STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 20-KA-129
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
FREDERICK SEYMORE, JR. COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE FORTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 16,340, DIVISION "A" HONORABLE MADELINE JASMINE, JUDGE PRESIDING
November 04, 2020
HANS J. LILJEBERG JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois, Robert A. Chaisson, and Hans J. Liljeberg
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED HJL JGG RAC COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA Honorable Bridget A. Dinvaut William R. Dieters
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, FREDERICK SEYMORE, JR. Prentice L. White LILJEBERG, J.
Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for second degree murder,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and arguing that the non-unanimous
jury verdict was unconstitutional. Considering the holding of Ramos v. Louisiana,
infra, we vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence, and we remand to the trial
court for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 10, 2016, a St. John the Baptist Parish Grand Jury returned an
indictment charging defendant, Frederick Seymore Jr., with the second degree
murder of Tory Horton, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced before a twelve-person jury on June 24,
2019. On June 27, 2019, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. The
verdict was not unanimous. On January 6, 2020, the trial court sentenced
defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence. Immediately after sentencing, defendant
filed a motion for appeal, which the trial court granted.
At trial, Sergeant Joshua Gilboy of the St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriff’s
Office testified that on August 5, 2016, he was with Sergeant Michael Gill when
they were called to the LaPlace Discount gas station and store (“LaPlace
Discount”) located at 820 Airline Highway in LaPlace, Louisiana, in reference to a
shooting. When they arrived at the store, Sergeant Gilboy observed blood on the
floor and saw the victim, later identified as Tory Horton, lying in the hallway near
the manager’s office. Sergeant Gilboy testified that Sergeant Gill performed CPR
on the victim while he secured the scene. After members of the fire department
arrived to assist with life-saving services, Sergeant Gilboy and Sergeant Gill began
20-KA-129 1 searching for a “red sedan” in relation to the shooting while other officers
canvassed the scene for witnesses.1
The victim was initially transported to River Parish Hospital, where it was
decided that he would be transferred to University Hospital. During the ambulance
transport to University Hospital, the victim had medical complications and died
while returning to River Parish Hospital.2 Tory was sixteen years old at the time of
his death.
During the course of the investigation, officers were provided with two
names, “Gator” and “Bruce,” and they were able to locate Bruce Butler. At trial,
Bruce Butler testified that he witnessed defendant shoot the victim on August 5,
2016, and he identified defendant in open court. He explained that he knew
defendant from school, and they would “hang out” regularly. He confirmed that
defendant’s nickname was “Gator.”
Mr. Butler testified that defendant picked him up in a red car on the day of
the shooting. They went to Walgreens to conduct a drug exchange but relocated to
LaPlace Discount to complete the transaction. After exiting the vehicle, Mr. Butler
entered another car to finish the drug exchange and returned to the passenger seat
of defendant’s car. Mr. Butler stated that his window was rolled down because it
was hot outside. He testified that “the little boy came up to the car” after defendant
called him over. According to Mr. Butler, defendant reached across him and shot
the victim, who was standing about three feet from the open, passenger window.
Mr. Butler denied knowing that defendant had a gun or that he planned to shoot
Tory.
1 Surveillance video footage recovered from LaPlace Discount revealed a red vehicle pulling alongside the victim before he was shot. 2 Dr. Samantha Huber, an expert in the field of forensic pathology, testified that she performed the autopsy of Tory. She testified that he died from a gunshot wound which entered the left chest, passed through ribs, bone, and lung, and exited through the right back.
20-KA-129 2 Mr. Butler testified that defendant drove away from the scene after the
shooting, and Mr. Butler exited the vehicle in front of Cambridge Drive because he
had to go to work. Mr. Butler testified that he and defendant did not speak after
the victim was shot. He went to his house after the shooting and the police arrived
about five hours later. Mr. Butler admitted that he tried to leave his home when
the police arrived. During the search of his home, bullets were found in his closet,
but Mr. Butler testified they were not used on August 5, 2016. Mr. Butler
responded that he “did not know” in response to questioning about why he
showered and washed his hands, and “got rid of his clothing” before the police
arrived.
