State of Louisiana v. Wayne Jackson

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 16, 2019
• Docket: 2019-KA-0255
• Status: Published

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2019-KA-0255

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL WAYNE JACKSON * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******

APPEAL FROM ST. BERNARD 34TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 15-00817, DIVISION “C” Honorable Kim C. Jones, Judge ****** Judge Roland L. Belsome ****** (Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Regina Bartholomew- Woods, Judge Dale N. Atkins)

Perry M. Nicosia District Attorney Josephine P. Heller Assistant District Attorney DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE ST. BERNARD PARISH 1101 W. Saint Bernard Hwy. Chalmette, LA 70043

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLEE

Bruce G. Whittaker LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT 1215 Prytania Street, Suite 332 New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED

OCTOBER 16, 2019 The defendant, Wayne Jackson, challenges his conviction and sentence. For

the reasons that follow, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Facts

On December 5, 2014, Nathanial Hebert and his wife, Heather, were living

in an apartment on Lyndell Drive in Chalmette, Louisiana. They were getting

ready to go out when they heard a lot of noise from the upstairs neighbors. He

called the police because the noise was very loud. Mr. Hebert walked out of his

apartment and saw his neighbors’ children standing outside. The children said that

their father had hurt their mother. Mr. Hebert went to the apartment and saw the

victim in the living room. Mr. Hebert called 911 for help. He stated that the

victim was bleeding from her neck, face and arms and she was gasping for breath.

Deputy Joshua English responded to a domestic call involving a potential

stabbing on December 5, 2014. When the officer arrived on the scene, he observed

a woman in the living room who appeared to have been stabbed multiple times.

When Deputy English entered the kitchen, he saw a man, later identified as the

defendant, who also appeared to have been stabbed. Khalil Sudlow, the victim’s

1 son, identified the defendant as the person who stabbed his mother several times

after an argument.

Procedural History

On January 20, 2015, the defendant, Wayne Jackson, was charged by bill of

information with the attempted second degree murder of Ameisha Jackson. The

defendant pled not guilty at his arraignment. Subsequent to his not guilty plea,

counsel for the defendant made an oral motion for a sanity commission, which the

trial court granted. After a sanity commission hearing on August 13, 2015, the

defendant was found competent to proceed. On October 20, 2015, the defendant

withdrew his not guilty plea and pled guilty to the offense. Then, on April 19,

2016, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court

granted the motion on the same date. In October of 2017, the defendant filed a

motion to change his plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The

trial court granted the motion and ordered a sanity commission. Approximately

seven months later, the defendant and the State of Louisiana received the experts’

reports on the defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense.

After a three-day jury trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged.

The defendant subsequently filed motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial.

After a hearing on October 16, 2018, the trial court denied the motions. At the

sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve thirty-five years

at hard labor, with credit for time served. The defendant orally filed a motion for

appeal, which was granted by the trial court.

Errors Patent

A review of the record for errors patent reveals that the trial court failed to

state that the defendant's sentence was to be served without benefit of parole,

2 probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14: 30.1. and La. R.S. 14:27 require

that a person convicted of attempted second degree murder serve the sentence

imposed without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The trial

court failed to impose these restrictions at the sentencing hearing held on

December 18, 2018. These restrictions are automatically contained in the sentence

whether or not imposed by the sentencing court. La. R.S. 15:301.1(A); State v.

Dominick, 2013-0121, p. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/20/13), 129 So.3d 782, 787.

Accordingly, those errors patent are self-correcting. See State v. Klein, 2018-0022,

p.12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/22/18), 252 So.3d 973, 981.

Assignments of Error

On appeal, the defendant challenges his conviction on the grounds that the

State failed to prove the necessary elements for attempted second degree murder.

More specifically, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to

prove he had the intent to kill the victim. Therefore, he maintains that the evidence

was only sufficient to support a verdict of attempted manslaughter. Alternatively,

if his conviction is affirmed, he claims his sentence of thirty-five years is

excessive.

