STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 23-KA-41
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
COREY WOODS COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 17-1036, DIVISION "L" HONORABLE DONALD A. ROWAN, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING
November 15, 2023
MARC E. JOHNSON JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois, Marc E. Johnson, and Robert A. Chaisson
AFFIRMED MEJ JGG RAC COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr. Thomas J. Butler Anne M. Wallis Douglas W. Freese Jennifer C. Voss
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, COREY WOODS Corey Woods Prentice L. White JOHNSON, J.
In his second appeal, Defendant, Corey Woods a/k/a “Cocomo”, seeks
review of his convictions for three counts of second degree murder and one count
of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the resulting sentences. For
the following reasons, Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In his first appeal, this Court found that upon the granting of Defendant’s
Motion for Appeal, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to subsequently
sentence Defendant or to rule on Defendant’s Motion for New Trial and Motion for
Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal. As such, we vacated the sentences and the
trial court’s rulings on Defendant’s motions, and remanded this matter for the trial
court to rule on Defendant’s motions and, if the motions were denied, resentence
Defendant. This Court also reserved Defendant’s right to appeal his convictions
and sentences in the event Defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied, upon
resentencing. State v. Woods, 19-200 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/26/19), 288 So.3d 256,
257-58; 259.
On June 25, 2020, on remand, the trial court granted defendant’s Motion for
New Trial based on Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. - - , 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206
L.Ed.2d 583 (2020), as the case was on direct review and Defendant was convicted
by a non-unanimous jury. See State v. Woods, 19-200 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/26/19),
288 So.3d 256, 257-58. On August 16, 2022, the case again proceeded to trial
before a twelve-person jury, and on August 19, 2022, the jury unanimously found
Defendant guilty as charged of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S.
14:30.1 (counts one, two, and three) and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count four).
23-KA-41 1 On August 29, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial that was
denied on September 2, 2022. Thereafter, defense counsel waived the sentencing
delays, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor
without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence each on counts one,
two, and three, consecutively. The trial court also sentenced Defendant to
imprisonment at hard labor for twenty years without benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence on count four, to run concurrently with the sentences on
counts one, two, and three and the sentence in case number 17-1037. On
September 12, 2022, the district court granted Defendant’s Motion for Appeal.
The testimony and other evidence presented at Defendant’s second trial are
summarized below.
On January 22, 2017, at approximately 9:41 p.m., the first of several 9-1-1
calls were made regarding a shooting inside a vehicle that crashed into a utility
pole in the 1400 block of South Laurel Street in Metairie. Detective Joseph
Waguespack, formerly employed by the homicide division of Jefferson Parish
Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”), went to the crime scene where three victims, later
identified as Malcolm Wallace, Monica Bates, and Daneka Lott, were found inside
the vehicle. Ms. Bates was already deceased, and Malcolm1 and Ms. Lott were
taken to the hospital, where they ultimately passed away. Detective Waguespack
subsequently supervised the collection of evidence and interviewed Malcolm’s
siblings, Montrell and Maya Wallace, at the detective bureau that night. Later, he
obtained pertinent cell phone records and surveillance videos from the security
cameras of businesses nearby.
Detective Waguespack testified that Montrell and Maya told him that the
victims left their mother’s residence on South Laurel Street, and went to Academy
1 Malcolm Wallace will be referred to as “Malcolm,” and his brother, Montrell or Monty Wallace, will be referred to as “Montrell” in this opinion.
23-KA-41 2 Sporting Goods (“Academy”). He found two receipts in the car from Academy and
Taco Bell. The Taco Bell receipt showed a purchase of one small Pepsi on January
22, 2017, at 9:26:51 p.m. The Academy receipt showed a purchase on January 22,
2017, at 9:29 p.m. of a pair of Nike men’s Benassis slippers; the slippers were not
found in the vehicle.
Detective Waguespack further testified that Academy’s parking lot could be
observed in the background of the surveillance video of the Taco Bell drive-thru.
Detective Waguespack asserted that he could see someone in the back seat of the
vehicle at the Taco Bell wearing a red “Reallionaire” hoodie or sweatshirt. He
stated that he also obtained surveillance video from Academy, which showed Ms.
Lott and Ms. Bates entering and leaving the store. Detective Waguespack thought
that in the video it looked like Ms. Bates was holding the slippers up like they were
on a hanger.
Detective Waguespack stated that the car left Academy at 9:31:55 and that
the homicides occurred at approximately 9:41:49. The detective confirmed that the
distance between the Academy and the crime scene could be travelled in about ten
minutes without speeding on a Sunday evening. A surveillance video of the crime
scene was obtained from what was then Electronics Depot off of Airline Highway
on North Laurel Street. Detective Waguespack testified that Montrell and Maya
Wallace identified Defendant as the man in the red shirt running in the video.
