, and highly prejudicial. He maintains that the firearm found in 1996 was different in make and model from the
murder weapon and that the incidents were separated by two years and a prison
term, negating any continuity or opportunity. He contends that mere proximity to
an unrelated firearm years earlier does not establish possession of the murder
weapon and improperly suggests a criminal propensity. Additionally, he
challenges the admissibility of his 1996 drug arrest, arguing it is unrelated to
proving motive, plan, or opportunity in the 1998 homicides. He asserts that the
two incidents are distinct and that the State’s reliance on this evidence to
corroborate a drug debt motive is improper under La. C.E. art. 404(B). Lastly, he
opposes the admission of his 1996 “notice of evidence,” contending it is premature
and irrelevant, as it is being used to rebut a defense theory not yet presented.
ANALYSIS
Generally, evidence of other crimes or bad acts committed by a criminal
defendant is not admissible at trial. State v. Neveaux, 23-477 (La. App. 5 Cir.
11/10/23), 377 So.3d 749, 757, writ denied, 23-1633 (La. 3/12/24), 381 So.3d 56.
Courts may not admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of a criminal
defendant in order to show that the defendant is a person of bad character who has
acted in conformity therewith. La. C.E. art. 404(B); State v. Hardy, 14-1569 (La.
11/21/14), 154 So.3d 537, 538. However, when evidence of other crimes tends to
prove a material issue and has independent relevance other than to show that the
defendant is of bad character, it may be admitted by certain statutory and
jurisprudential exceptions to this rule. State v. Jenkins, 18-645 (La. App. 5 Cir.
4/3/19), 267 So.3d 203, 207, writ denied, 19-1223 (La. 10/21/19), 280 So.3d 1169.
The State may introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts if it establishes
an independent and relevant reason for its admissibility, such as to show motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. La. C.E. art. 404(B); Hardy, supra. The evidence must tend to prove a material fact at issue or to rebut a defendant’s defense. State v. Martin, 377
So.2d 259, 263 (La. 1979).
The fact that the other acts or crimes happened some time before the offense
for which defendant is on trial is not sufficient, in and of itself, to require the
exclusion of the evidence. State v. Guidroz, 98-377 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/14/98),
721 So.2d 480, 486, writ denied, 98-2874 (La. 2/26/99), 738 So.2d 1061.
Remoteness in time, in most cases, is only one factor to be considered when
determining whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect. Generally, a lapse in time will go to the weight of the evidence rather than
to its admissibility. Jackson, supra; Guidroz, supra.
Finally, the probative value of the extraneous evidence must outweigh its
prejudicial effect. State v. Page, 08-531 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/10/09), 28 So.3d 442,
451, writ denied, 09-2684 (La. 6/4/10), 38 So.3d 299. Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. La. C.E. art. 403. Clearly,
evidence of other crimes or bad acts is prejudicial since all evidence which tends to
show it more probable than not that an individual committed a criminal offense is
necessarily prejudicial. State v. Williams, 02-645 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/26/02), 833
So.2d 497, 507, writ denied, 02-3182 (La. 4/25/03), 842 So.2d 398. The
underlying policy is to protect against unfair prejudice when the evidence is only
marginally relevant to the determination of guilt of the charged crime. Id. As used
in the balancing test, “prejudicial” limits the introduction of probative evidence of
prior misconduct only when it is unduly and unfairly prejudicial. State v. Rodgers,
16-14 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/26/16), 202 So.3d 1189, 1201, writs denied, 16-2189
(La. 9/15/17), 225 So.3d 479, and 16-2093 (La. 1/29/18), 235 So.3d 1104. Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of
evidence pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1) will not be disturbed. Jenkins, supra.
The erroneous admission of other crimes evidence is subject to a harmless error
analysis. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 921; State v. Johnson, 94-1379 (La. 11/27/95), 664
So.2d 94, 100-01 (errors leading to improper admission of evidence subject to
harmless-error analysis; error is harmless if verdict “surely unattributable” to the
error, quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124
L.Ed.2d 182 (1993)).
This case involves the second trial of relator. In the original trial, relator
was convicted of the 1998 first degree murders of Gregory Vickers and Fergus
Robinson at Claudette Hurst’s home in Metairie. Neal v. Vannoy, 603 F.Supp.3d
310, 316 (E.D. La. 2022). Relator is now facing trial for two counts of second
degree murder of the same victims.
Having thoroughly considered the writ application, as well as the applicable
law, on the showing made, we decline to disturb the trial court’s ruling. The trial
court’s determination that the evidence’s relevance and probity outweigh its
prejudice has not been overcome by relator herein. While relator emphasizes the
differences between the 1996 incident and the 1998 crimes for which he faces trial
now, the trial court noted similarities, including the involvement of firearms and
drug activities. We see no abuse of the trial court’s great discretion in its ruling on
the State’s notice of intent to introduce evidence pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(B).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this writ application is denied.
Gretna, Louisiana, this 24th day of February, 2025.
JGG SMC MEJ SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIRST DEPUTY CLERK SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org
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25-K-23 E-NOTIFIED 24th Judicial District Court (Clerk) Honorable Jacqueline F. Maloney (DISTRICT JUDGE) Matthew R. Clauss (Respondent) Thomas J. Butler (Respondent) Russell D. Barksdale (Relator) Gregory Q. Carter (Relator)
MAILED Erica L. Navalance (Relator) Attorney at Law The Promise of Justice Initiative 1024 Elysian Fields Avenue New Orleans, LA 70116