NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
21-129
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
VICTOR LUIS AVILA RAMOS
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 14773-17 HONORABLE G. MICHAEL CANADAY, DISTRICT JUDGE
CANDYCE G. PERRET JUDGE
Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, John E. Conery, and Candyce G. Perret, Judges.
MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION AND SENENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL; OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE CONVICTION AFFIRMED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Edward Kelly Bauman Louisiana Appellate Project Post Office Box 1641 Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641 (337) 491-0570 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Victor Luis Avila Ramos
Stephen C. Dwight District Attorney Post Office Box 3206 Lake Charles, LA 70601 (337) 437-3400 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana
David S. Pipes Assistant District Attorney 901 Lakeshore Drive Lake Charles, LA 70601 (337) 437-3400 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana PERRET, Judge.
Victor Luis Avila Ramos, Defendant, was found guilty of manslaughter, a
violation of La.R.S. 14:31, and obstruction of justice, a violation of La.R.S.
14:130.1. He was sentenced to thirty-five years at hard labor with credit for time
served, and fifteen years at hard labor, with credit for time served, respectively.
The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. He appeals the nonunanimous
verdict for the manslaughter conviction under Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___,
140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020), and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the
obstruction verdict. On appeal, we vacate Defendant’s manslaughter conviction
and remand the case for a new trial on that charge. Further, we affirm the
obstruction of justice conviction with instructions to notify Defendant of the
provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 within ten days of this opinion and to file
written proof in the record that Defendant received the notice.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Defendant was arrested for the injury of Lauren Guidry, from which she
later died. On May 22, 2017, the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office was called to
investigate an incident at the LeBleu Mobile Home Park. The record indicates Ms.
Guidry was leaving their mobile home when an argument ensued between her and
Defendant. Ms. Guidry was subsequently pinned between the mobile home and a
vehicle Ms. Guidry stated was driven by Defendant. Ms. Guidry was brought to
Christus St. Patrick’s Hospital with extensive injuries. She later succumbed to her
injuries after being transferred to Lafayette General Hospital.
Prior to her death, Ms. Guidry gave a statement to officials while at the
hospital in which she identified Defendant by name and claimed Defendant
smashed her between the mobile home and the vehicle. Thereafter, deputies at the scene of the incident apprehended Defendant when he rode up to them on a four-
wheeler and freely gave them his name. No vehicles believed to be involved in the
incident were found at the scene, but the mobile home skirting was damaged. A
maroon vehicle was later located some distance away in a gated parking area with
a large shed or structure and behind a building labeled “LeBleau Mobile Home
Park & Mini Storage.” The vehicle had damage to the front passenger side bumper
and headlight.
Defendant was ultimately charged with manslaughter and obstruction of
justice for tampering with evidence. Defendant, a non-English speaker, was
provided a translator and, through counsel, entered pleas of not guilty to both
charges. Ultimately, Defendant expressed his desire to represent himself. The trial
court inquired into Defendant’s educational and linguistic background, warned
Defendant that he would be at a disadvantage representing himself, especially
considering the language barrier, and informed him of the seriousness of his
charges and maximum sentences. Despite this, Defendant elected to continue pro
se at trial.
During trial, Defendant was provided an interpreter and had the benefit of
stand-by counsel. The jury found Defendant guilty of manslaughter by a ten-to-
two verdict and guilty of obstruction of justice by a unanimous verdict on October
10, 2019.1
1 When the verdict was read and the jury was polled on October 10, 2019, the trial court announced the vote was eleven to one to convict Defendant of manslaughter. However, at a hearing on October 16, 2019, the trial court explained that, after the verdict was read and the jury was polled, one of the jurors indicated she had misunderstood the polling and did not realize it sought her personal verdict. She indicated she did not vote for the guilty verdict on the manslaughter charge, but she did vote guilty on the obstruction of justice charge. Thus, the verdict was correctly ten to two to convict Defendant of manslaughter and not eleven to one.
2 The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve thirty-five years at hard labor
for the manslaughter conviction. The trial court also sentenced Defendant to serve
fifteen years at hard labor for the obstruction of justice conviction. The sentences
were ordered to run concurrently.
Defendant now seeks review from this court. He alleges his nonunanimous
verdict on the manslaughter conviction is unconstitutional and that the evidence
was insufficient to convict him of obstruction of justice.