Mr. Butler testified that he was arrested in connection with the victim’s
murder, but the charges against him were dismissed. He denied any promises were
made in exchange for his testimony. Mr. Butler testified that he spoke with
detectives several times after the shooting, and he admitted that he lied during
questioning. Mr. Butler also admitted that he had prior criminal convictions.
Detective Brandon Barlow was the lead investigator in this case. He
testified that he reviewed photographs taken at the scene and spoke with witnesses
on the scene who indicated they did not observe the actual shooting. Detective
Barlow testified that he reviewed the August 5, 2016 surveillance video footage
obtained from LaPlace Discount. The detective noted the victim entering the scene
around 3:30 p.m. on August 5, 2016, and he identified the individual as Tory
Horton. He asserted that the video showed the victim entering and exiting the store
and “hanging out” in the store’s parking lot before the shooting. Detective Barlow
described the victim walking away from the store and defendant’s red vehicle,
which was registered to defendant’s mother, coming to a stop alongside him. He
asserted that defendant’s vehicle then accelerated from the parking lot and Tory
started running toward the store. The detective saw Tory on the video in the front
20-KA-129 3 area of the store with a “large collection of blood” on his T-shirt. Detective
Barlow also confirmed that he saw Mr. Butler, wearing dark blue and white
clothes, exiting defendant’s vehicle in the footage. The detective stated that a
search of Mr. Butler’s residence on Cambridge Drive was conducted, and his
clothing from that day was collected.
Detective Barlow testified that crime cameras set up throughout the parish
captured defendant’s vehicle’s movements from earlier on August 5, 2016. The
cameras revealed the vehicle traveling to the Walgreens parking lot but did not
capture its relocation to LaPlace Discount. He explained that after the shooting,
the vehicle took a right from the LaPlace Discount parking lot onto Cambridge
Drive and traveled north. Based on this information, a “BOLO” was established
for the vehicle and shared with the other departments within the area.3 The vehicle
was located by the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office after receiving a “suspicious
vehicle call” at an apartment complex. Detective Barlow identified photographs
taken of the vehicle at the apartment complex, and he stated that they obtained and
executed a search warrant for the vehicle. No firearms or casings, proof of
insurance, or registration were recovered from the vehicle; however, a tax form
containing defendant’s name was found in the car.
Detective Barlow further testified that the police obtained surveillance video
footage from near the apartment complex, and he reviewed the footage. On the
video, he observed the vehicle, a red Toyota Corolla, pull into the apartment
complex’s parking lot on August 5, 2016, at approximately 6:00 p.m. Detective
Barlow testified that defendant exited the vehicle, turned to the driver’s door, and
wiped the area with his shirt. The detective noted a different black male in the
video return to the vehicle later that night at approximately 7:40 p.m. and enter the
driver-side door.
3 Detective Barlow explained that a BOLO stands for “Be On The Lookout.”
20-KA-129 4 Detective Barlow testified that video footage from two days after the
shooting, August 7, 2016, revealed that two individuals returned to the vehicle and
removed several items, including the license plate. The individuals were later
identified as defendant’s cousins, Travis Stewart and Jarell Vanzant.
Detective Barlow testified that he obtained an arrest warrant for defendant,
and he was located in Houston, Texas. He testified that he spoke with defendant
after his arrest, and defendant gave a statement after he was advised of and waived
his rights. The detective stated that defendant admitted he knew the victim’s
brother, Cory Horton. Defendant informed Detective Barlow that Cory, whom he
knew as “Lil Co,” had previously broken into his vehicle to steal narcotics but stole
a book bag containing a PlayStation 4 instead. According to the detective,
defendant indicated that he reported the incident to the police. Deputy Galen
Joseph testified and confirmed that defendant reported a vehicle burglary on April
21, 2016, and defendant informed him that the perpetrator was “Lil Co.”