Expert forensic pathologist Dr. Dana Troxclair testified that she performed
the autopsies on the three victims and that, for each, the manner of death was
homicide. Dr. Troxclair further testified that Ms. Bates sustained a perforating
gunshot wound to the head and that the path of the projectile was from back to
front, left to right, and slightly downward. She determined that the range of fire
was distant (over two to three feet) because she did not see any soot, searing of
edges, or stippling on the surrounding skin.
23-KA-41 3 Malcolm sustained two gunshot wounds. Dr. Troxclair explained that a
projectile entered his left shoulder and went through his spinal cord – Malcolm
would have been permanently paralyzed as a result of this injury had he survived.
The projectile was recovered from Malcolm’s right arm. She asserted that the
wound was consistent with a gun being fired from someone sitting in the rear seat
of the vehicle toward an individual sitting in the front passenger seat. She
determined that the range of fire was distant (over two to three feet) because she
did not see any soot, searing of edges, or stippling on the surrounding skin. Dr.
Troxclair also testified that Malcolm also sustained a graze wound to his mid-
forehead.
Ms. Lott sustained a perforating gunshot wound to the head; it entered on
her right posterior scalp and exited on the right frontal scalp. She determined that
the gunshot wound was distant as there was no searing or stippling. Dr. Troxclair
asserted that the path of the projectile was back to front and slightly downward
with no deviation to the left or right. She provided that the gunshot wound was
consistent with someone sitting in the rear seat shooting at someone sitting directly
in front of him. The three autopsy reports and several photographs were admitted
into evidence.
Deputy Jene Rauch, accepted by the trial court as an expert in the fields of
firearm identification and shooting incident reconstruction, testified that she
previously worked at the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office crime lab. Deputy Rauch
further testified that she reviewed and verified the initial examiner’s work. Five 9
mm casings, a copper-jacket fragment, a copper-jacketed projectile, and a lead
light projectile were recovered from inside the vehicle at the crime scene. Deputy
Rauch concluded that the five 9 mm casings were all fired from the same weapon.
She also concluded that the copper-jacketed projectile was consistent with .38
caliber ammunition, which includes 9 mm bullets. Deputy Rauch testified that the
23-KA-41 4 firearms evidence was consistent with one weapon, a Glock, being used. Deputy
Rauch stated that the projectile recovered from Malcolm’s autopsy, a .38 caliber
projectile, was intact. The fragment recovered had polygonal rifling – the same
style of rifling as the projectile. However, Deputy Rauch could not confirm
whether both had been fired from the same weapon.
Moreover, all of the evidence found at the crime scene was located inside
the vehicle. Deputy Rauch indicated that police found Ms. Bates in the rear
passenger seat on the driver’s side, Ms. Lott in the driver’s seat, and Malcolm in
the front passenger seat. Deputy Rauch testified that she was able to reconstruct the
shooting based on her personal observations of the crime scene, as well as the
crime scene photographs. She opined that considering the location of the casings
and the projectile damage to the vehicle, the evidence was most consistent with the
shooter being in the back seat of the vehicle at the time the incident occurred, and
inconsistent with the shooter firing into the vehicle from outside of the vehicle.
Deputy Rauch opined that the shooting probably occurred while the vehicle was in
motion.
Montrell Wallace testified that Ms. Bates was his sister, Malcolm was his
brother, and Ms. Lott was the mother of his brother’s child. Montrell further
testified that, a few hours before the murders, they were at his mother’s house
watching the playoff football game between the Patriots and the Steelers. He
explained that at some point, he left the house to buy marijuana and ran into
Defendant, a childhood friend whom he had known his whole life. After he
purchased the marijuana, Defendant followed him to his house without being
invited. Montrell recalled that he and Defendant went upstairs, smoked marijuana,
and watched the rest of the football game.
At the end of the football game, Defendant asked Malcolm to take him to
Academy so he could buy some Nike slippers. Malcolm, Ms. Lott, and Defendant
23-KA-41 5 left the house and got into Ms. Lott’s grandfather’s car. Ms. Lott got into the
driver’s seat, Malcolm got into the front passenger seat, and Defendant got into the
rear passenger seat behind Ms. Lott. Montrell thought they must have picked up
Ms. Bates, who was coming from a friend’s house, as they were leaving because he
did not see her get into the car. Montrell went back into the house after he saw the
car pull out of the driveway. Montrell testified that he saw Defendant with a
weapon that night. Montrell was not familiar with guns but that he thought that the
gun was a 9 mm with an extended clip on it. Montrell recalled that Defendant was
wearing a red sweater or hoodie with writing across it that said “Reallionaire.”
Montrell testified that later they heard a loud crashing sound. He and his
sister Maya went outside and saw Ms. Lott’s grandfather’s car had crashed into a
pole. They ran to the car and saw that Malcolm and Ms. Bates had been shot. He
recalled that Malcolm was still alive and in and out of consciousness. Montrell
asserted that he asked Malcolm who shot him and where, but Malcolm just told
him to call their mother.
