Judgment rendered September 27, 2023. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 55,275-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
TYRONE TERRY BRADEN Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 372,153
Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge
PAULA CORLEY MARX Counsel for Appellant
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
REBECCA ARMAND EDWARDS VICTORIA T. WASHINGTON COURTNEY RAY Assistant District Attorneys
Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and THOMPSON, JJ. STEPHENS, J.
This criminal appeal arises out of the First Judicial District Court,
Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana, the Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr.,
Judge, presiding. Defendant, Tyrone Terry Braden, was convicted by a
unanimous jury of second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1.
The trial court imposed a sentence of eight years at hard labor, the maximum
sentence under La. R.S. 14:34.1(C). Braden appeals, urging that the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he shot the victim, the lineup
was improperly admitted into evidence, and the eight-year sentence for
second-degree battery is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 20, 2019, the defendant, Tyrone Braden, was charged
by bill of information with aggravated battery, illegal carrying of weapons
while in possession of CDS, and obstruction of justice. Braden waived
formal arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty on February 20, 2020.
On February 7, 2022, an amended bill was filed charging Braden with
aggravated battery. Braden waived formal arraignment and entered a plea of
not guilty on that same date. A jury trial was held on May 25, 2022. The
evidence at trial included the following.
Kerion Mims testified that, on November 6, 2019, he returned to the
home he shared with his girlfriend after spending the day at the fair with his
family. Mims stated he lived at the house on Rosenwald Drive in
Shreveport, Louisiana, and had lived there for the last two years. Once he
dropped off the vehicle for his girlfriend, Mims left the home, located on a
cul-de-sac, on foot, and headed to his cousin’s house in a nearby
neighborhood. Instead of walking around the cul-de-sac, Mims used a trail that runs between some houses in the area. Mims testified that others who
lived in the complex would use the trail to move to and from a nearby store.
As he walked along the trail and entered the David Raines Community
Center parking lot, an SUV approached Mims from the right side and
“pulled up on him.”
Once the vehicle stopped, Mims testified that a person in the driver’s
seat spoke to Mims and asked if he lived in the area; Mims’s response was
yes. In return, the person in the driver’s seat opened the car door and
confronted Mims in an aggressive manner, questioning why he was coming
down the trail between the houses. Mims indicated that he attempted to
defuse the situation by walking away in the direction of his cousin’s house.
As Mims continued to the sidewalk, he took about ten steps before he was
shot in the back of his legs. Mims stated that the shots occurred “kind of
quick,” and that five to ten seconds passed before he heard the gunshots after
he turned around to walk away.
When he heard the gunshots, Mims stated he took off running but
glanced over his shoulder and saw the same SUV that had confronted him.
He observed that its lights had been turned off and there was a hand over the
top of the window in the driver’s door. When asked if he saw the gun, Mims
responded, “I can say yeah and I can say no, because it was kind of, like,
you know, like, oh, and I’m gone.” Mims stated that he took cover behind
what he thinks was the community center’s van nearby. Mims then flagged
down off-duty Shreveport Police Officer Terence Washington, who was
parked in his cruiser in the apartment complex parking lot across the street
from the David Raines parking lot. Mims gave a description of the vehicle
to the officer. 2 Once Mims arrived at the hospital for treatment, he spoke with
Detective Jonathan Varnell and told the detective that he did not know who
shot him. In response to questions from the officer, Mims related that while
he did not personally know the man who shot him, he had seen the man
outside in the yard a few times prior to the incident. Furthermore, Mims
stated the man was tall and had a bald head, a goatee, and a distinctive head
shape.
After being questioned by Det. Varnell at the hospital, Mims stated
that he later discovered that “Monkey Roy,” or Tyrone Braden, was the
individual who might have shot him. Mims reported this to detectives.