Detective Barlow explained that during his statement, defendant mentioned
picking up Mr. Butler from his residence on August 5, 2016. He stated that he
brought Mr. Butler to Walgreens to complete a drug transaction and then they
relocated to LaPlace Discount. Defendant indicated that Mr. Butler entered the
store to purchase cigars, which the surveillance video footage did not support.
Defendant told the detective that he had received a call from Mr. Butler earlier that
day, and Mr. Butler said he had been robbed at his residence by two individuals
who fled with marijuana. Detective Barlow testified that, according to defendant,
Mr. Butler rolled the window down and said, “that’s one of them” before shooting
Tory.4
According to Detective Barlow, defendant told him that after Mr. Butler left
his vehicle, he went to a gas station in Kenner. Defendant said that he left his car
4 In his testimony, Mr. Butler denied that the victim stole marijuana from him earlier that day.
20-KA-129 5 running while he went inside the gas station to call his father, and his car was
missing upon his return. Defendant told the detective that he did not report the
missing vehicle and instead gathered money to purchase a ticket to Houston. After
he was informed about the surveillance footage from the apartment complex on
August 5, 2016, defendant admitted he had left his vehicle in Metairie before
leaving for Houston. Detective Barlow testified that defendant denied giving his
keys to anyone or knowing that any individuals returned to his vehicle afterwards.
When asked why Mr. Butler’s clothing was not tested for gunshot residue,
Detective Barlow stated, “[p]artially because, inside that car, it’s a tight fit, so both
of them were in close contact.” He explained that Mr. Butler and defendant both
would likely have had gunshot residue on them, regardless of who fired the shot.
Jarell Vanzant testified that he saw defendant on August 5, 2016, and gave
him a ride to the bus station. He explained that defendant went out of town to visit
his girlfriend. Mr. Vanzant denied that defendant told him anything that he had
done that day. On the following Sunday, defendant asked him to remove items
from his vehicle—including the radio, license plate, registration, and paperwork—
and bring the items to his father. Mr. Vanzant testified that he learned about the
homicide after watching the news, and he told defendant to turn himself in when
they spoke on the phone. Mr. Vanzant testified that during his statement to the
sheriff’s office, he told officers that defendant said, “he had to do what he had to
do.” He clarified that defendant did not admit to shooting anyone and denied any
wrongdoing. Mr. Vanzant admitted during his testimony that he had prior criminal
convictions.
Detective Barlow testified that he took a recorded statement from Mr.
Vanzant, who identified himself as defendant’s cousin, on September 22, 2016.
He noted that Mr. Vanzant mentioned defendant’s ongoing issue with the victim’s
brother and that defendant felt bullied in their narcotic exchanges. According to
20-KA-129 6 Detective Barlow, Mr. Vanzant provided that defendant “did what he felt he had to
do when he saw the younger brother that day.” Detective Barlow further testified
that Mr. Vanzant informed him that defendant admitted to shooting the victim.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
On appeal, in defendant’s first assignment of error, he argues that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder.
Defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was the perpetrator of the crime. He notes that both he and Bruce Butler admit
they were present when the shooting occurred, and the only witness who identified
him as the shooter was Bruce Butler. Defendant argues that Mr. Butler’s
identification of defendant was not believable as he testified in his own interests,
and he repeatedly lied throughout the investigation. Defendant also complains that
the testimony of Mr. Vanzant was used by the State to infer that defendant had a
guilty conscience following the shooting, but Mr. Vanzant did not testify that
defendant admitted to being involved in the shooting. Finally, defendant argues
that a gunshot residue test of Mr. Butler’s clothing should have been conducted,
because it would have revealed whether Mr. Butler was only a passenger in the
vehicle or the actual shooter.