Montrell testified that the police later asked him to look at two surveillance
videos, State’s Exhibit 86 in globo. He identified the man running in one of those
videos as Defendant and that the man’s clothing was the same clothing that
Defendant wore at Montrell’s mother’s house earlier that evening. Montrell also
testified that in the Taco Bell drive-thru surveillance video, the individual in the
back seat wore the same outfit that Defendant was wearing at his mother’s house.
He explained that, although he could not see the face of the person in the Taco Bell
drive-thru video, the clothing of the man in the back seat was the clothing he saw
Defendant wearing that night. He also explained Ms. Lott and Malcolm were
wearing the same clothing in the Taco Bell drive-thru video he had observed them
wearing at his mother’s house earlier that night. Montrell testified that he had
known Defendant his entire life, he recognized the way the person was running in
23-KA-41 6 the video, and that he had seen Defendant run like that before. He stated that
Defendant was not wearing a hat that night.
Maya Wallace testified that Ms. Bates was her sister, Malcolm was her
brother, and Ms. Lott was Malcolm’s fiancée and the mother of his child. She
stated that they grew up with Defendant. Ms. Wallace further testified that she did
not watch the football game on the night in question, but she went to see who was
watching the game. She recalled that Defendant, Malcolm, Ms. Bates, and Ms. Lott
were there. Ms. Wallace testified that Defendant was wearing a red hoodie that
said “Reallionaire” on it. She further testified that at some point, Malcolm, Ms.
Bates, Ms. Lott, and Defendant left the house. She stated that she did not go
outside to see who got into the car. Ms. Wallace recalled that they indicated they
were going to Academy but she did not know why. She also recalled that her six-
year-old son wanted to go with them, but she did not allow him to go because it
was late at night. Ms. Wallace asserted that her son was crying, so Defendant gave
him five dollars not to go. She further asserted that they all walked out together
and that Defendant was the last person to leave the house.
Ms. Wallace saw Defendant with a gun the night of the murders and testified
that he always had a gun on him. The police showed her surveillance videos from
Taco Bell and the Electronics Depot security cameras, State’s Exhibit 86. She
identified Defendant in those videos and explained that Defendant was wearing the
same “jacket” in those videos that he was wearing that night at the house.
Ms. Wallace testified that at some point she heard a crash, after which she
walked outside and saw Ms. Lott’s grandfather’s car at the pole. She further
testified that she walked back inside and told her mother that it looked like the car
had crashed into the pole. They walked outside and saw that Malcolm was still
alive. Malcolm asked for their mother but never said who shot him. Ms. Wallace
called 9-1-1 and told them Terry Lloyd had killed her family. Ms. Wallace further
23-KA-41 7 testified that she did not see Mr. Lloyd kill her family nor did she see him there
that night. She did not see or hear anything that night that would lead her to believe
that Mr. Lloyd was in the car or on that street. Ms. Wallace gave the 9-1-1 operator
Terry Lloyd’s name because, earlier that day, Mr. Lloyd had threatened to kill her
mother, brother, and sister in order to get to Malcolm. Detective Waguespack
testified that the police interviewed Terry Lloyd and asked about his whereabouts
that night. Still photographs of Walmart security camera surveillance video were
entered into evidence and published to the jury. The photos showed Terry Lloyd
entering and exiting the Walmart, and his vehicle leaving the Walmart 11 minutes
before the 9-1-1 call. Detective Waguespack confirmed that phone records
“reflect[ed] a large number of communications that day” between Defendant and
Terry Lloyd, and testified that Terry Lloyd was not wearing a red “Reallionaire”
shirt in the surveillance photos.
The Court allowed the State to treat Lionel Alexander as a hostile witness
over the defense’s objection. Mr. Alexander testified that on January 22, 2017, he
was on North Elm Street on the upstairs balcony of a friend’s apartment smoking
marijuana when he saw a car crash into a pole. Then, he saw someone wearing a
red “Reallionaire” hoodie with white writing on it get out of the car, run across
Airline Highway, and then across the bingo hall parking lot. Mr. Alexander
explained that when the man first got out of the car, he could not see the man’s
face from that distance; however, Mr. Alexander stated that when the man ran
closer to him, he could see the man’s face. He further testified that on January 27,
2017, he identified Defendant, whom he knew beforehand, in a photographic
lineup as the man he saw run across the street that night.
Mr. Alexander also recalled seeing Defendant earlier that day wearing a
“Reallionaire” shirt but insisted that his identification was from Defendant’s face
and the shirt. He denied telling Jermika Lang that he lied about being near the
23-KA-41 8 scene that night.2 Mr. Alexander admitted that he did not tell the police right away
about what he saw in the instant case. He subsequently was arrested for
committing a crime, and then asked to talk to the police about the instant case. Mr.
Alexander testified that he was on probation or in drug court at that time, he had
recently been locked up for failing a drug test, and he was in a treatment facility.