Mims testified that he eventually met with detectives and identified Braden
from a photo lineup. The court admitted the photo lineup into evidence over
several objections from Braden’s counsel, who argued the State failed to lay
a proper foundation for introduction of the lineup. Mims testified that he
was instructed to pick out the offender from a photo lineup. Officers told
him to take his time, not to guess, and that the offender may or may not be
included. Ultimately, Mims identified Braden in the lineup.
Mims testified that he had previously been convicted of domestic
abuse battery. Despite this conviction, he carried a handgun in his pocket on
the night of the incident. However, Mims stated that he did not remove the
firearm from his pocket or use it during the shooting. Once he sought cover,
Mims removed the handgun from his pocket and put it on the ground next to
him. Mims testified that he carried the gun with him because someone had
been shot and killed in the area just 30 minutes before he began his walk that
night. He also noted that he was concerned for his safety in general because
3 of the area in which he lives. Mims stated that he was unaware he was
prohibited by law from possessing a firearm.
Officer Washington also testified at the trial, stating that he was in his
patrol unit near the David Raines parking lot when he heard shots fired. He
then rolled his window down and heard someone yelling and screaming.
Once Ofc. Washington identified where the noise was coming from, he went
to David Raines Park, where he found Mims lying on the ground, bleeding,
and in pain. Ofc. Washington stated that he also saw the gun nearby, which
he moved away from the injured Mims in order to secure it. Ofc.
Washington testified the gun, a black, semi-automatic handgun, showed no
sign of being fired: it was not warm when he moved it, he could not detect
any lead-like odor typically associated with a weapon having been fired, and
he did not see any smoke coming from the gun. When questioned about the
lighting in the parking lot, Ofc. Washington observed that it was adequate
for him to be able to see.
At the conclusion of the trial on May 25, 2022, the jury returned a
responsive verdict of second-degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1.
On June 22, 2022, Braden filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of
acquittal, alleging insufficiency of the evidence to establish him as the
shooter. The court denied the motion that same day.
The trial court also sentenced Braden on June 22, 2022. In
accordance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, the court stated that Braden used
threats of or actual violence in the commission of the offense; used a
dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense; and foreseeably
endangered human life by discharging the firearm during the commission of
the offense. Furthermore, the court noted Braden’s criminal history, which 4 included convictions for aggravated battery, possession with intent to
distribute schedule II CDS, and possession of marijuana in Arkansas, as well
as possession of schedule I CDS. The court found no mitigating factors and
sentenced Braden to serve eight years at hard labor, with credit for time
served.1 The court informed Braden of his right to an appeal and also noted
for the record that the instant offense was a crime of violence.
On July 19, 2022, Braden filed a motion to reconsider sentence; this
motion was denied on July 22, 2022. Braden filed a pro se motion for
appeal on August 10, 2022, and counsel filed a motion for appeal on August
18, 2022. The motion for appeal was granted on August 19, 2022.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first assignment of error, Braden argues that the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he shot Mims. The standard of
appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case is
whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658
(La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604,
158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively embodied in La.
C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to
substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder.
1 We note that there was no limitation placed on his eligibility for probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. 5 State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Burch,
52,247 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1190.
The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and
circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by
viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When
the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct
evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence
must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.
State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Norman, 51,258 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So. 3d 96, writ denied, 17-1152 (La. 4/20/18), 240
So. 3d 926.
Direct evidence provides proof of the existence of a fact, for example,
a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard something. State v. Lilly, 468 So.
2d 1154 (La. 1985); State v. Baker, 49,175 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/14), 148
So. 3d 217. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
according to reason and common experience. State v. Broome, 49,004 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So. 3d 979, writ denied, 14-0990 (La. 1/16/15), 157
So. 3d 1127. For a case resting essentially upon circumstantial evidence,
that evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La.
R.S. 15:438; State v. Christopher, 50,943 (La. App. 2 Cir. /16/16), 209 So.
3d 255, writ denied, 16-2187 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So. 3d 985.