ERRORS PATENT:
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for
errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there
are two errors patent, one discussed below, and one which is raised and discussed
in Assignment of Error Number One.
The record before this court does not indicate that the trial court advised
Defendant of the prescriptive period for filing post-conviction relief as required by
La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8. Thus, the trial court is directed to inform Defendant of
the provisions of Article 930.8, sending appropriate written notice to Defendant
within ten days of the rendition of the opinion, and to file written proof in the
record that Defendant received the notice. State v. Roe, 05-116 (La.App. 3 Cir.
6/1/05), 903 So.2d 1265, writ denied, 05-1762 (La. 2/10/06), 924 So.2d 163.2
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE:
Defendant contends he is entitled to a new trial because his nonunanimous
jury verdict for manslaughter was declared unconstitutional by Ramos, 590 U.S.
___. The State agrees Defendant’s conviction and sentence for manslaughter
2 This Court notes that resentencing may not be required if Defendant is either not retried on the manslaughter charge or is acquitted after a retrial. Accordingly, this court orders written notice of the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 rather than notice at resentencing.
3 should be vacated. The State further agrees the charge of manslaughter should be
remanded for a new trial.
Although the concurring justices in Ramos did not join in all parts of the
majority opinion, the Supreme Court unambiguously determined that
nonunanimous verdicts are not permitted by the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution. The prohibition applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment and applies to cases pending on direct review. Id. at p. 1397; see also
concurrences by Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Thomas, JJ.
Defendant’s case was still in the process of direct review at the time of the
Ramos decision. Thus, Ramos applies and requires Defendant’s conviction for
manslaughter by a nonunanimous jury to be vacated and remanded for a new trial
on the manslaughter charge.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO:
Defendant contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of
obstruction of justice. The standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is “whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged.” State v. Leger, 05-
11, p. 91 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 170, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S.Ct.
1279 (2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979); State
v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984)). The Jackson standard of review is
now legislatively embodied in La.Code Crim.P. art. 821. It does not allow the
appellate court “to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the
fact-finder.” State v. Pigford, 05-477, p. 6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517, 521
(citing State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La. 10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1165; State v.
4 Lubrano, 563 So.2d 847, 850 (La.1990)). The appellate court’s function is not to
assess the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith,
94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442.
The factfinder’s role is to weigh the credibility of witnesses. State v. Ryan,
07-504 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/07), 969 So.2d 1268. Thus, other than ensuring the
sufficiency evaluation standard of Jackson, “the appellate court should not
second-guess the credibility determination of the trier of fact,” but rather, it should
defer to the rational credibility and evidentiary determinations of the jury. Id. at
1270 (quoting State v. Lambert, 97-64, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/30/98), 720 So.2d
724, 726-27). Our supreme court has stated:
[A]n appellate court may impinge on the fact finder’s discretion and its role in determining the credibility of witnesses “only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law.” State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La.1988). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, an appellate court must preserve “‘the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence’ by reviewing ‘all of the evidence . . . in the light most favorable to the prosecution.’” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. [120, 134], 130 S.Ct. 665, 674, 175 L.Ed.2d 582 [(2010)](quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). When so viewed by an appellate court, the relevant question is whether, on the evidence presented at trial, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. Applied in cases relying on circumstantial evidence, . . . this fundamental principle of review means that when a jury “reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant[ ], that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt.” State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La.1984).
State v. Strother, 09-2357, pp. 10-11 (La. 10/22/10), 49 So.3d 372, 378 (second
alteration in original).
Defendant was convicted of obstruction of justice for tampering with
evidence. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:130.1(A)(1) sets forth the necessary
elements for a finding of obstruction of justice applicable to this case:
5 The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following when committed with the knowledge that such act has, reasonably may, or will affect an actual or potential present, past, or future criminal proceeding as described in this Section:
(1) Tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding. Tampering with evidence shall include the intentional alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance either:
(a) At the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows or has good reason to believe will be the subject of any investigation by state, local, or United States law enforcement officers; or
(b) At the location of storage, transfer, or place of review of any such evidence.
Our courts have further explained the knowledge requirement in La.R.S.
14:130.1(A):
The knowledge requirement in paragraph (A) [of La.R.S. 14:130.1] is met if the perpetrator merely knows that an act reasonably may affect a potential or future criminal proceeding. State v. Jones, 2007-1052, p. 9 (La.6/3/08), 983 So.2d 95, 101; State v. Tatum, 09-1004, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/25/10), 40 So.3d 1082, 1090. The defendant must also have tampered with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of a criminal investigation. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1). Nothing beyond movement of the evidence is required by the statute if accompanied by the requisite intent and knowledge. Jones, 2007-1052, p. 10 (La.6/3/08), 983 So.2d at 101.