Jermika Lang testified that on January 22, 2017, she was on her phone
sitting in a car parked in her grandmother’s yard on South Laurel when she heard
four gunshots. The court granted the prosecution’s motion to treat Ms. Lang as an
adverse witness under La. C.E. art. 611(C). She recalled telling the detective that
she then saw a man wearing a red sweatshirt and a black knit cap running from a
car that had hit a telephone pole. Ms. Lang claimed she only told the detective that
because he threatened to take her children away from her. She later admitted that
she heard the car crash and the four gunshots and looked up. Ms. Lang
remembered that the backseat driver-side door of that car was open. She also
admitted that she saw somebody run down South Laurel (on the same side of the
street as the driver’s side of the car) to the corner and then turn right on Mistletoe.
Ms. Lang contended that she did not see that person’s face and she saw the
person wearing a sweatshirt, although she did not remember if the sweatshirt was
red. She did not remember the person wearing a knit cap. Ms. Lang testified that
she did not see anyone on the street at the time of the shooting except for the man
who was running down the street. She had known Defendant all of her life but
insisted she was not concerned with retaliation. Ms. Lang saw Montrell approach
the car and ask Malcolm who did this to him. Ms. Lang also testified that she knew
Mr. Alexander and that he told her he lied when he was in front of “this judge.”
2 According to a Notice of Additional Information filed on August 2, 2022 by the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Office, that same day, Ms. Lang met with representatives and told them that the detective who initially interviewed her did not like her answers and compelled her to say that the perpetrator was wearing a red shirt. She also claimed that Mr. Alexander told her that “he lied because he had a beef with ‘Cocomo’” when she asked why Mr. Alexander lied because she never saw him on the street where the homicides occurred.
23-KA-41 9 She stated that nobody was at the scene other than her and the victims. She
admitted she had been convicted of the felony offense of resisting arrest but stated
that she did not receive a deal from the State in exchange for her testimony.
Detective Waguespack testified that on January 24, 2022, two days after the
homicides, Defendant was arrested, and his cell phone was seized. Defendant was
advised of his rights. Defendant waived his rights, completed a JPSO rights of
arrestee form, and then gave a statement to another detective. A recording of
Defendant’s statement was published to the jury. Defendant told the detective that
he was a family friend and good friends with Malcolm’s uncle, Otis Wallace. He
stated that on the night in question, he ran into Malcolm3, after which he walked
with Malcolm to the Wallaces’ home. Defendant stated that he arrived at the
Wallaces’ house at approximately 8:40 p.m., where he watched the game with
Malcolm. Defendant recalled that Montrell was there as well and that Ms. Bates
was in and out of the house. He told the detective that he and Malcolm talked about
the game, but otherwise refused to talk about the specifics of their conversation.
During his statement, Defendant explained that Malcolm and his girlfriend
said they were going to Academy when the game ended. He claimed that he did
not know why. Defendant asserted that he left first, then Malcolm and “them” left
afterwards. He stated that he walked up Laurel Street toward the tracks and sat
down on a back street by himself. Defendant refused to say where he went next. He
stated that he did not want to talk about what he had heard on the street about the
homicides. When asked what he was wearing on the night of the murders,
Defendant responded that he was wearing what he had on (during the statement).
The video reflected that Defendant was wearing a dark-colored hooded sweatshirt
3 A review of the recorded interview reveals that, on January 24, 2017, Defendant told the detective that he met Malcolm on the street the night of the homicides. However, both Defendant and Montrell testified at trial that they encountered each other on the street before going to the Wallace home to smoke marijuana and watch the game that night.
23-KA-41 10 with white writing on it and a pair of white and dark-colored, patterned pants.
Afterwards, Defendant said that he did not want to talk anymore. Defendant denied
shooting the three victims.
Detective Anthony Buttone testified that he worked for JPSO’s homicide
section and that he also handled cell phones and “geo-location data plotting.” He
provided that he reviewed the cell phone records of Defendant and Mr. Lloyd that
were produced pursuant to search warrants directed to T-Mobile and Sprint. He
indicated that he also reviewed the PowerPoint created by then-retired Detective
Zanotelli, which consisted of maps showing the homicide scene, Academy, Taco
Bell, the cell phone towers, and the relevant phone calls and texts made by
Defendant and Mr. Lloyd.
Detective Buttone stated that the phone records were consistent with
Defendant being in the area of the homicide scene on January 22, 2017, between
8:01 p.m. and 8:55 p.m., after which Defendant moved, and his phone connected to
the tower that serviced Academy and Taco Bell from 9:22 p.m. to 9:33 p.m. He
also stated that the phone records were consistent with Defendant leaving
Academy and traveling back to the homicide scene, stating that his phone
connected to the tower at 9:51 p.m. and 9:59 p.m. Detective Buttone pointed out
that there was no activity on Defendant’s phone after the last call connected at 9:33
p.m. until 9:51 p.m. He asserted that the homicides occurred between those times.