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, an appellate court must determine
that the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a mixture of both, viewed in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational
trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d
560 (1979); State v. Neal, 00-674 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657, cert. denied,
535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1323, 152 L.Ed.2d 231 (2002).
In cases involving circumstantial evidence, the trial court must instruct the
jury that “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in
20-KA-129 7 order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” La.
R.S. 15:438. The reviewing court is not required to determine whether another
possible hypothesis of innocence suggested by the defendant offers an exculpatory
explanation of events. Rather, the reviewing court must determine whether the
possible alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could
not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mitchell, 99-
3342 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78, 83; State v. Washington, 03-1135 (La. App. 5
Cir. 1/27/04), 866 So.2d 973, 977.
In the instant case, defendant was convicted of second degree murder, which
is defined as the killing of a human being when the offender: (1) has specific intent
to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2) is engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of one of several enumerated felonies, even though he has
no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1; State v. Harris,
15-485 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/13/16), 190 So.3d 466, 474, writ denied, 16-902 (La.
5/12/17), 220 So.3d 746. At trial, the State proceeded under the first theory—
specific intent. Defendant does not allege on appeal that the State failed to prove
the essential statutory elements of the crime for which he was convicted. Rather,
defendant challenges his conviction on the basis that the evidence was insufficient
to prove his identity as the perpetrator of the offense.
Encompassed within proving the elements of an offense is the necessity of
proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. State v. Ray, 12-684 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 4/10/13), 115 So.3d 17, 20, writ denied, 13-1115 (La. 10/25/13), 124
So.3d 1096. Where the key issue is identification, the State is required to negate
any reasonable probability of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof.
Id. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical
evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to
support a requisite factual finding. State v. Caffrey, 08-717 (La. App. 5 Cir.
20-KA-129 8 5/12/09), 15 So.3d 198, 203, writ denied, 09-1305 (La. 2/5/10), 27 So.3d 297. A
reviewing court may impinge on the fact-finder’s discretion only to the extent
necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law. State v. Harris, 02-
1589 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 709, 713 (citing State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305,
1310 (La. 1988)).
In the present case, the record reveals that the State proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was the perpetrator of the murder. The jury heard
the testimony of Mr. Butler, who stated that defendant drove him to LaPlace
Discount to complete a narcotics exchange. He testified that Tory came up to the
passenger side of the vehicle after defendant called him over, and defendant
reached across him and shot the victim through the open, passenger window.
Surveillance video footage from LaPlace Discount, which was published to the
jury, confirmed Mr. Butler’s presence and that defendant’s vehicle stopped next to
Tory, who was on the passenger side, before he ran toward the gas station after
being shot.
Detective Barlow testified that surveillance video footage revealed that
defendant parked a red Toyota Corolla in an apartment complex around 6 p.m. on
August 5, 2016, and appeared to wipe down the car before leaving. The vehicle
was registered to defendant’s mother, Lisa Seymore. Additionally, the surveillance
footage from near the apartment complex on August 7, 2016, showed two
individuals, identified as Travis Stewart and Jarrell Vanzant, return to the vehicle
and remove several items, including the license plate. Mr. Vanzant testified that he
saw defendant on August 5, 2016, and gave him a ride to the bus station so he
could visit his girlfriend. Mr. Vanzant further provided that defendant asked him
to remove certain items, including his license plate and his registration, from his
vehicle because he did not want anyone to steal his belongings. Mr. Vanzant
stated that defendant said, “he had to do what he had to do.”
20-KA-129 9 Defendant argues that although the State used Mr. Vanzant’s testimony to
infer a guilty conscience following the shooting, it only established that he left for
Houston to visit his girlfriend and that he asked him to remove items from his car
to prevent them from being stolen. However, while Mr. Vanzant testified that
defendant did not tell him he shot the victim, Detective Barlow testified that Mr.