State v. Matthews, 50,838, 50,839, pp. 16-17 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 200 So.3d
895, 906, writ denied, 16-1678 (La. 6/5/17), 220 So.3d 752. Furthermore, our
court in State v. Vercher, 14-1211, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/15), 162 So.3d 740,
747, writ denied, 15-1124 (La. 5/20/16), 191 So.3d 1065 (citing State v. Allen, 99-
320 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/27/99), 742 So.2d 949) has stated:
[O]bstruction of justice is a specific-intent crime. Specific intent is “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La.R.S. 14:10(1). Therefore, specific
6 intent need not be proven by fact but can be inferred from the circumstances and the actions of the defendant.
In the current case, the following testimony was presented to the jury.
Detective Roland Jones went to the hospital to interview Ms. Guidry while other
officers were dispatched to the scene. The interview was recorded and played for
the jury. Ms. Guidry told Detective Jones that she and Defendant had a fight, and
she was going to leave their home. She told Detective Jones that Defendant “‘put
the car in drive and put his foot down to the pedal and smashed [her] between the
trailer and the car[.]’”
Several deputies testified regarding the scene and location of the vehicle
allegedly involved in the incident. Corporal Miller was the first officer on the
scene. He saw two vehicles in the driveway, and he “encountered approximately
four subjects” as he noticed “some damage to the trailer and stuff like that, and
damage to the door.” Officers determined that these vehicles were not part of the
investigation and cleared them from the scene. The four individuals were aware of
an earlier disturbance, but they had not “figured all that out yet[.]” One of them, a
friend or relative of Ms. Guidry, “thought [Ms. Guidry] was being held hostage
inside the house and actually kicked in the door, trying to make sure she was all
right.” Ms. Guidry was not there. Based on evidence at the scene, Corporal Miller
“could tell there was a vehicle that accelerated, hit its brakes, and then the damage
they described on the vehicle where it was – it was pretty clear what occurred,
based on the statements, evidence at scene and stuff like that.” Corporal Miller
spoke with dispatch to check with other agencies and local hospitals and located
Ms. Guidry at St. Patrick’s Hospital. He then went to the hospital to see Ms.
Guidry.
7 Deputy Ryan Tarver also arrived on the scene and performed a perimeter
check. During this time, he “was approached by a gentleman on a four-wheeler,
and [Defendant] was accompanying that gentleman.” The man was Felipe
Dominguez, and Defendant was a passenger on the four-wheeler. As to the scene
of the incident, Deputy Tarver testified that there was damage to the siding and
skirting of the mobile home and that tire marks on the driveway veered off to the
right, toward the mobile home, coinciding with the damage on the mobile home.
Photo evidence corroborated his testimony.
The vehicle involved in the incident was not at the immediate scene.
Detective Jones testified that once Ms. Guidry was transported to Lafayette
General, he went to the scene of the incident. When he arrived, he saw a lot of law
enforcement officers present, but did not see a vehicle. Though the record is
unclear regarding who specifically located the vehicle allegedly involved in the
incident, Detective Jones testified the vehicle was located “in a gated parking area
that’s also attached to the trailer park itself.” The area “was nowhere near where
the trailer was or where the incident occurred. It was kind of hidden off in another
location, out of the way. It was a good walking distance away.” Detective Jones
believed the property was either owned or utilized by someone who “did
maintenance and kind of cared for the property, for the mobile home park.” The
owner, who was not identified in the record, told Detective Jones “that vehicle did
not belong to [him] and it wasn’t supposed to be there.” The vehicle was towed on
a flatbed wrecker to the Forensics Investigative Unit (FIU) after obtaining
permission from the property owner.
Photos of the gated parking area were admitted into evidence and showed a
fenced, gated area between two buildings. A tall, covered area was inside the
8 fence, and a four-wheeler sat outside the fence to the left of the double gate. One
side of the gate was closed, with a yellow chain dangling from it; the other side
was opened. Detective Jones described a maroon vehicle and another vehicle
under the covered area as “kind of hidden to the right[,]” with the maroon vehicle
in line with the open portion of the gate. Detective Jones agreed the area was “a
ways off the road[.]” The maroon vehicle had damage consistent with the damage
Detective Jones had observed to the mobile home. He also noted that the front
passenger seat was reclined all the way back as if someone was laying down.