The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or
reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442; 6 State v. Walker, 51,217 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 221 So. 3d 951, writ
denied, 17-1101 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1064. Where there is conflicting
testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a
determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the
weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Ward, 50,872 (La. App.
2 Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d 228, writ denied, 17-0164 (La. 9/22/17), 227
So. 3d 827. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict
with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of
fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Hust,
51,015 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/11/17), 214 So. 3d 174, writ denied, 17-0352 (La.
11/17/17), 229 So. 3d 928. The trier of fact is charged to make a credibility
evaluation and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the
testimony of any witness; the reviewing court may impinge on that
discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due
process of law. State v. Sosa, 05-0213 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So. 2d 94; State v.
Hust, supra.
A reviewing court accords great deference to a fact finder’s decision
to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.
Brown, 51,352 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/2/17), 223 So. 3d 88, writ denied, 17-1154
(La. 5/11/18), 241 So. 3d 1013. When a defendant challenges both the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict and one or more trial errors, the
reviewing court first reviews sufficiency, as a failure to satisfy the
sufficiency standard will moot the trial errors. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d
731 (La. 1992); State v. Patterson, 50,305 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 184
So. 3d 739, writ denied, 15-2333 (La. 3/24/16), 190 So. 3d 1190.
7 La. R.S. 14:34.1(A) states that second degree battery is a battery when
the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury; however, this
provision shall not apply to a medical provider who has obtained the consent
of a patient.
In State v. Johnston, 53,981 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/21), 326 So. 3d 970,
the defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to prove the defendant
was the perpetrator to support his conviction of simple burglary of an
inhabited dwelling because of the victim’s generic description as well as a
lack of DNA or fingerprint evidence. The state argued that the victim’s
testimony and unwavering identification of the defendant sufficiently
established him as the offender. Id. at 973-74. Testimony revealed that the
length of the encounter allowed the victim to repeatedly question the
perpetrator, and the interaction between them was close and physical. Id.
The victim identified the defendant in a photo lineup “almost immediately”
and “without hesitation” about a week after the burglary occurred. Id. at
975. The victim also identified the defendant in open court years after the
incident occurred. Id. Considering the victim’s physical encounter with the
defendant and the victim’s ability to identify the defendant after the incident
had occurred, this Court found no reason to overturn the defendant’s
conviction in light of the jury’s finding that the victim’s testimony was
sufficient to identify the defendant as the burglar. Id. at 976.
In the instant case, Mims identified Braden in a photo lineup six days
after the shooting and again at trial. When questioned on the stand, Mims
stated he was “one hundred percent” sure that Tyrone Braden had shot him.
Mims also recounted the verbal exchange he had with Braden when he
initiated contact with Mims. Similar to the victim in State v. Johnston, 8 supra, who gave a generic description of the defendant, Mims identified
Braden based on his head shape and goatee. Although Mims testified that
the parking lot was dark, Mims stated he could see the driver of the vehicle.
Ofc. Washington’s testimony regarding the lighting conditions in the
parking lot served to corroborate Mims’s ability to see the driver.
As evidenced by Braden’s conviction, the jury ultimately determined
that Mims’s testimony was credible, as was that of Ofc. Washington
regarding events after the shooting. Given Mims’s unwavering
identification of Braden as well as Mims’s statement about seeing Braden
around the neighborhood before the encounter, we find no reason to disturb
the fact finder’s conclusions. Therefore, this assignment of error is without
merit.
Admissibility of Photographic Lineup
Next, Braden contends that the trial court erred in admitting the
photographic lineup into evidence absent a proper foundation due to
noncompliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 251. Braden argues that the
prosecution failed to lay a proper foundation because the officers who
conducted the lineup did not testify as to the methods used in compiling the
lineup. In response, the State contends that nothing in La. C. Cr. P. art 251
addresses laying a foundation for admission of a photographic lineup.
Additionally, the State cites La. C. Cr. P. art. 253(E), which provides that
failure to conduct a photographic or live lineup identification procedure in
substantial compliance with the policy adopted under this article shall not
bar the admission of eyewitness identification testimony.