Detective Buttone further testified that between January 16 and January 23,
2017, Defendant and Mr. Lloyd communicated on their phones fifty-five times. He
stated that on the date of the homicides on January 22, 2017, between 8:46 p.m.
and 9:21 p.m., Defendant and Mr. Lloyd communicated by text messages sixteen
times. Detective Buttone explained that in his experience, text messages were a
covert way of communicating with someone. He also stated that between 8:46 p.m.
and 8:53 p.m., those connected calls were hitting off the tower with the strongest
23-KA-41 11 signal, which was the tower nearest the homicide scene. Detective Buttone asserted
that at 10:23 p.m., there was a phone call between Defendant and Mr. Lloyd.
Detective Buttone testified that Mr. Lloyd was deceased at the present time and
that he died from a homicide unrelated to the instant case. He explained that a
suspect, now also deceased, was charged in that case. Additionally, the State and
the defense entered into several stipulations regarding his prior convictions.
At trial, Defendant testified that on January 22, 2017, he went with his
cousin, Joseph Woods, to sell marijuana to Montrell. Defendant stated that
Montrell was a close friend of the family, so he knew he would be welcome at the
Wallaces’ home. He went to the Wallaces’ house where they “chilled,” smoked
marijuana, and watched the game. Defendant asserted that after the game, he left.
He denied asking anyone to go to Academy so someone could buy him slippers
and testified that he did not get in the car on January 22, 2017, with the three
victims. Defendant claimed that he left the house and went down South Laurel.
Defendant testified that Ms. Bates did not get into the car and give him the
slippers and that he did not give Ms. Wallace’s six-year-old son five dollars to stay
home. He also testified that Ms. Wallace lied when she said he left with the victims
to go to Academy. Defendant asserted that Montrell lied when he said that
Defendant had a gun and wanted to go to Academy, and he saw Defendant get into
the car. Defendant believed that Ms. Wallace and Montrell lied because they think
he knows who killed the victims, but he insisted that he had no motive to kill them.
Defendant testified that he and everyone in the neighborhood knew about the
trouble between Mr. Lloyd and Malcolm. He further testified that he did not plan
on running into Montrell or going to the Wallace home that evening.
Defendant stated that he was arrested on January 24, 2017, for three counts
of distribution of heroin, and that he gave a voluntary and true statement to the
police. Defendant testified that when he was arrested, the police took his only cell
23-KA-41 12 phone, which was the same cell phone he had on the night of the murders.
Defendant claimed that his cell phone did not have a code, that it could have been
opened, and that the messages between him and Terry Lloyd could have been seen.
Defendant knew Mr. Lloyd from the neighborhood; he was older than Mr. Lloyd
and had known him his whole life, but stated that they were not friends. Later, he
explained, “We was all friends to tell you the truth, we were all cool, like just
knowing each other from the neighborhood until something occurred.”
Defendant contended that he had a business relationship with Mr. Lloyd. He
maintained that the communications prior to the homicides involved the buying
and selling of drugs, and that there was a lot of communication between him and
Mr. Lloyd because of their business dealings. Defendant claimed that, on January
22, 2017, they were texting about drugs. Defendant testified that he had one of the
phones when he went to the Wallaces’ house, but then corrected himself and
claimed he only had one phone. He admitted he had the phone at the Wallaces’
house and later when he left and crossed the tracks the night of the homicides.
Defendant denied having a gun on the day or the evening of the homicides.
Defendant provided that if he did carry a gun, it was because he had a lot of
money. He pointed out that he had never been convicted of any violent offenses,
that he had never hurt anyone, and that he did not hurt the victims. Defendant
testified that Ms. Wallace and Montrell were lying when they said he was wearing
a red hoodie on the night of the homicides. He claimed he was wearing a blue
hoodie and blue jeans—the same clothes he was wearing when he was arrested on
January 24, 2017. Defendant stated that he did not own a red “Reallionaire” hoodie
and had never worn one.
The defense rested after Defendant’s testimony. The jury convicted
Defendant on all four counts by a verdict of 12 - 0 after three hours of
deliberations. On September 2, 2022, at the beginning of the sentencing hearing,
23-KA-41 13 the district court denied Defendant’s Motion for New Trial in open court, which he
filed to preserve the right to appeal his convictions based on insufficiency of the
evidence. After a victim impact statement given by the victims’ grandmother,
Defendant was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences on counts one, two
and three, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension, to run concurrently
with a twenty-year sentence without benefits on count four.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Defendant’s appellate counsel assigns insufficiency of the evidence as error.
Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it accepted the
jury’s verdict when the record reflects that it was based exclusively on
circumstantial evidence. The prosecution’s theory of the case was that Defendant
shot each of the three victims at the behest of Terry Lloyd.4 Defendant contends
that the State presented only circumstantial evidence that he shot and killed the
victims: “his alleged clothing [that he was wearing the night of the shootings], and
his alleged communications with [Mr. Lloyd,] who allegedly threatened one of the
[victims] and their family members earlier” that day, and that Mr. Lloyd was in
constant contact with him prior to the shooting. Defendant argues that, without the
recovery of the firearm used to commit the crimes or any physical evidence that
proves that he and no one else, shot the three victims, “the prosecution’s case was
based on speculations and innuendos,” and the evidence presented by the State was
not sufficient to convict Defendant of possession of a firearm and three counts of
second-degree murder. Defendant’s counsel requests that this Court find the
evidence was insufficient in the case, reverse Defendant’s convictions, and enter a
judgment of acquittal.
In his pro se brief, Defendant avers that the district court erred when it
denied trial counsel the opportunity to re-urge pre-trial motions from the prior trial
4 Mr. Lloyd was killed in an unrelated incident prior to the second trial.
23-KA-41 14 before the new trial and rested on its previous rulings. Defendant requests that his
convictions and sentences be vacated and the matter be remanded for further
proceedings.
The State counters that Defendant has failed to show that the evidence used
to convict him of three counts of second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:
30.1, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of La. R.S.
14:95.1, was insufficient under the standard set forth in Jackson v Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The jury found Defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt after hearing all testimony and viewing all of the
evidence and the State avers that it carried its burden of proof (specifically
regarding the identification of Defendant as the perpetrator of the subject crimes),
and this Court should not second guess the jury’s credibility determinations.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
The constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, as
enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, supra, is whether after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ortiz,
96-1609 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So.2d 922, 930, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 943, 118 S.Ct.
2352, 141 L.Ed.2d 722 (1998); State v. Scott, 06-134 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/25/06),
939 So.2d 462, 470, writ denied, 06-2133 (La. 3/30/07), 953 So.2d 61. Under the
Jackson standard, a review of a criminal conviction record for sufficiency of the
evidence does not require the court to ask whether it believes that the evidence at
trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Flores, 10-651 (La. App.
5 Cir. 5/24/11), 66 So.3d 1118, 1122. Rather, the reviewing court must decide,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
23-KA-41 15 doubt. Id. See also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781; Ortiz, 701 So.2d at
930.
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Flores, 66 So.3d at 1122.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the existence of the main fact can be inferred according to reason and
common experience. Id.; State v. Williams, 05-59 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 904
So.2d 830, 833. When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of
an offense, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that “assuming every fact to be proved that
the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence.” State v. Wooten, 99-181 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/1/99), 738
So.2d 672, 675, writ denied, 99-2057 (La. 1/14/00), 753 So.2d 208. This is not a
separate test from the Jackson standard but rather provides a helpful basis for
determining the existence of reasonable doubt. All evidence, both direct and
circumstantial, must be sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
In the instant case, Defendant was convicted of three counts of second
degree murder and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Second degree murder is defined in pertinent part as the killing of a human being
when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.
14:30.1(A)(1).
Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances
indicate the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to
follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Because specific intent is a state
of mind, it need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the
circumstances and actions of the accused as well as the extent and severity of the
victim’s injuries. State v. Chester, 19-363 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/3/21), 314 So.3d 914,
942, writ denied, 21-350 (La. 6/8/21), 317 So.3d 321. Specific intent to kill may be
23-KA-41 16 inferred from a defendant’s act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. State v.
Anderson, 18-45 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/18), 258 So.3d 997, 1002, writ denied, 18-
1848 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So.3d 1131. Whether a defendant possessed the requisite
intent in a criminal case is a question for the trier of fact, and a review of the
correctness of this determination is guided by the Jackson standard. State v.
Patterson, 10-415 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11), 63 So.3d 140, 148, writ denied, 11-
338 (La. 6/17/11), 63 So.3d 1037.
To support a conviction under La. R.S. 14:95.1, the State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant had: (1) possession of a firearm; (2) a prior
conviction for an enumerated felony; (3) absence of the ten-year statutory period of
limitation; and (4) the general intent to commit the offense. State v. Chairs, 12-363
(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/12), 106 So.3d 1232, 1250, writ denied, State ex rel. Chairs
v. State, 13-306 (La. 6/21/13), 118 So.3d 413. With respect to the third element,
the State must prove that ten years has not elapsed since the date of completion of
the punishment for the prior felony conviction. State v. Miller, 20-182 (La. App. 5
Cir. 12/23/20), 308 So.3d 1246, 1255, writ denied, 21-233 (La. 4/27/21), 314 So.3d
838.
Encompassed in proving the elements of any offense is the necessity of
proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. When the key issue in the
case is identification, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of
misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof under Jackson. State v.
Taylor, 99-296 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/99), 740 So.2d 216, 222, writ denied, 99-
2609 (La. 3/17/00), 756 So.2d 322.