Vanzant indicated in his statement that defendant admitted he shot Tory. Detective
Barlow also testified that in his statement, Mr. Vanzant stated that defendant felt
bullied by the victim’s brother and that “he did what he felt he had to do when he
saw his younger brother that day.” Detective Barlow also testified that defendant
previously reported an incident in which his vehicle was burglarized by the
victim’s brother, Cory, whom he knew as “Lil Co.”
The State presented additional evidence from which a rational trier of fact
could have inferred that defendant had a guilty conscience. After the incident,
defendant failed to report the shooting and fled from the scene. Detective Barlow
testified that defendant initially said his vehicle was stolen after the homicide, but
when he was confronted with surveillance footage, defendant admitted he left his
vehicle in Metairie before leaving for Houston. A defendant’s flight and attempt to
avoid apprehension are circumstances from which a trier of fact may infer a guilty
conscience. State v. Cazenave, 00-183 (La. App. 5 Cir 10/31/00), 772 So.2d 854,
860, writ denied, 00-3297 (La. 10/26/01), 799 So.2d 1151; See also State v.
Patterson, 10-415 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11), 63 So.3d 140, 150.
Defendant asserts that his conviction was based on Mr. Butler’s “self-
serving” testimony, relying heavily on the fact that Mr. Butler provided false or
inconsistent statements during the course of the investigation. Although the record
reflects that Mr. Butler made several inconsistent and contradicting statements to
the police after the shooting, these inconsistent statements were heard and
considered by the jury and ultimately went to the witness’ credibility. The
20-KA-129 10 credibility of witnesses presenting conflicting testimony on factual matters is
within the sound discretion of the trier of fact. State v. Jones, 08-20 (La. App. 5
Cir. 4/15/08), 985 So.2d 234, 240. Where there is conflicting testimony about
factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the
credibility of witnesses, this is a matter of the weight of the evidence, not its
sufficiency. State v. Miller, 11-498 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/13/11), 84 So.3d 611, 617,
writ denied, 12-176 (La. 9/14/12), 97 So.3d 1012. The credibility of witnesses will
not be reweighed on appeal. Id.
Defendant also complains that the State did not have Mr. Butler’s clothing
tested for gunshot residue and claims the test would have definitively proven who
shot Tory. However, Detective Barlow explained that defendant and Mr. Butler
were both inside of the vehicle during the shooting. Therefore, he would have
expected Mr. Butler to have residue on him because he was within the area where
the gun was fired.
In light of the foregoing, we find the evidence was sufficient to convince a
rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot and killed Tory
Horton on August 5, 2016. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient under the
Jackson standard to support defendant’s second degree murder conviction. This
assignment of error is without merit.
In his second assignment or error, defendant argues that the trial court erred
in accepting a non-unanimous jury verdict in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recent ruling in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. --, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583
(2020). He argues that the trial judge referred to the verdict as being responsive,
which indicated that the verdict was not unanimous, and he later learned that the
guilty verdict was by a vote of ten to two. Defendant contends that because the
jury’s verdict was not unanimous, his conviction and sentence for second degree
murder should be vacated pursuant to Ramos.
20-KA-129 11 On June 27, 2019, the jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder,
in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Since the punishment for this offense is
necessarily confinement at hard labor, a jury of twelve persons was required. See
La. Const. Art. I, § 17; La. C.Cr.P. art. 782; La. R.S. 14:30.1. The record reflects
that the jury was polled, and the results were discussed in a sidebar conference that
was not transcribed. Thereafter, the trial court stated, “[t]he verdict is responsive.
The Court adopts the verdict of the jury as the verdict of the Court.” On appeal,
defendant states that a conference call occurred with the trial judge and prosecutor
confirming a ten to two verdict.