Having reviewed La. C. Cr. P. arts. 251-253 in their entirety, we find
that the plain language of these statutes provides that they govern how 9 lineups are to be prepared and administered–they2 do not address the
foundational requirements for the admissibility of photo lineups as evidence
at trial.3
Relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. La. C. E. art. 401. All relevant evidence is generally admissible.
La. C.E. art. 402. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. La. C.E. art. 403.
Questions of relevancy and admissibility are discretion calls for the trial
judge, and determinations regarding relevancy and admissibility should not
be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Bradley, 53,550
(La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/20), 307 So. 3d 369.
With regard to foundation, an adequate foundation for a piece of
documentary evidence such as a photograph or a photo lineup is laid when it
is identified and authenticated. Authentication of a document occurs when
evidence is presented that demonstrates the document is what its proponent
claims. La. C.E. art. 901(A). Such evidence may include the testimony of a
witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be. La. C.E.
art. 901(B)(1); State v. Smith, 430 So. 2d 31 (La. 1983). It suffices if the
2 Article 251 contains the legislative intent for this Title; art. 252 contains the definitions applicable to this Title; and, more specifically, art. 253 delineates the eyewitness identification procedures to be adopted by each government agency. 3 It is beneficial to establish a foundation for a photo lineup through the testimony of the police officer who prepared and/or showed the lineup to the victim. However, this is not required. 10 foundation laid establishes that it is more probable than not that the object is
one connected with the case. Id.
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the
testimony of the witness himself. La. C. E. art. 602. A proper foundation
for admission into evidence of a photograph is laid when a witness having
personal knowledge of the subject depicted by the photograph identifies it.
State v. Bates, 397 So. 2d 1331 (La.1981); State v. Lewis, 478 So. 2d 665
(La. App. 2 Cir. 1985).
In State v. Anthony, 347 So. 2d 483 (La. 1977), the defendant made
the same argument as Braden in the instant case, urging that the trial court
erred in admitting a photograph of a lineup for which a proper foundation
had not been laid by the State. Before offering the photograph, the
prosecutor asked the witness whether she recognized the photograph, if she
received any prompting or suggestions as to selecting a suspect, and if she
identified any possible suspects in the photograph. Id. at 489-90. The
witness answered she recognized the photograph, she received no
promptings or suggestions in selection, and she identified two possible
suspects. Id. The State then offered the photograph into evidence, but the
defendant objected on the grounds no foundation existed to show the source
and origin of the photograph. Id. at 490. The Louisiana Supreme Court
determined a sufficient foundation for the photograph’s admission was
established because the witness identified the photograph depicting the scene
she viewed on the date of the lineup. Id.
11 Similar to the witness in Anthony, in the instant case, Mims testified
that the picture fairly and accurately depicted the lineup he was shown, the
officers told him to take his time and not to guess, and the officers did not
force or coerce him to pick a suspect from the lineup. Mims also described
his signature on the bottom of the photograph as well as other markings he
made on the lineup. Mims’s testimony revealed that he had a personal
knowledge of the photograph and the contents of the photograph. As a
result, we conclude there was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its
determination that, through Mims’s testimony, the State laid the proper
foundation for the photographic lineup. Braden’s second assignment of
error is without merit.
Excessiveness of Sentence
In his third assignment of error, Braden urges that the eight-year
sentence imposed by the trial judge, which is the maximum penalty for
second degree battery, is excessive by constitutional standards. In support,
Braden suggests that the court failed to comply with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1
because it found no mitigating circumstances. Braden contends the trial
court had no proper insight into Braden’s personal history because no
presentence investigation (“PSI”) report was ordered. According to Braden,
a PSI report would have shed light on relevant factors for consideration in
sentencing. Furthermore, Braden alleges that he is not the “worst kind of
offender,” and this is not the most serious violation of Louisiana’s second-
degree battery statute.