Conviction

The defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence focuses on the

State’s failure to prove the intent to kill, which is required for attempted second

degree murder. He argues that because the State did not prove the element of

intent, the jury should have returned a verdict of attempted manslaughter.

It is well settled that Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61

L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), is the standard under which this court evaluates whether

evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction. Reviewing the

3 record under Jackson requires an appellate court to determine whether the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for

any rational trier of fact to have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. State v. Watkins, 2013-1248, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/6/14), 146 So. 3d

294, 303.

To obtain a conviction for attempted second degree murder the State must

prove the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act

tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death. State ex rel. G.B., 2007-

1577, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/08), 985 So.2d 828, 830; State v. Bishop, 2001-

2548, p. 4 (La.1/14/03), 835 So.2d 434, 437. A conviction for attempted second

degree murder requires proof that the offender “had the specific intent to kill and

committed an act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal.” State v.

Sullivan, 97-1037, p. 20 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/24/99), 729 So.2d 1101, 1111. “Specific

criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate

that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow

his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(1). “Specific intent may be inferred from

the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant.” State

v. Caliste, 2012-0533, p.9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/4/13), 125 So.3d 8, 14; Bishop, supra.

In contrast, manslaughter is defined, in pertinent part, by La. R.S. 14:31 as

“[a] homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder)

or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden

passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive

an average person of his self-control and cool reflection.” The Supreme Court has

explained the relationship between the two separate offenses of homicide and

manslaughter as follows:

4 It is the presence of “sudden passion” and “heat of blood” that distinguishes manslaughter from murder. This court has repeatedly stated, however, that “sudden passion” and “heat of blood” are not elements of the offense of manslaughter. Rather, they are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense which exhibit a degree of culpability less than that present when the homicide is committed in the absence of these factors. Because they are mitigatory factors, a defendant who establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in “sudden passion” or “heat of blood” is entitled to a verdict of manslaughter.

State v. Snyder, 98-1078, p. 4 (La. 4/14/99), 750 So.2d 832, 837-838 (internal

citations omitted).

“Heat of blood” or “sudden passion” is defined in the jurisprudence as

provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool

reflection. State v. Miller, 98-642, p. 10 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/28/98), 720 So.2d 829,

834. However, such provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the

jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled or that an average person's

blood would have cooled at the time the offense was committed. State v. Collor,

99-0175, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/26/00), 762 So.2d 96, 102. When reviewing the

argument that evidence was produced that the offender committed the crime in

sudden passion or heat of blood, the Jackson standard of review must be employed

to determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the mitigating factors were not

established by a preponderance of the evidence. Snyder, 98-1078, pp. 4-5, 750

So.2d at 838. However, defendant need not affirmatively establish the factors; the

jury is free to infer the mitigating circumstances from the evidence. State v.

Robinson, 2001-1305, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/17/02), 820 So.2d 571, 579; State v.

Lindsey, 98-1064, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/3/98), 715 So.2d 544, 547.

In a recent case, State v. Bias, 2018-268 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/6/19), 265 So.3d

821, the defendant’s conviction for attempted second degree murder was affirmed.

5 The facts in Bias, were that the victim and Ladray Bias, Jr., had a dating

relationship until June 2016. Mr. Bias sought to re-establish the relationship

calling the victim numerous times, but the victim refused to speak with him. On

the night of July 29, 2016, the victim was at a friend’s house for dinner. Mr. Bias

came to the house on three separate occasions. On each visit to the house, Mr.