Upon review of the record, we find that a rational trier of fact could have
found that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient under the Jackson standard to
convict Defendant of three counts of second degree murder and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. The murder weapon was never recovered and no
23-KA-41 17 physical evidence placed Defendant in Ms. Lott’s car that evening. However,
using surveillance video, phone records, and/or the testimony of Maya and
Montrell Wallace, Lionel Alexander, and Jermika Lang, the State placed
Defendant, wearing a red “Reallionaire” sweatshirt, at the Wallace home, near the
Academy, in the backseat of Ms. Lott’s grandfather’s car at the Taco Bell drive-
thru, and later at the scene of the crime at pertinent times that evening. Deputy
Rauch testified that all three victims’ wounds were consistent with the shooter
firing a 9 mm/.380 caliber gun from the back seat of the vehicle. Montrell testified
that Defendant was known to carry (what he believed was) a 9 mm gun with an
extended clip. Ms. Wallace and Montrell testified that they saw Defendant with a
gun at the house that evening. Ms. Wallace further testified that Defendant always
had a gun on him, and he paid her son five dollars so he would comply with her
wishes to remain at home because it was late. Ms. Wallace and Montrell identified
Defendant in the surveillance videos and recognized that Defendant wore the same
clothes he wore while visiting their home and watching the football game. Lionel
Alexander saw a car crash into a pole and watched Defendant, who he recognized
from the way he ran, run across Airline Highway and the bingo hall parking lot.
Jermika Lang heard four gunshots and a car crash. She initially told police that she
observed a man in a red sweatshirt running away from the scene of the car crash.
Detective Buttone testified that phone records placed Defendant at the Taco
Bell and Academy at all relevant times. Additionally, Defendant and Terry Lloyd,
who had threatened the family earlier that day and was known to be in conflict
with Malcolm, communicated, mostly through text messages, several times before
and after the homicides.
As to count four, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the State
presented circumstantial evidence that established that Defendant possessed a
firearm when he shot the three victims. Ms. Wallace and Montrell testified that
23-KA-41 18 they saw Defendant in possession of a gun at the house before the shootings. Also,
the State and the defense stipulated that Defendant had prior convictions of
enumerated felonies, although proof of only one such prior conviction was
necessary. Further, Defendant testified that he had prior felony convictions. The
State also proved that less than ten years had elapsed since the completion of the
sentence for the prior felony conviction.
A reviewing court must consider the whole record and determine whether a
rational trier of fact would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Taylor, 20-215 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/28/21), 347 So.3d 1008, 1018. In making this
determination, a reviewing court will not re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses or
re-weigh the evidence. State v. Caffrey, 08-717 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/12/09), 15 So.3d
198, 202, writ denied, 09-1305 (La. 2/5/10), 27 So.3d 297. We note that there were
some discrepancies in the testimony. Mr. Alexander and Ms. Lang’s statements to
the police and their testimony at the two trials were inconsistent and not
necessarily reconcilable. There were also varying reports between Ms. Wallace and
Montrell regarding what Defendant wore that night. It also appears that Mr.
Alexander possibly received a benefit from testifying after the trial, so Defendant
could not explore whether he had an incentive to falsify his testimony. However,
the resolution of conflicting testimony rests solely with the trier of fact, who may
accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Taylor,
20-215 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/28/21), 347 So.3d 1008, 1018.
The jury considered the testimony of the witnesses and had to make
credibility determinations. The credibility of witnesses is within the sound
discretion of the trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the
testimony of any witness; the credibility of the witnesses will not be reweighed on
appeal. State v. Bartholomew, 18-670 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/23/19), 282 So.3d 374,
382, writ not considered, 19-1869 (La. 1/28/20), 288 So.3d 123. Absent internal
23-KA-41 19 contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s
testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual
conclusion. State v. Washington, 16-732 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/12/17), 219 So.3d
1221, 1226. In cases relying on circumstantial evidence to prove one or more
elements of the crime, when the fact-finder reasonably rejects the hypothesis of
innocence advanced by the defendant at trial, that hypothesis fails, and the verdict
stands unless the evidence suggests an alternative hypothesis sufficiently
reasonable that rational jurors could not find proof of the defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. White, 07-831 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/11/08), 982 So.2d
843, 846, writ denied, 08-846 (La. 10/31/08), 994 So.2d 534. State v. Taylor, 20-
215 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/28/21), 347 So.3d 1008, 1018. In this case, the jury did not
credit Defendant’s testimony that he did not go to Academy and Taco Bell with the
victims, that he was not the person in the red hoodie that witnesses observed
running away from the scene of the crime, and that he lacked specific intent to kill
the victims because he was a family friend and had no motive to kill his long-time
friends.
Considering the foregoing, we find that a rational trier of fact could have
found that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient under the Jackson standard to
support Defendant’s convictions of three counts of second degree murder and one
count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We also find that the
evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the State negated any
reasonable probability of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof
under Jackson. See State v. Cochran, 09-85 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/23/09), 19 So.3d
497, 505, writ denied, 09-1742 (La. 3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1249 (finding evidence
sufficient to identify the defendant and support second degree murder conviction
despite lack of direct, physical evidence that placed the defendant at crime scene);
State v. Miller, 20-182 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/20), 308 So.3d 1246, 1256, writ
23-KA-41 20 denied, 21-233 (La. 4/27/21), 314 So.3d 838 (finding the State’s circumstantial
evidence sufficient to support conviction of two counts of second degree murder
and to establish that the defendant must have possessed a firearm when he shot the
victims).