In response, the State contends that the record reflects compliance
with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and Braden is neither entitled to a PSI report
nor is the court required to order one. In support of the trial court’s 12 compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, the State points to its consideration
of Braden’s criminal history as well as his use of threats or actual violence in
commission of the offense.
In reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, an appellate court uses a
two-step process. First, the record must show that the trial court took
cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The
articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art.
894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v. Bell,
53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307; State v. Kelly, 52,731 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 6/26/19), 277 So. 3d 855, writ denied, 19-01845 (La. 6/3/20),
296 So. 3d 1071. The trial court is not required to list every aggravating or
mitigating circumstance so long as the record reflects that it adequately
considered the guidelines of the article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La.
1983); State v. Bell, supra; State v. Kelly, supra.
Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime or nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey,
623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bell, supra. A sentence is considered
grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in
light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v.
Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166; State v. Bell, supra.
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.
Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Bell, supra. A trial 13 judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of a particular case and, therefore, is given broad discretion in
sentencing. Id.; State v. Allen, 49,642 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/15), 162 So. 3d
519, writ denied, 15-0608 (La. 1/25/16), 184 So. 3d 1289. On review, the
appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may have been
more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.
Bell, supra; State v. Kelly, supra.
A PSI report is an aid to help the court, not a right of the defendant,
and the court is not required to order a PSI. La. C. Cr. P. art. 875; State v.
Houston, 50,126 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 181 So. 3d 188. La. R.S.
14:34.1(C) provides:
Whoever commits the crime of second degree battery shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than eight years, or both. At least eighteen months of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence if the offender knew or should have known that the victim is an active member of the United States Armed Forces or is a disabled veteran and the second degree battery was committed because of that status.
In giving reasons in support of Braden’s sentence, the trial court
opined that there was an undue risk that, during the period of a suspended
sentence or probation, Braden would commit another offense as well, and
noted a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of Braden’s crime.
Similarly, the court stated that Braden needed correctional treatment or a
custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his
commitment to an institution. The trial court found no mitigating
circumstances applied, but articulated the following aggravating
circumstances in determining what sentence to impose:
14 1) Braden used threats of or actual violence in the commission of the offense; 2) Braden used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense; 3) Braden foreseeably endangered human life by discharging a firearm during the commission of an offense which has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another and which by its very nature involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense; and 4) Braden used a firearm or other dangerous weapon while committing or attempting to commit an offense which has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another and by which its very nature involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense.
The trial court also noted Braden’s convictions of aggravated battery in
1993; possession with intent to distribute CDS II in the early 2000s;
possession of marijuana in Washington County, Arkansas, in 2006; and
possession of CDS I in 2012.
The record reflects that the trial court adequately complied with La. C.
Cr. P. art. 894.1 when sentencing Braden. The court discussed the facts of
the case and cited the factors it specifically considered before imposing the
eight-year hard labor sentence. According to the record, the trial court
exercised its discretion in finding no mitigating circumstances, and the law
does not entitle Braden to a PSI report. As such, the first inquiry in
determining whether a sentence is excessive is satisfied.
The second step in reviewing a sentence or excessiveness is a
determination of whether the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive. The
trial court sentenced Braden to eight years at hard labor as a result of his
conviction of second-degree battery. We find that this eight-year sentence,
as noted above, although the maximum, is within the statutory range and is
not unconstitutionally excessive. The instant offense was a senseless crime
of violence—Braden fired shots at and wounded the victim in both of his 15 legs, all over Mims’s choice to use a shortcut to get to his cousin’s house.
Given these facts, Braden’s sentence is neither grossly out of proportion to
the severity of the crime nor a purposeless and needless infliction of pain
and suffering. La. Const. art. I, § 20; State v. Dorthey, supra; State v. Bell,
supra. As such, we cannot say that this eight-year sentence shocks the sense
of justice. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, the conviction and sentence of the
defendant, Tyrone Terry Braden, are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.