Bias showed increasingly aggressive behavior toward the victim, and the police

were called after each incident. On the second visit to the house, Mr. Bias was

physically abusive hitting the victim several times in the face, and the victim

fought back. Bias, 2018-0268, p. 9, 265 So.3d at 826. The third time Mr. Bias

returned to the house, he busted through the door, ran to the kitchen and grabbed a

knife from a drawer, yelling continually that he was going to kill the victim, calling

her a “bitch and ho.” Id. The victim tried to run but he caught her. After he

stabbed the victim four times, he ran out of the house. The victim went in and out

of consciousness as her friend wrapped a towel around her wounds. Someone

called 911, and emergency medical personnel and the police came. Bias, 2018-268,

pp. 9-10, 265 So.2d at 827. The Third Circuit concluded that the evidence in that

case was sufficient to establish the elements of attempted second degree murder.

In the case at bar, Mr. and Ms. Jackson were having marital difficulties. The

testimony established that he had been sleeping on the couch for months before

this incident and Ms. Jackson wanted him out of the apartment and he did not want

to leave. On the evening of the stabbing, the defendant attempted to have sexual

relations with the victim and was rejected. He then threatened Ms. Jackson and

told her that she would not be going to work and to call her supervisor. Shortly

thereafter, Ms. Jackson’s son, Khalil Sudlow, testified that while he was on the

couch watching television with his younger siblings his step-father pushed his

6 mom through the doorway and into the living room where he proceeded to stab her

repeatedly. While stabbing his wife, the defendant told Khalil not to call the

police. At trial, the jury heard medical testimony regarding Ms. Jackson’s thirteen

stab wounds, which caused her to have two blood transfusions and spend two

weeks in the hospital’s intensive care unit. They also heard from the victim, Ms.

Jackson, who testified that those injuries left her partially paralyzed due to spinal

cord damage, her jugular vein had been cut and she had to have plastic surgery on

both sides of her face. Ms. Jackson’s testimony also described the defendant as a

habitual abuser. The defendant admitted that he stabbed the victim, and the victim

and her son, Khalil, testified that the defendant continuously stabbed the victim

while she was unconscious and defenseless.

Given the record before this Court and the Jackson standard of review, we

find any rational juror could have found that Mr. Jackson intended on killing Ms.

Jackson, and that there were no mitigating factors to warrant a finding of

manslaughter.

Sentence

The defendant argues that the sentence of thirty-five years at hard labor

imposed by the trial court is unconstitutionally excessive. While the defendant did

not file a written motion to reconsider sentence, the defendant, through counsel,

objected to the sentence imposed at the sentencing hearing. The trial court noted

the defendant’s objection, but maintained the sentence imposed.

In the present matter, prior to sentencing the defendant, the trial court

referenced the victim impact testimony given by the victim, as well as, the trial

testimony and a presentence investigative report that had been prepared. The trial

court stated that the defendant stabbed the victim numerous times in front of their

7 children, causing not only physical injury to the victim but emotional and

psychological injury to the children. The trial court recognized that the victim

would have died from her injuries if she had not received immediate medical help

from her neighbor. The court noted the victim had stab wounds to her facial area,

neck, upper torso and arm. One of the stab wounds was to the victim’s artery in

her neck, which caused a large amount of blood loss and was life threatening. The

trial court discussed the severity of the injuries and the extensive medical treatment

the victim received. The court also noted that the victim has suffered permanent

debilitating injuries, which affect her ability to work and her and her children’s

quality of life. The victim and all her children suffer from mental health issues as a

result of the incident and receive mental health counseling.

In light of the facts of this case, it cannot be said that the trial court abused

its discretion in sentencing the defendant to thirty-five years at hard labor. The

sentence is not unconstitutionally excessive considering the defendant’s lack of

remorse, the extent and seriousness of the injuries sustained by the victim, and the

fact that the defendant stabbed the victim in front of their children, causing the

children emotional and psychological injury.