Last, we find that Defendant’s pro se assignment of error is without merit.
Citing State v. Acevedo, 21-164 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/19/21), 325 So.3d 1117,
Defendant contends that, under La. C.Cr.P. art. 857, the effect of granting a new
trial is to permit retrial with as little prejudice to either party as if the case had
never been tried. He maintains that his defense counsel should have been provided
the opportunity to re-urge the pretrial motions in order to put forth new or creative
arguments to support the previous motions.
The record reflects that on August 15, 2022, the day before trial began,
defense counsel re-urged numerous motions as follows:
And while we’re on the motions, Your Honor, I would - - based on some conversations we had in the very beginning, where we all agreed this was just a Ramos retry, but just out of an abundance of caution I am going to reurge all of the Motions to Suppress Evidence, Statements, Photograph Identifications, and there were - - I’m going to adopt all of the Motions to Suppress and the Motions in Limine tried by the Defense prior to the first trial. I am aware of three Motions in Limine filed by the Defense having to do with photographs, having to do with previous drug arrests, that Mr. Woods has already been convicted of in this courtroom and also there is a Motion in Limine related to daytime pictures; so I would just reurge out of an abundance of caution to protect the record, reurge all of the Motions to Suppress and Motions in Limine that were tried before Your Honor in the first trial.
The prosecutor responded that there had been no change in circumstances
that would warrant the trial court to change its earlier rulings. He further responded
that the only thing he would add would be with respect to the Motion to Exclude
Reference to the drug convictions. The prosecutor explained that he would not
adduce any evidence relating to those convictions unless Defendant chose to
testify.
23-KA-41 21 The trial judge then denied defense counsel’s request, stating:
You’re correct. Mr. Ehle - - I’m sorry, Mr. Freese, there has been nothing to change my rulings where I deny the Motion to Suppress the Evidence, Motion to Suppress the Statement or anything else. With regards to the conviction, Mr. Freese, didn’t use in your first trial and as I told you, you won’t use it in this one but if your client testifies - - I’m going to leave all my prior rulings in place, okay, where I denied everything. [***] And - - just move forward.
In Acevedo, supra, this Court considered whether as a matter of law all
pretrial proceedings or rulings rendered in connection with a defendant’s first trial
should be set aside and rendered null and void when a defendant is granted a new
trial pursuant to Ramos. We found that La. C.Cr.P. art. 857 and the relevant
jurisprudence mandated that the relator be given the opportunity to raise any new
motions in preparation for his defense at his new trial. Acevedo, 325 So.3d at 1121.
We also found that the trial court may reconsider any pretrial motions or
evidentiary rulings previously considered, should counsel show that good cause
exists which warrants reconsideration of the previously considered motions. Id. In
Defendant’s case, his counsel re-urged the motions “in an abundance of caution”
but did not show good cause whereby the district court could justify reconsidering
the motions. See Acevedo, supra. Therefore, we find that the district court did not
commit error when it rested on its previous rulings.
ERRORS PATENT
The record was reviewed for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920;
State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
The mandatory fine on count four (possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1) of “not less than one thousand dollars nor
more than five thousand dollars” was not imposed; however, this Court has
previously exercised its discretion to decline to correct an illegally lenient sentence
23-KA-41 22 in the case of an indigent defendant. See State v. Fisher, 19-488 (La. App. 5 Cir.
6/24/20), 299 So.3d 1238, 1249. Here, Defendant is represented by the Louisiana
Appellate Project, which represents indigent defendants in non-capital felony
cases. Therefore, due to Defendant’s indigent status, we decline to remand this
matter for imposition of the mandatory fine as to count four. See State v. Manuel,
20-172 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/2/21), 325 So.3d 513, 570-71, writ denied, 21-926 (La.
10/12/21), 325 So.3d 1071.
DECREE
Considering the foregoing, Defendant’s convictions and sentences are
affirmed.
AFFIRMED
23-KA-41 23 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN STEPHEN J. WINDHORST FIRST DEPUTY CLERK JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org
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23-KA-41 E-NOTIFIED 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK) HONORABLE DONALD A. ROWAN, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE) ANNE M. WALLIS (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)
MAILED PRENTICE L. WHITE (APPELLANT) COREY WOODS #511562 (APPELLANT) DOUGLAS W. FREESE (APPELLEE) ATTORNEY AT LAW LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR. LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT ANGOLA, LA 70712 (APPELLEE) 16731 CICERO AVENUE JENNIFER C. VOSS (APPELLEE) BATON ROUGE, LA 70816 ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 200 DERBIGNY STREET GRETNA, LA 70053