On June 9, 2020, defendant filed a Motion to Supplement the Record,
requesting that the jurors’ polling slips be included in the record on appeal. This
Court granted the motion that same date. On June 22, 2020, the record was
supplemented; however, the record reflects only eleven polling slips were
provided. Of these eleven polling slips, nine reflect a verdict of guilty and two
reflect a verdict of not guilty. Because one slip is missing, the final vote is
unknown. Regardless, the polling slips confirm the verdict was not unanimous. 5
Non-unanimous verdicts were previously allowed under La. Const. Art. I, §
17 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 782 and the circumstances of the instant case. However, in
Ramos, supra, the United States Supreme Court found that the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial—as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment—requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious
offense. The Court concluded: “There can be no question either that the Sixth
Amendment’s unanimity requirement applies to state and federal trials equally …
5 Defendant’s offense was committed prior to January 1, 2019, and therefore, the pre-amendment version of the statutes applied at that time, requiring that ten jurors must concur to render a verdict. See La. Const. Art. I, § 17 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 782(A). Because the final vote is unknown, the missing slip could show that defendant was convicted by a vote of ten out of twelve or an improper vote of nine out of twelve. Defendant would be entitled to a new trial if the polling slips revealed an insufficient number of votes to find a verdict in the instant case. See State v. Cook, 396 So.2d 1258, 1261 (La. 1981). While defendant asserts that the verdict was ten to two, this is unclear from a review of the record. Nevertheless, it is clear that pursuant to Ramos, defendant is entitled to a new trial.
20-KA-129 12 So if the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to
support a conviction in federal court, it requires no less in state court.” Based on
Ramos, Louisiana defendants who were convicted of serious offenses by non-
unanimous juries and whose cases are still pending on direct review are entitled to
new trials.6
In light of Ramos, this Court and other appellate courts have vacated
defendants’ convictions and sentences and remanded cases still pending on direct
review where the jury verdict was not unanimous for a serious offense. See State
v. Harrell, 19-371 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/8/20), 299 So.3d 1274; State v. Rivas, 19-378
(La. App. 5 Cir. 5/21/20), 296 So.3d 1198; State v. Frinks, 18-899 (La. App. 3 Cir.
7/29/20), ---So.3d ---, 2020 WL 4343314; State v. Broussard, 19-792 (La. App. 3
Cir. 6/12/20), 299 So.3d 176; State v. Calloway, 18-1724 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/29/20),
---So.3d---, 2020 WL 2832629; State v. Peck, 53,478 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20),
296 So.3d 1168, writ denied, 20-787 (La. 10/14/20), ---So.3d---, 2020 WL
6055053; State v. Myles, 19-0965 (La. App. 4 Cir. 04/29/20), 299 So.3d 643.
In the present case, because the verdict was not unanimous and the case is
still on direct review, we find that defendant is entitled to a new trial pursuant to
the holding in Ramos, supra. Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s conviction and
sentence for second degree murder, and we remand for further proceedings.
ERRORS PATENT
The record was reviewed for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920;
State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175
(La. App. 5 Cir. 1990). We find no further errors requiring corrective action.
6 For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, federal law defines petty offenses as offenses subject to imprisonment of six months or less and serious offenses as offenses subject to imprisonment over six months. The Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial only attaches to serious offenses. State v. Harrell, 19-371 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/8/20), 299 So.3d 1274, 1283 (citing Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 327-28, 116 S.Ct. 2163, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996); Hill v. Louisiana, 2013 WL 486691 (E.D. La. 2013)).
20-KA-129 13 DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence
for second degree murder, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED
20-KA-129 14 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
MARY E. LEGNON FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ STEPHEN J. WINDHORST FIRST DEPUTY CLERK HANS J. LILJEBERG JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org
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20-KA-129 E-NOTIFIED 40TH DISTRICT COURT (CLERK) HONORABLE MADELINE JASMINE (DISTRICT JUDGE) HONORABLE BRIDGET A. DINVAUT WILLIAM R. DIETERS (APPELLEE) PRENTICE L. WHITE (APPELLANT) (APPELLEE) GRANT L. WILLIS (APPELLEE)
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