Capacity to Proceed to Trial

In this assignment, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing

the matter to proceed to trial without having resolved the issue of his capacity to

proceed. A review of the appellate record reveals that a sanity commission was

requested and granted on June 23, 2015. A sanity hearing was conducted on

August 13, 2015, and the defendant was found to have the capacity to proceed. On

October 12, 2015, the defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and pled guilty as

charged. On April 4, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw the guilty

8 plea, which was granted by the trial court. Then, on October 10, 2017, the

defendant filed a motion to change his plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of

insanity (NGBRI). The trial court granted the motion and ordered a sanity hearing

to determine the defendant’s sanity as it related to his NGBRI plea. A hearing was

conducted on May 1, 2018, at which defense counsel acknowledged he had

received the doctors’ reports on the defendant’s NGBRI plea and was ready for

trial. Trial occurred on June 5-7, 2018.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 642 provides:

The defendant's mental incapacity to proceed may be raised at any time by the defense, the district attorney, or the court. When the question of the defendant's mental incapacity to proceed is raised, there shall be no further steps in the criminal prosecution, except the institution of prosecution, until the defendant is found to have the mental capacity to proceed.

Generally, a person who suffers from a mental disease or defect which

renders him incapable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings

against him, of consulting with counsel, and of assisting in preparing and

conducting his defense, may not be subjected to trial. La. C.Cr.P. arts. 641-649.1;

State v. Gibson, 2008-0741, p.5 (La. 11/10/08), 993 So.2d 1193, 1196; State v.

Rogers, 419 So.2d 840, 843 (La. 1982)(citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95

S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); State v. Bennett, 345 So.2d 1129 (La. 1977)).

In the present matter, the defendant’s capacity to proceed was determined at

a sanity hearing held on August 13, 2015. At that time, the trial court heard

testimony from the medical experts and determined that the defendant had the

capacity to proceed. Subsequently on October 10, 2017, the defendant changed his

plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. As a result, the trial court

ordered the medical experts to prepare reports on whether the defendant was insane

9 at the time of the offense. At a hearing on May 1, 2018, the defendant and the State

received the experts’ reports concerning the defendant’s sanity at the time of the

offense. The defendant acknowledged receipt of the reports and announced his

readiness for trial.

Seeking medical expert testimony on the sanity of a defendant at the time of

the offense falls within the purview of La. C.Cr.P. art. 650, which provides:

When a defendant enters a combined plea of “not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity,” the court may appoint a sanity commission as provided in Article 644 to make an examination as to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense. The court may also order the commission to make an examination as to the defendant's present mental capacity to proceed. Mental examinations and reports under this article shall be conducted and filed in conformity with Articles 644 through 646.

A defendant is not entitled of right to an examination and evaluation of his sanity

at the time of an offense. State v. Buras, 439 So.2d 1187, 1189 (La. App. 4 Cir.

1983). The appointment of a sanity commission to inquire into the mental

condition of the accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and

his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of

discretion. State v. Wilkerson, 403 So.2d 652 (La.1981); Buras, supra.

In State v. Wry, 591 So.2d 774 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1991), the defendant

entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. A sanity

commission was appointed by the trial court, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. article 650.

The doctors examined the defendant and filed their reports. Once the reports were

filed, the defendant submitted the issues of insanity at the time of the offense and

capacity to proceed to the trial court on the basis of the reports. The matter then

proceeded to trial. The Second Circuit found that the defendant waived his right to

contradictory hearing on the issues. The court concluded that there was no

showing that the defendant’s waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily made. The

10 court stated “we do not find any prohibition in the law to a waiver of such a

hearing and a stipulation to submit the competency issue to the trial court based on

the doctors' reports. Louisiana courts have consistently upheld stipulations entered

into by a defendant, his defense counsel and the state.” Wry, 591 So.2d at 780.

In the present case, the hearing transcript of May 1, 2018, reveals that the

defendant and the State received the reports from the medical experts concerning

the defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense, and thereafter, the defendant

announced his readiness for trial. In doing so, the defendant stipulated to the

experts’ reports and waived his right to a hearing. There is no evidence in the

appellate record to suggest that the waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily

made. Moreover, the district court had previously found the defendant competent

to stand trial on August 3, 2015.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, Wayne Jackson’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.