Although Ms. Guidry said Defendant struck her with his vehicle and pinned
her between it and the mobile home, and damage to the maroon vehicle was
consistent with the damage to the mobile home, no direct evidence was offered to
show the vehicle was owned or used by Defendant. However, Defendant viewed
the photos introduced into evidence and heard the testimony about damage to the
maroon vehicle. Defendant never testified. He did, however, make comments
during his objections and cross examination that the damage to the vehicle shown
in the photos was not present at the time of the incident.3 Defendant also never
indicated the maroon vehicle was not involved or that he was not the person
involved in the incident. Defendant even stated, through his interpreter at trial,
“How is it possible that the car ended up with those scratch marks because when I
took her to the hospital, it had no marks, no damage on the vehicle.” Nevertheless,
Defendant offered no evidence to rebut that of the State or that would support an
alternative theory that the damage resulted from anything other than this incident.
3 The trial court informed Defendant that only testimony given from the witness stand could be considered evidence: “Evidence comes from the witness stand . . . . If you want to argue, just argue your position, or argue against the State. That’s not under oath. . . . But there’s a difference with the way that the Court treats it.” The court also instructed the jury following opening statements that evidence comes from the witness stand.
9 As previously mentioned, Defendant did not testify at trial. He also did not
call any witnesses on direct examination. His purported questions to witnesses
during cross examination more often resembled arguments and comments about
their testimony. During some of those comments and during objections, Defendant
admitted “a person” was between the car and the trailer at the time of contact.
Although the State showed evidence to the contrary, Defendant argued the
vehicle’s tire went off the driveway, and any impact was at zero miles per hour and
not the twenty-two miles per hour without the brakes being activated as presented
by the State. He also argued the damage to the vehicle was not in the same place
as where the vehicle had struck Ms. Guidry and that there was no damage to the
vehicle when he took Ms. Guidry to the hospital. Defendant presented no evidence
to support those claims.
To prove obstruction of justice, the State must prove that the “perpetrator
merely knows that an act reasonably may affect a potential or future criminal
proceeding” and that the defendant “tampered with evidence with the specific
intent of distorting the results of a criminal investigation. . . . Nothing beyond
movement of the evidence is required by the statute if accompanied by the
requisite intent and knowledge.” Matthews, 200 So.3d 895, 906. “[S]pecific intent
need not be proven by fact but can be inferred from the circumstances and the
actions of the defendant.” Vercher, 162 So.3d 740, 747. Additionally, on review,
this court must view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution”
and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged.” Leger,
936 So.2d at 170.
10 No direct evidence was presented to show Defendant or someone at his
direction parked the vehicle where it was found with the intent to affect the
criminal investigation. However, a review of the circumstantial evidence supports
the theory that Defendant or someone on his behalf moved the vehicle involved in
this incident from the scene to the gated parking area. The vehicle was not at the
scene when the first officer arrived. Additionally, Defendant’s comments during
trial may be interpreted as a motive for moving his vehicle to a location away from
the scene of the incident and a reason to try to hide it from the investigation: he
struck Ms. Guidry, pinned her between the vehicle and the trailer, and damaged the
vehicle. Testimony that at least four people were at the scene when officers
arrived, one of whom kicked in the door of the mobile home, may explain why
Defendant did not want to return to the scene without officers present. However,
when Defendant did return once officers arrived, he returned without the vehicle,
choosing to leave the vehicle in a more hidden location away from the scene.
After a review of the record, this court finds that a rational trier of fact could
find that the circumstances, as presented to the jury, proved beyond a reasonable
doubt Defendant’s specific intent to distort the results of the criminal investigation
of the victim’s death. Thus, we find the evidence sufficient to convict Defendant
of obstruction of justice for tampering with evidence.
DECREE:
For the above stated reasons, Defendant’s conviction for manslaughter is
vacated and remanded for a new trial on the manslaughter charge. Defendant’s
conviction for obstruction of justice is affirmed. Additionally, the trial court is
directed to inform Defendant of the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8
sending appropriate written notice to Defendant within ten days of the rendition of
11 the opinion and to file written proof in the record that Defendant received the
notice.
MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL; OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE CONVICTION AFFIRMED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.